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Introduction:                                                                                               
Trade-offs in Theory that Make Sense 
 
The following overview offers a general game plan of the present work, based on a critical 
evaluation of current problems in the study of language, culture, and cognition. Its purpose is 
to make a general case for an interdisciplinary approach and to contour a number of theory 
elements from where to set out. For readers familiar with the field in question this overview 
will provide brief theoretical points of orientation, while more detailed introductions to the 
subject matter itself are given in chapter 1 (for Part I) and chapter 7 (for Part II). 
    This work is about metaphor and imagery in cultural thought models. The quest throughout 
is for a rapprochement between a cognitive and a cultural analysis. Building on recent 
approaches in cognitive linguistics, I raise the question of how we can shape the cognitive 
approach to metaphor and imagery into a genuine point of interdisciplinary convergence. 
Regarding metaphor, I begin by taking stock of the issues most relevant for the neighboring 
field of cognitive anthropology. This includes the manifold socio-cognitive functions of 
metaphor, its contextuality and its embedding in more complex tropes, as well as its relation 
to higher-level cultural schemas. Next, I argue for a balanced view between cultural 
universality and variation of metaphoric models. Finally, I espouse a stronger focus on 
cultural knowledge stored in the body in the study of metaphor. The second part of this work 
expresses a strong interest in developing a general theory of spatialized (‘geometric’) mental 
imagery. I discuss its shape and function based on, both, ethnographical examples and 
recent findings from the cognitive sciences. My overall ambition is to document the amazing 
scope of the cognitive phenomena relating to imagery, both in non-linguistic symbolic media 
and in various aspects of language. As a challenge to the broader cognitive sciences, I claim 
that general-purpose mental ‘tools’ are constituted by highly abstract images. Specifically, it 
is suggested that our major ontological categories are mentally processed as kind-defining 
imagery skeletons.  
 
METAPHOR AND IMAGERY 
The strategic ambition of this work is to straddle the fence between several scientific fields of 
study. Specifically, it introduces to cognitive anthropology (and other social sciences 
interested in cognition) two overlapping trends from cognitive linguistics called metaphor 
theory and image schema theory. In other words, a well-developed theoretical body 
originating with cognitive linguistics is applied to extant ethnographic data and to questions 
more typically raised by anthropologists, cognitive or other. The analytical apparatus 
originating from cognitive linguistics (in which metaphor theory and image schema theory are 
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leading trends)1 is most closely associated with the writings by Ronald Langacker (1987a, 
1991) and George Lakoff (1987). These landmark publications spearheaded an increasing 
amount of academic output in the past decade or so and led to the establishment of a 
growing scientific community among cognitive linguists, which is now also spreading out to 
literary and discourse studies. Cognitive linguists also exerting significant influence on 
cognitive approaches to philosophy, music, and anthropology, as well as inspiring applied 
cognitive approaches to embodied intelligence, computational linguistics, wayfinding, and 
others. Despite this first stage of consolidation that the discipline has gone through, major 
implications of cognitive linguistics still await a more extensive treatment. One of these 
arenas for development concerns the culture issue and the scope of spatial cognition. 
    The chief objective of this work is to build a bridge between anthropological issues and 
methods from metaphor theory. This requires showing that the method is applicable to what 
anthropology is most interested in, i.e. complex cultural models, enacted cognition in rich 
context, and cosmology. Through the tremendous leaps metaphor theory has taken in recent 
years and through some publications dedicated to the issue (Quinn 1991, Palmer 1996, 
Kövecses 2000) a fruitful analysis of complex cultural thought is more palpable than ever. I 
am not alone in suggesting that cognitive scientists of any disciplinary background should 
vigorously acknowledge that metaphoric processes and imagery are pivotal in understanding 
representations. The existing transdisciplinary research on metaphor offers both a fine-
grained theory and a wealth of methodological approaches that cross-strengthen each other. 
    Metaphor – let us provisionally define it as conceptual ‘mappings’ between everyday 
domains of thought – is ubiquitous in cognition. Metaphor analysis is a major avenue towards 
understanding conceptual representations. Analyzing metaphor means looking at the 
partitions of cultural thoughtscapes into semi-permeable domains and describing how these 
are dynamically brought together again in discourse in such a way that something better 
understood sheds light on something less understood or in a way that a wholly new idea is 
created. In this work, I use metaphor in several senses that all relate, in one way or the other, 
to the fundamental connectivity and creativity of cognition. This includes mappings between 
experiential or social domains, either single, multiple, or of a network kind. It also includes 
mappings from procedural body knowledge to conceptual knowledge, and vice versa. I hold 
this connectivity and fluidity to be a defining characteristic of culture, when approached as a 
cognitive phenomenon. Following the mainstream model, metaphor is understood as a 
process of extracting skeletal images and mapping these.  
                                                 
1 Often ‘cognitive semantics‘ or ‘Cognitive Semantics‘ (with capitals) is used in linguistic literature as 
nearly coterminous. I will stay with the broader designation ‘cognitive linguistics’ here. At any rate, my 
own inquiry goes beyond language proper. 
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    My interest lies in explaining metaphoric process proper, but also extends beyond it. Most 
generally, I am interested in demonstrating the theoretical scope of imagery theory and its 
cultural dimension. Here I follow Palmer (1996: 116) who speaks of worldviews as “culturally 
defined imagery”. Hence, much of the work revolves around the importance of so-called 
‘image schemas’, i.e. spatialized, skeletal, dynamic, experientially motivated (embodied), and 
multi-modal mental images. These may be more central to all cognition than has been 
suspected, including by its proponents. By virtue of metaphor, they structure much of 
abstract thought and they shape cultural models of all sorts. In other words, the human 
capacity to build complex models rests on basic physical experiences in space, which 
motivate conceptual representations. The capacity to perceive image-schematic structure 
underlies the very ability to see what one concrete thing and another have in common. These 
points are well recognized. However, the sheer complexity of imagistic thought has not been 
fully apprehended. I want to respond to this lacuna by showing in how large a number of 
phenomena and through which complex ways it plays a role. At the crossroads of cognitive 
linguistics and cultural and cognitive anthropology I suggest a series of new applications, 
which have yet to be tried in practice.2  
 
ANTHROPOLOGY AND COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS  
The theory mix I propose includes the following theoretical ingredients: cultural schema 
theory, metaphor theory, and the theory of mental imagery, i.e. a Gestalt psychology of 
conceptual images. These theories possess a natural mutual affinity that needs to be 
exploited at its fullest. By breaching existing rifts we can make steps toward a common 
language of these approaches and thus develop a cognitive theory of culture and cultural 
representations. 
    This work departs from well-entrenched habits on both disciplinary sides. Regarding 
linguistics, neither the typical micro-methodology nor a restriction to language per se will be 
adopted. Bulky case studies in heavily theoretical notation, although occasionally included, I 
will avoid as far as possible. Regarding anthropology, the essayistic and evocative style of 
much anthropological writing, resulting in a confusing variety of concepts such as ‘symbols’, 
‘models’, ‘schemas’, ‘metaphors’, ‘key concepts’, ‘core-stories’, ‘ethos’, to name but a few, 
will be forged into a more clear-cut theoretical apparatus. Moreover, a close analysis of 
                                                 
2 In many respects this work is similar in intent to Palmer (1996), who collects numerous examples of 
imagery-based linguistics across cultures, also with the aim of bridging the gap between cognitive 
linguistics and anthropology. I concur with his advertisement that “[i]magery does not explain 
everything about language, but an examination of its role illuminates many usages and domains of 
language of abiding interest to anthropologists” (p. 4). At the same time, the present work will broaden 
the scope beyond language itself.  
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imagery through a specific theoretical lens will be suggested, which is still infrequent among 
anthropologists. 
    I hasten to admit that the cognitive reinterpretations of many of my examples must remain 
tentative to some extent. Where empirical rigor stands against theoretical scope, as it often 
must, I choose scope at the expense of rigor. The rationale for this is that a satisfactory 
cognitive theory in the social and cultural sciences requires an encompassing framework and 
bold strokes more than anything else to catch the attention it deserves, while working out the 
details is up to future studies. I want to chart a navigational grid to cultural thought by 
describing the interconnections of many relevant themes across disciplinary boundaries. My 
claims should, then, be understood as programmatic for a cognitive social science based on 
spatial imagery (cf. Palmer 1996). With this I hope to second the current endeavor of many 
like-minded colleagues of pushing cultural analysis into the mainstream of cognitive science 
against the massive countercurrent and using the theory of imagery as a powerful tool in this 
task. 
    Cognitive linguistics is of far greater interest to anthropology than most other state-of-the-
art approaches in the cognitive sciences:3 First of all, its theoretical apparatus presents a 
theory of how language is understood through mental imagery on the conceptual level. Since 
the locus of study are conceptual representations and not words, the perspective can easily 
be broadened to include non-linguistic cognition. By consequence, the approach starts from 
structures continuous with percepts and social experience and offers an interesting account 
of how meaning is grounded in embodied being in the world. Furthermore, cognitive 
linguistics describes cognition as dynamic and creative, especially with regard to the 
incessant flow of information between conceptual domains. Finally, let us compare cognitive 
linguistics to more accepted approaches in the cognitive sciences. Mainstream approaches 
to cognition contribute an elaborate micro-apparatus for modeling representations, while only 
skirting or even dodging big issues such as power and culture. Although in cognitive 
linguistics topics such as ideology are just starting to be discussed more elaborately (Dirven 
et al. 2001), they have been present in the sub-text all along from the project’s inception. The 
four mentioned aspects, i.e. (1) a conceptual medium deeper than surface language, (2) 
experience-proximity and the integration of percepts and concepts, (3) cultural creativity, and 
(4) compatibility with ideology analysis, all have a strong affinity to the aims of 
anthropological theorizing. Were today’s cognitive linguistics not still be done mainly by 
linguists, much of it would qualify as cognitive anthropology. The boundaries between these 
                                                 
3 Cognitive linguistics sets its foci in ways perfectly compatible with social science interests. By 
comparison most mainstream linguistics, notably the Chomskian school, presents unnecessary 
stumbling blocks through applying analytic and abstractive, but frequently not empirically cognitivist 
frameworks and through an unquestioning acceptance of universalist assumptions. 
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fields are historical ones to a large extent, and theoretical ones only in minor, though not 
wholly insignificant, respects (cf. Keesing 1990). Indeed the methods can be adopted and 
adapted as a tool of the trade for doing ethnographic fieldwork. 
    The anthropological frame of my inquiry attempts to confront issues still treated as 
stepchildren by cognitive linguists (presumably for the reason that they consider such issues 
too far-ranging at the present stage). These include the cognition of large-scale episodes, 
complex orchestrations in ritual, cultural key concepts, contextuality, multimediality in 
cognition, complex images, embodiment and preconceptual thought, subjectivized methods, 
and participant experience. I propose that cognitive linguistics can benefit from the holistic 
anthropological outlook in a number of respects: First, cognitive linguistics is slow in 
incorporating a genuinely interdisciplinary scope, although it is acknowledged that the 
approach of dynamic and embodied Gestalt imagery is perfectly suitable for handling it. 
Although pictorial representations (Forceville 1998), gestures (McNeill 1992, Cienki 1998), 
and sign languages for the deaf (Wilcox 1993, Taub 1997) have been recently written on, 
other extra-linguistic phenomena, e.g. complex cultural knowledge encoded as body habitus 
or action structure, are still underrepresented or absent (pace Bailey et al. 1998). As a 
consequence of this linguacentrism, a full-blown theory of the multimedial co-orchestration of 
imagery in information-rich settings is not yet in the offing. A second problem of cognitive 
linguistics has to do with its theory of embodiment, which emphasizes the origin of concepts 
in kinesthetic experience. Though stimulating, the theory espoused lacks clear terms and 
invites an underestimation of the cultural factor in body knowledge. Recent advances in the 
anthropology of the body afford an enriching complement here, as I will show. Third, the 
metaphor branch of cognitive linguistics is somewhat tardy in adopting a more contextualized 
view of language that deals with large-scale imagery structuring discourse (rather than 
sentence or phrase structure only), with dynamized reshapings of imagery, and with 
multimedial imagery. Contextuality and dynamicity, of course, are the hallmark of cultural 
anthropology and its most important legacy to neighboring disciplines. 
    Anthropology, with the exception of those parts of cognitive anthropology already 
centering on representational formats (e.g. schema theory), can equally profit from the 
proposed mediation. In the past the descriptive style employed by anthropologists, as far as 
it dealt with cultural symbolism and structures of thought, was neither unified nor, as a rule, 
satisfactory in the light of what we know now about memory, reasoning, language 
processing, motivation, and beliefs. Anthropology can benefit from fine-grained cognitive 
descriptions, even though a loss of descriptive flexibility and situatedness may result. In my 
view, adopting and refining cognitive methods is a major or perhaps even the only way out of 
the present impasse of anthropological theory and the disorientation that resulted from the 
post-modernist critique of the 1980s (cf. Kimmel 2000). Most importantly, cognitive 
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approaches provide the only descriptively precise and therefore falsifiable way of sorting out 
the disagreement between relativists and universalists in an even-handed manner. Although 
the proposed marriage of large-scale ethnography and cognitive micro-studies needs 
methodological maturation, a higher degree of rigor in debates about epistemology and 
method can be attained through the adoption of a cognitive apparatus in many presently 
ongoing debates. While the framework will, no doubt, have to be refashioned, it has the 
virtue of connecting anthropological ideas to neighboring disciplines such as linguistics and 
psychology. Through a stronger reliance on ‘convergent evidence’ (Lakoff/Johnson 1999) 
theory becomes more testable for cognitive reality. Collecting evidence across methods that 
points in the same direction is the only answer to the dilemma that we cannot look into 
people’s heads directly, yet should aim at a degree of ‘cognitive reality’ of our claims. 
    Abstraction and concretion both play a role in the proposed merger. Although theoretical 
abstraction is often present I emphasize that we are always dealing with the orchestration of 
(public or mental) imagery for specific goals situated in real culture: Pragmatics comes 
before semantics (cf. Gärdenfors 2000: ch.5) and culture as an extended thoughtscape is 
treated on a par with situational pragmatics. This work is about universals to the extent that 
the general nature of the human mind as imagistic, creative, and metaphoric is concerned. 
Nevertheless, universal mechanisms can be creatively fashioned and recombined with 
culturally specific effects. The appeal of the imagery-based approach is that it shows how – 
through superimposition, elaboration, blending, dynamization, etc. – the basic thought 
structures are recombinable to an unlimited number of culturally specific representations, 
while sharing some basic experiential motivations and core-images the world over. I will 
argue that a theory of culture requires an understanding of both basic structures and specific 
elaborations. In explaining where the partial sameness and the partial divergences occur 
imagery theory is far superior to any other cognitive theory of culture that I know. My specific 
objective, then, is to develop a theory of cultural representations based on metaphor and 
imagery that occupies a middle ground between universalism and relativism. Such a theory 
fuses the cognitive human endowment and universal experiential structures with human 
creativity and with cultural appropriation in deploying these basics to complex ends. 
 
OVERVIEW 
Part I of this study is inspired by the work of George Lakoff and his associates centering on 
metaphor. Part II takes its lead from Langacker’s work, which posits types of spatial imagery 
to explain the function of various grammatical classes at the phrase level, and now applies it 
to generic ontological categories, to several interacting levels of language as well as non-
linguistic cognition, and to dynamic as well as large-scale cognition. 
 15 
    Undoubtedly, Lakoff’s exciting new insights about metaphor, developed together with Mark 
Johnson and Mark Turner, and owing greatly to Leonard Talmy and Charles Fillmore, 
brought popularity to imagery-based approaches. On the other hand, metaphor and other 
tropes have been of abiding concern of cultural anthropologists for nearly a century. Although 
this convergence of interests has not been lost on observers and although many 
anthropologists now cite Lakoff, a thorough adaptation and critique of recent metaphor theory 
in the light of cultural anthropology has not been compiled so far. Taking up this challenge, 
Part I of the work introduces metaphor theory to anthropologists. It identifies major themes 
that have not been treated with enough clarity, and simply summarizes others.  
    This is the game plan: Chapter 1 introduces the state of the art of cognitive metaphor 
theory and provides an outlook of its general relevance to anthropology. Chapter 2 identifies 
a series of functions of metaphoric cognition that must figure centrally in any theory of 
culture. Chapter 3 enters into a discussion of a number of not yet sufficiently clarified 
theoretical issues in metaphor theory that must be solved if the notion of culture is taken 
seriously. This regards the culturally shaped embodiment of metaphor, its contextual use and 
embedding in more complex tropes, metaphor networks and other high-level organizing 
schemas, metaphor universals, and cultural variation. Chapter 4 focuses on a specific, highly 
interesting facet of metaphor theory, namely its grounding in embodiment theory, and on 
findings about preconceptual ways of cognizing. The question raised here is in what ways 
‘bodily knowledge’ is inherently cultural. Chapters 5 and 6 give a first flavor of how 
fundamental metaphors in the context of complex worldviews operate through image 
schemas and present a framework for understanding how the issues of imagery and 
worldview analysis are connected. Together all these chapters make a strong case for the 
claim that understanding cultures means understanding their metaphorical thoughtscapes. 
As a result, there is an absolute necessity that anthropologists acquire familiarity with the 
methods and theories of metaphor analysis in their training (cf. Lakoff 1989). 
    In Part I metaphor was the key issue, and imagery one way (perhaps among several) of 
explaining its central features. Part II cuts the pie differently. It rests on a theory of imagery 
that encompasses metaphor but goes beyond a narrow definition of metaphor. My focus is 
on describing the mental imagery underlying complex and dynamic cultural models, 
especially as regards kinds of ontological effect elicited by them. The uniting idea of Part II is 
this: Conceptual thinking means – literally – negotiating a multi-dimensional mental 
landscape. No doubt the metaphor of the mind-as-a-space has a long pedigree. Yet, the 
claim set forth here is more ambitious than attempts, such as that of Gärdenfors (2000), to 
construct explanatory models of conceptual thought based on a ‘geometrical’ mode. Instead, 
 16 
I discuss the possibility that space logic may be phenomenally real.4 Here I try to integrate 
ideas stemming from George Lakoff and Ronald Langacker. From Lakoff I take the idea that 
general-purpose mental tools at the highest possible level of abstraction (or, technically, 
‘schematicity’) are spatialized images that organize mental details into particular 
configurations. In other words, I submit that the mind thinks of its own structure as a complex 
space. Accordingly, even generic mental forms are understood as spatial constructs on the 
basis of what we know about real things in physical space. In order to capture the topology or 
form of thought, generic mental tools are made of skeletal features such as containers, links, 
distance, overlaps, etc.5 From Langacker I embrace the idea that mind uses these tools in a 
dynamic fashion and coordinates these tools by employing transformations, scanning 
movements, perspective changes, zooms, blends, and new linkages.6 
    Chapter 7 introduces the key concept of image schema in detail, and gives an idea of how 
broad its applicability is across grammar functions, categorization, understanding symbols, 
habitus, etc. While all the foregoing chapters treated image schemas on a more or less 
‘semantic’ level, chapter 8 introduces a wholly new kind of image schema use. With 
reference to Lakoff’s (1987) ‘spatialization of form’ hypothesis it is proposed that highly 
generic multi-purpose tools in the mind are ‘built out of’ image schemas, too. In other words, 
there are top-level generic structures that obey spatial logic in the same way as mental 
imagery evoked on the phrase level. These I call ‘spatialized co-signatures’, because they 
frame and assist lower level spatial conceptualizing. In this core chapter I will give a 
systematic treatment of Lakoff’s hypothesis, introduce examples, discuss the ontological 
status and the present empirical support of the claim, and eventually advance a multi-level 
                                                 
4 Although I emphasize that my discussion is about cognitive devices laymen actually use in everyday 
cognition, even if this hypothesis proved wrong (i.e. if it turned out that people do not think in images 
after all), a secondary gain would still justify the endeavor. As Gärdenfors rightly points out, the models 
developed here are highly interesting even from a purely observers’ theory (‘etic’) point of view, both 
for explanatory purposes and for building artificial intelligence. 
5 Note also that this idealist view dovetails with the materialist perspective typical of connectionist 
models in AI or neuroscience, where nodes, linkages, chaining, overlaps, etc. likewise play a major 
role in explaining how the brain substrate works. Although the analogy may eventually prove spurious, 
as a heuristic for the ever-elusive relation of mind and brain it is suggestive enough and may 
eventually turn out to be more than that. 
6 To a limited, but important degree I throw into the mix research from other cognitive sciences, such 
as experimental psychology and neuroscience. This may help solving the problem that it has remained 
rather unclear with what ontological status cognitive linguists speak of spatial cognition. Do we really 
think abstract things as if they were physical ones, or is this only a convenient fiction in an explanatory 
theory? It also depends on an answer to this question to what extent different strands of cognitive 
linguistics, such as metaphor theory, the theory of blends, and cognitive grammar, are exactly related. 
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model of spatial cognitive architecture. In chapter 9, Langacker’s (1987) theory of linguistic 
imagery is introduced. This has the aim of specifying an apparatus for the analysis of 
dynamic ontological images. After this introduction, I turn to anthropological applications of 
the theory, especially with regard to the theory of essences, the learning of cultural key 
notions, the distinction between process and substance ontologies, and the nature of ritual 
creativity in shaping concepts. In chapter 10, I discuss dynamic features of spatialized 
images, especially in evoking holistic effects. Chapters 11 through 13 deal with the question 
of how extended action sequences can be understood through image schemas. In chapter 
13, this culminates in a general theory of the multimediality of image schemas, i.e. the inter-
mapping of various cognitive mediating structures, such as sound structure, linguistic 
images, action structure, percepts, body proprioception, and others. Thus, while starting from 
Langacker’s linguistic achievements, Part II is not solely concerned with language, but with 
all kinds of meaning structures.  
 
REORIENTING THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES THROUGH SPATIALIZATION AND CULTURALIZATION 
Though a cognitive approach in the social and cultural sciences, my perspective has 
repercussions on the cognitive sciences in general. I see two major reasons for this wide 
relevance: The approach promotes a stronger perspective on the conceptual level of 
cognition, and specifically a view resting on spatial or geometric ways of representing 
knowledge. And, it departs from general multi-purpose mechanisms and includes the study 
of shared representations. Let me discuss these points in turn: 
   Gärdenfors (2000: 1f), in his recent programmatic book about conceptual spaces, identifies 
three strands of modeling in the cognitive sciences. These are  
(1) the symbolic approach, which assumes that cognitive systems can be described 
as Turing machines; 
(2) the associationist approach, where representations are carried by the associations 
between different kinds of information. (Connectionism is a special case of 
associationism that models by using artificial neural networks); 
(3) an approach that uses geometrical structures, foremost at the conceptual level in 
the overall cognitive architecture. 
 
Gärdenfors (ibid.) advocates a stronger development of the third among these three: 
 
“The conceptual form of representations, however, has to a large extent been neglected in the 
foundational discussions of representations. It has been a common prejudice in cognitive science that 
the brain is either a Turing machine working with symbols or a connectionist system using neural 
networks. (...) a conceptual mode based on geometrical and topological representations deserves at 
least as much attention in cognitive science as the symbolic and associationist approaches.” 
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I agree with Gärdenfors’ suggestion that this perspective contributes crucially to building a 
multi-level account of cognition by bridging a theoretical gap between the two mainstream 
accounts of symbolic and sub-symbolic (connectionist) cognition. The conceptual level, as 
analyzed through spatialized forms, can connect these levels (For a tentative model of a 
multi-level architecture of cognition see Lakoff/Johnson 1999: appendix). 
    The second general implication of my approach for the cognitive sciences is that it 
highlights culturally shaped mental representations rather than the general architecture of the 
mind. Raymond Gibbs (1994: 443) observes that the problem with past approaches in 
cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics is that they 
 
“traditionally concentrate on specifying the general architecture of the language processor. For 
example, do people possess separate linguistic processors representing their knowledge of 
phonology, morphology, the lexicon, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics? (...) [A]s is the case for 
cognitive psychology in general, there is very little impetus in psycholinguistics to study the contents of 
the mind in terms of the actual beliefs and conceptions that people have of themselves and the world 
around them or how such knowledge specifically motivates linguistic behavior.” 
 
This critical comment can, in my view, be directed against mainstream cognitive science in 
general. The methodological bias of the cognitive mainstream privileges subdisciplines with a 
natural science aura about them, while sidetracking anthropological approaches. As a 
consequence, a whole class of questions is neglected. This unduly narrow focus runs the risk 
of introducing, both, a universalist and a biologist bias in the study of the mind.7 
 
WHAT TO EXPECT: SOME DISCLAIMERS 
This work is situated within a fairly new paradigm that cuts against the grain of many time-
honored theories in linguistics and philosophy. However, I will take for granted that an 
empirically-minded and interdisciplinary cognitivist approach is a means vastly superior to 
armchair theorizing. Relating to a more specific debate within the cognitive approach, I will 
                                                 
7 Gibbs’ criticism can be extended to include an influential current trend in cognitive anthropology 
under the banner of the ‘naturalist’ program spearheaded by Dan Sperber, and taken up by Pascal 
Boyer, Lawrence Hirschfeld, and Scott Atran. This approach draws on evolutionary epistemology to 
develop a theory of culture. While it is profitable to read these stimulatingly heretical correctives in the 
context of a field that stood under the sway of excessive relativism for a long time, they leave much to 
be explained. Especially compared to descriptive accounts of mental representations (as in schema 
and metaphor theory) they seem but a pale reflection. While this is a justification for not throwing the 
‘naturalization’ approach in high relief in this work, I want to emphasize that the two approaches are 
basically compatible regarding most issues, although perhaps not all. 
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devote only a minimum of time to the confrontation with the adversaries of the anti-Objectivist 
approach, and develop the paradigm instead. We can now build upon other works that have 
adduced devastating evidence that Objectivist theories of cognition are a dead-end street 
(Lakoff 1987, Lakoff/Johnson 1999). 
    My approach will be interesting to readers who wish to gain a more profound 
understanding of issues like symbolism, metaphor, metonymy, narrative structure, habitus 
and the ‘logic of the concrete’, or who are seeking instruments for framing the key notion of 
‘culture’ as thought and action. In this sense I see my forebears in cognitive anthropology. 
Yet, the work is not impelled by the aim of understanding any one rich cultural context. In 
other words, it is not concerned with delving deeply into any single ethnographic setting. I do 
not aim at cultural ‘thick descriptions’ or anything nearly like them. Instead, the present work 
should demonstrate the incidence of a class of general cognitive mechanisms across a 
variety of different cultural settings, although it means to do so on an empirical basis. 
    Although cultural representations (so-called ‘folk-models’) are the object of study here, 
some important issues are bracketed out. One such problem concerns the knowledge 
distribution in a cultural or social community. Although the incorporation of such approaches 
is a pressing demand for current theory building, my focus lies elsewhere.8 I am mainly 
concerned with the types of cognitive operations that are characteristic of complex beliefs, 
irrespective of by whom exactly they are shared and to what extent. A consequence of this 
idealization is that I will speak of cultural schemas as if they were uniform structures, which, 
of course, is only true in a very simplified model of reality. In truth, they usually have various 
subversions – some people of a culture will not share them, some will have acquired 
alternatives and gone beyond them (in particular experts), and their application will be 
flexible, partial, and vary according to the context. We speak of cultural images within a 
cognitive approach, which clearly subscribes to a sort of methodological individualism. We 
have thus ‘collective representations’ in mind, although there is, strictly speaking, no 
collective ‘mind’. Any cognitive account of cultural phenomena must, of necessity, rest on 
artificial aggregates of what many people have thought in similar but non-identical ways. 
Often the accounts will even be Weberian ideal-types of cognitive events in the sense that all 
of their features can never be found in any single real instance. 
    Furthermore, I will avoid a systematic distinction between expert knowledge and everyday 
knowledge, although my emphasis lies on the latter and the two are frequently closely 
                                                 
8 This very important concern has often been bypassed without due recognition. Various authors 
lament the lack of a sociology of knowledge in anthropology that concerns itself with the uneven and 
disparate social distribution of knowledge and sees culture as an organized diversity (Hannerz 1992, 
Barth 1987, Keesing 1987). Most promisingly, Hutchins (1995) outlines a view of distributed cognitive 
tasks and thus of cultural knowledge as supraindividual process. 
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interconnected. By the same token, relatively little emphasis is given to cultural theories, i.e. 
conscious discursive ideas. My focus lies more on the level of what has been called cultural 
models (Holland and Quinn 1987), i.e. shared knowledge structures in the minds of laymen 
that are indirectly inferred by the observing theorist and that are usually more complex than 
what the subjects typically believe about their own thought. 
 
GRAPHIC REIFICATION VS. COGNITIVE FLUIDITY 
Both graphs and a quasi-graphic mode of describing cognitive representations are used in 
this work. This is an immediate requirement of the subject matter. After all, we are dealing 
with analog representations of the mind, meaning picture-like or, if we eschew the visualist 
bias inherent in this, percept-like. Thus mental entities are represented as a synchronic 
whole (i.e. a ‘one-shot’ Gestalt), and not in a checklist-like sequence. Speaking of pictures 
minimally implies a convenient observer’s model of what happens in the mind. However, the 
graphs used here are more than a vivid way of depicting ideas that might be also depicted 
through other modes. They try to present a closely approximated depiction of how the 
studied subjects themselves represent knowledge. Within the well-known framework 
originating with Kenneth Pike and adapted to anthropology by Marvin Harris we may say that 
the graphs seek to represent ‘emic’ representations (i.e. indigenous thought models), as 
opposed to ‘etic’ observers’ models. The graphs approximate emic realities because they 
share key topological features, i.e. image-schematic similarities, with the mental entities they 
want to describe. Thus, while analytic descriptions provide a more roundabout approach to 
mental imagery, the graphs let you sense at a single go what the idea is.  
    All this notwithstanding, the graphic mode can only bring into focus particular structural 
aspects of a representation. The way cultural thought is depicted in this work is, then, bound 
to be partial and simplifying. Provisos are in order with regard to several features of human 
cognition: (1) We do not always have clear-cut images in our mind when we think. Much of 
our thought operates unconsciously and automatized, meaning that we are not fully aware of 
our mental images. Hence, the graphs normally represent indirectly inferred imagery 
topologies. (2) Moreover, it is often hard to isolate a specific aspect from our stream of 
thought. Our cognitive endowment is inherently connective and associative, so that no 
concept has a clear-cut extension. Invariably, a host of other subconscious images is 
integrated with the ones depicted here. We can expect an extensive representational field 
around each concept, without such a linkage showing in the graphs. No representational 
region of the mind is ever an island. The mind can be likened to a landscape, a sky rising 
above it, and deep ground extending below with mental objects spread and scattered in 
clusters throughout, but it is not best thought of as a space of three dimension only. (These 
metaphors foreshadow the theory to be outlined later, namely that humans think as if their 
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mind was a multi-dimensional landscape with spatial locations in it.) The entities of the mind 
are linked in multiple ways which any single graph could never capture. (3) The graphs only 
depict the schematic topology within the meaning extension of a single concept. However, 
most of our thought images include rich mental information within the same concept. Those 
features are excluded here, although they are conceptually present. A cognitive reason for 
excluding this parallel level is that the image schema level is functionally autonomous to 
some degree. In other words, the associated imagery can be bracketed for the purposes of 
explaining many functional aspects of thought and language. (4) Finally, the graphs often 
neglect the dynamic nature of human cognition. They only capture the transitory mental 
images of a given moment, highlighting the focal features, while other patterns recede into 
the background. Therefore, we can figuratively think of the graphs as momentary spotlights. 
Such frozen features never tell the whole story about a cultural thought pattern, because any 
complex schema is embedded in a field of broader temporal and thematic scope. Note also 
that the graphs are not necessarily meant to depict utterly exclusive or entrenched models. 
Other construals can be applied to the same mental object at other times, or even at the 
same time. While the mind works in dynamic patterns in any given situation, what is 
permanent are transcontextual tools, be they innate, transculturally learned, or culturally 
specific. The graphs found here then mostly depict such mind-tools with multiple applications 
and many more situated sub-versions. 
    Another short prefatory note is in order: In accordance with the currently most frequently 
adopted notational practice among cognitive linguists I use small capitals both  
(1) for simple image schemas in mental imagery, such as FORCE, UP-DOWN, CENTER-
PERIPHERY, BALANCE, CONTAINER, and  
(2) for entire conceptual metaphors (or cultural schemas), such as ANGER IS A 
HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, IDEAS ARE PLANTS, LIFE IS A JOURNEY, MARRIAGE IS A PATH, 
ARGUMENTS ARE BUILDINGS, etc., some of which are produced by a mapped image 
schema (for a more differentiating and theoretically precise notation see 
Ungerer/Schmid 1996: vii) 
 
Occasionally, when a previously introduced metaphor / schema is subsequently mentioned 
or when the metaphor / schema is embedded in a sentence, the lower-case will be preferred 
for the sake of readability.  
    Note also that double quotation marks are exclusively reserved for rendering literal 
expressions as they are used in everyday language or for quotes from other authors, while in 
all other cases (e.g. for new theoretical terminology) single quotation marks will be used. 
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PART I:                                                                                  
Metaphor Theory in Anthropology 
 
The issue I propose to address in Part I of this work is the broad relevance of cognitive 
metaphor theory for cultural anthropology and other social sciences. Chapter 1 will outline 
main elements of a cognitive theory of metaphor based on recent major advances in the field 
of cognitive linguistics and determine to what extent they are adequate for anthropological 
concerns. Chapter 2 moves on to a discussion of the function of metaphor in culture and 
explains metaphor’s socio-cognitive role based on anthropological literature. Chapter 3 
brings into focus a series of theoretical issues that are of particular pertinence to a cultural 
theory of metaphor: In particular, I will approach the issue of mutually embedded and 
intertwined tropes, present a framework for analyzing culture through its fundamental 
(‘thematic’) metaphors, discuss the issue of cultural universality, and finally attempt to defuse 
allegations about metaphors and schemas as strictly alternative cognitive operations, while 
also showing that they are not wholly continuous. Chapter 4 examines in detail the claim that 
metaphor is not only a phenomenon of conceptual but also of embodied knowledge, and 
argues that bodily knowledge is fundamentally cultural. To this end basic insights from 
medical anthropology will be recast into cognitive terminology. In chapter 5 I will try to 
develop a theory of cultural worldviews based on the fundamental types of cognitive 
operation they emphasize or downplay and discuss the role of imagery in this. Chapter 6 
already foreshadows Part II: It deals with the contribution of rather simple image schemas 
characterizing folk-models and metaphors in very complex worldview domains: cosmology, 
the self, and epistemology. The aim of this chapter is to give a first flavor of the tremendous 
importance that imagistic models have for the understanding of cultural thought. 
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Chapter 1:                                                                                                       
A Cognitive Approach to Metaphor 
 
Metaphor has been one of the most continuously debated topics since antiquity. 
Foundational figures such as Aristotle, Quintilian, Vico, Nietzsche, and others devoted 
thought to it. With Max Black and I.A. Richards it recently became a prominent issue in 
Anglo-Saxon language philosophy, most notably with Donald Davidson and John Searle. It 
also plays a major role in Ernst Cassirer’s, Suzanne Langer’s and Kenneth Burke’s work on 
symbolic forms, in Ricœur’s hermeneutics, in the deconstructivist work of Rorty, Derrida and 
Foucault, and in Hayden White’s cultural criticism.  
    Metaphor is an issue that stands at the junction of many disciplines, including literary 
studies, philosophy and rhetoric, political theory, anthropology, theology, and psychology. 
This ubiquity is not accidental. Metaphor is now being recognized as a cornerstone of 
general epistemology and human cognition, which has a bearing on how we think about 
experience, reason, language, creativity, the body, communication, and cultural worldviews. 
Up to the 1980s the theoretical terms of the debate were as contested as the substantive 
results remained scarce. The systematic and empirical study of metaphor use is a 
comparatively new phenomenon, especially the theories and methods now accepted as 
adequate. With the publication of Michael Reddy’s article The Conduit Metaphor (1979) and 
Lakoff’s and Johnson’s seminal book Metaphors We Live By (1980) cognitive metaphor 
theory appeared on the scene. The field has vastly expanded since and has come to play a 
central role in cognitive linguistics, studies of categorization, and linguistic approaches in 
general that analyze language as evoked conceptual imagery.  
    What can this newly burgeoning cognitive approach contribute to long-standing questions? 
Questions such as: What types of metaphors are there? What is their common denominator? 
What cognitive functions are involved in metaphor comprehension and analogy in general? 
To what sort of mental representations do metaphors give rise? How can ‘metaphorical’ and 
‘literal’ be separated, if at all? Does it make sense to separate terms such as ‘simile’ and 
‘analogy’ from metaphor, and how is metaphor related to other tropes, such as ‘metonymy’ 
and ‘irony’? How are metaphors related to ‘cultural schemas’ and other kinds of mental 
models? This introductory overview will give a basic account of the nature of metaphor, 
based on the work of Lakoff and his collaborators. I will discuss the answers to the above 
questions as we go along. 
 
1. What is conceptual metaphor? 
In the past it was often maintained that the definition of metaphor should be kept as inclusive 
as possible. Now, after two decades of research by cognitive scientists there seems little 
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necessity to keep the concept vague, but there is certainly a point in starting out from a 
general notion of metaphor that can accommodate a wide variety of phenomena. To get a 
first idea of the scope of metaphor consider the following examples: 
 
conventional everyday speech: “He ran out of ideas“, “There are too many facts here for 
me to digest them all”, “The theory will stand or fall on the strength of the argument“, “She 
fought for him, but his mistress won out” (Lakoff/Johnson 1980), “I didn’t score with her 
on our first date” (Shore 1996) 
locution: “Spill the beans!”, “My job is a jail” (Glucksberg/Keysar 1993) 
proverb: “Man is a wolf” (Black 1962), “No man is an island” 
poetry: “Death is the mother of beauty” [Wallace Stevens] (Turner 1987): “There are some 
days the happy ocean lies // like an unfingered harp below the land. // Afternoon gilds all 
the silent wires // into a burning music for the eyes.” [Stephen Spender] (cited in 
Indurkhya 1994)  
science: In artificial intelligence, it is common to see the human mind as a computer and 
vice versa (Hoffman/Cochran/Nead 1990). For a long time Western medicine saw the 
human body as a machine (Johnson 1987) needing a repair of parts when ill. Today, the 
metaphor of the human as a homeostatic system is becoming increasingly popular.  
Ecologically oriented metaphors of the human being as a system embedded in other 
systems can be found in esoteric thought as well as in systems theory.  
visual: A print by the Dutch artist M.C. Escher shows two distinct scenes of different scales 
seamlessly flowing into one another: a table plate in the foreground molds into a plaza of 
a Mediterranean street scene in the background (Gerhardt/Allen 1984). 
political theory: “Society is an organism”, this is, for example, visually depicted in the well-
known frontispiece of Hobbes’ Leviathan, which shows the state as body of the sovereign 
made from innumerable miniature bodies of the subjects.  
ritual enactment: Christian Communion (“This is the blood and flesh of Christ given to wash 
away your sins”). The Japanese tea ceremony promotes a sense of cohesion between 
the natural and social worlds, where the mossy green tea, for example, evokes a close 
relation to nature (Colby 1991). 
religious language: Hinduism speaks of “the Great Wheel of Being” (Olds 1992a), 
Christendom of “the Kingdom of God” (McFague 1982). Personalization is frequent, e.g. 
death is pictured as “The Grim Reaper” (Lakoff/Turner 1989). Secular outlooks like (Neo)-
Liberalism are similarly governed by central metaphors like the “Invisible Hand”, 
originating with Adam Smith. 
mythical worldview:  Several ethnographic examples indicate that humans are equated 
with certain animals. The Nuer of the Sudan say that “Twins are dappled birds” (Evans-
 26 
Pritchard 1956, The Nuer Religion, Oxford) and among the Amazonian Bororo the men 
proclaim, “We are arara parrots” (see Crocker 1977, Turner 1991). Similarly, the Huichol 
of Mexico have the expression that “corn is deer”  (Myerhoff 1974). 
 
All these examples have been characterized as metaphorical. What, then, makes them 
instances of one type of cognitive phenomenon? Let us start from the pedestrian, but 
consequential observation that human experiential reality is structured in a way that carves 
up ‘domains’, such as physical knowledge, biological knowledge, social knowledge, etc. 
Domains may be defined as coherent and permanent organizations of experience into arrays 
of clustered knowledge. We can speak of a domain when observing frequently co-activated 
representations and patterns of inference. At the same time, domains are mutually linked in 
many ways. Human cognition can only work because it is capable of creatively recoupling 
domains, such as seeing the social in terms of the natural. This semi-permeable nature of 
domains forms the elementary condition for metaphor.  
    What is metaphor then? According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) the common 
denominator of all metaphors is that one domain of experience that is less structured in a 
relevant respect is understood in terms of another domain that is more well-structured in the 
same respect. Put simply, one thing is thought of in terms of another. The function of 
metaphoric predications runs the gamut from epistemic to expository. In other words, it is 
used to think things that would otherwise be difficult to think at all (epistemic), to give a better 
illustration of an idea that would otherwise be more opaque, or just to find a catchy way of 
framing a pre-existing idea (expository).  
    In all cases a conceptual structure from another domain is applied to a topical domain that 
is in conceptual focus. Metaphor is a mapping of certain salient and fitting characteristics of 
one domain to another domain, so as to give a rise to a set of systematic correspondences. 
In order to characterize the directional nature of this mapping we speak of a topical target 
domain and a source domain from which new structures are adduced: For example, the 
domain of traveling and its notion of crossroads is used by speakers of English to structure 
the description of a precarious marriage situation that involves a decision between two 
‘courses’ of action.  
    In many cases the source domain is concrete, sensate, and everyday, whereas the target 
domain is more abstract, non-physical, and specialized. A reason for this, which will be 
discussed later, is suggested by Mark Johnson (1987) with a thrust implicative of Piaget’s 
work on early conceptual development. There is a body of linguistic, experimental, and 
developmental evidence that people derive a large part of their more abstract knowledge 
from the most basic experiential structures of the physical and kinesthetic domain. According 
to Johnson, that is where human meaning is grounded. The idea of sensate grounding also 
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partly converges with the observation that most metaphors are not reversible, but uni-
directional (Jäkel 1993, Kövecses 2001: ch.2). 
    Going beyond simple spatial relations as metaphorical source domains Wagner (1993: 
185) shows that the experienced immediacy of social relations may be also effective in 
grounding. For example, dominance and subordination or asymmetry between the sexes 
lend themselves to a use as source domains. Though there is a clearly a tendency, we 
should not expect on principle that all metaphors have either a physical or otherwise 
experientially immediate source domain. Examples of non-physical source domains from 
quite complex social domains have been documented. Alverson (1991: 101) mentions as an 
example the game of poker, which American speakers use to speak of social decision-
making: “Stay with the blue chips. How do they stack up against the penny-ante stuff? They 
sweeten the pot by upping the stakes. Stand pat. Just play above board and don’t pass the 
buck. Otherwise you might wind up in a hock.” Here, it is not obvious that playing poker is 
more experiential than the social decisions it is used to characterize.  
    The issue of directionality and preferred source domains aside, there is at present a broad 
acceptance of the domain-mapping model for the conceptualization of metaphoric thought. It 
should not be overlooked that in characterizing the nature of metaphor we are using a 
spatialized metaphor ourselves, namely that of the relationship between two topological 
spaces. The metaphor according to which knowledge structures are separate spaces that 
can be connected and partly merged is almost canonical in the cognitive sciences and has 
proven quite fruitful. The notions of mapping and correspondences from geometry are 
perfectly suited to allow for the idea that attributes are mapped individually, while some may 
be dropped as too fine-grained or irrelevant. Note also that the idea of mapping is sufficiently 
abstract to cover a broad spectrum of cases. It pictures metaphor as a multi-purpose device, 
a general cognitive tool, that bears on inter-domain relations, whatever their content and 
whatever the precise mapping vectors. Yet, two other conceptualizations of metaphor 
deserve mention, namely the ‘class inclusion’ view and the theory of ‘blends’, one of which is 
less and the other more specific than the ‘mapping’ view.  
    (1) A view widely held in classical contributions states that metaphor involves the creation 
of a common superordinate category for source and target. This view still rallies many 
adherents and was recently newly elaborated by Glucksberg/Keysar (1993). They argue that 
an example such as “My job is a jail” evokes the idea of a general category of ‘things that are 
confining’. According to this view, no directional mapping relationship between two domains 
is involved in metaphor. Instead, Glucksberg and his collaborators use notions of cognitive 
salience to determine which concepts can be aptly expressed metaphorically and which 
cannot. As a heuristic this model may be useful at points, but overall it remains too unspecific 
for cognitive theory. Most importantly, among the many aspects of a domain 
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correspondences are always chosen selectively and what guides this selection is not 
satisfactorily explained by the salience argument. Clausner and Croft (1997: 275) point out 
its weakness in explaining eligibility restrictions of mappings. Their example is THEORIES ARE 
BUILDINGS: 
 
“the constraints do not clearly block nonexistent metaphors which would link theory and building in the 
reverse relationship. For example, The steel frame is valid (...) is not an apt expression about buildings 
in terms of theories or arguments. However, it is not clear that the class-inclusion constraints disallow 
the predicate is valid from providing relevant and diagnostic aspects of theory-structure, such that 
steel-frame structure is described in terms of theoretical validity. The theory-structure category is not 
sufficiently specific to make this determination. The generality of class-inclusion categories might by 
nature preclude such specification.” 
 
Thus, directionality preferences in actual usage are left unexplained by the ‘class-inclusion 
view’, as it is called. Furthermore, Lakoff (1993: 236) points out that it falls short of a 
cognitive theory of metaphor in three further respects: It does not explain the systematicity of 
mappings of multiple attributes between two domains, it does not account for the evocative 
indeterminacy of rich poetic metaphors, and it does not explain purely imagistic ‘one-shot’ 
metaphors where fairly simple mental images are mapped in the way of a cross-fading film 
scene. 
    (2) The theory of blends or network models as proposed by Fauconnier and Turner (1995) 
is a recently expanding approach for capturing complex meanings that emerge when two or 
more domains interact. Within this broad framework metaphor is a subcategory, which is 
based on the analysis of how different ‘mental spaces’ interact. The framework’s general 
purpose is the explanation of novel and creative mental activity. This, of course, makes the 
approach attractive as a more comprehensive account of cognition. The blending approach 
has things in common with the mapping approach but also features important differences. 
Whereas mappings play a central role in both, in the blending account they are not thought of 
as going from one domain to another, but going from two domains to a newly emergent 
mental space called ‘blend’. The blend has emergent properties featured by neither source 
nor target space. In addition, blending theory also introduces a ‘generic space’, which 
represents the mental recognition of commonalties between source and target outside the 
ongoing blend. Overall, I believe that the blending framework is analytically superior to the 
approach presented here. It is more comprehensive and allows for the reconstruction of 
dynamic linguistic micro-cognition. However, for an introduction it is too cumbersome, so that 
the two-domain framework will suffice here. 
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ACHIEVEMENTS OF COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 
Cultural metaphor systems have been investigated in both cognitive linguistics and in cultural 
anthropology. Examples from anthropology featuring rich contextual data will be presented in 
the following chapters. When in need of conceptual tools we should chiefly look to cognitive 
linguistics, though. What commends this approach is its integrated theoretical framework, 
which “attempts to connect what we know about conceptual metaphor with what we know 
about the working of language, the working of the human conceptual system, and the 
working of culture” (Kövecses 2001: 7). It is comprehensive in that it discusses the 
systematicity of metaphor, its relationship to other tropes, issues of cultural universality, and 
applications to fields such as developmental psychology, literature, or teaching. Cognitive 
linguistics is supported by a set of characteristic methods and kinds of data. Major evidence 
for systems of conceptual metaphor comes from the following sources (Lakoff 1993: 205): (1) 
polysemy, i.e. words with a number of related meanings, (2) cases where inference patterns 
from one domain are used in another, (3) novel metaphorical language, such as in poetry, (4) 
patterns of diachronic semantic change, (5) psycholinguistic experiments. 
    There is now a fairly broad coverage of domains of everyday thought, even though mostly 
limited to English and other European languages and with a great deal of work to be done. 
Kövecses (2001: ch.2) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999: references) are good places to find 
overviews. Metaphor research includes highly generic metaphors about events and actions 
of any sort (Lakoff 1990, 1993) or the conceptualization of causality (Lakoff/Johnson 1999). 
Force dynamic relations are treated by Talmy (1988) in a non-domain bound way, as a basic 
class of metaphors that cover a variety of abstract domains. Spatial concepts as manifested 
in prepositions and the like are treated in large number of studies. Brugman (1981/1988), 
Lakoff (1987), and Dewell (1994) study OVER and ABOVE in English, Lindner (1981) UP and 
OUT, Brugman (1983) locationals in Mixtec, and Casad (1982) locationals in Cora, to mention 
but a few. Folk-models of thought, reason, morality, and emotion form another cluster of 
study. Jäkel (1995) analyzes the mind-as-a-workshop and thought-as-the-manipulation-of-
tools-and-objects metaphor, Sweetser (1990), in her study of metaphor in semantic change, 
adds the mind-as-body metaphor, and Johnson (1987) the understanding-is-seeing 
metaphor. The general metaphorical folk-model of communication as objects passed through 
a conduit was investigated by Reddy (1979) and Grady (1998). Johnson (1993) analyzes the 
morality-as-accounting metaphor. Emotions have been extensively studied by Kövecses 
(1986, 1988, 1990, 1991a, b, 2000), Averill (1990), Barcelona (1986), Matsuki (1995), and 
Yu (1995). Folk-models of social relations have also been explored: Lakoff covers important 
metaphors for nation and politics in his analysis of propagandistic metaphors used to justify 
the Gulf War (1992). He also explores the relation of morality and its relation to politics 
(1995) in America, with a focus on explaining the worldview differences between liberals and 
 30 
conservatives. Adamson et al. (1996) analyze the American political scene. Winter (1989) 
treats metaphysical implications of legal metaphors. Quinn (1987, 1991) studies metaphors 
of marriage in the U.S.A. Metaphor theory has also been applied to various experts’ models. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) explore the metaphorical basis of philosophical systems, but also 
of now fashionable scientific theories such as Chomsky’s generative linguistics or Rational 
Choice theory. Lakoff and Nunez (2000) study the foundations of mathematics. Metaphors in 
the history of psychology are investigated by the authors in Leary (1990). Literary texts are 
also an important field of metaphor research: Lakoff and Turner (1989) deal with metaphors 
for life, death, and time. Turner (1987) treats the English kinship system as a source domain 
in literature, and Turner (1996) presents a general account of parables. 
    Despite these remarkable achievements, there are still noticeable limitations in metaphor 
research in cognitive linguistics. As mentioned above, the cognitive linguistic approach is 
only slowly reaching out to cover non-European languages. In particular, some issues of 
cultural universality still remain intractable as a result. Another problem is that the linguistic 
bias in metaphor research is only slowly being overcome, now including some research in 
pictorial metaphor, but still eclipsing many other important fields (see Lakoff 1993: 241ff for a 
brief overview of some of these). A final problem is that the largely corpus-based method 
employed by most researchers is not very sensitive to questions of pragmatic use of 
metaphor and the workings of cultural context.  
    Metaphor analysis implies choosing a specific focus on cognitive phenomena and 
employing a set of methods with particular strengths and weaknesses. While metaphorical 
thought plays a role in almost any socio-cognitive situation, few social phenomena can be 
wholly explained by it. On the theory side it excludes questions asked in cognitive 
anthropology, for example about inferential mechanisms and dynamic cognition, on the 
method side it excludes experimental evidence, though compatible with it (Gibbs 1994). Why 
is contemporary metaphor theory, then, of prime interest to social scientists? Two major 
reasons for employing it in the study of culture are the following: (1) Metaphor theory is 
suitable for providing insights about the cognitive integration of worldviews, and (2) it is a 
major way of improving our understanding of the cultural variation of thought. It affords a 
method to investigate in detail the structure of many cultural domains together with the 
frequency, permanence, intensity, and function of their interlinkages. With the exploration of 
entire fields and families of metaphors we have now an unprecedented means of tracing out 
cultural landscapes of knowledge, though empirically still incomplete. As I will argue later, 
metaphor and its background theory of cognitive linguistics offer promising integrative 
perspectives with schema theory and cognitive anthropology. 
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THEORIZING METAPHOR 
What are the requirements for an appropriate framework for theorizing metaphor? Let us 
start from a common sense notion of metaphor and see how far this will take us. According 
to most time-honored accounts some utterances fall into the category of metaphor while 
others are literal. The idea of metaphor was traditionally defined through its opposition to 
literal language and considered a rhetorical twist in something that could just as well be 
expressed literally. Authors beginning with Aristotle see it as rhetorical trope, an 
embellishment, an expository or illustrative means, something out of the ordinary, while the 
core of human understanding lay in the correspondence between literal descriptions and the 
actual state of affairs in the real world. Metaphor, to the classics, was a linguistic, but not a 
conceptual phenomenon. 
    A first point of criticism of this common sense intuition is that the identification of a given 
utterance as metaphor is highly context-sensitive. What is a metaphor in one context need 
not be one in another. Take the expression “No man is an island”. It is recognized as 
metaphorical rather than literal because the literal construal, even though making perfect 
sense, would seem unmotivated in most contexts. This simple example shows that nothing is 
given as a metaphor. The way people use an utterance or other symbolic structure may be 
recognized as more or less metaphorical, depending on context and intention.  
    Upon further thought the notion of literalness itself turns out to be rather obscure. While it 
seems to work well as a heuristic with many examples at first glance, it ultimately runs into 
trouble. Donald Davidson and other analytic philosophers have expended vast amounts of 
intellectual energy to defend the literalness thesis and the Objectivist view of reality going 
with it. Yet, the notion of literalness in the sense of correspondence with ‘things in the world’ 
is outright untenable (see Lakoff 1987 for a brilliant and comprehensive refutation of the 
positions of modern Objectivism in Anglo-Saxon philosophy). This includes the most simple 
sentences. Conventional cultural information enters into the representation of even an 
utterance as “The cat is on the mat”. John Searle has conclusively demonstrated that for 
creating a mental representation out of the sentence extra information is necessary, for 
example that the mat is on the ground, that the mat is rectangular, and that the cat is sitting. 
In the sentence itself these knowledge items are not specified. Instead, this knowledge 
comes from cultural prototypes (ideas about typical situations) in the minds of those who 
read the sentence. If the sentence underspecifies the evoked representation and is not literal 
in the simple sense, what is it then? George Lakoff (1987, 1993), who is sometimes accused 
of making everything a metaphor, very clearly states that basic-level concepts that are not 
metaphorical. In his terminology metaphors are defined by virtue of an inter-domain mapping 
occurring on the basis of how domains are intuitively carved up. Yet, simple sentences are 
understood in their own terms rather than in those of a wholly other experiential domain. At 
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the same time, it remains a fact that neither the terms “cat” nor “mat” have an inherent 
referent, but give rise to culturally acquired prototypes in the mind instead. Therefore, it 
seems that such expressions are neither literal in the Objectivist sense, nor metaphorical in 
the narrow sense. A cognitive approach has to go beyond a crude dichotomy of metaphoric 
and literal. 
    I believe that the notion of literalness can be upheld in a relational sense, in the sense of 
concepts belonging to roughly the same domain. For example the expression “to digest food” 
belongs to the same proper domain, while “to digest an idea” blends two domains.9 In the 
above sense of the word ‘literal’ no unitary, pre-given, or ‘real’ world is implied. It only relies 
on speakers’ intuitions on how the world is carved up and takes their subjective mental world 
as a yardstick. The notion of literalness is very suspect from a cognitive perspective if, and 
only if it implies (1) a given external reality that is wholly independent of human construal of 
it, and (2) that some expressions are exact matches for this reality, while others are 
roundabout ways of description. Whenever the term literal turns up this work it can be read 
as a gloss for ‘domain-proximity between two or more concepts according to speaker’s 
intuitions’. 
    At times, some terminological confusion may arise through the term metaphor. In the past 
it referred both to a cognitive process itself or its product, especially its linguistic 
manifestation. Cognitive linguistics remedies this lack of clarity through adopting the 
terminological distinction between ‘conceptual metaphor’ and ‘linguistic metaphor’. According 
to this, a variety of linguistic manifestations can result from the same conceptual metaphor. 
The manifestations “She is seething with rage”, “Simmer down”, “He’ll blow his top”, “ He 
stewed in his anger”, and “I was letting off steam”, and hundreds of others, cluster around a 
single conceptual metaphor, often indicated by small capitals, i.e. ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER (Lakoff/Kövecses 1987). Cognitive linguists describe conceptual metaphors at a 
generic level. It uses generic words such as ‘fluid’ and ‘container’ rather than ‘water’ and 
‘kettle’, because the inferred conceptual metaphors are intended as an analytic description of 
the mental structure that linguistic expressions with otherwise deviating particulars share. 
    We should also take Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) admonition seriously that many 
metaphors are so conventionalized and entrenched in everyday thought that people would 
neither call them such nor attach any more special attention to them than to any other 
utterance. Examples such as “The prices are rising”, “feeling down”, “What are you getting 
at?”, “I see what you mean”, “in a state of exasperation”, “bursting with joy”, “ a well-
structured argument” seem to be quite commonplace everyday expressions. Cognitive 
linguistics sheds light on their metaphorical nature. Therefore, a cognitive metaphor 
                                                 
9 Note, however, that many abstract words, such as ‘good’, ‘do’, or ‘thing’ have no proper domain to 
begin with and are in some sense inherently metaphorical. 
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paradigm interested in a systematic description of cultural thought needs a much more 
inclusive framework than a mere focus on poetic and rhetoric language (or other artful and 
expressive symbolism). It is the rule and not the exception that people draw on well-
structured knowledge from other experiential domains to make sense of a comparatively 
opaque domain. And, it can be shown that they do so in highly systematic ways. 
    Contemporary metaphor theory tends to present more a static than a dynamic view of 
cognition, although the growing focus on the pragmatics, contextuality, and embedding of 
metaphors in other tropes indicates a way out of this predicament. What sets my approach 
slightly apart from mainstream research on conventional metaphors is my emphasis on the 
fluidity and relative openness of our cognitive system. To me it seems salutary to avoid 
reifications of metaphor. It is quite easy to get a slightly wrong idea by speaking of metaphor 
as ‘correspondences’ between ‘domains’. Both expressions suggest permanent states rather 
than situated processes. The stability of the conceptual system across time and settings is 
here taken for granted more by intuition than by argument, even though the precise degree 
of this invariance is one of the most pressing empirical issues yet to be tackled. While it is 
duly recognized that some conceptual metaphors are highly entrenched and others are more 
ad hoc, at the entrenched pole I see a problem. Conventionalized metaphors tend to be 
reified as culturally existing entities too easily. More attention should be devoted to explaining 
why they are taken from our stock in a given context and what transformations of the 
prototypical form occur in this context, even if they are frequently used and commonly 
known. 
   I propose that the fluidity of cognition concerns both the metaphorical mappings 
themselves and the domain system they are based on. It is well known that many cognitive 
representations are ad hoc (cf. Barsalou/Medin 1986), and so are many metaphors. 
Likewise, what we call domains for convenience are in truth open networks in our cognitive 
landscape. Gärdenfors (2000: 185ff) points out that when we think of a dog’s face, it is hard 
to say if the concept of ‘face’ comes from a more restricted domain of human bodies and is 
mapped to dogs or if it stems from a more inclusive domains of mammalian bodies or of an 
even more inclusive domain of animate bodies. Domains undergo expansions, for example 
when a child extends the meaning of “leg” from its own leg, to human legs, to animal legs, 
and then to the legs of tables: 
 
“When expanding domains in this way, it is (...) often impossible to draw a nonarbitrary boundary 
between a domain that covers the literal meaning of an expression and a domain that is clearly 
metaphorical. The upshot is that there is no sharp distinction between literal meaning and metaphor.” 
(Gärdenfors 2000: 187) 
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In addition to this, the partitioning of the experiential world within any culture may be done 
from several complementary vantages, each of which is highlighted for other practical 
purposes, or varies with personal predilections (cf. MacLaury 1995, Hill/MacLaury 1995). 
Cultural systems therefore define ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ vantages that hang together in a 
larger frame. To be sure, cultural representations feature clusters and lattices that are to a 
degree permanent (perhaps a ‘competence’ aspect), but at the same time also rely on an 
incessant dynamic activity of interlinking and recoupling (a ‘performance’ aspect).  
    Concerning metaphor specifically, two domains may appear more far or near (to the point 
of being identical) depending on the setting. For example, what is construed as a metaphor 
in one case may be felt to be a metonymy in another. Also, it has been long observed that 
metaphor (analogy) and metonymy (contiguity) often intertwine and either one may rest on 
the other. This has led to all sorts of highly complicated models of trope interaction (cf. 
Fernandez 1991). The sense of confusion that arises is a result of the undue reification of 
fluid facts as either metaphor or metonymy. Presumably because of their intuitions about 
domain boundaries and their fixed nature many authors fall prey to the fallacy that metaphor 
is a natural category. The failure to recognize that cognitive domain boundaries are vantage-
dependent lies at the bottom of this problem. In truth, when an analyst identifies something 
as metaphor this is often more like a phenomenon of ‘seeing as’, i.e. an intentional 
interpretation (I will discuss this problem in detail in chapter 7). 
    In sum, because metaphors are dynamic recouplings between domains, the strength and 
duration of these in a given source-target pairing must vary both with (1) the cognitive task or 
given situational intent and (2) the basic domain relationship assumed on the basis of the 
larger context. And, of course, between altogether different metaphors (i.e. different source 
target pairings) even greater variability can be found. 
 
2. A model of metaphor as process between experience, conceptual knowledge, and 
public representations 
I will now develop a processual model of the general nature of metaphor. In line with many 
recent theoretical contributions, I propose to model metaphor as a multi-level process of 
emergent bodily knowledge structures that are used in the conceptual domain and eventually 
result in externalized and public meanings.  
    A processual model is a precondition for a deeper understanding of metaphor, which more 
often than not is taken to stand for a static utterance or symbol, as a gloss for the entire 
process involved. A prerequisite for such a model is a general discussion of cognitive 
formats, i.e. the two-fold question what the locus of mental activities is and how they are 
encoded on each level. 
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    It has been repeatedly pointed out by George Lakoff (1993: 209, 245) to his audience of 
fellow linguists that the locus of metaphor is thought and reason, not language. Metaphor is 
fundamentally conceptual. What this means is that it can emerge at a linguistic level, but 
does not necessarily need to. Even where metaphor does not surface it may be present at a 
purely conceptual level, structuring our understanding of an experiential domain. In line with 
this Earl MacCormac (1985) distinguishes a conceptual deep layer from a superimposed 
semantic level and from a level of surface language.  
    However, the terms ‘conceptual’, ‘thought’ and ‘reason’ still conceive metaphor too 
narrowly. In a human world that emerges not only from reason, but also from experience, we 
have to ask what lies at the origin of metaphor. Several other authors describe metaphor as 
a multi-layered cognitive process that reaches further down into a third level of embodied 
knowledge structures. In these accounts, the term metaphor is also used to describe the very 
activity of linking primary processes to higher-level processes (which is a sense very different 
from ‘conceptual mappings between domains’). Among others, Brenda Beck (1978), Robert 
Haskell (1989), and Laurence Kirmayer (1992, 1993) explicate the fundaments of this 
conceptual layer, characterizing metaphor as a mediator between a relatively undifferentiated 
pool of motor, sensory, and emotive experience on the one hand and semantic thought on 
the other. To make sense of the metaphoric process a basic idea of the relation between 
experience and conceptual formation is needed. In a similar vein, the seminal theoretical 
works of Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) as well as Joe Grady’s (1997a) theory of primary 
metaphors show how concepts are experientially grounded. Christopher Johnson’s (1997) 
developmental findings on concept acquisition do the same thing with a slightly different 
slant; they focus on early childhood domain conflation and thus broad experiential meaning 
compounds. Most recent approaches highlight that basic kinesthetic schemas are used to 
structure a great many everyday concepts. In other words, these kinesthetic schemas span 
the preconceptual and conceptual levels. The basic schemas that have been studied 
prominently include link, inside-outside, up-down, front-back, center-periphery, path, cycle, 
balance, and force relations. 
    I would now like to present a general model of three superimposed levels that incorporates 
the central insights of these authors. These are the experiential, the conceptual, and the 
symbolic level. 
    (1) The primary level of experience is not structured in a symbolizing manner. Loosely 
speaking, inchoate experience is given to us more as a whole than as pre-existing chunks: a 
cornucopia of not strongly hierarchical information with no very particular focus, waiting as it 
were for the human mind and body to impose their structure.10 If we speak of knowledge at 
                                                 
10 This notwithstanding, we should not forget that primary experience often already imposes structure 
and salience, for example when intense pain makes it difficult to attend to other things.  
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this level it is (a) embodied, (b) pre-objective, and (c) non-propositional. By saying it is 
embodied I emphasize the sensorimotor and proprioceptive nature of such knowledge, which 
is not conceptual in the ordinary sense. The knowledge, say about dancing, making love, 
what a spring day is, or simply how to operate a car, is in the skin, the muscles, the nose, not 
in the mind. Embodied knowledge is also largely pre-objective because what is known is not 
inherently sensed as different from the knower; the sign and the signified have the same 
locus. One much discussed issue bearing on this is the subject-object format of 
experiencing. Some phenomenologists, Buddhist psychologists, and other ‘transpersonal’ 
psychologists argue that this is a construction of the human mind, and not the invariant basis 
of the ‘real world’, so that our supposedly a priori distinction of perceiving subject and 
external object world is imposed through an acquired mental habit upon inchoate reality. This 
form of consciousness is still very much active, for instance, in some types of meditative 
experience or in small children before the self is objectified. By non-propositional I mean that 
reality is not sensed (or made sense of) in a symbolic or linguistic format. There is no string 
of discrete chunks of information processed in a sequential way to form a proposition. Non-
propositional is, to use standard terminology, not coded digitally, but in an analog way. 
Spoken language or comparable symbolic systems therefore require a transformation of the 
analog structures of human experience into a digital code. In inchoate experience the degree 
of chunking of reality characteristic of goal-directed rationality has not yet taken place. There 
is no picking out of discrete signifiers in the mind to stand for, say, specific objects, activities, 
or attributes.  
    (2) At a secondary level we impose conceptual formats on primary experience. This 
invariably involves a (most often non-conscious) focus on selected aspects of the full initial 
experiential Gestalt. There are different types of conceptual format, some analog in nature, 
and some digital. Analog means that the concept is structurally isomorphic and continuous 
with the experience. Later I will discuss whether analog and digital are not continuous with 
one another and a matter of relative degree. Leaving this issue aside for now, three basic 
cognitive modes need to be distinguished. They were contrasted for the first time by Philip 
Johnson-Laird (1983), who termed them imagistic models, mental models, and propositional 
models. These subsequently recurred in somewhat changed terminology in the work of other 
authors. In accordance with the now mainstream terminology favored by Lakoff and Johnson 
and now largely adopted by the cognitive community, I will speak of rich images, image 
schemas, and propositional models as the three major formats of the conceptual level.  
(2a) Rich images are continuous with, though not identical to percepts and possess a 
fairly detailed inner structure. For example, in the case of visual images, we can 
evoke colored images before our inner eye. Thoughts are similar to pictures or, more 
frequently, to movies passing before the ‘mind’s eye’. Most frequently rich images are 
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of visual nature, but auditory, tactile, kinesthetic, olfactory, or gustatory images are by 
no means excluded. Often a rich image associated with a specific situation is a blend 
of elements of sight, smell, sound, etc. that are recognized as belonging together; it is 
a multi-modal ‘feeling image’. 
(2b) Image schemas are skeletal abstractions with less detail than rich images. The 
human mind has the faculty of abstracting a set of identical structural features from 
non-identical perceptions or rich images. Lakoff (1993) calls these generic-level 
abstractions. Because of this multi-purpose or generic-level structure image schemas 
are precisely what enables us to perceive underlying analogies. For example, we are 
capable of finding a structural schema underlying simultaneously a classroom full of 
children, a map with a country’s borderline and cities on it, the notion of society, and 
the notion of a mathematical set: A schematized container, possibly with schematized 
contents in it, underlies all these rich images. Some of these notions can only be 
conceptualized as pure image schemas, a mathematical set being the extreme case 
for which there is no rich image. The notion of society per se is similar but possibly 
evokes rich images through association. A classroom or a map, on the other hand, 
can either produce a rich image or an image schema as its structural abstraction. 
Three more points deserve to be mentioned here: First, whatever their difference to 
other forms may be, the distinction of rich images and image schemas is by no means 
a clear-cut one. They flow into one another varying with the amount of detail. No 
exact line can be drawn between them, because the mental format of both 
mechanisms is analogic in nature. Presumably most image schemas can be fleshed 
out with more imagistic detail, and every rich image has a potential for becoming an 
abstract skeleton. Second, image schemas can extend across sense modalities, e.g. 
we sense similarities between a visual schema of balance and a sensorimotor one. 
The same applies to visual and acoustic notions of rhythm. It makes sense to speak 
of image-schematic skeletal concepts in other sense modalities as well, especially 
auditory, visual, proprioceptive, and tactile. In contradistinction to the olfactory and 
gustatory modes these allow for temporal patterning and are therefore more highly 
structured with reference to most people. Third, even though the imposed formats in 
question are situated at a level we called conceptual, the cognitive operations need 
not be conscious and seldom are. Often they can only be indirectly inferred through 
linguistic methods, or through experimental or other analytic techniques. 
(2c) In their logical shape both above mentioned formats contrast sharply with 
propositional models. These derive their name from the shape of spoken language, 
which is sequential, chunked, and features syntactic relations. We speak of such 
models mostly at the level of very abstract or condensed signifiers, where it is difficult 
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to image a single analogic image that incorporates all denoted aspects of meaning. 
Metaphors are usually identified with this propositional type when there are many 
corresponding features that are mapped between two domains, and the metaphor 
cannot be reduced to a simple image skeleton of one kind. That the mental format of 
propositional thought is language-like, digital, and discrete has significant 
implications. Because information is transposed into a discrete sequence of symbols 
holding among them certain syntactic relationships, any prior structural analogy of 
meaning to sensory experience is lost. While our mental picture of a house and the 
percept of a house are continuous, the sounds of the word “house” have no 
characteristics in common with the percept. The designated thing and the word have 
nothing in common, apart from being assigned to one another through a mental link. 
Their relationship is one of signification. Onomatopoeia aside, it is an arbitrary pairing 
of symbol and meaning.  
 
(3) The fact that propositional models were named for their sentence like-structure indicates 
their proximity to the third, the surface level of symbolic models. Speech, inner speech, and 
similar levels of explicit thought are included in this category. Although the production rules 
underlying surface language are again mostly automatized and subconscious, it is through 
the externalized utterances that the digital nature of thought is most strongly subject to 
conscious self-reflexivity. Linguistic models proper are a sub-category of such symbolic 
models, which can use other media as well. What all symbolic models have in common is 
that external referents like sounds, writing, or pictures are matched with corresponding 
conceptual models in the mind.11  
                                                 
11 The relation of the third level of surface symbolism such as uttered speech to the prior level of 
mental conceptualization deserves further comment. What sets the two apart is a shift of our 
observational perspective. In the terminology of Shore (1996) this is a shift from mental models to 
instituted models, i.e. meaning that is externally encoded and made public rather than existing only in 
the heads of people. Sperber (1996: 32) introduces the same distinction under the names of public vs. 
mental representation, with Keesing (1991: 377) discriminating in a similar way. Donald (1991) 
describes this shift as the ‘externalization’ of memory and knowledge, which through ritual mimesis of 
accumulated skills, narrative, writing, or symbolic representation socially reifies thought and thus 
ensures its stability. A similar point is raised by Berger and Luckmann (1967) in their sociological 
classic The Social Construction of Reality. The consequences of this distinction have often been 
overlooked, especially by anthropologists. Besides the implications of non-observable mental 
phenomena for the development of an appropriately suitable methodology, what this amounts to is a 
shift in our ontology. The term ‘instituted model’ refers to a recurrent external manifestation of cultural 
meaning in speech, symbolism, and behavior. However, this never allows a direct access to mental 
models, whose locus is the mind of individuals (or, within a more holistic perspective that includes 
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    All this indicates that there are three legitimate levels of analysis: The kinesthetic and 
sensorimotor experiences that often underlie metaphor (body), conceptual realizations of 
these (mind), and symbolic models (language). This tripartite distinction of levels is an 
                                                                                                                                                        
lived experience as well as motor schemas, the locus of ‘mind-body’). Mental models can only be 
indirectly inferred by the ethnographer or linguist from cultural regularities in behavior and speech, i.e. 
instituted models. Thus, the ontological rift extending between these two levels of description has to be 
bridged by the observer through appropriate analytic methods. 
    For many cultural anthropologists and semioticians it is still necessary to point out that instituted 
models do not have any life split from the mental reality of people who create and transmit them. A 
ritual, an item of material culture such as an object of art, a proverb, a text, or an utterance do not 
speak for themselves. They constitute more or less conventionalized cues for the reconstruction of 
meaning, but are subject to context and subjectivity. As cues they only become meaningful through 
the interpretation by individual minds. Instituted models invariably require a transposition into a mental 
model. Analysts often fail to recognize that they cannot get at public meanings directly (Strauss/Quinn 
1997: 13ff). Clifford Geertz, who takes a deliberately anti-cognitive stance in the sense of opposing a 
mental locus of meaning, is an influential example. Interpretivists such as Geertz speak about public 
symbols in an ideal-type way that subsumes diverging meanings of many people in a single formula, 
while setting aside the question of cognitive reality of these ideal types. Mental meaning is treated as a 
‘black box’. However, it seems to me that by standards of logic even people maintaining the contrary, 
such as Geertz, have to assume in some crude way that instituted models must come into people’s 
minds for them to act on them.  
    A momentous reason why this transposition from instituted to mental models should be studied 
carefully is the schematically mediated nature of meaning. Rather than being simply absorbed by the 
mind as a veridical image public representations impinge on the mind indirectly through the mediation 
and constraints of pre-existing mental models. Cultural schemas or individualized expectational 
patterns are brought to bear, so that novel information is often assimilated to what is familiar. While 
schemas make for selective screening of information, they also contextualize by placing the novel 
information within a known category and by evoking particular affects, encyclopedic information, or 
inference patterns. 
    It is not to be simply taken for granted that any given model on this instituted, observable level is 
being transposed into roughly the same mental model by all members of a culture. Individuals may 
interpret public knowledge quite differently, perhaps even in a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ where everyone 
believes that all others share one’s interpretation. Moreover, how well a mental model fares in 
spreading throughout a population is subject to many factors. In this sense Sperber (1996) 
programmatically calls for the study of micro-mechanisms responsible for the stability of shared 
cultural ideas. This necessitates asking why a person chooses to make a thought public, which 
institutional or personal factors make its repeated dissemination likely, what construal of so-encoded 
knowledge by the audience is likely, which changes of content are likely with repeated transmission, 
which means (such as writing) serve the stability of ideas, what makes an idea salient, memorable, 
and practically relevant, and so on. 
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analytic division of what usually occurs in a functional continuum. The distinction is 
nonetheless of value for two reasons: First, it pictures metaphor as a complex processual 
interaction of levels and thus makes the grounding of abstract meaning tractable by relating it 
to experiential structures. Secondly, most literature on metaphor has been overly 
preoccupied with level three, although it is clearly inadequate to see language as the sole 
locus of metaphor. With linguistic metaphor we need to include embodied and conceptual 
levels of theorizing. More than that, we have to broaden the scope of inquiry to include non-
linguistic metaphor, such as those found in pictures, emblems, movements, actions, and 
embodied feelings. The present model indicates that many important realizations of 
metaphor ought to be sought by analyzing phenomena such as gestures, emblems, action 
structures, or the bodily ‘feel’ of an experience. I will pick up this thread in chapter 4. 
 
THE CONCEPTUAL LEVEL: DUAL CODING VS. TWO POSSIBLE REDUCTIONISMS 
The most controversially debated level among these three is the conceptual one. On the 
basis of our distinction between analog vs. digital conceptual formats, there are two possible 
approaches to the analysis of metaphor. One approach that is prominent in semantic field 
theory, artificial intelligence, and much of cognitive philosophy focuses on the associative 
relations within semantic fields (e.g. MacCormac 1985, Kittay 1987, Way 1991, Indurkhya 
1992). According to this view, the similarity created in metaphor is attributed to common 
verbal associations evoked by source and target. However, as Johnson-Laird, Hermann and 
Chaffin (1984) have shown, these semantic network models of cognition are subject to 
formal limitations and cannot completely account for metaphor, to state but one problem with 
this view. The alternative view focuses on imagistic mechanisms that create a common 
ground between source and target by abstracting image structures from experience. The 
most detailed version of an imagistic approach, championed by Lakoff and his associates (cf. 
Lakoff/Turner 1989, Lakoff 1993, Turner 1993), puts forward the strong claim that the basis 
of all kinds of metaphor is the extraction of a common image-schematic structure.  
    Although I strongly sympathize with the image schema approach, I believe that metaphor 
involves multiple modes of cognition, which work jointly, albeit with varying emphasis on the 
different modes.12 Here I side with Paivio and Walsh (1993), who convincingly argue in favor 
of a dual coding approach. It makes sense to believe that propositional thought and image 
schemas lend themselves to different kinds of representations (cf. Quinn and Holland 1987: 
24ff). Nevertheless, we should be wary of an either-or view – for the purposes of analyzing 
applied language the distinction of analog and digital formats is of restricted value. 
Propositional and non-propositional thought usually co-occur in everyday thought. Much as 
                                                 
12 Although later I will suggest a possibility of reducing propositions to images, for the present 
purposes of introduction I prefer to stay with this distinction. 
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our brain has actual neuronal nodes, we can metaphorically speak of virtual nodes in our 
mind, which make translation and re-translation between analog and digital a routine task. 
Speech or any other kind of symbolic cue can evoke either images or semantic attributes and 
whole propositional chains, or both. In the same way images, or their abstracted image 
schematic structure, can evoke either further images or semantic attributes. Plausibly, both 
images and semantic attributes can serve as mediators either way.  
    Both theories and the respective mechanisms they emphasize have shortcomings and 
strengths. The basic strength of the propositional mode of cognition is that it allows for 
considerable complexity; its weakness is that without connection to the other levels it is 
difficult to account for the phenomenon of meaning in regard to sensory reality. In the analog 
mode the genesis of meaning from percepts is quite transparent, but we do not know how 
complex and abstract knowledge arises from this basis.  
    The relative importance accorded to propositional and analog formats accounts for a major 
theoretical rift among cognitive scientists. A more far-reaching question is whether either one 
of these formats can be ultimately reduced to the other. The imagery debate of the 1980s 
with the central figures of Stephen Kosslyn and Zenon Pylyshyn centered on the question 
whether imagery is an epiphenomenon of algorithmic (and thus propositional) calculations. 
The notion of ‘language of thought’ championed by Jerry Fodor and Pylyshyn himself is 
based on the assumption that the actual level at which thought takes place is just as 
propositionally shaped as surface language. According to this perspective, the analog 
images we report on the phenomenal level are relegated to a secondary status of an 
epiphenomenon, whilst the human mind is taken to be a symbol-manipulating device much 
like a computer in a sequential, chunked, and digital manner. Lakoff (1987) and Johnson 
(1987) have made a convincing case contra Pylyshyn that imagery is an irreducible level of 
meaning in its own right. Gibbs (1994) brings together a great amount of empirical support 
for this.  
    The converse question whether propositions are simply a kind of imagery of extreme 
abstraction and condensation, or an irreducible level, has not been entirely settled to date. 
On this view, the propositional format is a mere epiphenomenon characteristic of the surface 
level of words, while the mind is fundamentally imagistic at any level of complexity. Such a 
position is at least implicitly present with Langacker (1987a) and more explicitly postulated by 
Palmer (1996). The overall idea seems to make sense. When our mind condenses imagery, 
it ends up with propositions that somehow function as manageable single tokens for an 
internally highly complex mental array. Although the issue how this happens has not been 
settled through empirical research, some authors seem to think of knowledge even at the 
highest level of abstraction and condensation as imagistic to some extent. Although I find this 
position intuitively appealing, at present we have to remain uncommitted as to the exact 
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relation of imagery and propositions pending further findings from experimental psychology 
and neuroscience. However, in chapter 8 I will indicate some interesting entailments of the 
view that propositional thought and imagery are cognate phenomena based on my 
subsequent development of a theory of cultural imagery. 
    For our immediate purposes this question is more technical than substantial, as long as 
we acknowledge that these formats are seldom a strict either-or matter. Depending on which 
aspect of a concept we highlight, it will seem more given to an imagistic description or to 
classifying it as proposition due to its degree of abstraction or due to its multiplex nature that 
defies any simple image. 
 
A VERTICAL MODEL OF METAPHOR AS PROCESS BETWEEN LEVELS 
Metaphor is best understood as a process (cf. Gerhart/Allen 1984). Within the outlined three-
level model metaphor can be depicted as an interactive process between these levels. The 
following statement by Beck (1978: 85) intends to capture this: 
 
“A verbal metaphor can now be understood as a device whose function it is to inject the results of 
analogical reasoning processes into the semantic domain. (...) [It is] a process whereby images and 
experiential associations that develop at a level where a network of sensory associations prevails are 
transferred to a level where thoughts are ordered according to a logic of verbal categories.”  
 
The same idea is emphasized by Lawrence Kirmayer (1993:185), who, following a 
terminological innovation originating with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, says that “meaning or 
action is presented to the representational system (…) from lower levels of sensory-affective 
processing in the central nervous system and from bodily experience.” 13 In the way proposed 
here it makes sense to characterize the very grounding of the conceptual in the sensorimotor 
as metaphoric, since the human being is in some fascinating way capable of sensing analogy 
between them. In what follows I would like to contrast this other, somewhat unconventional 
use of metaphor as concept with the more traditional use in order to demonstrate that both 
form part of a single process: For this purpose, let us call the grounding process in the 
sensorimotor realm discussed above metaphor in the vertical mode. In apparent divergence 
                                                 
13 Kirmayer (1993: 171ff) places this process within the relational triad ‘archetype’, ‘metaphor’, and 
‘myth’, which he develops to emphasize that body, thought, and socio-cultural structure all contribute 
to meaning. In his terms, ‘archetype’ refers to bodily-givens rooted in the nervous system and/or 
formed by the exigencies of social life. ‘Myths’ in his terminology are the legitimating and structuring 
narratives of a society. ‘Metaphor’, finally, operates as the crucial mediating device between the former 
two to produce an interaction with the sensory and affective aspects of concepts. He also insists that 
the imaginative nature of metaphor always generates a surplus of meaning and is never determined 
one-way from either side.  
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from this, metaphor was traditionally understood to refer to a mapping either from word to 
word or concept to concept. Here metaphor is conceived as movement between domains at 
a single functional level. This can be designated as metaphor in the horizontal mode.  
    The point that I want to emphasize here is that recognizing a metaphor on the linguistic 
level requires a switch to or inclusion of the other two levels. Speech needs concepts, and 
concepts frequently take recourse to the embodied level. It is an important theoretical 
proposition of this chapter that metaphor (1) as an inter-level process and metaphor (2) as a 
concrete mapping at the same level are inseparably related. How is this to be understood? In 
processing a metaphor we establish nodal connections between the three conceptual modes 
and from these to the sensorimotor level downwards and to the symbolic system level 
upwards and thus use mechanisms, both horizontally and vertically, at the same time. This 
merits a closer discussion: 
    Characterizing the three levels as functional continuum means that metaphor can set out 
at any of the first two levels once it is cued by language, other symbolic perception, semantic 
or episodic memory. This also means that metaphor makes use of all three conceptual 
mechanisms of the second level. Concerning the first point, metaphors can extend over the 
full three-level gamut within the above described bottom-up process, but they need not do 
so. Let us consider three alternative possibilities in turn: In full-scale metaphors embodied 
knowledge is screened for conceptual correlates, thus extracting an image schema, which in 
turn is transposed into propositional coding and ultimately into surface-level symbolism. 
Alternatively, the process may stop short of propositional transposition into uttered language 
and use the image schema as it is within the analogic mode only (‘image metaphors’). 
Finally, it may be that metaphor only stretches between level two and three in the case of 
evocation of linguistic attributes from semantic memory, which have already been clustered 
and prepackaged in memory earlier, so that in the concrete instance no evocation of 
associations from the bodily level is necessary any more. However, embodied associations 
can be, at any time, brought to resonate. Contrary to Beck’s idea of a bottom-up injection of 
inchoate experience into conceptual thought I contend that the process is not a one-way 
street. Conceptual structures work their way back to the level of immediate experience. Just 
imagine a vague emotion triggering a thought process that leads to several creative insights, 
which then create a new embodied emotion or workings of the pre-objective unconscious. 
    If we focus on the conceptual level, we find an interacting triangle of image, image 
schema, and propositional coding. The richness of metaphors emanates precisely from the 
swift transposition between all three modes, a multiplicity of mutually translatable formats 
that is characteristic of cognition in general. However, what actually enables metaphor is the 
picking out of similar structures from two backgrounds or newly creating a common 
background for dissimilar domains. Either image schemas or propositional mechanisms are 
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chosen to account for this. If a metaphor operates on image-schematic similarity this means 
that the generic level structure of an analog mental image is extracted and mapped on 
another image. If it operates on propositional knowledge this means that symbolic structures 
associated with a cue are matched. Yet, rich images may also play a certain role. It is 
acknowledged that except in cases of ‘one-shot’ image metaphors (see below) they lack the 
power to initialize metaphors. Yet, in almost any metaphor rich images can provide enriching 
associations, which in turn can yield valuable detail information of, both, source and target 
domains.  
    The following graphic depiction summarizes what has just been said: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is metaphor then? Metaphor constitutes a particular cognitive process of temporarily or 
permanently creating connections between what are considered largely separate domains. 
This process encompasses vertical and horizontal relations. Vertical relations relate to the 
emergence of metaphor from body knowledge via conceptual knowledge to externalized 
public knowledge. Attending to these is important for the discussion of the grounding and 
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embodiment issue (see below). Horizontal relations are given prominence in the analysis of 
conceptual metaphors. They are based on mapped correspondences at the same (i.e. the 
conceptual) level.  
    It is important to see that the vertical and the horizontal principles work together. Any 
linguistic metaphor may involve all three levels, both in the speaker’s mind and in that of the 
addressee: Via a public utterance one person tries to encode her embodied-cum-conceptual 
intentions, upon which the other person decodes this surface level utterance, which evokes a 
conceptual-cum-embodied understanding in the addressee if successful. Note that I take the 
relation of conceptual and embodied knowledge to be a two-way interchange. In chapter 4 I 
will present a model of how embodied feelings emerge as concepts and how conceptual 
knowledge conversely can produce embodied states. 
 
3. Types of metaphor 
A broad definition of metaphor, as proposed here, makes it necessary to distinguish various 
subtypes of metaphors. Of course, the category of metaphor can be internally differentiated 
in a number of ways. Metaphors can be systematically classified with respect to at least six 
criteria,14 which can be broken down into two groups of three. In the first group there are 
three pragmatic-functional criteria:  
(1) the evocative determinacy of the metaphor, 
(2) the scope of the metaphor,  
(3) the degree of conventionality of the metaphor.  
 
The second groups includes three closely intermeshing cognitive criteria which all distinguish 
differential sorts of representations involved:  
(4) the cognitive format of the metaphor,  
(5) the level of schematicity of the metaphor, and  
(6) the complexity type and compositionality of the metaphor, i.e. its interaction with 
and embedding into more complex metaphors. 
 
(1) EVOCATIVE DETERMINACY TYPE: DIAPHORS VS. EPIPHORS 
A first distinguishing criterion is what a metaphor evokes conceptually and how strong the 
tension is it maintains between two domains. MacCormac (1985), and before him 
Wheelwright (1962), distinguish ‘epiphor’ from ‘diaphor’. While an epiphor expresses a 
similarity and uses a readily understood source to illuminate a less understood target 
domain, a diaphor is merely of suggestive, intuitive value and emphasizes dissimilarity. 
                                                 
14Kövecses’ outstanding introductory guide to metaphor (2001: ch.3) mentions most of these criteria 
and gives excellent examples for them, though his and my terminology partly diverge. 
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Diaphors are, for example, employed in science for providing new insights or for illustrative 
purposes. Epiphors in their purest form might be found in symbolist and dada poetry, non-
imitative music, and abstract painting. In diaphors metaphoric indeterminacy and 
multivocality is strongest. The degree of indeterminacy is also a principal issue with other 
authors. Berggren (1962-63) and Fernandez (1977, 1986) speak with similar intent of 
‘analog’ or ‘structural metaphors’ on the one hand and ‘textual metaphors’ on the other. An 
analogic metaphor is assigned to its subject on the basis of isomorphic patterns or 
isomorphic relationships, e.g. in speaking of a ‘tree’ diagram or an organism as ‘mechanical’ 
relationship. Textual metaphors are defined as those which make assimilations based on 
feeling tone, as in the expressions “glowering clouds”, “a brooding landscape”, or “dyspeptic 
bureaucracy”.15 
    These two poles are ideal types, inasmuch as complete identity and complete lack of 
meaningful analogy both would obviate any metaphoric process. It has often been said that 
in metaphors a relationship of “is and is not” exits (Berggren 1962-63). In other words, it 
involves a dual vision and it is this dual vision that accounts for metaphoric tension. 
Metaphoric tension is higher in diaphor than in epiphor, but always present. Tension induces 
a complex process of meaning reconstruction. A diaphor’s high tension is what incites rich 
associative processes in the mind. 
    The degree of tension owes to the primary distance of source and target domains. With 
reference to examples such as ‘George the Lion’ or ‘The attorney general is a jellyfish’ it is 
obvious that no permanent identification is created to any important extent. The distance 
between the two semantic domains is sufficiently great that the two remain separate except 
for the mapping of a single feature, such as the lion’s courage or the lack of backbone in a 
jellyfish (see Ohnuki-Tierney 1991: 176). Other metaphors have the power to ‘spill-over’, i.e. 
to create more durable links of a general kind between domains. Many metaphors use a 
particular feature of analogy in a given context to evoke the general analogy between the 
domains. Conversely, a particular cultural proximity of source and target may call for a clear 
demarcation. Precisely because monkeys or dogs are often like humans in an uncanny way, 
                                                 
15 Metaphors of feeling tone are perhaps less responsible for basic meaning generation than for 
putting ‘the icing on the cake’. In this sense Paul Werth (1999: 318) stresses that everyday conceptual 
metaphor on the one hand and poetic metaphor on the other tend to differ in important respects. The 
poets (and presumably the audience’s) thought is usually not so ineffable that she has to use better 
understood-areas of language to express otherwise inexpressible concepts. While a lack of words may 
be the motivation for some poetic metaphors, more often metaphor is used for the purpose to make an 
expression more striking. Further below I will argue that the purposes for employing metaphor include 
that it evokes emotions, creates memorable and condensed images, and produces further 
associations. 
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calling someone a ‘dog’ or a ‘monkey’ is a potent insult. It lumps the person into the category 
as a whole, instead of evoking a particular feature of similarity only, and derogates his 
humanness in a stronger way than is the case with a lion or a jellyfish. 
    Note that the degree of tension also crucially bears on a classic bone of contention of 
metaphor theory, namely the interaction theory. The interaction theory, associated with I. A. 
Richards and Max Black, posits – while remaining too obscure about the mechanism – that in 
a metaphor the target not only is understood in terms of the source domain, but the reverse 
is also true. According to this view, a metaphor brings the two domains closer together. 
 
(2) SCOPE TYPE: EXPOSITORY VS. GENERATIVE METAPHORS 
Another distinction of considerable importance, in particular for cultural anthropology, 
pertains to a metaphor’s scope. Scope in the sense used here means the overall power a 
metaphor has within a conceptual system, and how much it governs other elements of it. 
Various terminologies have been proposed in the past to highlight this distinction between 
metaphors of local, limited scope and such with a key function within a thought system.16 
MacCormac (1985: 48) suggests the terminology of conveyance vs. basic metaphor and 
characterizes the difference as follows:  
 
“The difference between conveyance and basic metaphors follows from their scope and function. 
Conveyance metaphors usually propose an insight limited in scope, whereas basic metaphors underlie 
an entire theory or discipline devoted to the description of widespread phenomena.”  
 
An almost coterminous distinction is pervasive in the literature on metaphor in science is that 
between metaphors and models. The issue has been much debated and relates both to 
scope and clarity. Representative of one particular trend, Way (1991) expresses this 
distinction by designating those entities as models that are more extensive than metaphors, 
and usually less ambiguous. 
   On the other hand, sometimes the opposite distinction has been drawn between metaphor 
and analogy. Gerhart/Russell (1984: 119) are representative of this when they state: 
 
“The distortion of the fields of meaning by means of the metaphoric process is a structural change 
which demands that other meanings and understanding have to be changed in the wake of the 
metaphor. (...) Analogy on the other hand, is an extension of meaning (as distinct from the creation of 
new meaning.)” 
 
                                                 
16 See Ortner (1973: 1338) for an overview of terminology on key concepts and Fernandez’ 
introduction to the volume Beyond Metaphor  (1991) for a state-of-the-art overview with a particular 
focus on metaphor and its relation to other tropes. 
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It is clear that the distinction drawn here excludes ‘one-shot’ metaphors from the term. 
Instead the emphasis lies on highly systematic metaphors of great scope and with a great 
number of entailments. According to this somewhat dualistic view everything that does not 
entail a fundamental epistemic change (e.g. illustrative and elaborating metaphors) should 
rather be consigned to the category of ‘analogy’. But let us return to MacCormac’s distinction 
of scope between conveyance and basic metaphor, which is a fruitful starting point for further 
considerations. 
    In an insightful treatment of selfhood metaphors Brewster Smith (1985: 76f) proposes a 
more elaborate distinction encompassing a total of three levels, which circumscribe the field 
of inquiry. (1) Generative metaphors delineate the field and mode of discourse as such, 
much as metatheoretical paradigms do in science. I will also use the term ‘root metaphors’ 
for these below. (2) Constitutive metaphors, in Smith’s terms, are such that contribute to the 
composition of fairly broad target domains such as human selfhood and consciousness. By 
extension, this term might cover all kinds of metaphors that are constitutive of a central 
domain of human thinking. Thus, when folk-models about knowledge and mind, emotions 
and personality, natural kinds and classification, etc. are structured by virtue of a central 
metaphor, we can think of these metaphors as constitutive theories of a cognitive domain. 
These are perhaps not as encompassing as root metaphors are, which amount to 
transcontextual preferences of basic cognitive modes (such as modularity vs. organicity, or 
mechanic causality vs. contextuality). Nevertheless, generative root metaphors obviously 
inform constitutive theories in their particulars. (3) Finally, Smith speaks of expository 
metaphors, which are embedded in the continually reconstructed narratives of everyday life. 
Pedagogical metaphors also fall within this category. Smith’s approach is of particular 
interest, because he gives some thought to the relation between expository and constitutive 
metaphors: 
 
“The general import of this chapter is that our expository metaphors about ourselves tend to become 
constitutive metaphors: there is no clear line between the two classes. The case is similar, I think, for 
the expository metaphors of personality theory. In this respect psychoanalysis has been particularly 
rich. The metaphoric institutions of the person – id, ego, and super-ego (...) became for a while more 
identifiably functional in people at large, one can speculate, because psychoanalysis reified them 
metaphorically.” (p. 77) 
 
The metaphors that Smith calls generative have been of abiding interest both to philosophers 
and cultural anthropologists. It makes sense to speak of metaphors of the uppermost level of 
the cognitive architecture, which organize a whole culture or worldview, if we allow for some 
degree of parallelism with other terminology. The philosopher Stephen Pepper (1942) was 
the first to suggest the term ‘root metaphor’ for such culturally central devices of the mind, 
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the term perhaps being related to other terms such as ‘key concepts’, ‘core values’, or 
‘ethos’. Pepper investigates the power of complex metaphors by describing generative 
nuclear images that stand at the center of whole systems of philosophical thought. One such 
root metaphor would be REALITY WORKS LIKE A SIMPLE MACHINE (such as a lever or a pulley). 
This root metaphor defines a worldview referred to as ‘mechanism’. The ontologizing power 
of root metaphors is made evident if we reframe them in the terminology of complex cultural 
schemas, in accordance with more recent conventions in cognitive anthropology. Root 
metaphors impart a basic shape to specific level knowledge structures. They possess all the 
characteristics of what the cognitive anthropologist Bradd Shore (1996) calls a ‘foundational 
schema’. Characterizing them as ‘schema’ means (1) that they screen the scene for 
culturally relevant and contextually appropriate information that are defined by the schema’s 
knowledge ‘slots’, and (2) they are sufficiently schematic so that they can be applied to a 
high number of specific instances which are non-identical but similar.17 Characterizing them 
as ‘foundational’ means that this schematic structure recurs across an exceptionally large 
number of domains as a powerful ordering device. They are of central cultural importance in 
that they organize many life domains in a similar way. Concerning this terminological 
brushwood it will be argued in much detail in a later chapter that ‘metaphors’ and ‘schemas’ 
are highly compatible concepts and that an implicit dualism, as present in Naomi Quinn’s 
(1987, 1991, 1997) critique of Lakoff (1987), often only clouds the fact that the two 
dialectically act on each other, if they are not partially identical concepts to begin with. 
    The rigorous description of multi-level hierarchies of metaphor in a previously 
unprecedented form comes from cognitive linguistics. Only recently Zoltán Kövecses 
presented a detailed reconstruction of the contributing metaphors for some high level 
metaphors. One such metaphor with various more specific sub-metaphors is the English 
INTENSITY IS HEAT (2001: ch.9, 10). The true scope of cognitive linguistics, however, emerges 
from Kövecses’ (2000) careful analysis of the metaphor EMOTIONS ARE FORCES, which is 
placed at a high level in the cognitive hierarchy and unites a great many sub-metaphors. 
Although the idea that emotions are forces does not completely delineate a cultural field of 
discourse and remains on the level called ‘constitutive metaphors’ by Smith, a quite 
significant part of the cultural field is structured by the metaphor. Therefore, repercussions of 
the metaphor are likely to be found across all sorts of thought domains. Intriguingly, 
Kövecses moves to a yet higher level of analysis by showing that the metaphors for 
rationality and for emotions comprise in fact a complementary and conceptually closely 
linked system of FORCE-based imagery. In the overall system two forces, ‘agonist’ and 
                                                 
17 Scripts and scenarios for a given situation then fill the slots when information is missing by providing 
cultural expectations relative to a schema. They also order our memories of an event-sequence, and 
that they generate complex action defaults comprising different phases (Allbritton 1995). 
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‘antagonist’, act on each other. In this conceptualization, emotion is a force that overcomes 
(pushes away) rationality at times, while rationality has to have enough weight (inertia) to 
stay in place. This recent move to high-level analysis in linguistics comes close in scope to 
what Brewster Smith calls ‘generative’ metaphors. In the next chapter I will present at length 
an analysis by Lakoff (1996) of an American high-level metaphor that THE NATION IS A FAMILY 
and a whole hierarchy of sub-metaphors structuring the conservative and liberal worldview 
as a whole. The case study perhaps comes closest to a bottom-up analysis of a ‘generative 
metaphor’, although is in fact a complex system of many metaphors. Further research along 
the same lines points to a new agenda uniting linguistics with anthropology, which develops 
a nuanced and multifaceted description of cultural cognitive landscapes and does not stop at 
single domain analyses. In the future we need a detailed coverage of metaphors in a greater 
number of domains together with an integrative theory of how these form larger clusters. 
 
(3) CONVENTIONALITY TYPE 
Some metaphors are highly conventional, culturally permanent, and recurrent among a group 
of people, while others are novel and ad hoc, and still others somewhere in-between. Up to 
the 1970s little was written on conventional metaphor and the term metaphor was primarily 
used for novel metaphors. In the wake of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) pioneering work it has 
become one of the main fields of cognitive linguistics. Research on conventional metaphor 
(or other related structures such as schemas) is a highly significant means of describing 
existing cultural thoughtscapes.  
    The term conventional as used by cognitive linguists, both for linguistic metaphors and 
their underlying conceptual basis, means that they are well-entrenched in usage rather than 
arbitrary (Kövecses 2001: ch.3). People use conventional metaphors effortlessly, naturally, 
and recurrently in everyday situations. They are often not recognized as metaphorical, 
because they stem from an entrenched conceptual mapping between domains.18 Kövecses 
presents the following English conceptual metaphors, and one corresponding linguistic 
manifestation for each which indicates their degree of familiarity: ARGUMENT IS WAR: “I 
defended my argument”; THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS: “We’ll have to construct a new theory”; 
IDEAS ARE FOOD: “I can’t digest all these facts”; SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE PLANTS: “The 
company is growing fast”; LIFE IS A JOURNEY: “He had a head start in life”. 
    While poetry is usually thought of as using striking, new metaphors, Lakoff and Turner 
(1989) and Gibbs (1994) conclusively demonstrate that a great number of poetic metaphors 
                                                 
18 Note that this has a bearing on our preconceived notions about domain structure. When many 
highly conventionalized metaphors between two domains can be found, this indicates that the 
domains may not be as separate after all. With novel metaphors the sense of domain separation is 
usually strong. 
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are in fact elaborations of conventional everyday metaphors. An example of theirs comes 
from a poem by Robert Frost: “Two roads diverged in a wood, and I - // I took the one less 
traveled by, // and that has made all the difference.” Their analysis shows that while the 
linguistic expressions used here are strikingly unconventional, the single underlying 
conceptual metaphor is not. It is the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor mentioned above. 
    Cognitive linguists make far-reaching claims about the cultural function of conventional 
metaphors. Systems of conventional metaphors comprehensively structure how people think 
about an experiential domain. While any number of linguistic realizations of existing 
conceptual metaphors can be found, the number of conventional conceptual metaphors for a 
given target is usually limited. For example, the target domain of love is limited to the 
following conventional source domains (Kövecses 1988, 2000: 26f.): LOVE IS.... A JOURNEY 
(“We’ll just have to go our separate ways”), A NUTRIENT (“I’m starved for love”), CLOSENESS 
(“They are very close”), FLUID IN A CONTAINER (“She was overflowing with love”), FIRE 
(“burning with love”), PHYSICAL UNITY (“We are as one”), INSANITY (“I’m madly in love”), 
ECONOMIC EXCHANGE (“She invested a lot in that relationship”), A PHYSICAL FORCE (“She 
attracts me irresistibly”), A NATURAL FORCE (“He was swept off his feet”), AN OPPONENT (“She 
tried to fight her feelings”), AN ILLNESS (“She has it bad”), MAGIC (“I’m enchanted), RAPTURE 
(“He was high on love”), A SOCIAL SUPERIOR (“She is completely ruled by love”), WAR (“She 
eventually surrendered”), A GAME (“She is playing hard to get”). According to Kövecses, other 
metaphors are seldom to be found. English speakers comprehend their love experiences via 
these conceptual metaphors, which comprehensively structure the domain. 
    Novel metaphors are found in poetry and song lyrics, science, journalism, political or 
religious rhetoric, slang, humor, graffiti, and other fields. They may also play a role in how 
individuals conceptualize their everyday life. A non-conventional metaphor for love 
suggested by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) is LOVE IS A COLLABORATIVE WORK OF ART. This is a 
new way of thinking about love, which promotes a mutually responsible, active, creative, and 
esthetic way of living together. In Wheelwright’s terminology, novel metaphors not 
infrequently have strong ‘diaphoric’ leanings, in the sense that they irritate and are not easily 
positioned within conventional knowledge, whereas conventional metaphors are situated 
near the ‘epiphoric’ pole. This pole is closer to so-called dead metaphor, i.e. the case where 
through habitual use and lexicalization a metaphor’s tensive aspects fades away. 
Conventionality means lesser tension and stronger entrenchment. 
 
(4) COGNITIVE FORMAT TYPE 
On the basis of the distinction between rich images, image schemas, and propositions we 
can classify metaphors according to which mechanism plays the major role. A basic 
distinction is that between image metaphors and attribute mappings.  
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    Image metaphors are described as ‘one-shot’ (Lakoff and Turner 1989, Lakoff 1993), 
meaning that they are not systematic multiple mappings. Two mental images are 
superimposed on one another, as in the expression “My wife, whose waist is an hourglass”. 
Image metaphors start out from rich images that are mapped like a superimposed 
transparent foil on the target image and impart the rich imagery to it. In poetry image 
mappings play an important role. Another example cited by Lakoff and Turner coming from 
the Navaho is this: “A horse with a mane made of short rainbows”. Image mappings also lend 
themselves to synesthesia and multi-modal images. Consider the following poem by Stephen 
Spender (cited by Indurkhya 1994): 
 
“There are some days the happy ocean lies  
like an unfingered harp below the land.  
Afternoon gilds all the silent wires  
into a burning music for the eyes.”  
 
A visual image schema based on the harp’s chords constitutes the core of the mapping. The 
rich image is one of the sun imparting golden color to the little ripples of the waves almost at 
rest and of blazing brightness. In addition, a blend between the visual and auditory modes is 
suggested. An image of musical pattern in the glistening of the sun or perhaps even in the 
sound image of surf and sea gulls is conjured up. (Note that as far as the abstract structure 
of music is imagined the evocation is more image-schematic than a rich image.)  
    In many metaphors complex propositional structure is mapped from one domain to 
another. Classical examples are ARGUMENT IS WAR and ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) call this type ‘structural metaphors’, because multiple 
propositional structures are mapped in a systematical fashion. They bring into 
correspondence several concepts or inferential structures of the source domain with others in 
the target domain. By virtue of this they create a structural similarity that is more than a 
simple similarity between two ranges of experience; it involves a similarity in how the 
individually highlighted experiences fit into a coherent whole. For example, the conceptual 
metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS gives rise to the following systematical entailments: “Is 
that the foundation for your theory? The theory needs more support. (...) Here are some 
more facts to shore up your theory. We need to buttress the theory with solid facts. The 
theory will stand or fall with the strength of your argument.” (Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 46). Thus 
many features of a complex concept are systematically mapped onto another concept. It will 
be explained a little further below that image schemas, in fact, play a major role in structural 
metaphors, although no single image schema can explain all of it.  
    The above-mentioned cognitive types have been sometimes related to conventionality 
types. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) actually use of the term ‘conventional metaphor’ in two 
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senses, as opposed to ‘novel metaphors’ and as opposed to ‘image mappings’. Lakoff and 
Turner (1989: 91) state explicitly that imagistic ‘one-shot’ metaphors are not involved in 
everyday reasoning. Contrary to this, I believe that examples for conventionalized image 
metaphors can be found, for example in proverbial expressions such as ‘He’s (as fat as) a 
barrel’. However, it seems to be the case that ‘one-shot’ image metaphors lend themselves 
more to novel metaphors, while systematic structural mappings are more likely to be found in 
conventional metaphors . 
    A third category of metaphors, which rely exclusively on image schemas, is also quite 
frequent. A simple example is MORE IS UP as in “The prices have risen”, “I hold her in high 
esteem”, or “The market has plummeted”. Up is an abstract spatial image schema without 
any rich image attached to it. It conceptualizes quantity in terms verticality. Though ‘more’ is 
also an experientially accessible concept, notice that the spatial image in the source domain 
also applies to abstract domains. In IMPORTANT IS UP the source is the same experientially 
obvious image schema, while the target domain of importance is a bit more abstract. For 
example, what the social importance of king may be perhaps quite complex a notion, but can 
be expressed through the simple spatial metaphor of an elevated throne.  
    We will get to another kind of purely image-schematic metaphors called ‘ontological’ a bit 
later. Another issue to be discussed is whether (apart from image metaphors, where this 
cannot be the case) correspondences in basic image-schemas are a privileged underlying 
mechanism in understanding complex structural metaphors. 
    Suffice it to say here that many metaphors evoke image schemas and complex 
propositions in association. Combinations of representational format can be illustrated 
through a cursory re-examination of three love metaphors: LOVE IS JOURNEY, LOVE IS 
MADNESS, LOVE IS WAR (Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 47ff). In all three examples some entailments 
may be described as simple image schemas and others require complex theories for 
interpretation. These complex theories may again include image schemas, but are not easily 
reducible to any one of them. LOVE IS A JOURNEY can, at its simplest, be well understood by 
the abstract image schema for purposeful movement alone (source-path-goal). Deviations, 
cross-roads, obstacles, and their removal or circumvention can equally be understood as 
purposeful action mapped onto space. Vessels for traveling introduce the CONTAINER image 
schema (e.g. a marriage may be the vessel). Finally, the comprehension of many other 
metaphorical entailments of the journey metaphor, such as guides, co-travelers, fuel, and 
provisions, requires a fair amount of propositional understanding, because their function is 
complex both in travelling and in love relationships. LOVE IS MADNESS offers no simple image 
schema for the whole concept of madness. We may extract partially constitutive image 
schemas from our understanding of madness, such as the sensorimotor experience to be 
bursting with some emotion (a container under pressure from within) or the body experience 
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of being dizzy and without orientation. On the other hand, we may well use our concrete 
experience of mad people and our theories of their psychological makeup propositionally in 
understanding the bulk of the concept. Many notions involved, such as ‘mental pressure’ or 
‘balance’, will clearly be image-schematic, but they are only meaningful in highly complex 
theory-compounds combining many image-schematic models. LOVE IS WAR again offers 
nothing even close to a single image schema for the extremely complex concept of war. 
Again a few basic image schemas can be found, such as the sensorimotor experience of 
physical collision, tension, and arousal. Yet, these do not account for the systematicity with 
which other aspects of the complex concept are mapped, for example ally, siege, bulwarks, 
treason, and treaty. Again more complex knowledge structures are involved. In sum, we can 
say that while the central aspects of the journey metaphor are reducible to a single image 
schema, madness and war are much more complex compounds. 
    In many complex cases imagery is enriched by screening the semantic markers triggered 
by the central image schema(s) for associative data. The following example from 
MacCormac (1985: 76) aptly illustrates this. He cites Yeats’ poetic description of “birth as a 
cannon that thunders time away”. The metaphor perhaps builds on the basic schematic 
commonality of birth on the one hand and cannon/shooting on the other that a ‘projectile’ 
emerges from a passage. In my analysis, image-schematically this can be mapped onto 
time. Just as a cannon suddenly creates a trajectory when fired, birth suddenly creates the 
trajectory of (life-) time. Time conceived as an entity is ejected into a space (and perhaps 
disappears in the distance). The general metaphor is BIRTH IS A PRODUCER OF TIME. As far as 
I can see, this is based on the two conventional image schema metaphors POINTS IN TIME ARE 
POINTS IN SPACE and THE PASSING OF TIME IS MOVEMENT ON A PATH. A possible entailment 
employed here is TIME STARTS WHERE A TRAJECTORY EMERGES. This also evokes the more 
specific metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, which hangs together with time as movement on a path. 
The cannon image in Yeats’ metaphor adds to the basic idea that birth produces time. The 
three elements presumably implied by it are that birth creates time from nothingness (the 
cannonball cannot be seen), suddenly (it is shot away), and as a trajectory (it flies in one 
direction and disappears). Alternatively, the expression “thunder away” might also be read as 
THE EXPERIENCE OF BIRTH IS AN ELIMINATOR OF TIME. This is also based on a conventional 
metaphor TIME IS A POSSESSED OBJECT. Just as cannonballs disappear from view when fired, 
so does time disappear suddenly in birth.  
    Be that as it may, MacCormac emphasizes that the aspect of the projectile alone (and I 
would add the other image schemas I just analyzed) are not sufficient for an explanation of 
the metaphor. There are several possible sources for adding rich knowledge: 
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“But what corresponds to the thunder of a cannon in birth? The screams of the mother or the screams 
of the baby or both? And how does this ‘thunder’ eliminate time? Through eternal succession of 
biological reproduction or through creation of an eternal religious soul?” 
 
Moreover, MacCormac adds that there lies an element of irony in the fact that cannons kill 
the very thing that birth produces. One may understand the poetical metaphor in these and 
various other ways. Whatever the interpretation, it will include several more complex aspects 
other than the initial image schema. Moreover, actual bodily states may be induced through 
associative evocations. Be it that envisaging thunder gives you ‘the shivers’, i.e. makes you 
experience an immediate bodily response, or be it that the metaphor creates a complex 
conceptual blend, where the pain and the joy of birth, the horrors of war, thunder, life, and 
death create a unique phenomenal imprint of a holistic quality, which perhaps encompasses 
contradiction, metaphor, metonymy, and irony at the same time. Throughout these aspects 
rich cultural knowledge needs to be recruited. 
 
(5) SCHEMATICITY TYPE: SPECIFIC VS. GENERIC LEVEL METAPHORS  
Different linguistic metaphors prompt us to highlight different levels of cognitive generality. 
This was first expressed implicitly by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 14, 147) in a taxonomy of 
metaphor types. They distinguish ontological (such as THE MIND IS A CONTAINER), orientational 
(such as MORE IS UP), and structural metaphors, i.e. systematic multiple attribute metaphors 
(such as IDEAS ARE FOOD). Even though this taxonomy of metaphor is perhaps not 
convincingly comprehensive, it implies that metaphors work at different levels of 
schematicity. Ontological and orientational metaphors only require very simple image 
schemas, whereas structural metaphors are both more complex and more detailed. 
Schematicity refers to the relation between rich images, image schemas, and propositions. 
Cognitive schematicity is understood as imagistic schematicity. This entails that a high level 
of cognitive generality means a skeletal image on the imagistic continuum, whereas a high 
level of specificity means a rich image or a proposition. For example the linguistic 
manifestations of metaphor are always more specific than their inferred conceptual basis, 
which has to fit several manifestations. 
    In a later work Lakoff (1987: case study 1) clarifies this issue by introducing a distinction 
between basic level (specific) and superordinate level (generic) metaphors. This is based in 
the general literature on categorization, which reveals that conceptual fields are hierarchically 
ordered into basic and superordinate level concepts. For example, the basic level concepts 
“cars”, “trains”, “airplanes”, “bicycles”, and “subways” are all bound up in the superordinate 
level concept “vehicle”. Therefore, a superordinate level concept is the shared abstraction of 
several basic level concepts. It involves a high level of cognitive schematicity and generic 
commonalties. On the other hand, the specific level adds more detail to the schematic image. 
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The same relation between generic and specific formulations plays a crucial role in how we 
analyze the metaphors resulting from such concepts. Because of the current mainstream 
usage I will speak of specific and generic level metaphors instead of basic and superordinate 
levels. 
    As an illustration take a linguistic metaphor such as “What I found out was hard to digest”. 
When we look for an underlying conceptual metaphor of a more general kind we can express 
this in two ways: At the more specific level we get IDEAS ARE FOOD, but if we further abstract 
from this there is also a superordinate or generic level of IDEA ARE ENTITIES. (This is the level 
Lakoff and Johnson would call an ontological metaphor.) The metaphor IDEAS ARE ENTITIES 
gives ideas a very general and schematic profile as object-like (instead of describing them 
as, say, a process), while saying nothing on their more specific nature. The corresponding 
specific level metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD, by contrast, creates a more detailed image within 
this broad general category of entities. It is crucial to see that an analysis at both levels is 
important. More obviously, to choose the specific level formulation is in the interest of a 
precise description and of capturing the full extent of relevant information about the source 
domain of food. Less obvious, but equally important for another purpose is teasing out the 
generic level structure even at the cost of losing much of the concrete knowledge from view. 
The generic level is indispensable for explaining how families of metaphor hang together. 
Divergent specific level metaphors can give rise to a single generic level metaphor. The 
basis of this is their partial meaning identity at a highly schematic level. For example, the 
basic level metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD and other basic level metaphors, such as IDEAS ARE 
PLANTS, IDEAS ARE PEOPLE, and IDEAS ARE PRODUCTS, share a common generic level 
metaphor of IDEAS ARE ENTITIES. Owing to its high schematicity, the generic level of a 
metaphor organizes and unites these differing concepts. Note that the grouping into families 
does not stop at the level where several idea metaphors share their basic structure, it goes 
even higher. The generic level of ENTITY is a true ontological category that occurs across 
various cultural contexts by predicating a similar basic topology on them. In European and 
many other languages a great number of notions from other abstract domains, such as 
feelings, beliefs, events, messages, etc., share the entity ontology with ideas.  
    From the analysis of cognitive schematicity and the generic level in metaphors we acquire 
an understanding of how ontological metaphors work. Ontological metaphors can be defined 
as reflecting only the highest level of schematicity, such as CONTAINER, ENTITY, PROCESS, or 
FORCE. They are expressed as image schemas and can thus function generically. As a 
result, two kinds of situations in which ontological metaphors occur can be distinguished: 
Ontological metaphors are either the generic part of complex metaphors, with the function of 
bestowing only the merest cognitive framework, or more simple metaphors operating 
exclusively on image-schematic abstractions at a high level: 
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(1) A conceptual metaphor that is purely ontological and inherently situated at the 
generic level is evoked by the expression ”to put into the mind” (THE MIND IS A 
CONTAINER). It has no specific level structure, simply because “into” evokes a generic 
image. The same holds for all other prepositions and their metaphoric and imagistic 
meaning core, and for other kinds of expressions. 
(2) Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 152) observe that ontological metaphors frequently 
prepare the ground for complex attribute mappings (which they call ‘structural’).19 In 
the case of linguistic metaphors like “Time is money” the initial image-schematic 
operation consists in bestowing a simple spatial ontology on time via the conceptual 
metaphor TIME IS AN ENTITY. This also fits with other metaphors of time conceiving it 
as entity (”I have time”) as well as with metaphors conceiving it as a CONTAINER that 
can be filled with time (“Time is running out”). Only then propositional knowledge of 
what we can do with substances becomes effective, such as “give”, “spend”, “waste”, 
“steal”, etc. Note that the range of associated attributes is constrained by further 
propositional knowledge about money, since we can’t for, example, “throw”, “carry”, 
“kick”, or “touch” time. 
 
It should be noted that complex domains are frequently metaphorically expressed through 
more than one ontological type, as Quinn’s (1991) study of American marriage shows. 
Following Cienki’s (1997: 13) slightly rephrased version, four ontological types of metaphor 
are found, namely MARRIAGE IS AN OBJECT, MARRIAGE IS A CONTAINER, MARRIAGE IS A 
PROCESS, and MARRIAGE IS A PATH. These, in turn, have many subtypes at a more specific 
level. For example, the ontological PROCESS metaphor is realized as MARRIAGE IS MERGING, 
MARRIAGE IS A LINK, MARRIAGE IS CONTACT, and DIVORCE IS SPLITTING. 
    Th rub of this is that all more complex metaphors contain detail and generic information at 
the same time, so that their meaning can be isolated by the analyst at any point on the 
schematicity scale, ranging from highly detailed to highly skeletal. Figuratively speaking, 
levels of schematicity lie embedded within one another like the figurines of a matrjoshka. It is 
important to see that they serve different cognitive functions: While the specific level 
contributes the details characteristic of a single concept, the generic level is responsible for 
its ontological identification within the most general categories of a culture. For example, we 
know that entities are different from events. All this yields a definition of ontologizing more in 
general. The ontologizing function is a basic function of the representational system that 
                                                 
19 They also venture the hypothesis that novel metaphors are less likely to be of the ontological and 
orientational kind than of the structural kind. The reason they give is that structural metaphors often 
build upon the former two more primary kinds. Whether these are indeed more deeply entrenched 
cognitively and thus less likely to be called into question should be a matter for future empirical study.  
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assigns a concept to a broad ontological category. It is implied that any such category binds 
a number of concepts from different domains into a generic unit. 20 
 
(6) COMPLEXITY TYPE AND COMPOSITIONALITY 
Frequently metaphors are constituted by a set of more primary metaphors, especially with 
regard to the compositional nature of complex target domains. The criterion emerging here 
may be called the complexity type of a metaphor.21 It has just been shown that specific-level 
metaphors always carry more generic ontological metaphors in them. I now want to 
demonstrate an aspect related to the previous one: Simple metaphors of a more schematic 
nature can cut across several domains and they are co-defined by prototype effects 
emerging from the source domain. 
    I will base the following discussion on a proposal by Kövecses (2001: 185ff) in which he 
opposes ‘simple metaphors’ to ‘complex metaphors’. The two terms are defined in a way that 
simple metaphors function as mappings in complex metaphors. As he notes, Grady, Taub, 
and Morgan (1996) distinguish, in a similar, though not identical vein, between primary 
metaphors and more complex compound metaphors. An example in the work of Kövecses is 
the relation between the English metaphors ANGER IS FIRE, which is a complex metaphor, and 
INTENSITY IS HEAT (OF FIRE), which is a corresponding simple metaphor. There are several 
aspects worth discussing here:  
    (1) When linguistic manifestations for the postulated conceptual metaphor ANGER IS FIRE 
are sought, it turns out that they all highlight the same aspect. The linguistic examples all 
cluster around a limited number of submappings, such as the following: “He was blazing with 
rage” points to HIGH EMOTIONAL INTENSITY IS HEAVY FIRE, while “She felt a tiny spark of hope” 
points to LOW INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS A SMALL AMOUNT OF FIRE. “Fuelling the flames of 
hatred” points to MAINTAINING THE INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS MAINTAINING THE FIRE. “He’ll have 
to keep his fiery temper under control” points to CONTROLLING THE INTENSITY OF EMOTION IS 
CONTROLLING THE FIRE. “Tempers flared and harsh words were exchanged” points to A 
                                                 
20 The problem is also one of how we as analysts tackle the differing metaphor types conceptually. 
While expressions with underlying spatial image schemas in ontological and orientational metaphors 
can be isolated by simply putting their highest level of schematicity into a succinct formula (such as 
THE MIND IS A CONTAINER), this is not possible for structural metaphors. They contain too many features 
to be simply subsumed within a single ontological metaphor at the superordinate level, such as ENTITY, 
SCALE, RELATION, PATTERN, or SYSTEM. Their metaphoric content is so complex and varied that it can 
only be expressed through serially listing the numerous mappings, and thus analytically capture all its 
features. 
21 This criterion is partly related to the schematicity type previously discussed. It is also related to the 
cultural scope and power of a metaphor, since a generic metaphor can govern several domains. 
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SUDDEN INCREASE OF EMOTION IS A SUDDEN INCREASE IN THE INTENSITY OF FIRE. All these and 
other entailments from our knowledge about fire are related to intensity. Therefore, when fire 
is used in an anger metaphor by English speakers, this is done in order to highlight the 
aspect of intensity of anger. It turns out that, although the overall anger concept is much 
richer than intensity only, its other aspects are metaphorically expressed through other 
source domains. 
    (2) As an immediate corollary, each simple metaphor like INTENSITY IS HEAT (OF FIRE) 
constitutes what Kövecses (2001: 174) calls a ‘main meaning focus’ of the more complex 
metaphor ANGER IS FIRE.22 The notion is based on the observation that source domains tend 
to be used for highlighting specific aspects, while other aspects that form part of the source 
typically do not enter into the mappings. Thus, the ‘used’ aspects from a given source 
domain tend to be invariant with different targets: English speakers know that fire is 
conventionally used as an expression of intensity, and intensity only, with the anger target 
and any other one. Originally the main meaning focus of intensity is therefore mentally stored 
as a part of the source domain. In the given metaphor the target domain of anger then 
inherits this main meaning focus. The anger example bears this hypothesis out because, 
insofar as fire is used as a source domain for talking about anger, it is only used to highlight 
the single aspect of intensity. Likewise, the source domain of building is employed to 
highlight structural integrity across all sorts of target domains, but not other features of 
buildings. If all this is correct, a source is then chosen because speakers know that it 
prototypically highlights the intended aspect of meaning. With conventional metaphors the 
focus or the foci of a source concept are culturally agreed upon, so that only novel 
metaphorical uses of the source transcend this.23 Kövecses’ findings indicate that domain-
specific cognitive prototypes, e.g. structural integrity in the case of buildings or intensity in the 
case of fire, are frequently used in metaphor. 
    (3) Complex metaphors are constituted from more than one simple metaphor. In other 
words, several simple metaphors are responsible for a constituent mapping, with each simple 
metaphor representing one among several meaning foci of the complex metaphor. For 
example, the metaphor COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS has three main meaning foci 
constituted by three more simple metaphors. These are ORGANIZATION IS A PHYSICAL 
STRUCTURE, PERSISTENCE IS REMAINING ERECT, and CREATION IS BUILDING. Each of these 
simple metaphors introduces one meaning focus to the complex metaphor. Again these three 
simple metaphors capture the conceptual content of all linguistic metaphors having to do with 
                                                 
22 In another work Kövecses (1999) relates this to Langacker’s notion of ‘central knowledge’. 
23 However, I want to add to Kövecses that some source domains have a great number of possible 
foci. An example that I will mention in the next chapter is the body as a source domain. 
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buildings. For conceptualizing other aspects of complex systems people use other source 
domains. 
    (4) While it has just been said that complex metaphors involve several simple metaphors, 
the pie can also be cut the other way around: Any single simple metaphor can characterize a 
whole range of target domains (although few fully). For example, the metaphor INTENSITY IS 
HEAT plays a role in a whole number of domains other than anger, such as hatred, lust, hope, 
desire, psychological pressure, ambition, curiosity, interest, conflict, political activity, or 
popularity. The scope of the metaphor covers any intense situation (actions, events, and 
states). Because of its application to many targets the simple metaphor can be called a 
generic level metaphor. The same is the case when we start from the source domain of 
buildings. Here, the three jointly working simple metaphors ORGANIZATION IS A PHYSICAL 
STRUCTURE, PERSISTENCE IS REMAINING ERECT, and CREATION IS BUILDING do not only apply to 
arguments or theories, but to all other kinds of complex systems, too. Other target domains 
metaphorized as buildings include relationships, careers, companies, economic systems, or 
life, to list but a few. Overall, an analysis based on simple metaphors has the virtue of 
making our perspective shift to the source domains of metaphors. On the one hand, in 
analyzing a given target, we can take notice of the compound nature of complex metaphors 
and we can learn which source domains the various parts of a metaphor come from. 
Conversely, by starting off from a single source domain, we can ask for which targets it is 
used and take notice of the prototype structure that the source imparts to all of them. 
    (5) As I see it, as a consequence of being applicable to all sorts of different targets the 
simple metaphors must be stored as a schematic mental entity. The descriptive level of 
INTENSITY IS HEAT is relatively independent of any specific mental setting and therefore 
implies a schematic image. Simple metaphors are therefore nearer in schematicity to the 
level of basic ontological structures based on image schemas like ENTITY, LINK, PROCESS, or 
PATH. Like them, simple metaphors form the basic elements behind a large number of 
specific target domains. However, simple metaphors are richer in structure and different to 
the extent that they include more than an image schema only. Instead, they are cognitive 
pairings, namely of a (possibly imagistic) schema, such as intensity, and a prototypical 
source domain associated with it, such as fire. This double nature probably means that some 
inferential potential from our knowledge about fire itself flows into the simple metaphor and is 
used for selecting entailments. 
    (6) In a critical view, the distinction between simple and complex metaphors can be 
interpreted as ways of how scientists phrase their theoretical formulations, namely in a more 
precise and in a more loose way. By isolating simple metaphors like INTENSITY IS HEAT we 
can better describe the mappings as they actually occur, since the entailments suggested by 
a knowledge-rich formulation, such as ANGER IS FIRE, are not fully exploited. Often, the 
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rationale for employing a complex metaphor formulation is simply to have a shorthand for 
expressing several included mappings, although other mappings logically implied in that 
formula do in fact not occur. All in all, it seems legitimate to use complex metaphor formulas 
where a sufficiently large number of mappings is present or where their restricted number is 
mentioned explicitly. 
 
4. Further theoretical issues 
I will now turn to two central issues in the metaphor debate already touched on above, but 
not sufficiently discussed so far. The first one concerns the question how metaphor is 
cognitively performed and what the source and the target domains, respectively, contribute to 
it. The second section continues a theoretical problem just raised above:  how to phrase 
conceptual metaphors in the most precise way possible. 
 
GENERIC LEVEL EXTRACTIONS AND IMAGE-SCHEMATIC INVARIANCE 
The most essential and basic aspect of metaphor lies in the extraction of a shared generic 
level structure from source and target domain or the novel creation of such shared structure. 
I believe that the following example by Lakoff and Turner (1989: 162ff) is quite representative 
of metaphors in general. They discuss at length the Chinese proverb “Blind, blames the 
ditch”. In the specific level understanding a blind person encounters a ditch, and, because of 
the blindness, falls into it. She blames the situation, but it is clearly implied that she should 
rather have held herself responsible. The generic level schema in this is that someone has 
an incapacity; the incapacity results in a negative consequence. The person blames the 
situation, although she should have blamed herself. With a proverb, which is of more general 
relevance, it is most clear that it is not the specific level that is implied. The proverb takes a 
specific example as a source domain and applies it to a generic target domain of many 
similar cases. In a proverb, a specific linguistic manifestation is searched for its generic level 
structure. Lakoff and Turner call this the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor. I believe that one 
might just as well say that this is the most basic general mechanism responsible for 
metaphoric cognition at large. Both, SPECIFIC IS GENERIC and GENERIC IS SPECIFIC are 
transformation principles for interpreting metaphoric meaning. With proverbs (i.e. metaphors 
which insinuate a target implicitly) and all other sorts of metaphor, a generic level 
correspondence between source and target is highlighted or created.  
    The function of imagery in perceiving generic commonalties is significant. The ‘Invariance 
Hypothesis’ by Lakoff and Turner (1989) and Lakoff (1990, 1993) gives an account of the 
cognitive process underlying metaphor that highlights imagery. According to these authors, 
what I called the extraction of generic structure above can be also described as the 
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preservation of the cognitive topology from the source domain in the target domain.24 Lakoff 
(1993: 228-29) makes a very strong claim on the role of imagery in this: 
 
“[Earlier we] argued that metaphors could map complex propositional structures. The Invariance 
Principle does not deny this, but puts those claims into a very different light. Complex propositional 
concepts involve concepts like time, states, changes, causes, purposes, quantity scales, and 
categories. If these abstract concepts are characterized metaphorically, then the Invariance Principle 
claims that what we had called propositional structure is really image-schematic structure. So-called 
propositional inferences arise from the inherent topological structure of the image schemas mapped by 
metaphor onto concepts like time, states, changes, actions, causes, purposes, means, quantity, and 
categories.” 
 
When we speak of the preservation of topology, the word is therefore to be understood in the 
literal sense as spatial configuration here. It means that parts are mentally mapped onto 
parts, wholes onto wholes, links onto links, sources onto sources, paths onto paths, goals 
onto goals, and so on. 
    I basically agree with this characterization, and indeed Part II of this work hinges on this 
assumption. At the same time we have to be clear about two things: First, as far as complex 
mappings are concerned, the claim is only about the preservation of very basic ontological 
categories, not all the mapped propositions. These ontological categories are imagistic, but 
not necessarily all the specific information mapped with them. Thus Lakoff’s claim has to be 
understood as saying that imagistic ontological basic categories cannot be at variance 
between source and target. About the more complex specifics it does not say anything. 
Second, as critical appraisals of the ‘Invariance Hypothesis’ by Turner (1993) and Brugman 
(1990) point out, the preservation of topology is always only true of selected aspects of the 
source’s image schema structure, never of all possible aspects (see below).  
    Turner (1993) justifiably argues for three specific kinds of mappings that operate by 
preserving parts of the image-schematic structure of the source. First, images can be 
mapped on images (such as mapping a stooping willow on a depressive man with his head 
down), second structural parameters of events (such as time and causality) can be mapped, 
and third the structure of mental activities such as scanning can be mapped on the structure 
                                                 
24 Lakoff (1993: 215) clearly specifies that an algorithmic or one-way interpretation of this is mistaken. 
According to him, it is not the case that the whole image-schematic structure from the source is picked 
out and mapped to the target unless the target domain interferes. Unfortunately Lakoff does not 
present a clear alternative model of how mappings are established (and we have to doubt that this can 
be done based on linguistic evidence only). I believe that the model of extracting and mapping image-
schematic structure is a good heuristic, and that it does not necessarily imply any misguided 
commitment to seriality or algorithms, which are separate issues. 
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of events or of force vectors. At least in these cases the imagistic topology is preserved, and 
serves to explain how the mapping works. 
    We would over-generalize by suggesting that a common ‘topology’ invariably has to be 
introduced through image-schematic correspondences. Consider the canonical example 
“man is a wolf”, which, as far as I can see, does not involve image-schematic mappings in a 
crucial way. The mapping highlights complex attributes that the common cliché about wolves 
invokes, like fierceness, rapaciousness, and solitariness. If the metaphor is also about basic 
imagistic properties, this is to the extent that a common topology is already present as a 
background condition (and is thus presumably preserved). Generally speaking, if Lakoff’s 
(1993: 231) hypothesis is understood to say that all extraction or creation of generic level 
similarities is due to image schemas this jumps to premature conclusions. Propositionally 
derived common structure other than the basic imagistic ontology can be present. As long as 
we do not know whether the so-called propositional mode of thought can be collapsed into 
imagistic thought the preservation of cognitive structure through imagistic topologies falls 
short of a full explanation. 
    A related but separate question from that of image-schematic topologies concerns the 
question where the entailments and the associative knowledge in a metaphor come from. 
Are they recruited from the source domain or from the target domain? And, if associative 
knowledge is recruited, say from the source, in what way is this constrained by the target? 
How much target and source domains each contribute depends on the type of metaphor. 
Indurkhya (1994: 137) distinguishes three types of metaphor, according to how much they 
actually create a novel similarity: 
 
“In syntactic metaphor, the process of forming metaphorical relation is completely mediated by the 
target concept network. In suggestive metaphor, the target concept network provides an initial 
ontology to the target realm, based on which additional structure is imported from the source concept 
network to the target realm. In projective metaphor, the target concept network is completely 
discarded, and the target realm is given a new ontology by the source concept network.” 
 
It is in the projective type of similarity-creating metaphors that the source domain plays the 
strongest role. The best examples come from creative problem solving in science. Schön 
(1979) reports a well-known case in which a product developing team came up with the 
metaphor of “paintbrush-as-a-pump” to develop an improved synthetic-fiber paintbrush. Here 
chunks of the target were regrouped and renamed. With reference to Thomas Kuhn’s work 
on the structure of scientific revolutions Indurkhya (p. 141) says that “a truly creative or 
revolutionary metaphor almost invariably works by disregarding the existing ontology of the 
target environment”.  
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    In the rephrased version of Lakoff’s ‘Invariance Hypothesis’ by Brugman (1990), Lakoff 
himself (1993: 216), Turner (1993), and Fauconnier (1997: 169) both source and target are 
accorded a specific role: (1) The image-schematic topology of the source is preserved in the 
target, but (2) the basic ontology of the target domain constrains the number of possible 
topological attributes. The source imparts a particular conceptual focus on the target, but for 
metaphoric entailments to play a role they also have to be in line with the target’s ontology. 
Compare the two following manifestations of the CAUSATION IS TRANSFER metaphor 
(Kövecses 2001: 163): “She gave him a headache” and “She gave him a kiss”. In the first 
case the logical entailments of the source domain of physical giving is fully exploited: when 
the headache is caused or “given”, the person has it. However, in the second case nobody 
would infer the same entailment. If a kiss is given the person does not have it. When the 
target is a lasting state the topology of the source is fully preserved, because the two match. 
When the target is a momentary event, the part of topology is rejected, simply because it 
does not fit with the target. In such cases the schematic structure of the target provides 
selection restrictions and overrides potential entailments from the source. The mapped 
knowledge has to be in keeping with the basic ontology of the target.  
    One particular way the source domain is of importance has to do with its conventional use 
rather than its imagistic topology. This is emphasized by Kövecses (2001: 187, see above) in 
what he calls the ‘main meaning focus’ of a source domain. He describes this as “the 
culturally agreed-on conceptual material associated with the source that it conventionally 
imparts to the target”. In other words, prototypicality effects in the source domain constrain 
which aspects of it are mapped and which are not. Some parts of a source domain are, by 
cultural convention, not prototypical enough or salient enough to be elected.  
    More generally, the fact that many possible entailments are left unexploited is not always 
amenable to an explanation by the Invariance Principle. In the following example there is no 
override by the target domain to account for an unused entailment: The conceptual metaphor 
THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS in linguistic reality produces the entailment that they have 
frameworks, but not that they have windows (cf. Grady et al. 1996). Yet, there is no logical 
reason for this restriction to do with the schematic structure of the target domain. One 
alternative explanation for eligibility restrictions was just mentioned, i.e. simple cultural 
convention. Another one could be that the overall analytic formula of THEORIES ARE 
BUILDINGS, which we inferred from the linguistic manifestations, is too general to begin with 
(see below). 
    Recently the idea is on the rise that something fundamentally new is created in a 
metaphor that cannot be assigned to either of the two domains. Pauwels/Simon-
Vanderbergen (1993: 358), for example, did a linguistic survey that shows how complex 
entailments – in this case value judgements – may come from either source or target, or an 
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interaction of the two. The point made by Fauconnier and Turner (1995) that conceptual 
blends, of which metaphors are a sub-case, recruit from entrenched structures on the one 
hand and local context on the other also seems to be compatible with this. It is a cornerstone 
principle of the theory of blending that blends (and thus metaphors) frequently contain 
emergent structure, which cannot be simply predicted from either source or target. In fact, 
the mapping process goes back and forth, and the generation of entailments may be more 
complex than any single model can easily capture. There is also an interesting contribution 
from phenomenology by Kirmayer (1993: 172f) in line with this. His view is that the mapping 
from source onto target must involve many small leaps, first moving structure to the vehicle 
and then checking for coherence by translating the result back. This at least provides a 
heuristic model of this process, although at the brain level it is probably not performed 
serially. 
    A frequently recognized feature of metaphors to do with associative activation spread is 
their inherent meaning surplus or ‘metaphorical indeterminacy’, as Paul Friedrich (1986) calls 
it. This means that metaphors are always prone to give rise to additional images or 
propositions that are not strictly required for making sense of them or for communicating 
about them. This connotative level of associated mental, emotional, and embodied images 
may be virtually inexhaustible and depends much on personal as well as cultural experiences 
of all sorts. A complex metaphor is a means to trigger a reflexive process that goes far 
beyond the initial understanding of a single symbolic image. While this is a fortiori true for 
metaphors in art, it points to the fact that a strictly denotative level of what a metaphor means 
is hard to nail down even with more conventional metaphors. 
 
CASTING OUR NETS: FINDING AND OPTIMAL LEVEL OF SCHEMATICITY FOR ANALYTIC CONCEPTS  
This is a good point to give some thought to the pitfalls of scientific descriptive language in 
metaphor theory. To capture the cultural reality of a metaphor the analyst has to find the right 
level of description, both regarding how generic it is and how productive it is in terms of 
entailments. As an example let us turn back to the two metaphors IDEAS ARE PLANTS and 
IDEAS ARE PEOPLE. It would first appear that the two can be subsumed under a more abstract 
metaphor IDEAS ARE ORGANISMS, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest. However, not all 
entailments inherent in the complex idea of organism are systematically exploited. Assuming 
that Lakoff and Johnson’s analysis is correct only two entailments from the very complex 
organisms concept have linguistic manifestations, growth and the life cycle. Other knowledge 
we might have about organisms, such as metabolism, inner structure, or ecology do not 
enter into the mapping. For characterizing ideas these are simply not exploited. 
Consequently, there appears to be something misleading about describing the metaphor as 
IDEAS ARE ORGANISMS. More fitting for descriptive purposes would be a terminology that picks 
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out the used mappings, i.e. IDEAS ARE BEINGS WITH A LIFE CYCLE, or even more precisely 
IDEAS ARE BEINGS WITH A GENITOR AND A RESTRICTED LIFE-SPAN.  
    Clausner and Croft (1997) give expression to the general problem as follows: When we 
seek to explain mapping restrictions, there is an optimal level of schematicity for describing 
conceptual metaphors. To answer the problem of eligibility of entailments one needs to pay 
close attention to the degree of schematicity of a given metaphor. Less schematic levels 
enriched in specific detail can explain selection restrictions, while a maximally schematic 
formulation of the metaphor fails to do so. For the classic example ARGUMENTS ARE BUILDINGS 
the less schematic formulation THE CONVINCINGNESS OF AN ARGUMENT IS THE STRUCTURAL 
INTEGRITY OF A BUILDING explains best the entailments that can be included and those that 
cannot. To give an example, it is simply not an apt expression to say that a theory has a 
broken pipe or to speak of the rafters of a theory, because rafters and pipes have a structural 
integrity of their own but do not confer this integrity to an entire building. To characterize the 
metaphor under scrutiny as ARGUMENTS ARE BUILDINGS, then, falls short of providing the full 
information necessary to predict the eligibility of possible mappings. The conceptual 
metaphor, as reflected in its linguistic manifestations, only highlights a specific aspect of 
buildings, namely its structural integrity. 
    As noted above, Kövecses claims that limitations in mapped aspects from a domain are a 
systematic feature of metaphors. Any given source domain tends to be used for highlighting 
specific aspects, while other aspects that are part of it typically do not enter into the 
mappings. In my view, Kövecses’ search for main meaning foci and Clausner and Croft’s call 
for optimal schematicity react to the same descriptive shortcoming, i.e. that mappings from 
the source domain are more selective than we think and metaphors such as ARGUMENTS ARE 
BUILDINGS were initially phrased at a wrong level of schematicity. The problem lies to a great 
extent in the cognitive strategies we use as analysts. In describing metaphors we intuitively 
tend to carve up domains on the basis of superordinate level concepts such as ‘buildings’, 
and neglect more specific divisions. Counterintuitive though it may be, why should not the 
‘structural integrity of a building’ be a legitimate source domain to begin with? 
    Choosing an abstract formulation for a conceptual metaphor can be necessary for the 
analytical task of describing generic metaphor systems, i.e. high-level categories of 
metaphor. It is also useful for generating hypotheses to test for related entailments of the 
same generic metaphor. However, if we do this we always have to add which entailments are 
not exploited in a given mapping. For more selective analytic tasks we should try to formulate 
conceptual metaphors so carefully that this accounts for all entailments. In sum, then, the 
level of optimal description should (1) guarantee that all existing linguistic manifestations can 
be explained as one, and (2) avoid that factually not existing entailments are implied.  
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DO PEOPLE RECALL ABSTRACT METAPHORS AS EXEMPLARS OR AS GENERIC IMAGES? 
Given that in everyday talk even the most abstract concepts tend to be couched in concrete 
metaphors, what role do such concrete exemplars play for memorizing abstract concepts? 
Especially in a cognitive approach dealing with memory it is of interest by which mechanism 
individuals primarily store and recall a given metaphor. Generally, both a generic image 
schema and exemplars derived from culturally prototypical cases can play a role in storing a 
conventional metaphor. However, how important exemplars are in a given instance or how 
many of them are important is a question for empirical study. Rather than presenting 
experimental evidence from metaphor comprehension studies here (cf. Gibbs 1994), I want 
to draw attention to theoretical questions we have to ask when analyzing complex metaphor 
systems. 
    (1) The most basic question is whether a concept is memorized and stored abstractly or 
via exemplars. Let us take an example. Kövecses (2001: ch.8) argues that our 
conceptualization of complex systems derives from our knowledge of plants. However, we 
may ask whether a specific plant metaphor for a complex system like “They selectively 
pruned the workforce” is actually stored as a plant related metaphor in the average mind. 
After all, the expression “pruning” could also be only an illustrative exemplar, while the 
predominant representation is no more than a skeletal image of a complex system being 
reduced in size at one of its joints. Some individuals do not use any concrete metaphor or 
only search for fitting expository cases for a more abstract image if prompted to do so. While 
every competent and creative speaker is capable of coming up with an exemplar for an 
abstractly stored metaphor, this can be found through psycholinguistic experiments (e.g. 
reaction time, etc.). Another indication for abstract memorizing is present when a person 
devises non-conventional exemplars. This indicates that the conventional exemplars 
associated with the concept by other speakers plays no great role in her personal memory 
system. Of course, this issue may vary from individual to individual and with age. Children 
presumably first acquire a detailed knowledge about a prototypical source domain they 
associate with the target. (If these are plants or machines may, for instance, varies according 
to whether a child grows in the countryside or in a city.) Later they may acquire the whole set 
from the conventional linguistic stock or learn to abstract away from exemplars altogether. 
    (2) In addition, there is the question if there are one or more prototypical exemplars for a 
domain. Even though the plant metaphor is very systematically exploited as a source domain 
for complex systems and this systematicity gives a clue to its importance, this is no proof that 
plants are the only source that plays an important role. In fact, later in the same work 
Kövecses (2001: ch.10) demonstrates that we think about complex systems employing four 
kinds of metaphoric source domains. Apart from plants, the source domains of the body, of 
machines, and of buildings are used. All four exemplars are conventionally used and cover 
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four complementary aspects of complex systems. Kövecses shows that each exemplar (or 
instantiation) of the generic metaphor contributes one specific element, which then together 
make up the overall folk-model of complex systems. The source domain of the human body 
in health characterizes the appropriate state of a system, the source domain of buildings a 
system’s structure and stability, the source domain of a machine a system’s working, and the 
source domain of plants and their growth a system’s development.25 
    In the graph below I present a model of how a generic image is associated with one or 
more culturally prototypical exemplars (with the size reduction aspect being left out here for 
convenience). The generic image is that of a COMPLEX SYSTEM, which I have here depicted 
as a ‘rhizome’ image. The names in the boxes represent the associated prototypes for the 
generic image. The dotted lines represent a cognitive coding connection (whose 
representational nature can be left unexplained here). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 In many other English metaphors the aspects of appropriate condition, stability, functioning, and 
development constitute the general main meaning foci which these four source domains serve to 
highlight. This is related to the so-called ‘Great Chain of Being’ metaphor (Lakoff/Turner 1989) in the 
Judeo-Christian folk-model. The model assumes hierarchical levels, each of which is prototypically 
used to highlight a specific kind of attribute (namely the one which elevates each category vis-à-vis the 
next lower one). Humans are used for higher-order attributes and behavior (like thought and 
character). Animals are used for instinctual attributes and behavior. Plants are used for biological 
attributes and behavior. Complex objects are used for structural attributes and functional behavior. 
Finally, natural physical things are used for basic physical attributes and behavior. 
image-schematic 
rhizome image 
exemplar 1 
PLANT 
exemplar 2 
BUILDING exemplar 3 
BODY 
exemplar 4 
MACHINE 
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    For the sake of argument, we can distinguish several patterns of memorization on the 
basis of what has been said. Suppose that one individual recalls the core image schema with 
the aid of the exemplar ‘plant’, another through the exemplar ‘body’, another through both 
exemplars, and a fourth, proficient thinker of abstraction as image schema only. Dual coding 
is the case in the first three instances, since rich propositional knowledge associated with 
plants and bodies plays some role. In the last case the image schema is dissociated from 
any prototype and memorized abstractly only. 
    These considerations go to show that we cannot come to a conclusive decision about the 
optimal level of description of abstract metaphors exclusively on the basis of linguistic 
evidence. Descriptions analytically derived from linguistic metaphor may not be characteristic 
of actual memorization and need to be supplemented by experimental studies. 
 
5. The grounding of metaphor 
A major task of a cognitive theory of metaphor is to explain the constraints on the selection of 
metaphorical source domains for a topic. Which metaphors are possible and likely, and 
which are not? Which source domains are likely to be chosen for a given topic? To theorists 
of culture it should be clear that cultural creativity cannot be predicted. Recent metaphor 
theory breaks away from the notion of predictability and emphasizes as a goal the 
explanation of metaphoric motivation from experience. In other words, what a cognitive and 
cultural account can do is explain how existing metaphors are grounded in human 
experience, either of a universal or culture-specific kind. What it cannot do is foresee which 
metaphors are possible. This position occupies a sensible middle-ground between positing 
complete arbitrariness of metaphors and a belief in its logical predictability. 
    Traditionally, the selection of metaphorical expressions was explained through objective 
similarity of source and target. However, as Kövecses (2001: ch.6) points out, there is no 
obvious pre-existing similarity between literal expressions like “digesting food” and “We’re not 
going anywhere” with the corresponding metaphorical expressions “digesting ideas” and 
“This relationship is not going anywhere”. Therefore, Kövecses emphasizes that “in addition 
to objective, pre-existing similarity – conceptual metaphors are based on a variety of human 
experience, including correlations of experience, various non-objective similarity, biological 
and cultural roots shared by the two concepts, and possibly others.” (p. 112) Kövecses 
distinguishes a number of kinds of motivation that go beyond the traditional account. He 
bases this on the tripartite typology of Grady (1997b) and works it out in greater detail. 
    (1) A first category are metaphors that build on perceived (but non-obvious) structural 
similarities or generate such structural similarities. An example is LIFE IS A GAMBLING GAME 
with manifestations such as “I’ll take my chances”, “The odds are against me”, or “It’s a toss-
up”. There are no inherent similarities, so that it is only the metaphor which highlights the 
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similarity between winning and losing in gambling and life’s actions and their consequences. 
It is only in the conceptual metaphor that we perceive the similarity. However, this solution 
pictures similarity as created out of the blue and therefore begs the question. It leaves open 
on what basis we are able to unite source and target into this conceptual metaphor, which 
then makes the recognition of similarity possible. The mechanism facilitating the perception 
of similarity between non-similars yet awaits a more precise description. In the LIFE IS A 
GAMBLING GAME example the responsible mechanism may have to do with similarities in the 
logical structure of action together with a similarity in resulting mental states, and thus 
perhaps similarity governed by a complex script.  
    (2) In a sub-case of this type of metaphor Kövecses provides an intriguing, yet simple 
explanation of what induces the perception of structural similarities. He ascribes the 
facilitating function to ontological metaphors like OBJECT, SUBSTANCE, or CONTAINER. Recall 
that these were described as extremely basic and schematic above. Kövecses illustrates this 
through the English language example IDEAS ARE FOOD. Food is cooked, swallowed or 
refused, chewed, digested, and it provides nourishment. Ideas are analogously thought 
about, accepted or rejected, considered, understood by the mind, and they provide mental 
well-being through the act of understanding. Thus a set of systematic correspondences is 
possible: 
THINKING IS COOKING (“Let me stew over this”) 
ACCEPTING IS SWALLOWING (“I can’t swallow that claim”) 
CONSIDERING IS CHEWING (“Let me chew over the proposal”) 
UNDERSTANDING IS DIGESTING (“I can’t digest all these ideas”) 
MENTAL WELL-BEING IS PHYSICAL NOURISHMENT (“He thrives on stuff like this”) 
 
According to Kövecses, this systematic set of correspondences is induced by a more basic 
ontological understanding about what the mind and communication is. As Reddy (1979) 
demonstrates there is a set of interrelated metaphors, namely THE MIND IS A CONTAINER and 
IDEAS ARE OBJECTS. Based on this, COMMUNICATION IS SENDING (OBJECT-)IDEAS FROM ONE 
MIND-CONTAINER TO ANOTHER. This is called the ‘conduit’ metaphor of communication by 
Reddy. On the basis of these two separate analyses Kövecses makes his crucial 
observation. In terms of the schematic, ontological metaphors there is an obvious 
correspondence between the body as container, food as substance, and the act of ingesting 
this substance into the body on the one hand and the metaphor IDEAS ARE OBJECTS on the 
other. It seems that the IDEAS ARE FOOD metaphor is guided by the more basic ‘conduit’ 
metaphor for communication. Although Kövecses does not say so, I presume that this 
ontological correspondence between communication and ideas primarily hinges on the core 
mapping ACCEPTING AN IDEA IS SWALLOWING. It acts as a conceptual ‘bridgehead’, which 
makes it possible to add the other mappings and complete it into a system of 
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correspondences. The swallowing part is a (short) act of letting something into our province 
of being; it thus matches the ontological topology of the conduit metaphor perfectly. By 
contrast, THINKING IS COOKING pictures an extended process and leads to slow qualitative 
refinement of a basic substance. Likewise, UNDERSTANDING IS DIGESTING is a process with 
the result of an ingested substance yielding a desired effect. These and other 
correspondences have a quite different topology and thus less in common with the 
communication metaphor than the idea of swallowing.  
    (3) Another class of metaphors is not based on similarity in the strict sense at all, but on 
‘experiential metonymy’ instead. This refers to prototypical correlations in our experience, 
meaning aspects that co-occur as bundles either invariably or on a fairly regular basis. Take 
the near universal metaphor of MORE IS UP with manifestations such as “The prices are going 
up”, “The unemployment is high”, and “Turn the volume of the radio down”. Here, quantity is 
conceived in terms of verticality. Verticality as a source domain is chosen here because of 
the salient and prototypical experience that piles get higher or the level of a fluid rises when 
something is added. (Other conceivable experientially motivated metaphors would base 
quantity on inflation, as with a balloon, length, as with aligning people in a row, or depth, as 
with digging holes. However, these would presumably be less prototypical.) Metaphors 
grounded in prototypical experiences regularly create generic level metaphors, such as 
PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS. On the one hand, many different situations in our life require 
movement in space in order to reach a goal, so that such a generic metaphor seems well-
motivated. On the other hand, such metaphors function as a prototype of purposes at large. 
In other words, they are extended beyond their experiential origin and are applied to cases 
where there is no grounding in spatial movement (cf. Lakoff 1993: 241). The PURPOSES ARE 
DESTINATIONS metaphor is thus (together with its sibling-metaphor TIME IS MOVEMENT IN 
SPACE) used for abstract notions such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY. Many experiential metonymies 
are based on the functioning of the human body. The experience of body heat, muscle 
tension, blood pressure, and agitation in anger gives rise to the English metaphors ANGER IS 
HEAT or ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER. Reduced blood flow, shivering, 
and paralysis in fear, likewise, give rise to a metaphor FEAR IS COLD. Again, there is no 
similarity between anger and heat or fear and cold in any abstract sense; what makes for the 
pairing is their common co-occurrence in bodily experience. 
    (4) A final case of motivation, not unrelated to the third, is based either on ontogenetical 
metonymy or a cultural-historical metonymy. In other words, its basis is a co-occurrence in 
childhood or earlier ages. With both types, prototypical situations where source and target 
happen to be recurrently paired form the basis of a more general metaphor. Kövecses 
speaks of motivation by a situation in which the source was manifest in the origin, or the 
‘root’, of the target. A first sub-case occurs when a biological and probably universal nexus 
 72 
provides this. Kövecses mentions as an example metaphors for love and affection such as 
LOVE IS A BOND (“There is a strong bond between them”), LOVE IS A UNITY (“She is my better 
half”), or AFFECTION IS CLOSENESS (“He’s close to his grandmother”). The target domain of 
love has ontogenetically grown out of the birth experience, early childhood experiences 
between mother and child, or the experience of sexual unity. Most people also experience 
these situations in their individual development as strong and prototypical influences. In other 
cases the original experiential metonymy at the root of the metaphor goes back to cultural 
history. Such is the case with the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor. Again, the verbal institution of 
arguments has evolved historically from war, and perhaps used to be an initial stage of it. 
The same applies to SPORT IS WAR, which has a common historical origin with ARGUMENT IS 
WAR. 
 
6. Cultural anthropology and metaphor theory 
So far the cases and results I presented originated mainly in cognitive linguistics. The 
question pertinent to anthropologists is if the approach outlined here is capable of explaining 
metaphor networks in cultural context. The focal shift from linguistics to anthropology tends 
to be a passage from rigor to scope. Anthropologists seek to describe cultural cognition with 
the broadest possible scope and a view on cosmologies. Yet, even on the basis of extremely 
fastidious fieldwork documentation, it is difficult to come up with analyses of religious 
concepts or worldview concepts that match recent linguistic work about more restricted 
domains in transparency. Though convergence between the two fields is only slow in 
coming, a series of programmatic moves can and should be envisaged. The following 
general observations relate to the issues of contextuality, embeddedness, and complexity of 
metaphor that an anthropological metaphor theory throws into relief. 
 
COSMOLOGIES VS. EVERYDAY METAPHORS 
A first question is what the rightful object of metaphor analysis in anthropology should be. 
While anthropologists are traditionally concerned with cosmologies as manifested in 
discourse and symbolism, cognitive linguists study the implicit conceptual structures of 
limited domains, such as time, emotions, thought, communication, morality, self, etc, mostly 
as manifested in conventional linguistic expressions. Lakoff (1989: 473) points out the 
following: 
(1) A given conceptual metaphor of cultural importance can but need not play a major 
role in cosmologies. Domains like ‘luck’ in English are probably a case in point. The 
exact status of a metaphor in a conceptual system is a significant matter that needs to 
be decided empirically. 
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(2) Conceptual structure and (discursive) cosmology need not be identical. The 
cosmology of a culture is a view of the universe that is all-embracing, consistent, 
conscious, believed, and acted upon. The conceptual structures found by cognitive 
linguists do not always have these characteristics. First, conceptual domains are 
much smaller in scope than the universe. Although they are internally consistent, they 
are often inconsistent with one another. Second, though conceptual metaphors are at 
least sometimes consciously believed, the rules of phonology and syntax are not 
conscious. Third, something may actually be consciously be disbelieved, but in fact 
acted upon. 
 
The method proposed by metaphor theory in cognitive linguistics (plus cognitive 
anthropology and social psychology, as far as the method is used there) relies on the indirect 
inference of conceptual patterns from surface language or behavior. Cognitive metaphor 
theory does not necessarily take discursive descriptions at face-value and does not assume 
that they mirror conceptual reality in a one-to-one manner. This gives the cognitive method 
an edge over more traditional anthropological approaches. For a long time anthropology has 
been overly concerned with so-called ‘folk-theories’, i.e. discursive structures, at the expense 
of ‘folk-models’, i.e. unconscious operative structures (Holland/Quinn 1987). Although these 
two levels interact closely, they are never identical and not seldom vie with each other. A 
mere focus on folk-theories eclipses many aspects of actual cognition and will simply not do 
as a cognitive research focus. 
    As I see it, cosmology is a kind of discursive meta-domain responsible for construing the 
most important other domains holistically. Conceptual material from all sorts of contexts is 
drawn together into a larger picture and given a fairly coherent construal. It follows naturally 
from their partial incompatibility that everyday domains are selectively conceived, reframed, 
and perhaps transmuted in cosmology. In other words, cultural cognition encompasses a 
parallel structure of everyday domains of more restricted scope and discursive cosmology. 
The study of cosmology, no doubt, is a relevant undertaking of its own. At the same time it 
must be acknowledged that it does not by far characterize a ‘culture’ without understanding 
everyday conceptual models. I believe that cognitive anthropology’s purpose is to describe 
how the two systems intertwine with each other. One of the greatest lacunae in the cognitive 
theory of culture today is that we have no idea of how discursive folk-theories and 
unconscious folk-models constrain or influence each other. A practical exigency for a 
cognitively responsible way of doing ethnography is to hold information sources apart, 
especially between discursive folk-theories and inferred folk-models. Interpretive and 
symbolic anthropologists should envisage more methodological transparency in how 
encompassing interpretations about thought systems are generated. 
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    At any rate, one has to be very cautious in evaluating conceptual metaphors as evidence 
for cosmological schemes. Keesing (1989: 464, 467) warns compellingly that a lot of 
seeming metaphors are so-called grammaticalized forms developed out of previously 
functional metaphors. Thus, verbs often become auxiliaries first, then aspect markers, and 
then tense markers; possessives are formed from expressions of spatial proximity or body-
part terms; and second verbs in serial verb constructions can become detached as 
postpositions and acquire a new function as complementizer. These expressions can be 
misinterpreted as indicators of metaphysical relations, if one reads their original meaning into 
them: 
 
“When a form moves further down the chain in the grammaticalization process, the historical 
metaphoric connection of grammatical element to lexical form (...) disappears.” (p. 467) 
 
Keesing illustrates this through a mistaken interpretation in one of his own earlier works on 
the Kwaio of Malaita. In writing on the word ‘nanama’, the Kwaio equivalent of ‘mana’, he 
tells us that he ignored crucial surface-linguistic evidence and treated the word as if it were a 
substantive, because he failed to take account of a missing noun-marker. This background 
mistake motivated his treatment of ‘nanama’ as an entity. To this he added misguided 
metaphoric evidence from idioms about ritual forms featuring the metaphoric expression 
‘afuia’, meaning ‘around, around the outside of’. Keesing sought to show that these idioms 
indicate a nanama-related concept of an ancestral ‘protective mantle’ against malevolent and 
destructive forces, which envelops the living, their settlements, and their gardens. His 
linguistically more careful restudy now shows that no such inference is warranted. It turns out 
that ‘afuia’, though a semantic derivation from the static verb for ‘to be wrapped’, has simply 
come to mean ‘on behalf of’ in some contexts in contemporary Kwaio. Thus, the rituals in 
question are simply talked about as being performed on behalf of the ancestors and not as 
the ancestors protectively enveloping anything.  
 
COMPLEXITY, CORE METAPHORS, AND METAPHOR NETWORKS 
Whether in cosmology only or everyday beliefs and actions, the study of cultural systems 
implies a high level of complexity. When anthropologists study metaphors they tend to focus 
on such ones that have to do with cultural core-meanings. Metaphors of cultural core-
meanings are in fact rich conceptual networks of a multi-contextual kind. Fitz John Porter 
Poole (1986: 432-33) mentions two quite typical examples of complex metaphor as studied 
by anthropologists: 
  
“Evans-Pritchard’s (1965) explication of the Nuer idea of kwoth by reference not only to various 
cultural metaphors that implicate matters of space, time, genealogy, ecology, et cetera, but also 
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various facets of different cultural notions of deity, power, spirit, refraction, and other abstract notions, 
implicitly proceeds by analytic attention to metaphoric constructions and analogic mappings. (...) In 
turn, my own approach to unraveling the complex Bimin-Kuskusmin concept of aiyem – not much 
enhanced by the gloss of ‘sacred’ – proceeds more explicitly by analytic attention to metaphors and 
analogies that delimit a theoretical puzzle in the ways the idea is conceptualized, used, and 
experienced in a myriad contexts (Poole, n.d.). The concept of aiyem may be an attribute of persons, 
things, contexts, and an aneng (‘time-place’). It is generally viewed as a condition – a state to be 
inferred retrospectively from the outcome of events. It is best understood to be canonically a stative 
verb, or less commonly, an abstract verbal noun denoting efficacy or potency.” 
 
According to Poole, a full analytic closure is usually not attempted. Instead, anthropologists 
present a partial coherence of metaphors and analogies through sets of different selections, 
focusings, bracketings, and other shapings.26 
     I agree that this is a necessity to the extent that any analytical approach must choose its 
focus. Yet, I also believe that a careful bottom-up reconstruction of conceptual systems, 
while being an elaborate endeavor, is in reach and that cultural metaphor theory can play a 
major role in this. In terms of methodological rigor most anthropologists can profit from 
cognitive linguistics here. I concur with Lakoff (1989: 473) who advocates for students of 
anthropology a “serious training in cognitive linguistics, training that would both turn them on 
to the possibilities of profound research in comparative conceptual systems and teach them 
what kinds of evidence they would need to establish their claims”. As to rigor, Lakoff speaks 
of a process that is “highly constrained and protected to a considerable extent from the 
whims of the analyst”. To me this is convincing because metaphor theory clearly specifies 
what evidence to look for and at the same time possesses a thorough theoretical apparatus 
for its study. The evidence includes systematic polysemy, correspondences of inferential 
                                                 
26 Poole rightly draws attention to the fact that our own analytic constructs as anthropologists are 
genres of metaphoric constructions just as the indigenous concepts under study are and proposes that 
we should bring the two into relation. Leach (1968), through his definition of ritual as communication, 
forges a complex set of analytic metaphors from information theory, linguistics, and structuralism, by 
which he dissolves the contrast between myth and ritual. Metaphors that gloss religion, myth, or ritual 
as a performative phenomenon, a system of symbols, or a functional design focused on need 
fulfillment are in fact complex systems of entailments with rich explanatory frameworks as a 
background. However, we need not stop at a very general epistemological recognition of the 
metaphoricity of complex analytic tools. I wholeheartedly agree with Poole (p. 440) that, with the 
assistance of the cognitive sciences, linguistics, and philosophical logic, anthropology can learn to 
reconstruct its analytic metaphors with increasing clarity as rational, systematic, and non-intuitive 
enterprise. In the past theoreticians in anthropology constructed blends of theory-like metaphors for 
their immediate purposes, but had no systematic theory of culture, communication, and cognition. With 
the rise of cognitive anthropology and cognitive linguistics a coherent theoretical framework is at hand. 
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structures, experimental evidence, historical semantic change on the basis of conceptual 
metaphor, and systematic extensions of live conceptual metaphors in poetry. 
    In anthropology a high level analysis of core metaphors and metaphor networks is 
required. I agree with Poole (1986: 432) who sees the promise of metaphor theory for this 
field as follows: 
 
“The intricate overlapping of metaphoric constructions may be revealed in shared metaphorical 
entailments and in partial correspondences among the metaphoric networks, structures, or foci 
established by those entailments.”  
 
The idea that core metaphors organize sub-metaphors was probably first proposed by Anne 
Salmond (1982). Her admirable article is a brief, but astute precursor of Johnson’s (1987, 
1993) and Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) studies of the cognitive fundaments of philosophy, 
while at the same time comparing Western scientific and indigenous Maori epistemologies 
based on metaphor. She shows that the epistemology of Western science is a theory 
governed by core metaphors presiding over a host of related sub-metaphors. In particular 
she demonstrates that a range of related metaphors are articulated through the spatialized 
core image KNOWLEDGE IS A LANDSCAPE. This is a metaphor that constrains a great number of 
others. In cognitive linguistics a similar line of interest has been pioneered by Lakoff (1996), 
as briefly touched upon above and to be discussed in more detail in chapter 2. His 
discussion of political worldviews in America uncovers the core metaphor THE NATION IS A 
FAMILY with an intricate system of sub-metaphors and a partial overlap with an equally 
intricate system of metaphors for morality. Quite obviously, such analyses undertaken under 
the rubric of metaphor also fit into cultural schema theory (Holland/Quinn 1987, D’Andrade 
1984, 1995). 
    In a brief overview, what are the analytical steps necessary for an analysis of nodes and 
clusters? In my view, an analysis of metaphor networks requires posing at least four kinds of 
questions: It should include the study of (1) partially shared inference structures, (2) 
representational structures from neighboring domains that are adduced peripherally in a 
complex metaphor, (3) partially shared source domains of a given target domain, or vice 
versa, and (4) the reconstruction of cognitive hierarchies according to high-level 
schematization through multi-domain metaphors. 
 
SCHEMAS AND METAPHORS 
An aspect of cultural complexity is that metaphor at a local level of, say, a single expression 
needs to be understood in relation to more global structuring schemas. In cognitive 
anthropology ‘cultural themes’ (Strauss/Quinn 1997) or ‘foundational schemas’ (Shore 1996) 
are thought to act as organizing principles for lower-level data structures. The same basic 
 77 
necessity is increasingly being acknowledged by linguists studying metaphor networks, as 
argued above. 
    For one thing, metaphor theory needs to be embedded in cognitive anthropology with its 
broader concerns with inference (Hutchins 1980, Cole 1974, Hamill 1990, Shweder 1991, 
Boyer 1994), complex spatial orientation (Hutchins 1987, Pedersen et al. 1998), memory 
(Bloch 1998, Whitehouse 1992, 1996), emotions (Abu-Lughod 1986, Lutz 1987, 1988), 
shared social tasks (Hutchins 1995), or religious ritual (Lawson/McCauley 1990, Bloch 1992, 
Boyer 1993, Whitehouse 1995). While an increasing recognition of metaphor theory is under 
way in cognitive anthropology (Keesing 1989, 1992, Shore 1991, 1996, Palmer 1996, Boyer 
1990, 1994) the reverse process is lagging behind. Metaphor theory is the predestined 
ground for a reunion of the two disciplines, yet this still requires shaping a common 
terminology and sorting out some territorial struggles.  
    A general problem lies in the dazzling number of concepts recently en vogue such as 
‘metaphors’, ‘schemas’, ‘scripts’, ‘frames’, ‘themes’, and what have you, describing different 
but inherently overlapping cognitive phenomena. The relationship between them is all but 
clear. Another problem is that this terminological jumble seems to involve serious conceptual 
issues. Interestingly, metaphor has become the point of crystallization for interdisciplinary 
arguments. This is indicated by a vigorous, though not always clear debate between 
cognitive anthropologists and cognitive linguists, which revolves around the question whether 
metaphor creates cultural reality or is an expression of underlying cultural schemas (cf. 
Quinn 1987, 1991, Keesing 1989, Gibbs 1994, Strauss/Quinn 1997, Kövecses 1999). In a 
later chapter I will discuss this issue in detail. In many respects, so I will argue, the 
theoretical rift results from the incompleteness of models and selective research foci on both 
sides, while these are in truth complementary. We need more studies like Allbritton’s (1995), 
which shows that metaphors fulfil functions attributed to schemas. A major future concern 
should be to sort out the overlaps of representational formats appearing in the relevant 
literature and proposing clear-cut distinctions embedded in an overall model of how they 
work together. We need to understand how high level schemas interact dialectically with 
local metaphors, how schemas organize metaphors, and how metaphors constrain schemas. 
 
DISTRIBUTED MEANING AND MEGAMETAPHORS 
Another serious limitation of linguistic metaphor theory in the past was that the cognitive 
effects of large-scale structures have been scarcely discussed. As Werth (1999) points out, 
quite often a metaphoric effect is created by sustained innuendo throughout a text, rather 
than by a single expression. Here a mental image is evoked cumulatively and cannot be 
definitely ascribed to any locus in a text or a narrative. It is distributed throughout the 
medium. Werth calls this ‘megametaphor’. Though originating from a cognitive approach to 
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literary texts, incursions such as Werth’s have a natural ally in anthropology, where the 
distributed nature of cognition is a standard precondition of writing ethnographies from a rich 
background of accumulated fieldwork data. Rituals and myths, which have extended 
meaning structures, have been analyzed in this way by anthropologists (structuralists even 
included patterns of kinship, patterns in everyday activities such as cooking, or phonological 
patterns), although the issue of cognitive reality was often disregarded. While the 
megametaphors approach is both suggestive and embedded in a comprehensive cognitive 
framework, what is missing in this comparatively new trend is an integrative theory. It should 
explain (1) how overall meanings are evoked and recalled, (2) how large scale meanings are 
condensed out of compounds of small scale meanings, and (3) how micro and macro levels 
can reinforce each other or how they can create more complex effects together, such as 
ironic tension. I will propose first steps in that direction in the final chapter. For future work all 
this also suggests that a closer integration with the theory of action ‘scripts’, which centers on 
sequential meaning to begin with, can be obtained. 
 
MULTIMEDIA COGNITION 
The complexities of the anthropological trade are not only reflected in linguistic metaphors 
but are added to by a necessary preoccupation with metaphor in other symbolic modes, such 
as architecture, ritual, dance, painting, etc. Integrative interpretations of the cumulative 
impact of all these modes are a characteristic goal of ‘thick descriptions’. This, in turn, 
requires that the interrelations between language and other symbolic modes be analyzed. In 
other words, what is needed is a cognitive theory of multimedia that explains how meaning 
structures from different media cumulate or interact in other ways. 
    In the cognitive approach to metaphor an unfortunate ‘linguacentrism’ still prevails (cf. 
Hill/Mannheim 1992: 394). This is particularly deplorable because the image schema 
approach, which is based in general Gestalt psychology and covers perceptual, conceptual, 
and actional aspects, warrants a much closer integration with other modes of cognition. The 
principal reason for linguacentrism is that most protagonists of metaphor theory were trained 
as linguists and not the restrictive nature of their theory itself. In my view, the theory of 
imagery, which forms a theoretical kernel of metaphor theory, is especially apt for explaining 
how the multimedial construction of meaning operates. I propose that the confluence of 
meaning from several modes of encoding cultural meaning can be suggestively explained, if 
we can show that even cognitive modes not obviously associated with imagistic thought are 
based in imagery. Chapter 13 will show that the imagistic approach is perfectly suited to 
explain how evoked linguistic images, structural features of languages, phonological 
structures, sensory percepts, proprioceptive feelings, and action structures can be mapped 
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onto one another. Imagery is thus a ‘common currency’ that explains meaning similarities 
across surface differences. 
 
THE PLAY OF TROPES 
In most cases of higher complexity, such as are typical of ritual or myth, metaphor cannot be 
understood as an isolated trope. It is typically embedded in complex and dynamic meaning 
structures. As a consequence, more attention than in the past has to be directed to the 
relation of metaphor to other tropes, chiefly metonymy, synecdoche, and irony in 
anthropology (Fernandez 1986, Friedrich 1991, Turner 1991, Ohnuki-Tierney 1991). 
Cognitive linguistics has also partly broadened its scope beyond metaphor with its recent 
focus on metonymy (Goosens 1990, Dirven 1993, Croft 1993, Gibbs 1994, 
Kövecses/Radden 1998, Barcelona 2000). Yet, the complex interaction of ‘polytropes’ in 
complex cultural contexts such as ritual has remained the domain of cultural and linguistic 
anthropology. 
    Fernandez (1991) suggests a focus on what he calls ‘the play or tropes’, i.e. the creative, 
dynamic, and innovative nature of concepts, which are held to be in incessant de- and 
reconstruction. In the reverse mode, Keesing (1989: 476) is concerned that highlighting 
those discursive genres and contexts in which creativity and flexibility is most vividly 
manifest, such as oratory, gossip, and poetry, submerges from view those genres where talk 
is most routinized. It seems to me that neither approach should be applied to the exclusion of 
the other, although cognitive linguists in the past have certainly focused more on 
conventional tropes than on the play of tropes, so that a balance is still missing here. 
 
SITUATED SOCIAL COGNITION 
One of the legitimate strengths of anthropology, perhaps most emphasized by proponents of 
the interpretive approach, is its concern with situated knowledge. Ethnographers are 
concerned with describing the pragmatics of a metaphoric incident. Recent works in linguistic 
anthropology by Levenson, Duranti, Ochs, Haviland, and Moerman are exemplary here (cited 
by Keesing 1992: 600). They have explored the social contextualization of language and the 
acquisition of cultural competence. Meaning emerges in discourse as interlocutors interpret 
each other’s speech performances (Palmer 1996: 37ff). Listeners frame situations and 
construe meaning in them. Meaning is contingent on events and not entirely fixed in 
conventional expressions and grammar. Its study requires attention to the identities and 
histories of the discourse participants. Palmer emphasizes the necessity to attend to (1) the 
immediate discourse situation and (2) the interlocutors’ world models. Yet, if meaning were 
only dynamic and emergent culture did not exist, so that Palmer argues for a middle ground. 
On the one hand, culture is defined through the existence of a large stock of conventional 
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expressions and structures with stable imagery. On the other hand, each individual usage 
implicates it in a particular social and linguistic situation. Therefore, imagery from the 
cognitive stock always requires framing. 
    Because metaphor, or any other trope, is a socially situated phenomenon it serves the 
intentions of actors. Metaphor (and language in general) is socially motivated and motivates 
others. Both processes must be understood relative to particular social settings (cf. 
Strauss/D’Andrade 1992), a fact that places metaphor squarely in the social sciences. As 
Lakoff and Johnson rightly state in their 1980 book title people ‘live by’ their metaphors. 
Dirven (1994) studies the metaphors Afrikaners in South Africa live by, Lakoff (1992, 1996) 
deals with the role of metaphor in American politics, and Dirven et al. (2001) have recently 
published a two-volume collection on ideology and cognitive linguistics with several 
contributions on metaphor. My general point is that the strong motivational character of 
metaphor inherently implies a power nexus. This can be shown for rhetoric and poetry, from 
which social movements often originate (Fernandez 1977). It can also be shown for the 
cultural episteme of everyday thought. 
    Situatedness implies that given metaphors have to be seen relative to their usage 
contexts, and that we have to refrain from too sweeping interpretations of their cultural 
significance. Many metaphors that anthropologists are interested in are meant to create a 
non-everyday context for a particular purpose. Outside this purpose normal ways of 
categorizing can prevail again. This, of course, is especially true of metaphors in ritual 
process, which gradually leads the performers away from everyday reality and then back 
again (Turner 1969).  
    An interesting field of study for anthropological metaphor theory (especially with reference 
to globalization and rapid cultural change) is how novel experiences are culturally 
metaphorized. In Piagetian terms, this involves either ‘assimilation’ or ‘accommodation’. This 
operates on a scale of familiarity. With very familiar experiences people tend to place them 
directly into a known schema or metaphor. Somewhat less familiar novel experiences require 
a process of filtering and highlighting for assimilating them. Still more unfamiliar experiences 
cannot be placed into existing knowledge structures and require accommodation, i.e. the 
reshuffling of knowledge and creation of new structures. As I will show later, tradition 
frequently asserts itself through casting the new in metaphors of the familiar, while 
metaphorical creativity may also fuel social change.  
 
COMPLEX IMAGERY 
As soon as the analysis shifts to both (1) complex metaphor networks and (2) situated 
metaphors, this affects the way we theorize about the underlying conceptual mechanisms. A 
cornerstone of characterizing the representational structure of metaphor, it has been argued, 
 81 
is the analysis of so-called image schemas. Therefore, we have to devise new ways of 
theorizing complex and situated image schemas according to the points just specified. 
    Most linguistic examples of metaphor given in this chapter involve image schemas at the 
most basic structural level (e.g. CONTAINER, FORCE, CENTER-PERIPHERY, UP-DOWN, BALANCE). 
These simple image schemas will, of course, continue to play a role for anthropological 
concerns, especially for creating basic ontological correspondences across domains. Yet, 
applying the anthropological lens also means that the perspective will undergo a shift to a 
more complex level. This is especially true when the explanatory goal is to understand how a 
complex situated concept is cognized, and not what basic parts a concept shares with 
others. Situated and complex meanings are usually not easily described as simple image 
schemas. Many authors put the tag ‘propositional mode’ to this higher level of complexity, 
although I will later suggest an alternative way in which this level can be incorporated into the 
imagistic perspective, with the work of Palmer (1996) offering a guideline. Palmer is 
successful in applying quite sophisticated theories of imagistic mechanisms developed by 
Talmy, Langacker, Lakoff, and Johnson to linguistic examples from many cultures. In the 
final chapters of this work I will also offer a series of examples for mental mechanisms 
structured by complex imagery. These chapters will focus on dynamic transformations or 
condensations of, multiple meanings in, and switches between imagery types. 
    Studies of imagery also allow a description of how complex cognitive models are 
constructed out of a set of more basic ones. There are two acknowledged major principles of 
uniting basic conceptual elements into ‘families’ (cf. Langacker 1987):  
(1) Conceptual organization typically includes the chaining of conceptual elements 
into clusters. Such a cluster may or may not include a core (a prototype). Conceptual 
micro-models are built like this, as studies on the structure of polysemy in 
prepositions show, but the existence of much broader conceptual families between 
word types or between cognitive domains is also conceivable, if more difficult to 
demonstrate. It is conceivable that conceptual clusters are activated as actual spatial 
configurations in the mind and obey certain organizing principles from our knowledge 
of physical space. Chapter 8 will be devoted to an in-depth discussion of this 
suggestion, which has been put forward by Lakoff (1987). 
(2) Besides organization through clustering conceptual elements can also be brought 
into a unity through the schematization of features on an abstract level. In other 
words, the filtering out the generalized basic features (e.g. ontological metaphors) of 
otherwise differing mental representations can unite metaphor families. Again, this 
filtering process can be understood as a process of mentally selecting the shared 
outline structures of imagery and dropping the too fine-grained details. 
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CONCLUSION: THE TASK OF A CULTURAL METAPHOROLOGY 
An anthropological perspective on metaphor calls for taking a specific social context as the 
starting point, not metaphor abstracted away from its use. The heightened sensitivity for 
contextuality and holism, which is the hallmark of anthropological approaches, needs to be 
joined with the effective theoretical apparatus of cognitive linguistics. Thus, metaphor 
analysis in anthropology has to respond to at least three general challenges: (1) With a view 
on explaining cultural core meanings it should inquire into complex metaphor networks and 
their rich background structure, distinguish types of models on various (mutually embedded) 
scales of generality, and theorize the trade-off between local and large scale cognitive 
structures on their basis (e.g. metaphors and schemas). (2) With a view on a theory of social 
behavior it should explain how and why metaphors are acted on, how they are saturated with 
emotions, and how they facilitate inferences. (3) With a view on the relativism issue it should 
ask how cultural particulars emerge through situated combinations of universal modules, 
while being guided by general functional principles of human cognition, and what sorts of 
bodily, experiential, environmental, or other motivations of metaphor are universal. 
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Chapter 2:                                                                                             
The Function of Metaphor in Culture 
 
An important avenue to an understanding of cultural cognition lies in analyzing the cognitive 
utility of metaphor for conceptual, social, and political ends. I will begin this chapter by 
discussing a number of general effects and cognitive functions of metaphor. Then I will 
progressively concentrate on the role that complex metaphors fulfill in bridging the gap 
between conceptual domains, as well as integrating or otherwise structuring cultural 
discourse. It will become evident that understanding cultural world-views as webs of meaning 
requires attending to metaphorical functions. In addition to these socio-conceptual stabilizing 
functions, I will also discuss the dynamic role of metaphor in cultural innovation and the 
expression of new ideas. Finally, the role of metaphor in expressing conceptually evanescent 
existential conditions will be examined. The integrative, creative, and expressive functions of 
metaphor have always been of highest interest to anthropologists, but are seldom thoroughly 
discussed by cognitive linguists, so that a social-functional view now rephrased in cognitive 
theory can considerably contribute to a rapprochement of metaphor studies and the social 
sciences. 
 
1. Basic characteristics of metaphoric cognition: Metaphor is attention-binding, 
memorable, emotional, and inferential 
The pervasiveness of metaphor is not surprising if we look at its tremendous cognitive utility. 
Generally, it seems to be a lot more difficult to invent new representations for problems that 
we wish to solve than to borrow them from other domains (cf. Strauss/Quinn 1997: 128). To 
some degree all human cognition depends on utilizing the familiar to grasp the less 
understood; i.e. associativity plays an important general role in cognition. Metaphor analysis 
is a direct way to describe this aspect of familiar knowledge harnessed to new tasks. On top 
of this, there are a number of specific features that make metaphor an especially powerful 
cognitive mechanism. A basic reason for metaphor’s power lies in its imagistic nature. 
Because of imagery metaphor is a format that facilitates, both, the vivid and the compact 
representation and expression of salient knowledge. Moreover, we can expect metaphor to 
occur at strategically important junctures in culture, since it is typically highly noticeable, 
memorable, and emotion-arousing. Let me discuss these points in more detail now: 
    First, metaphor often uses imagery and this in turn facilitates memorization. An obvious 
aspect of imagery facilitating recall is vividness. In addition, metaphor is presumably a very 
powerful means for the recall of complex knowledge. This has to do with the Gestalt-like 
nature of imagery evoked by metaphor. Paivio and Walsh (1993: 321f) argue that the 
availability of imagistic cognition – which is an inherent property of metaphor – increases the 
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speed of recall and promotes the efficient storage of information by integrating image 
clusters, which are then accessed as Gestalts. This simply means that whole chunks of 
experience and situations are stored in and recalled from memory as single items. This 
broadly corresponds to the notion of an experiential or cognitive ‘frame’ in the cognitive 
literature, suggested by Charles Fillmore (1982) and Marvin Minsky (1974). What is 
important here is that in Gestalt cognition an integrated whole is cognitively more primary 
and more easily understood than its individual parts, thus making for quick access speed to 
the whole. Screening Gestalts imposes no sequential constraints and gives way to 
simultaneous representation of several attributes. Even complex arrays of criteria can be 
said to be processed and memorized as imagistic Gestalts. The following argument is based 
on the assumption the metaphors are particularly effective at evoking such complex Gestalts. 
    The utility of integrated Gestalt cognition for processing the typically complex and fuzzy 
features of ‘cognition in the wild’ – to use Edwin Hutchins’ (1995) fitting expression – is 
evident (for details about Gestalts see chapter 7): A good example for a Gestalt 
representation in real-life cognition is Maurice Bloch’s (1998: 8) description of a Malagasy 
shifting cultivator faced with the complex decision of what makes a good swidden for 
cultivation. An experienced Malagasy cultivator can come to a decision in a matter of 
seconds without going through the numerous aspects in a checklist-like manner, which would 
take considerably longer. This is possible precisely because he has a conceptual Gestalt 
image of a good swidden that years of experience have formed. No swidden is exactly like 
any other and there is no list of necessary and sufficient criteria that precisely picks out all 
suitable swiddens from the set of possible ones.27 What makes a suitable swidden is a matter 
of degree. The features of all good sites stand in a ‘family relationship’ with one another 
without any exact matches being either possible or necessary. The reason for this is that 
everyday tasks, such as choosing a suitable swidden, regularly display ‘fuzzy’ features.  
    Because metaphor frequently has an image-schematic basis and because image 
schemas, in turn, are processed as analog Gestalts, the general cognitive utility of Gestalts 
                                                 
27 Bloch’s intention in giving this example is to argue in favor of parallel distributed models of cognition 
and against sequential modes of symbolic cognition in many everyday recognition tasks. The reader 
familiar with the general idea of parallel distributed processing (PDP), as implemented in the non-
symbolic models developed in ‘connectionism’, will notice that it neatly converges with the notion of 
Gestalt imagery. Although modeling tasks in artificial intelligence do not usually involve any notion of 
imagery (or even representation), the PDP-view is highly compatible with the concept of an integrated 
representational Gestalt, because both perspectives sidestep the constraints of sequential cognition. 
As is the case with Gestalt cognition, connectionist models are particularly good at pattern recognition 
tasks (and superior to models working with symbolic processing), especially at tasks with so-called 
‘fuzzy’ patterns that display slightly varying features. 
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in pattern recognition and memorization directly applies to metaphor. This suggestion is in 
keeping with evidence that metaphor furthers cognitive economy. It has been shown 
experimentally that meanings couched in linguistic metaphor can often be grasped faster 
than in cases when only nonfigurative speech is used. Also, metaphorical information is at 
least as easily retained in memory (Beck 1982: 94, 1987: 13). One reason that has been 
suggested is that for the kind of metaphors that employ bizarre or non-everyday 
combinations of domains a deeper base of cognition may be required. Another reason is that 
metaphors usually have a number of entailments, which are tacitly included. That means that 
inferences can be draw from them, given basic shared cultural models of the relevant 
domains. White (1987: 155) cogently makes this point with reference to proverbs, which are 
usually metaphorical: 
 
“Proverbs function as effective communicative devices because they set up the listener to draw such 
practical inferences by expressing one or more key propositions embedded in a cultural model with 
known entailments. By instantiating certain elements of an existing model, other, related propositions 
are invoked through inference. In this way, the proverb user is able to formulate and communicate a 
point of view without verbally articulating all of its elements.” 
 
Proverbs thus have a prototypical generic level structure that applies or may apply to a 
multitude of typical cultural situations (cf. Lakoff/Turner 1989). Even if this generic level, in 
the proverb, structure is couched in the details of the proverbial situation, it can be easily 
extracted, transposed, and understood in analogy, given that the evocative context to which 
the proverb is applied is right. When you hear such proverbs as “It’s no use crying over 
spilled milk”, “The grass is always greener on the other side of the fence”, or “Don’t make a 
mountain out of a mole hill!” your cultural knowledge and the context together will give rise to 
the appropriate inferences and lead to suitable actions. The fact that metaphors are ‘catchy’ 
and emotional makes them powerful devices, e.g. in political rhetoric. One aspect that 
emerges when speaking about entailments, namely that they can also backfire by over-
extending a metaphor, shall be only mentioned here and argued in detail later. 
    Specifically, metaphor can facilitate not only perception and expression, but also 
reasoning sequences. Quinn (1991: 81) stresses that a “metaphor might fix in mind a 
particular lengthy, complex causal sequence or preserve a piece of longer, more complex 
one, so that the piece can be retrieved and fit into the rest of the causal chain” (see also 
Fernandez 1986: 46). Quinn specifically shows how the effortless access to various 
metaphors of marriage and to their entailments allows for frequent and imperceptible slips 
between different conceptual metaphors within a single statement of her informants (p. 86). 
(For a thorough treatment of metaphor and inferential capacity see Klein 1987).  
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    Metaphoric cognition is not only memorable because of these features, but also because it 
is emotion-arousing.28 A great deal of recent research in cognition shows that the dualism 
between thought and emotion is no longer tenable and metaphor provides a perhaps the 
best example for this. Recall Beck’s and Kirmayer’s description of metaphor as the injection 
of sensory-affective knowledge into semantic space that was mentioned above. The reverse 
is also true: There is experimental evidence that thoughts produced by metaphors may be 
immediately felt emotionally because of the same inter-level interaction. Moreover, a large 
number of works describe the use of metaphor in therapy, for example for creating a vent 
and means of expression for suppressed and otherwise blocked emotions. Likewise, studies 
in medical anthropology from a large number of cultures deal with the importance of 
metaphor in healing. In all these accounts the emotional and the cognitive aspect are 
inseparable phenomena (cf. Kirmayer 1992: 336, Kirmayer 1993, Jackson 1983, Csordas 
1990). 
    In summary, metaphor creates cognitive salience due to five inherent properties: First, 
metaphor forces the mind to make higher-order linkages, which are the fundamental units of 
recall from memory (Beck 1987: 13). Secondly, this implies that the mind has to participate 
actively and that it invites reshaping. Thirdly, metaphor typically includes high levels of 
imagery, which is known to be memorable (ibid.). Fourthly, metaphor is an efficient means of 
storing complex information because of its entailments, which are reconstructed through 
applying a whole system of generic aspects from the source domain to a new context. And 
finally, metaphor encourages emotions, which in turn have the power to make an experience 
salient. For all these reasons metaphor is highly attention-binding. In all likelihood it is 
precisely through these factors that (non-conventionalized) metaphors are recognized as 
something out of the ordinary by the people who use or hear them. 
    After this introductory characterization let us now consider two examples to show that 
metaphor can involve both the transfer of complex inferential models and the transfer of 
emotions from one domain to another. 
 
                                                 
28 The insight that (linguistic) metaphor can arouse emotions goes back to Aristotle, who valued 
metaphor highly in his sparse but influential treatment of it. Yet for others, especially the 
Enlightenment philosophers, this potential was to become the chief source of opposition to metaphors 
and other tropes, castigating them as the appropriate means for populists and manipulative sophistry. 
To argue against metaphor as ‘unscientific’ and ‘ideological’ and to try to purge language of it has its 
adherents to the present day. A watered-down version of this persists in the largely futile attempts to 
reinterpret metaphor as literal proposition, e.g. by Davidson (1978). 
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MAPPED INFERENTIAL MODELS 
Frequently metaphors project an entire inferential structure from one domain to another. 
Palmer (1996: 223) aptly formulates that “[t]he cognitive topology of the source domain 
constitutes a field of inference.” Therefore, metaphorically mapping a topology means that 
this inferential field is preserved in the target domain (or at least in part). In other words, the 
principle of mapping does, in many cases, not only apply to static image-schematic structure 
in the narrow sense – whole inferential sub-models operative in the source domain can be 
transferred to do reasoning task in the target domain. 
    Certain metaphorical transfers cannot be observed as linguistic mappings, but only 
inferred on a basis of plausible conjecture from the entailments of how people reason about 
something. A case of cross-domain mapping where inferential structures are mapped across 
domains is explored by Boyer (1990, 1993b, 1994), who intends to show how religious ideas 
are corroborated by cognitive mechanisms commonly reserved for biological kinds. 
Specifically, he claims that the inferential characteristics of essentialism can be mapped from 
natural species to social ‘species’. Boyer starts from the observation that the identification of 
members of a social category is often constrained by tacit essentialist principles. He couples 
this with recent research suggesting that there is a general human propensity to ascribe 
essences to natural species. If essences are ascribed to social groups this is done because 
of this original predisposition in conceiving natural kinds that is mapped on other domains. 
Thus, social species are being perceived as ‘pseudo-natural kinds’.  
    To understand what this means a brief outline of findings on essentialist thought is 
necessary here (I will treat the subject in considerable detail later). Essences are ascribed to 
living kinds, and perhaps to other entities. Even though natural kinds, such as giraffes and 
lemons, are identified by typical perceptual features, this provides neither necessary nor 
sufficient conditions to define group membership. A typical lemon is yellow and a typical 
giraffe long-necked. When a lemon is bluish or a giraffe short-necked, they remain lemons 
and giraffes. Therefore, Boyer argues (on the basis of how people express folk-theories in 
discourse) that the belief in natural kinds includes as a second element the assumption of an 
‘underlying trait’. All individuals of a kind are presumed to have a common underlying trait. 
This trait, even though it remains vague, is considered to be existent and causally 
responsible for making a thing just that kind of thing it is. What makes a giraffe a giraffe is not 
its size, its habitat, its spots, or its long neck, but its ‘giraffeness’. As Boyer (1990: 104) says 
“[t]he idea of an undefined common essence is a powerful cognitive mechanism, universally 
available to human minds.” Essentializing is an intuitive heuristic, which is perhaps not innate 
as such, but a sort of default that can be easily instantiated by fitting input. A ‘natural kind’ is 
a predication that allows generalizations, because their features come in bundles. If one 
giraffe is pointed out to me and I know giraffes are a natural kind, then I can assume that the 
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observed features are those of all giraffes. With non-natural kinds this sort of straightforward 
inferential potential is limited.29 
    How is this inferential structure then mapped on the social domain? The mapping between 
natural and social kinds is reflected in the semantics of many languages. For example, the 
Indian concept jati can be glossed both as ‘caste’ in the social domain and as ‘species’ in the 
natural domain. Boyer bases his theory on the study of the Fang of Gabon and their social 
category of beyem (‘people who see’). This category includes ghost specialists and bards, 
yet it is not defined by any observable feature or by a set of such features. Rather, one either 
is a beyem or not by virtue of an unobservable inner organ. A person either belongs or does 
not belong to the category, with no intermediary cases permitted. Yet, common discourse on 
beyem is intrinsically vague, saying that they are involved in uncanny and anti-social 
activities, but that it is impossible to say anything definite apart from that. The actual decision 
about someone being a beyem is a matter of intuition or individual inference,30 so that a folk-
theoretical account operating on a defined observable features is impossible. Boyer argues 
that, nonetheless, an invisible essence is ascribed to the category of beyem. This invisible 
essence of a social kind is metaphorically perceived on the basis of knowledge about natural 
kinds, which are the prototype of essential categories. Only this underlying belief allows 
particular inferential patterns: 
 
“The fact that the class of beyem are represented in much the same way as a natural kind is crucial, 
because it makes possible to entertain beliefs based on inductive generalisations. Once beyem are 
represented as belonging to a ‘species’, characteristics of singular individuals can be represented as 
typical of a group as a whole. Then the properties of people identified as beyem will be extended as 
being probable properties of the whole class (...)” (Boyer 1993b: 138) 
                                                 
29 So far as I understand the experimental evidence cited by Boyer, it cannot be unequivocally decided 
whether the belief in essences ontogenetically really develops first for natural kinds and is then 
metaphorically mapped from this domain to others. Essentialist categories, which create the basis for 
inductive generalization, might also result from a general mental default. Such a default might  apply to 
all cases where a new category, social or other, is formed. However, whether pseudo-natural kinds are 
a general learning default for categorizing novel experiences or whether they are selectively mapped 
from natural kinds does not affect my argument. What is important is that inferential structures that are 
already known from one or more domains are transferred to novel domains. 
30 As an alternative a complex pre-discursive folk-model could be responsible (for example one that 
defines category membership through a family resemblance model). On that assumption the 
uncommitted stance of subjects is due to the fact that they may implicitly identify a beyem when they 
see one, but cannot specify a single general principle, simply because their mental model works 
differently from the discursive requirement to identify clear-cut rules. Unfortunately, Boyer has nothing 
explicit to say about this possibility. 
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Experts make definite statements about beyem, but when they do so they invariably focus on 
singular cases from their personal experience instead of using general principles. Boyer 
claims that non-experts construct representations of what a beyem is in terms of features 
gradually drawing on experts’ statements and diagnoses on individual cases and that they 
can do so because they believe that the category is essentialist. It is only through the 
essentialist belief that, despite external diversity, there is an invisible source of deeper 
‘sameness’ that licenses the inference. This belief is captured in the linguistic predication 
beyem, which is understood as an essentialist kind. 
    Boyer (1994a: 171f) repeatedly insists that interpretation merely in terms of conventional 
metaphor has serious shortcomings, since the inferential patterns of the essentialist 
assumption need to be analyzed in addition. Boyer asserts that his account goes beyond 
prior theories of metaphor, because a cognitive mode of construal figures prominently here 
that has to be analyzed independently. One can have essentialist assumptions without 
metaphors and vice versa (p. 172). Two features of Boyer’s analysis not typically included in 
the research design of metaphor theorists are the study of inferential patterns in social 
contexts and the reference to developmental data on how children learn to categorize. 
Although the appropriateness of the term metaphor may be questioned, in principle I see no 
reason against it, as long as we define metaphor in a way that it can include the mapping of 
specific inferential structures, including such that draw on auxiliary models like essentialism. 
We should also not forget that the importance of inferences has been duly recognized by 
Lakoffian metaphor theory under the label of a metaphor’s entailments. Furthermore, as I will 
try to show in chapter 9, I believe that such essentialist construals of categories need to be 
explained by an image-schematic Gestalt that is then mapped from one domain to another, 
and not only a set of inferential principles added up. 
 
MAPPED EMOTIONS AND MAPPED BODY KNOWLEDGE 
In many cases, the metaphoric process intermeshes much more intimately with experienced 
emotion than a purely rhetorical focus would lead us to believe. Metaphor can blend two 
emotional worlds. As the following example will show, it can serve to define a context in a 
culturally desired way by evoking particular emotions from another context. The example 
stems from McGee’s (1987) fieldwork on the Lancandon Maya of Chiapas and a key 
communal ritual that involves the brewing and drinking of an alcoholic beverage called 
balché. This drink, made of fermented water, honey, and balché bark, is consumed in 
prolonged ritual sessions by men, often until they become nauseated. A special song in the 
style of a love song is sung to accompany the ritual consumption. The song is called The 
Little Wife and its purpose is quite plainly to prevent the drinkers from vomiting. In this song 
the drink balché is likened to a woman and drinking the beverage is stated in physical terms 
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with obvious sexual connotations, like ‘embracing the Little Wife’. Although the drink only has 
a low alcohol content the men eventually become drunk, which is a desired state. Inebriation 
is sought because, as the Lacandon say, they do it in imitation of the gods and because of 
the ritual potency of the drink. Therefore, the men must seek not to get out of their state by 
vomiting. The song is designed to help them in this by equating the drink to a desired 
woman. It can be parenthetically noted that several aspects of Maya mythology motivate the 
likening of balché to a woman. (It is a woman because its main ingredient honey is linked 
with women and sexuality: Bee hives are viewed as female or womb symbols with 
indigenous peoples throughout Latin America, as are other objects where honey is found, 
such as hollow logs; bees are also regarded as female.) Furthermore, the sensory 
connotations of honey and the desire for the sweet taste provide an additional basis for the 
association to desiring a woman sexually. 
    All of the Little Wife song is structured with reference to balché, which, according to 
Mcgee, can be understood as a key metaphor of the Lacandon Maya religion (p. 112). Taken 
as a whole, it becomes apparent that the song is not about a woman, but rather a statement 
about the transcendental effects of balché, in particular an individual’s desire to experience 
the altered state of consciousness induced by the drink, and the psychological pain 
experienced in losing grasp of this state. This loss of the transcendental experience is 
depicted in the song as walking or feeling alone, whereas other verses are about the 
desirability of balché conceived as the Little Wife. In McGee’s account the central status of 
the metaphor lies in the fact that it expresses Lacandon thought about the relationship 
between gods and men. A crucial entailment following from the metaphor has to do with the 
proximity of the gods, which may be, by way of contrast, opposed to the remoteness of the 
Christian god of the Lacandon’s neighbors, who have converted to Protestantism. Just as a 
woman can be approached and embraced, so, too, a relationship with the gods can be 
cultivated by drinking balché. Interestingly, through the Little Wife metaphor the gods are 
conceived in terms of physical approachability and thus immanence, since the men can 
come nearer to them through the states of their bodies. Speaking in terms of the 
methodological framework of this work we may say that the metaphor is embodied in a quite 
basic sense. The memory of embracing, taking near one’s body, and possible sexually 
congregating with another desired body is mapped on the enacted ingestion of a substance 
into the body. Beyond being mythologically motivated, as described above, I would therefore 
suggest that the metaphor is also motivated phenomenologically by virtue of the similarities 
between the experiences of ingestion and embracing. Arguably, the similarity is image-
schematic both in an embodied and in a conceptual sense, in that something is brought 
within the physical orbit of the subject and has a profound bodily and emotional effect on him. 
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What is more, the effect is, in both cases, about not being alone anymore. Both experiences 
are about existential experiences of closeness in a very primal sense. 
    What is demonstrated very nicely here is how the metaphorical evocation of emotions of a 
particular kind can redefine a context or invest it with a particular kind of importance. In this 
case, the song crucially defines the ritual as going beyond its more mundane significance as 
a recreational binge. Admittedly, it is not the metaphor itself that gives the ritual its religious 
character of being about communion with the gods. Nevertheless, I would argue that it 
defines the particular embodied nature of what ‘religious’ here means to a considerable 
extent. As we have seen, it carries ontological entailments about the immanent relation of 
man and the gods. The drinking of balché is given religious significance, in that the desire to 
be near the gods is given an experientially well-known counterpart while a more basic form of 
desire is appealed to. The effect on the participants is that their desire to remain inebriated is 
strengthened by evoking sexual closeness and the wish to prolong it. Hence, it would be 
somewhat reductionist and superficial to see the Little Wife metaphor as no more than a 
handy psychological device that prevents vomiting. A main theme of Lacandon Maya religion 
is created (or at least expressed) through it, namely that of physical closeness and ritual 
states as being about transcending apartness.  
    In my reading of McGee’s case description, two domains of life, namely sexuality and 
religion, are integrated through the metaphor of the Little Wife and this is achieved by a 
mapping of embodied states of emotion and mood. Two forms of embodied desire for 
closeness are related by the metaphor. In other words, what the metaphor does can – for 
analytical purposes – be defined as a two-stage process: First it produces the effect to direct 
the attention to the physical experiences in both domains. Then the metaphor highlights their 
embodied similarity (ingestion/embracing, being stimulated, being part of a whole and not 
alone) and evokes the appropriate physical-emotional mood. Thus, one domain is imbued 
with a strong emotional coloration from another domain. Later I will discuss at length how, in 
such examples, two domains are brought further together as a whole through such 
metaphors and thus influence the way the world is ontologically carved up into distance and 
proximity relations between domains of experience. 
 
2. Explanatory ‘frame setting’ and generative deep metaphors 
Much past research on metaphor, pioneered by Mary Hesse (1970), has been devoted to its 
role in science, where its elementary function relates to the solving of new problems by 
analogy. Its scientific application encompasses the discovery, the development, the 
evaluation, and the exposition of new ideas. Although I am not much concerned with science 
here, it is clear that these functions can also be claimed for everyday thought in general (see 
various authors in Holland/Quinn 1987). Such explanatory metaphors can either import a 
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new viewpoint into a well-defined pre-existing theoretical domain or bring about a 
paradigmatic change of perspective about what a whole domain consists of.  
     When Donald Schön (1993) [1979] speaks of ‘frame setting’, i.e. the apprehension of a 
specific context via a deep metaphor, he aims at showing how new perspectives and 
interpretations are generated. He illustrates his general idea with reference to urban housing 
policies.  
 
“I have become persuaded that the essential difficulties in social policy have more to do with problem 
setting than problem solving, more to do with the ways in which we frame the purposes to be achieved 
than with selection of optimal means for achieving them. (...) Problem settings are mediated, I believe, 
by the ‘stories ‘ people tell about troublesome situations (...)” (p. 138) 
 
Schön gives a beautiful account of practical reason here. Initially, we are confronted with a 
problem-setting context, which we then give a ‘reading’. In doing so, we often construct a 
deep metaphor which is generative of the story. Although, more often than not, the deep 
metaphor remains implicit, it unfolds systematic entailments and shapes action in the 
problem setting. Applied to his case study this means: In the urban renewal policy of the 
1950s neighborhoods were mainly seen in terms of health and disease, and therefore as 
slums, as though ‘possessed of a congenital disease’. By contrast, in the 1960s it became 
customary to see slums in terms of a ‘natural community’. It is striking how the policies 
issuing from these different metaphorical apprehensions stand in diametrical opposition to 
one another. In the one view of social reality the ‘cure’ was seen in dislocation and complete 
restructuring, while ‘mere palliatives’ were rejected as ineffective. In the other view the urban 
renewal strategies of the previous decade were seen as dissolving social cohesion and 
solidarity and thus heavily criticized.  
    Schön also shows how one can deal with a dilemma by frame restructuring, i.e. devising a 
new story format that come to grips with both its horns, i.e. that conforms to both conditions 
of the dilemma simultaneously. It needs to be underscored that this does not mean a facile 
denial of conflicting aspects to achieve more cognitive consonance. On the contrary, our 
scope creatively broadens if the conditions allow: 
 
“We do this best, I believe, in the context of particular situations whose information-richness gives us 
access to many different combinations of features and relations, countering our Procrustean tendency 
to notice only what fits our ready made category schemas.” (p. 152) 
 
This observation clearly reminds of Piaget’s notion of accommodation. In accommodation 
schemas are transformed in order to fit the given data. Simply to assimilate data into 
preexisting schemas will not do in these contexts. The accommodation of our problem-frame, 
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on the other hand, may give us a new grip on the problem. A metaphoric account of a 
situation usually confers a problem-oriented focus on a matter. Note that a frame does not 
only give a theoretical view of a problem but that it also incites certain courses of action, and 
thus cultural practice. More about generative functions of metaphor will be said below. 
 
3. The enabling and delimiting of discourse 
Some metaphors can become so salient that they substantially shape cultural discourse. 
They do so in at least three ways: Firstly, metaphors provide the central themes of discourse 
and enable the thinking processes related to these. Secondly, it follows implicitly from this 
that, by focusing on some aspects of reality, they must also blot out others. That is, they 
delimit the thinkable, which means that metaphors can impose far-reaching and highly 
consequential epistemological and ontological constraints. Still other metaphors, thirdly, 
expand the thinkable. Cultural change brings about new ideas (and geniuses before-their-
time act as their vanguard). Usually these are initially considered as explicitly metaphorical, 
i.e. they are not well integrated into any existing domains, and only become conventionalized 
later. 
    Work in philosophy by Stephen Pepper (1942), in literary criticism by Paul de Man (1978), 
in cultural anthropology by Anne Salmond (1982), and most systematically in cognitive 
science by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) has shown how the philosophical discourses of the 
West have fundamentally drawn on metaphorical understandings. Rorty’s influential (1979) 
work – a touchstone of postmodern philosophy – has presented a forceful criticism of the  
‘reality as a mirror of nature’ metaphor as the problematic image on which millennia of 
Western epistemology rest. On categories such as ‘mind’, ‘soul’, ‘will’, etc. within the 
discipline of psychology the various excellent contributions in Leary (1990) are unparalleled. 
In past and present the metaphorical key models are constitutive for philosophical, scientific, 
and folk-theoretic views of reality and knowledge. All these beliefs rest on ‘root metaphors’, a 
term coined by Stephen Pepper. More on root metaphors will be said in chapter 5. For now it 
is sufficient to provide a few examples to show how metaphors govern the scope of 
discourse. 
 
SELECTIVE REALITIES 
In the simplest case the way that metaphors govern the scope of a discourse is 
straightforward: While they accentuate certain aspects of an issue, they hide others. 
Metaphors affirm the so-ness of something in a particular respect and thus mediate 
conceptual associations in connection with a topic. As James Fernandez (1977: 127) put the 
matter, metaphors make some things in the world relevant and all other things quite 
irrelevant. Metaphors are the conceptual pillars of ideologies. Apart from directing our 
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thought in a given field towards particular associations, metaphors sometimes have a 
constitutive function for the field as such, i.e. for thinking about some particular issue (cf. 
Pepper’s ‘root metaphors’ and Smith’s ‘generative metaphors’, ch.1). A high-level metaphor 
of this kind can provide a unique conceptual model for a domain to the exclusion of other 
possible models. The perhaps most famous example in the cognitive literature on metaphor 
can be found in Michael Reddy’s (1979) still important analysis of the CONDUIT metaphor for 
communication. According to Reddy, the American cultural model of communication is totally 
constrained by the CONDUIT metaphor and makes other ways of thinking about it quite difficult 
to conceive. We have a linguistically evident and cognitively deeply entrenched tendency to 
think of communicating as sending objects (the ideas) through a conduit (utterances) to a 
receiver. Any view of a necessity of interpretation or a complex hermeneutic process is 
excluded, as long as ideas are fixed and given objects that only require being transmitted in 
much the same way that parcels are. The parcels can be simply opened up and the items in 
them taken out still identical to those the sender put them in. Indeed, on such a view any 
failure to communicate can only be due to faulty objects (badly put ideas), a blocked conduit 
(not loud enough), or unopened parcels (unwillingness to understand, stupidity). Often the 
conduit view will work well enough and even provides certain benefits – a position that 
Rudzka-Ostyn (1988) defends in detail. Nevertheless, it has serious social consequences if 
people think exclusively in these terms. It becomes particularly detrimental in cases of 
cultural or worldview encounters, since the actors are unable to conceive of the necessity to 
empathize with frames of interpretation that one does not share or to realize that any 
difficulty might be involved in doing so. The conduit view also helps to naturalize the own 
worldview and to mystify the fact that it, also, is only defined against a background of 
unquestioned, but in fact culturally constructed pre-understandings, rather than being the 
result of a universal and pre-given reality. For along time the conduit metaphor has also 
hampered more sophisticated models of communication in scientific thought, especially in 
the wake of Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) influential theory of information (see also 
Strauss/Quinn 1997: 18, 153ff). 
    That metaphor is as potent in concealing as in revealing is especially true with respect to 
complex theories that rely on a combination of metaphors. Some metaphorical theories are 
quite consciously crafted to accentuate a particular view and blot out other facts. Take the 
theory of rational choice, for example. It rests on the generalized assumption that people 
make (a) dispassionate and conscious decisions, (b) based on sufficient information about 
alternative choices, and (c) to maximize their gain. As an analysis by Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999) shows, choices in this theory are metaphorically conceptualized by the image of a 
traveler standing at a bifurcation of paths and evaluating the desirability of the two final 
locations: In this mapping the paths are distinct, the destinations known, the path taken is 
 95 
independent of previous decisions or an overall orientation, there are always preferences, 
and choosing has no costs in any way. Furthermore, the desirability of the final location is 
metaphorically mapped as something that can be numerically measured in a basic common 
unit, in the same way that money makes commodities commensurable but leaves everything 
that cannot be converted into money unconsidered. What is blatantly absent in the universal 
view of the rational actor is the fact that people cannot always choose freely or even 
consciously, that very disparate local conditions cannot be measured by a single yardstick, 
and that economic choices are embedded in a social system as well as a cultural 
background. All this results in the possibility that the allegedly universal rational choice is 
nonsense from a commonsensical or local point of view. 
    An additional metaphor flows into the theory when it frames companies or even whole 
nations as rational actors (i.e. as having the same needs as individuals) whose purpose it is 
to maximize well-being in the form of wealth. With the help of this third mapping the whole 
metaphoric complex, as it stands today, has become the foundation of an economic and 
political doctrine. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 533-34) illustrate the inherent selectivity in such 
a mapping with respect to foreign politics: 
 
“Game theory and models of rational choice (…) have been used since the early days of the cold war 
as ways of making foreign policy and war more ‘rational’. In order to use rational-actor models for 
foreign policy nations must be conceptualized metaphorically as people with interests – national 
interests. What is used is a Nation As Person metaphor. It is in the interest of a person to be healthy 
and strong. In the Nation As Person metaphor, health of a person maps onto overall economic health 
for a nation, and strength for a person maps onto military strength. Maximizing the national interest, 
according to this metaphorical logic, is maximizing the nation’s overall wealth relative to other nations 
and its military strength. 
   What the Nation As Person Metaphor hides are the real people and all the forms of well-being they 
individually require. The metaphor also hides all ecological values that do not translate into wealth and 
military strength.”  
 
Thus certain aspects of the socio-political sphere are picked out and mapped by the 
metaphor, whereas others are left unrecognized. Such metaphors promote a normative view 
and presuppose a specific moral view that disregards the well-being of real people. However, 
this example shows yet another thing. In the present-day situation, rational choice theory has 
not only an implicitly normative character, but is promoted with a lot of scientific and political 
clout. The United States train economic personnel from all over the world in conformity with 
such a rational choice outlook. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank put 
states under the obligation to conform to the neo-liberal view of economic health that at the 
same time disregards completely the well-being of individuals (at least in the short run). In 
doing so they promote what will be called a Strict Father Morality a little bit further down, a 
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morality that wants to teach the ‘children’ to become self-reliant even if it hurts, rather than 
seeing to their emotional needs. Thus developing nations are not only forced to embrace a 
cultural ideology of economy that is not very compatible with their social system, they are 
also forced to apply metaphors of morality that originated in Anglo-Saxon Protestantism. 
These metaphors are being ideologically endorsed and disseminated as underpinning of a 
politically and economically motivated discourse promoting the interests of the rich countries. 
 
CORE METAPHORS ENABLE DISCOURSE 
That metaphors have the power to pick out important aspects of reality and conceal others is 
only one important aspect among several. Many important metaphors do not, as one might 
assume, simply preclude disagreement, dispute, or development. Much on the contrary, they 
enable multiplicity in discourse, albeit within a given range. This pertains foremost to 
metaphors that are generic and specify only a minimum of detail structure, so that a 
discourse can appropriate them in various ways, while always remaining within the 
fundamental limits of the metaphor. Danziger (1990: 332) takes an example from the history 
of psychology to show how a scientific discourse can be governed by a basic metaphor: 
 
“Basic metaphors, like that of psychological energy, provide a kind of rough schema that, when held in 
common, can constitute one of the minimal conditions for effective human communication. But 
because metaphors link two domains (...) in rather undefined ways, these schemata leave open the 
issue of precisely which assumptions and questions are to be transferred from the one domain to the 
other. So metaphorical schemata not only provide a framework for shared discourse, but encourage 
differences of emphasis and therefore conditions favorable for theoretical development.”  
 
There are two implications here. One is that the same basic metaphor can come to have very 
different entailments over the centuries, while remaining essentially stable. The other is that 
different schools of thought that otherwise have little in common may share a basic 
metaphor, thereby creating a common ground between them. 
    It is an interesting observation that certain source domains are employed again and again 
in numerous mappings in a culture. This runs against the argument by Zoltán Kövecses (see 
ch.1) to the effect that metaphorical source domains usually have a conventional main 
meaning focus in a given culture, i.e. the aspects they highlight are invariant across target 
domains. Conceivably, some source domains have a large number of possible cultural foci, 
i.e. they are a frequent exemplar used in discourse. Let us consider the example of the 
human body, which comprises a vast number of traits that lend themselves to mappings. 
Very different aspects of how we think about the body can become salient. For one thing, a 
body is an organic system. For another, it is a reproductive system. Then, it is a homeostatic 
system that tries to maintain a balance. It can be healthy or weak, defective or functional. It is 
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embedded in an ecological context. It is a whole with parts, some of which are more central, 
some less. It is a bounded entity with clear limits. (From a combination of all these aspects 
emerges the widespread metaphor of the society as a body.) Furthermore, the body serves a 
certain purpose, namely that of life; in this way it exemplifies a telos. It goes through cycles. It 
has aesthetic appeal and may embody the beauty of creation. It is the abode of selves and 
the agent of intentional subjects. It has two sexes which stand in complementary relation to 
one another and which are capable of sexual union. It has two symmetric sides, which can 
be used for mapping binary structures. It has a canonical spatial orientation and a 
characteristic topology, which can be mapped onto other spatial relations (cf. Heine 1997: 
143). It grows and decays. Its size and shape may vary. It comes with different racial traits, 
and so forth. It would seem that the potentialities for using salient characteristics of the body 
are virtually inexhaustible.31  
    It can be hypothesized that source domains of this sort serve the diachronic integration of 
shifting cultural discourses. In all likelihood, a rough template such as the body, by its status 
as a lowest common denominator, will resist change much longer than more context-bound 
sub-models and entailments that are tied to a specific historical situation. The popularity of 
the body as a source domain is likely to persist, even when a particular metaphor, such as 
the society as organism, falls into disuse. A source domain can stay in use, while its main 
meaning foci undergo shifts. Put in general theoretical terms, a productive source domain 
can accommodate a huge variety of particular ways of framing and entailments. We can 
surmise that such long-term stable metaphorical frames are one of the central ways that 
culture is diachronically integrated. (However, as I shall argue a bit later, metaphors and 
other tropes can also play against one another in a contrastive relationship between present 
and past.) 
    Basic metaphors also integrate cultural discourse synchronically, while at the same time 
diversifying it. An excellent demonstration of the differing, indeed contrary, ideological 
entailments of a culturally shared basic metaphor can be found in Lakoff’s analysis of U.S. 
American political worldviews in the book Moral Politics (1996). His analysis is worth 
discussing in detail: Lakoff’s basic contention is that Americans understand politics in terms 
of the family, with the state being the parent who is responsible for the citizens, who are its 
children. Through discourse analysis of selected political statements and manifestoes Lakoff 
analyzes the world-views of both conservatives and liberals in an ideal-type fashion and 
                                                 
31A similar example is given by Gudeman and Penn (1982: 90) with precisely the same point in mind: 
“A leaf, for example, could model bilateral symmetry of the body or of a social organization; 
alternatively its growth, coloration and desiccation might model the human cycle of life to death; yet 
again, its internal patterning might be seen to model a genealogy.” 
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traces the governing metaphor of THE NATION IS A FAMILY together with its various 
submetaphors.  
    Lakoff seeks to demonstrate that a single schematic conceptualization, i.e. the state as 
parent, can (1) accommodate two systematically configured political standpoints that are 
diametrically opposed, and (2) unite them on a common discursive ground. The split results 
from diverging views on pedagogical matters. In the conservative case the parental 
responsibilities are understood by the framework-metaphor of the so-called strict-father 
morality and in the liberal case by the metaphor of the nurturant parent. The differing and 
even contradictory political entailments of the basic metaphor follow from the mental topology 
of submetaphors and sub-models grouped around it: Both core-understandings of 
pedagogical style are a part of a tight-knit network of auxiliary metaphors about the nature 
morality and justice, about the nature of the human being and how she learns, and about the 
question whether human actions are determined by a moral essence or by social factors. As 
we shall see below, it is these auxiliary metaphors that make all the difference, in particular 
through the way they are hierarchically ordered. 
     The entailments of these versions of the THE NATION IS A FAMILY metaphor are manifold, 
systematically interrelated, and directly bear upon a great many social issues. In both 
versions the family metaphor has substantial repercussion on stances on the role of the 
government, taxes, social policy, abortion, crime prevention, environmental policy, military 
expenditure, etc. In strict-father morality the government’s role is seen in making the citizens 
self-reliant through teaching them responsibility for their own lives by being strict, but not 
interfering anymore in their affairs once they have become ‘grown up’. By contrast, in 
nurturant parent morality the government’s responsibility is to respond to the social needs of 
the people and promote their welfare and the capability for self-actualization and self-
development.   
     Lakoff shows how almost every aspect of conservatism is linked to a morality of reward 
and punishment and a view of the world as essentially hostile and ‘tough’, a world in which 
self-reliance of the individual is the only chance. (This is, by the way, the cultural hallmark of 
the Calvinist legacy and the central difference between U.S. conservatives and more 
traditional versions of the strict-father view in many other societies, which are based on 
gerontocracy, life-long respect for elders, and the power of extended family networks.) In 
strict father morality the myth of America as the land of opportunity looms large. It employs 
the metaphor of the ladder-of-opportunity that is literally there to grasp and for everyone to 
climb. Those who do not are themselves to blame because the ladder is assumed to be real, 
as a real physical object would be. This goes hand in hand with the assumption of strict 
father morality that human nature is basically motivated by rewards and deterred by 
punishments. Thus, social programs would only subvert human nature. In the nurturant 
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parent version of the liberals the federal government should encourage social programs 
because they are investments into communities and help people to empower themselves as 
productive citizens. In contrast with the ladder of opportunity metaphor, racism, sexism, 
poverty, the lack of education, and homophobia are recognized as barriers to the free pursuit 
of self-interest. Therefore, they also speak in favor of ‘affirmative action’ to promote fair 
chances for disadvantaged groups. In the liberal view of justice the notions of fairness and 
distributive justice are central, whereas conservatives believe in the metaphor of strict moral 
accounting. 
    For liberals progressive taxation is a way of meeting the parent’s duty to support the 
younger, weaker, or infirm children in the family. Taxation of the rich is, to conservatives, 
being punished for being self-reliant model citizens and for doing what they are supposed to 
do according to the American dream. For them, the very basis of morality is at stake. Also, 
because taxes are seen as service of the government provided to the public, who pays for it, 
it is seen critically that people have no right to choose whether to purchase this service. ‘Big 
Government’ is felt as meddling into the affairs of self-reliant citizens. 
     One might ask why conservatives increase military spending, although it means bigger 
government, which is otherwise abhorred. A good answer is that, above all else, in strict-
father morality the major duty of the government as a father is to protect his children. Since 
the ethic of moral strength has priority and everything is keyed to hierarchical authority, self-
discipline, building strength, and fighting evils, the military is the principal institution that 
embodies strict-father morality. People who go through the military are model citizens who 
acquire strict-father moral values there. Likewise, the conservative opposition to liberal 
attempts to enforce gun control results from a view that sees guns as the individual’s form of 
protection in an essentially hostile world and as symbolic of the male role as family protector. 
Guns are the instruments of moral strength, self-reliance, and the power of the strict father.  
        Conservatives hold a corresponding theory of moral essence, according to which past 
behavior is a guide to essential character and essential character predicts future behavior. 
The recent ‘three strikes and you’re out’ policy as a response to the growth of juvenile 
delinquency is a result of this view. Conservatives do not believe in social causes of crime. 
But apart from that it is essential to understand, Lakoff argues, that in this morality-based 
discourse pragmatic liberal arguments that strict policies do not actually reduce crime do not 
count. Many conservatives believe that only if children of welfare mothers are put into 
orphanages and raised to have strict father values, the cycle of dependency, immorality, and 
lawlessness can be broken, and that this will help to solve the problems of crime and drugs 
as well. Similarly, many conservatives believe that it is wrong to give out clean needles to 
drug users or condoms to teenagers. Instead, they should learn to ‘just say no’, and be 
taught self-restraint and abstinence. Some will get hurt in the short run, but in the long run a 
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societal standard of behavior will be set and the nation as a whole will be better-off. Also, 
illegal immigrants should not expect food, housing, or health care, since they are not 
‘children in our family’. For liberals, immigrants with no immoral intent are seen as innocent 
children needing nurturance. 
    Conservatives espouse a behaviorist theory of human nature. They claim that harsh 
punishment, such as the death penalty, will work to eliminate crime and they even declare 
that violent crime is the result of ‘permissive’ child-rearing practices. Liberals respond that 
violence results from abusive treatment and corporal punishment through the parents, 
neglect, and social causes such as poverty. Opposing the priority of moral strength and 
moral essence, their worldview recognizes concepts such as ‘class’ and ‘socio-economic’ 
forces. Social problems are located within society, and not within individual moral weakness. 
Also, since nurturance implies as supreme value a basic reverence for life and well-being 
liberals are opponents of capital punishment. 
     The metaphors employed in the human relation to nature are particularly interesting in 
comparing typical liberal attitudes and the traditional Christian conservative view. For 
conservatives nature appears as God’s dominion given to man to steward wisely, a resource 
for immediate human use, a property for sale and purchase, a work of art for human 
appreciation, an adversary to be conquered and domesticated (a wild animal to be tamed), or 
a mechanical system to be figured out and controlled. For liberals nature is a mother who 
provides for us, it is a whole of which we are inseparable parts, it is a divine being itself to be 
respected and revered, it is a home to be maintained and kept clean, and finally in today’s 
world it is a victim of injury whose wounds need to be healed. 
    Finally, Lakoff argues that Liberalism and Conservatism build on two different versions of 
Christianity grouped around different sets of metaphors. For conservatives the idea of sin 
and moral debts that have to be paid is preeminent. Good Christians are obedient to a 
remote and superior Father-God, accept the natural hierarchies and the literal truths of the 
Bible. A good moral essence requires self-discipline and self-denial. For liberals God is a 
nurturant parent to human beings. Since God’s grace is nurturance, empathy, and 
compassion, the moral way to act is nurturant action for humans as well. 
    All this indicates that liberal and conservative discourses are both grouped around a 
system of metaphors. The metaphors in question may be shared by both sides but are given 
different priorities. And, what makes them assume different priorities is, if we follow Lakoff, 
the basic organizing metaphors of strict-father vs. nurturant parent morality. For 
conservatives the metaphors of Moral Strength, Moral Authority, Moral Order, Moral 
Boundaries, Moral Essence, Moral Wholeness, Moral Purity, and Moral Health hold priority 
(p. 101). For liberals Morality as Nurturance, Morality as Empathy, Moral Self-Nurturance, 
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Morality as Nurturance of Social Ties, Morality as Self-Development, Morality as Happiness, 
Morality as fair Distribution, and Moral Growth figure on top (p. 135ff).  
    Apparently both versions of the family metaphor are linked to a complex model that is 
richer than the metaphors on their own. Yet the model is guided by them and organized into 
a coherent worldview. The family metaphor as embodying a major model of American society 
forms a discursive framework in which a host of densely interwoven beliefs, also amenable to 
a metaphorical analysis, is accommodated. Depending on which sub-metaphors are brought 
to bear within this shared framework (all of which emerge from opposed readings of the 
Bible) we get very different results in terms of political, social, and pedagogical outlooks. 
Lakoff shows that Americans are in fact not dealing with two wholly unrelated versions of a 
basic metaphor that are similar by chance, but that related buttressing metaphors direct the 
priority of entailments chosen. The family metaphor enables a cultural discourse on a shared 
ground, while at the same time creating a main watershed between politico-moral worldviews 
because of the multiplicity of its possible entailments and sub-models.  
    A highly important conclusion is that a metaphor must be always analyzed vis-à-vis its 
entailments, which are in turn dependent on the social and cultural context the metaphor is 
embedded into. It is indispensable for an anthropological perspective on metaphor to 
consider its embedding into a context and to closely attend to the diverging entailments of 
metaphors that are superficially similar for comparative purposes. 
 
4. Reinforcing inter-domain relations: Cross-buttressing and world-view integration 
Lévi-Strauss (1963: 96) characterizes metaphor as “a code which makes it possible to pass 
from one system to the next”. This adage touches upon one characteristic of metaphorical 
thought that has been of abiding interest to generations of anthropologists, namely the role it 
assumes in the integration of worldviews. The following sections pursue this issue, first 
focusing on the play of metaphor between two clearly circumscribed domains, and then 
broadening our view to include metaphors that provide a common conceptual underpinning 
for a large number of contexts. Finally, I will try to extend the term metaphor even further to 
describe mutually supporting conceptual networks, even where there is no central metaphor.  
All these settings deal with the cognitive integration of distinct realms of experience and 
disparate ontologies. The intriguing point for anthropology is that metaphors assume a 
central social function, aside from shedding light on a less understood domain: They weave 
the whole cultural fabric into a denser pattern. The basic cross-connections between two 
cognitive domains I term ‘cross-buttressing’, since the metaphorical reference to another 
domains provides stability for a domain, and vice versa. 
    Metaphor has an epistemic function in creating parameters of similarity between domains, 
thus determining which questions are asked for finding out the degree of similarity between 
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two things. It is useful to recall Nelson Goodman’s (1972) argument that anything is similar to 
everything else in infinitely many respects. While this is based more on a general 
philosophical argument than on cognitive study, it shows that relations of analogy do not 
preexist in any metaphysical sense. They need to be constructed either by our automatized 
conceptual apparatus or through conscious deliberation. Consequently, it is metaphoric 
thought, defined as links and mappings between dissimilar domains, that either produces or 
reflects salient common characteristics. No metaphor connects all conceptual material in the 
source domain to the target domain. Mappings are by their nature incomplete, so that a given 
domain never maps onto another in all possible respects. Or, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
put it, it is normal for metaphors to have ‘unused parts’. Some possible metaphorical 
entailments are not very relevant, others simply do not correspond with target domain beliefs 
and practices. For instance, Boyer (1993b: 134f, 1994a: 172) observes that the Fang of 
Gabon, use a metaphoric linkage of their clans to biological genera, which is reflected in a 
polysemous word designating both ‘clan’ and ‘species’. They metaphorically use the word 
‘species’ to describe variations in behavior and mentality between lineages. However, this 
metaphor has at least one very important entailment that is not exploited, since it would be at 
variance with Fang social reality: Fang clans are exogamous and therefore cannot be linked 
to the notion of biological genus, since that would, obviously, include that breeding is only 
possible within the species. Clans are like species in several important ways, yet in this 
respect they stand diametrically opposed to the typical characteristics of species. So what do 
metaphors then accomplish? I would argue that they select a limited number of comparative 
parameters geared to a given context. In our example the mismatch of the clan metaphor 
with respect to the breeding aspect simply does not matter for the relevant context, although 
it may create clashes in other contexts. 
 
SPILLOVERS  
Generally, which parts of a metaphor are used and which are not depends on the context, 
the background of the individual’s past experiences, and new matches created through new 
insights. Frequently there are core features, but which other attributes are carried over to the 
target domain together with them is variable. The assertion of metaphor can provoke a 
metonymic chain of elements or experiences associated with the metaphor as part to whole, 
cause to effect, or any other contiguity in time or space. Not only the mapped metaphoric 
topology itself may be relevant, there is always a hidden reserve of associated concepts, 
both in the source and the target domain, that may become activated. Which among the 
infinite number of possible elements enter into the metonymic chain actually exploited is 
context-dependent. 
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    I intend to show that this propensity of metaphor to carry less central metonymical 
associations with it has significant repercussions on the relation between domains in general. 
As Emanatian (1995: 178) points out, with a long pedigree going back to Max Black’s and 
I.A. Richards’ ‘interaction theory’, metaphor may enhance the similarity of structure across 
the two domains. Once domains are perceived as similar in several salient respects further 
aspects tend to be assimilated to this pattern. This is corroborated by experimental evidence 
by Kelly and Keil (1987) demonstrating that a successful metaphor may reinforce similarity 
ratings of people and predispose them to judge further cases on the same basis. In other 
words, there is an initializing metaphor that then attracts further mappings. Responsible for 
this is the metonymical (i.e. contextual) coherence of aspect-clusters within a domain that 
invites considering additional aspects as eligible for a mapping once one of them becomes 
metaphoric. For example, if we metaphorically conceive humans as computers this may 
result in a more general propensity to consider living beings as machines. The overall 
principle in question here is a transposition of the mapping from the specific level to the 
generic level. 
    In some particular cases a salient or apt mapping can trigger a psychological process of 
‘elective affinity’ (see ch.3) that continually reinforces the inter-domain bonds to the extent 
that a complete analogy is engendered, because people actively search for further 
correspondences. In other words, entire domains can come to be linked by a snowball-effect 
that further increases the tendency to consider yet new members of the first domain in the 
light of the other. Needless to say, such a process can only occur so long as the domains 
allow a sufficient number of similarities, i.e. if there is a ‘critical mass’. 
    Spillovers can also occur as sub-conscious knowledge transfers from another domain, 
because an analogy (or metonymy) is somehow already assumed. A study by Wagner et al. 
(1993) on popular biological beliefs about human reproduction exemplifies this: The authors 
examined how European beliefs about conception and about the behavior of reproductive 
cells are influenced by traditional gender clichés. They found a widespread folk-belief that the 
active ‘macho’ sperms seek out passive, ‘feminine’ eggs, competing for them, and that the 
best or fittest ‘man’ conquers the ‘female’. Modern biology proves these folk-theories (which 
are undoubtedly supported by much school education of the past) as of limited educational 
value, since eggs are apparently just as active as sperms. What these theories are 
successful at doing, however, can be gauged in a broader perspective on the role of 
knowledge in society: They integrate beliefs about gender behavior and thus support social 
role stereotypes. Nature, in this view, has ordained that not only humans act as traditional 
males and females, but that their reproductive cells as parts of them also do. I would even 
argue that, by way of reinforcement through such a metonymical part-whole relationship, a 
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more deeply seated understanding of human essence is supported, that replicates itself at all 
levels. 
    How are we to evaluate the example, then? A belief that is scientifically wrong, or biased, 
may nevertheless be socio-functionally instrumental in conserving traditional views. 
Educationally misplaced spillovers can also be highly effective when put in this perspective. 
While, on the one hand, they entail certain ‘false’ assumptions, they may, on the other hand, 
serve to integrate two domains in the same way apt metaphors do, irrespective on how one 
might feel about such a metaphoric buttressing of conservative strongholds. At a more 
general level, this indicates that successful spillovers may actually create an autodynamic of 
mutual cross-buttressing between two domains. In our case here they suggest an 
encompassing ‘natural law’ that is valid on the social and at the biological levels alike. Thus, 
the belief in a general, trans-domain ‘law’ may in fact be built up by a perception that was 
initially guided by one domain and then assimilated by the other  
    What makes spillovers likely? Let me develop a few speculations for future testing here: 
We can presume that if a metaphor is very conventionalized, if it maps a rather large number 
of aspects to begin with (in so-called structural mappings), or if it involves some highly 
prototypical exemplars of the domain, the rest of the domain context is more likely to be 
carried-over. Conversely, if a metaphor is a limited mapping, only expository, ad hoc, or far-
fetched, the likelihood of spillovers can be expected to be low. Permanent cross-domain links 
may also be inspired by basic primary metaphors from early childhood or the presence of 
synesthetic linkages, which both seem to be powerful motivators for metaphors (see chapter 
4). For example, a salient primary metaphor such as AFFECTION IS WARMTH may bring about a 
general tendency to use body sensations as source domain for understanding more complex 
emotions. 
 
BIDIRECTIONALITY 
Metaphoric domain pairings of historical importance have been observed to go back and 
forth in a discourse. This means that they change their direction in the course of historical 
development, when a metaphor’s target domain later becomes to be perceived as its source 
domain, or vice versa. This interesting aspect is, for example, highlighted by Danziger (1990: 
334), when he cites metaphors for the mind in Western discourse: 
 
“In the case of the physical energy metaphor, the bidirectionality is (...) striking. In fact, the interaction 
was historically recursive. Such concepts as ‘force’, ‘power’, and in part ‘energy’ had strong 
psychological connotations before they were metaphorically extended to the physical world.” 
 
There are several other examples in the history of Western science in which metaphorical 
mappings have gone back and forth between the social field on the one hand and science 
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and philosophy on the other hand (cf. Leary 1990). Newton provided another prominent 
example, when he drew on the idea of social solidarity and sociability to devise the concept 
of gravitation. Once the concept was formed, it was borrowed back to explain social structure 
in terms of physical gravity. This recursion could take place under the changed 19th century 
conditions when natural science had acquired unquestionable prestige. Thus, what is target 
and what source presumably depends on the relative social and cultural importance of the 
corresponding domains in an era. Bidirectionality can also be observed synchronically 
between different sectors or institutions in society. Thus, while religious institutions may use 
force-enablement images from politics, such as God as a sovereign, to reinforce their claims, 
politicians may point to similar, religiously inspired force-enablement metaphors, such as the 
divine right of kings, to justify their policies. Each social institution takes the other as a point 
of reference, whereby they support each other. Presumably the most often noted 
bidirectional relationship is that between discourse on nature and discourse on the human 
(social) sphere, whereby both the natural is humanized and the human is naturalized (see 
below). 
 
EXCURSUS: RESEARCH ON COGNITIVE CROSS-BUTTRESSING AND CO-ACTIVATION 
We have now seen examples of diachronic bidirectionality and of bidirectional relationships 
between social actors who mutually support each other. Let us next have a look at 
synchronic bidirectionality between mental domains or beliefs. This is a relationship I 
propose to call ‘cross-buttressing’, i.e. the circular learning and/or subsequent strengthening 
of two or more concepts. In the following excursus I will first introduce the notion of learning 
by co-activation and then go into an interesting recent approach from cognitive anthropology 
on the cross-buttressing of beliefs that are used in inferential tasks, in which co-activation 
plays an important role. 
    Let me first give a brief general sketch of learning and point to some possible similarities 
between the clustering/linking of concepts and neural clustering/linking. The mutual 
strengthening between neural regions is a consequence of learning by co-activation at the 
conceptual level (i.e. ‘experiential metonymies’): If we repeatedly encounter two prominently 
figuring experiences or two concepts in the same context, say dentists and pain, this is what I 
call co-activation. Depending on how often we go through this experience and on how 
impressive or traumatic it is, sooner or later a permanent conceptual link will result. (Pain-
traumatized people will be afraid of going to the dentist forever, even if newer techniques 
make the experience less terrible than it originally was.) Many researchers assume that there 
is a neural correlate to co-activated mental concepts, namely two agglomerations of brain 
cells with synapses linking one neural unit to the other. With repeated co-activation, these 
synapses become permanently or at least temporarily stronger, while other synapses may 
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fall into disuse. Learning models of this kind are today available not only from neuroscience, 
but also from the AI-approach of connectionism. In AI, artificial learning agents (implemented 
through parallel distributed networks with dynamically evolving synaptic weights) give greater 
weight to task-relevant ‘synapses’ following their repeated co-activation. Moreover, recent 
publications by D’Andrade (1995) and Strauss/Quinn (1997) argue convincingly for the 
relevance of such models for the explanation of cultural knowledge. 
    The relationship between neural clusters whose linkages are gradually strengthened can 
also serve as a heuristic for understanding conceptual representations. Although it would 
seem that complex concepts cannot be explained through neuronal arrays in any simple way 
– it is often said that concepts form an ‘emergent’ (i.e. non-reductive) level on top of the 
neural substrate – the structure of the following argument about cultural concepts is 
surprisingly analogous. 
    Cross-strengthening between cultural concepts has most extensively been treated by the 
anthropologist Pascal Boyer (1994a: 258f, summary on p. 288). He claims that, if a belief 
plays a role in a strengthening inference for another assumption, it may be strengthened 
itself in the process, simply because it is more often used. Thus, the probability of the belief 
being selected as relevant information in subsequent contexts will increase. Let me give an 
example: When a student is taught that experiential domains, such as physics, society and 
power, love and emotions, psychology, etc. can all be understood as hydraulics, this will 
probably not only improve her understanding of hydraulics, it will also make the concept still 
more eligible for future explanations and possibly dislodge other explanations in new 
contexts. One of the most widespread conceptual cross-links is that between thought about 
society and about nature. The literature on the discursive linkages between these two 
domains is exceptionally rich, much of it in the history and sociology of science, and the 
issue continues to be a hotly debated, like in the current sociobiology debate. While the 
distinction between the animal/plant world and the human world is a cultural universal, it is 
always an uneasy one. In structuralist anthropology the theme of cultural thought bridging 
this conceptual rift again is a central topic of analysis. For example, the structuralist theory of 
totemism posits that oppositions and relations between animal kinds replicate social 
oppositions and relations in a way that one becomes the template for the other or that both 
come to share a template more abstract than any of them. 
    Back to some interesting suggestions made by Pascal Boyer, who unfolds a general 
theory of ‘cross-strengthening’ between assumptions and beliefs. Although linguistic 
metaphor need not be involved – Boyer appears to be working more on the basis of long 
propositional reasoning chains without giving direct clues whether metaphors play a role or 
not – the cognitive principles employed seem of interest to metaphor theory. Boyer develops 
his theory based on his pet example from his fieldwork among the Fang, already discussed 
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above, where he envisages a relationship of circular ‘cross-strengthening’ between beliefs 
about social roles – especially about the essential character of ghost specialists and bards 
called beyem – and the episodic memories of past encounters with beyem that people 
adduce when trying to identify novel cases. A crucial hypothesis in Boyer’s theory is that 
strengthening can go backwards (p. 254-58). This means that assumptions used to enrich 
descriptions of situations in the memory are themselves strengthened in the process. For 
instance, whenever the Fang recall past episodes featuring mvet bards and mvet ghost 
specialists (together creating the category of beyem) in order to account for their intuitions 
about the category of mvet-ness itself, the episodes are also made more salient. Thus, the 
stability of certain non-schematic assumptions, such as episodic memories, can be explained 
by their continued contribution to inferences about other beliefs.32 
    It is interesting to discuss the differences of this approach to the study of metaphor proper. 
First, Boyer writes on reasoning task in discourse, such as category identification based on 
past experiences, while metaphor is neither necessarily about identifying salient attributes 
nor only about reasoning. Second, while metaphors do not primarily come from the episodic 
memory, Boyer claims that the inferences he discusses do. One aspect, which is almost 
diametrically opposed to the study of conventional metaphors, lies in Boyer’s claim that 
inferential linkages are contextually adduced when needed. He emphasizes that suitable 
pieces of information for strengthening a belief may be adduced from the episodic memory 
when needed in a given situation without either forming a permanent schema or being a part 
of a systematic ‘worldview’ – strengthening assumptions are only activated when needed to 
facilitate the construction of evidential accounts.33  
                                                 
32 At least these are plausible conjectures and one should think that, unless the episodes are 
remembered as especially untrustworthy examples, higher memorability can in some cases result in 
increased veracity. Presumably one would not remember non-pertinent episodes, so the fact that one 
did remember them can retrospectively make them appear important. Still, we should take care not to 
conflate the memorability and the evaluative dimensions of a representation, such as its veracity. 
33 Although Boyer fails to produce any conclusive evidence as far as I can see, this hypothesis is 
useful for countering exaggerated claims of systematicity in inference tasks. (At the same time, this 
does not exclude that schemas may be systematically encoded for a range of other cognitive tasks.) 
For methodological reasons I would also caution against the idea of wholly fluid, individual, and ad hoc 
reconstructions of evidential accounts that need no conventional schemas, especially as long as the 
role of schemas in the reasoning passages has not been tested for through detailed linguistic analysis. 
Together with other knowledge structures, it would be interesting to see what role metaphors play in 
reasoning, whether permanent cultural schemas are drawn on, and which other domains are actually 
invoked in the discourse portions – unfortunately we do not know from Boyer’s very abstract 
discussion of his data. 
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    The general upshot here is that, if we go beyond a restricted focus on episodic memories 
and classification, it follows that knowledge structures in general may mutually support each 
other and that co-activation may be the reason for this. The other aspect in Boyer’s approach 
that, by extension from beliefs to domain relations, is really interesting for metaphor theory is 
the suggestion of backward strengthening. It supports a slightly modified version of the 
‘interaction theory’ of metaphor, which used to claim that metaphors always affect the 
understanding of the source domain too. In line with this Boyer’s approach implies that if a 
source domain is used to shed light on one or more salient target domains (i.e. if it is co-
activated with salient knowledge), this increases the likelihood of future activation for other 
tasks of the source. Note however that, diverging from the classical ‘interaction theory’, this 
does not necessarily imply that source and target are understood as being ‘closer’ to each 
other. It simply means that a domain increases its likelihood to be chosen as a source 
domain in the future in the overall mental landscape. 
 
MACRO-METAPHORIC RELATIONS: THOUGHT-STYLES AS CLUSTERS OF MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE 
MODELS AND METAPHORS 
Without there necessarily being any one-way relationship between a source domain and a 
target domain, cultural knowledge is often structured in clusters of mutually supportive 
domains. Deborah Gordon (1988) analyzes a prime example of cross-buttressing in an 
article on the ideological roots of Western biomedicine. Irrespective of its superficial rhetoric 
of biological reductionism and a self-image as neutral and universal, in reality biomedicine 
 
“draws upon and projects cosmology (ways of ordering the world), ontology (assumptions about reality 
and being), epistemology (assumptions about knowledge and truth), understandings of personhood, 
society, morality, and religion (what is sacred and profane).” (p. 19) 
 
More specifically, Gordon maintains that there is a relationship of mutual support between 
naturalism, individualism, and biomedicine: 
 
“Naturalism is founded in a number of important distinctions that assert the autonomy of “nature” from 
the “supernatural”, from human consciousness, from “culture”, “society”, “morality”, “psychology” and 
particular time and space. Naturalism also asserts a separation between cosmology/ontology on the 
one hand and epistemology on the other (...)” (p. 23) 
 
An analogous relationship of mutual support holds between institutionalized fields in society, 
such as science, philosophy, politics, and everyday life. Gordon follows Charles Taylor’s 
(1985: 4) claim that the beliefs of natural science are intimately intertwined with underlying 
images of the self and the attached images of freedom, power, and dignity. They are 
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governed by a picture of the human agent who is capable of disengaging herself from the 
world and shaping it:  
 
“We objectify our situation to the extent that we can overcome a sense of it as what determines for us 
our paradigm purposes and ends, and we can come to see it and function in it as a neutral 
environment, within which we can effect the purposes which we determine out of ourselves” (cited in 
Gordon p. 21) 
 
Nature is disengaged from its previous metaphysical and spiritual connections. It is thought 
of as given ‘out there’ and as a mechanism to be understood, not as anything meaning 
something to humans, in the sense of purposes and goals. It distinguishes primary qualities 
of a thing in itself and the secondary meaning for someone. As a consequence, the physical 
is the real for biomedicine, which distinguishes ‘objective signs’ from the patient’s subjective 
complaints called ‘symptoms’. Furthermore, there is a commitment to atomism and its bias 
towards the discreteness of parts. Related to this is the belief that being is rooted in 
essences, not in relationships, or in process. For example, diseases are considered as 
separate entities from their hosts. As a consequence, they are not treated in society, but in 
the individual, and even more likely in an isolated body part instead of the body as a whole. 
The commitment to atomism and materialism is also reflected in the stance towards culture. 
The basic material parts of the body, which are understood as the vessels of disease, are 
objectively similar and therefore taken to be universal. Culture is external to the body and to 
disease. Disease is essentially an individual problem, systematically abstracted from social 
context. The distinction between ‘mind’ and ‘body’ is mirrored in the distinction of ‘natural 
man’ and ‘cultural man’. Nature’s truth is universal, eternal, and absolute: It stands beyond 
any specific place or time. Likewise, events are connected through the laws of nature, rather 
than through the lives of individuals. The deeper truth lies in general laws and essential 
abstractions. Diseases are perceived as statistical phenomena abstracted from individual 
patients. Related to this, individual diseases are metaphorized as generic diseases: The 
source of an individual occurrence of ‘cancer’ is the universal disease of ‘cancer’. The body 
itself is metaphorically defined as a stable physical – and, as such, passive – object with a 
stable identity, separate from the self, separated by the skin from other human beings and 
the social environment. As further consequence, the laws of nature in the body are 
independent of morality, just as rationality and truth are separate from morality: sickness has 
no special attraction to virtue or vice. 
     These views emerge from a general naturalist epistemology. Perception and 
understanding are separate in this view. Perception is an objective given, and understanding 
is looking into things by means of analysis. The agent of knowledge is the individual. The 
individual is as prior to society in the same way that the atom is to nature. This belief in the 
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sovereign individual actor is paralleled in an understanding of society not as end in itself, but 
as a means for individual happiness and, in the worst case, as an impediment to individual 
freedom. 
     Significantly, the visual metaphor for knowing is predominant and tends to yield a static 
picture of structure rather than process. In like manner it produces the feel of distance rather 
than involvement. It is then detachment that provides the privileged window to truth, and is 
best suited for the analysis of discrete parts in succession. The knower must separate 
(‘detach’) herself from the object of knowledge, in order to perceive it from the exterior 
without a bias. From this vantage point, the object can then be copied on the knower’s 
mental sketchpad as an accurate replica or mirror image. 
    All these models are already metaphoric in themselves, and they are metaphorically 
related through partial overlaps of their reasoning structure. Gordon gives a succinct 
characterization of the commonalties between biomedical naturalism and individualist 
epistemology: 
 
“Both take the atom as the model and have little use for society and culture. Both the naturalists (who 
regard humans as material beings) on the one hand, and the individualists (who treat the ’essentially 
human being’ as pure will and reason) on the other leave the space between subjects, objects, and 
atoms uncharted and impotent.” (p. 42) 
 
This symmetry arises from an extensive web of cross-mappings between nature and the 
human world, although it is hard to say which one is modeled after the other. Historically, it 
was perhaps the healing model that expanded into “a moral and engineering one” (p. 20), 
inasmuch as the symbolic reality projected by it is becoming more dominant as a folk-model. 
Now that the biomedical model has colonized other life-worlds, these may be invoked as an 
autonomous support of biomedicine. For example, a medical student experiencing doubts 
about her profession, perhaps in a gut reaction to the dispassionate ‘medical gaze’ on the 
dead bodies she has to dissect (Lella/Pawluch 1993), may take recourse to an objectifying 
gaze which she already is familiar with from bureaucracy, engineering, or even philosophy in 
order to ward off these doubts. 
    For a description of this complex thoughtscape it is best to take recourse to the notion of 
metaphoric cross-buttressing. Apart from the fact that each of the beliefs can be subject to a 
metaphoric analysis, the mutually supportive relations between the models may also be 
termed metaphoric, better yet maybe: macro-metaphoric. The crucial point for cross-
buttressing relations is that they stabilize a belief system. A structure of mutual reinforcement 
makes knowledge and associated practices a lot more difficult to overcome and accounts for 
their historical tenacity in the face of considerable counterevidence. By the same token, the 
structure of mutual reinforcement promotes the naturalization of the Western world-view. 
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This is to say that if all its relevant part domains fit into a larger picture, or mutually account 
for each other, what is a contingent social choice acquires a sense of natural inevitability. In 
Gordon’s words, ”a sense of ‘natural inevitability’ or ‘givenness’ is constructed out of social 
choice” (p. 20). 
    Beliefs can strengthen one another, as long as they are compatible. However, they need 
not constrain each other strictly in a way that permits no alternatives. Their significance may 
predominantly lie in the fact that alternative models can be dislodged in discourse, by 
referring to a supportive extant domain that forms part of the same metaphoric complex. 
Such a perspective shows that the mind is irreducibly metaphoric, for it fundamentally works 
through establishing links between domains. Many links are established on a temporary 
basis, as in seeking relevant information for reasoning tasks. Other links, however, are 
permanently entrenched. A suggestive hypothesis is that networks of cultural theories like 
the one described by Gordon has a partial neural counterpart in networks in the brains of 
acculturated adults. What we may minimally hypothesize is a match with neurally patterned 
responsive and adaptive reactions that have the purpose of answering to externally encoded 
culture, i.e. the instituted models shaped by legal, political, pedagogical, and scientific 
institutions, public symbology, culturally transmitted techniques of the body, etc. 
 
NODAL KEY-DOMAINS 
It can be an important function of key-symbols to unite disparate strands. Here I want to 
focus on the conceptual use of a single metaphorical source-domain as a ‘node’, which is 
employed to interweave discursive strands and create a focal point for cosmology. The best 
material for such a demonstration that I know of is found in Suzanne P. Blier’s work on house 
architecture and ontology among the Batammaliba of Togo and Benin (1987). Blier argues 
that a very prominent source domain for metaphors in various target domains can serve the 
task of epistemological unification for themes that would otherwise lack a single basis of 
coherence and grounding. Her material provides evidence that clarity and order are created 
out of multiple and disordered contexts by uniting several metaphors in the source domain of 
the house. Her analysis demonstrates how cosmological key features, ideas about the 
hereafter, the realm of the sacred, psyche, family, political expression, and theatrical 
performance are conveyed through different aspects of the house as an architectural 
metaphor:  
 
“Although the house is not thought to be a cosmos (even a miniature one), a paradise, a deity, a 
human, a family, a tomb, a political body, or a theater (in an exclusively dramaturgical sense), it is like 
all of these things. Through the metaphor of the house, the relationship between the diverse parts and 
actions comprising each of these worlds is made clear. The house provides a context for seeing things 
and actions in terms of other things and actions.” (p. 205) 
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The house provides a material focus for thought domains that would otherwise not co-occur 
in a single place. It may bring about a cognitive integration of contexts, especially since the 
house embodies all of these symbolic features as a single perceptual Gestalt. All of the 
important cosmological features can be imagined as a single, symbolically heavily saturated 
image. Such a perceptual Gestalt, then, would promote the creation of a conceptual Gestalt 
and thus bundle all sorts of unrelated associations into one cognitive structure. The house is, 
as it were, a mnemonic device to remind of the deeper unity of domains that are 
experientially distinct. 
    In his ethnography of a Kabyle village, Bourdieu (1977) proffers a similar analysis of a 
seemingly quintessential setting in which a set of metaphors stretching across domains 
convene in a single focal point as a foundational schema. This metonymic locus is again the 
house. Its interior space is symbolically endowed with multiple metaphoric significations and 
becomes a condensed model of significant ritual acts and cosmological codes. Perhaps 
Bourdieu would not object to calling the locus a prototype model in which the fundamental 
cultural schemas, which inform a great many other cultural domains, are packed into a single 
context and occur in their most condensed and most significantly holistic context: 
 
“All actions performed in a space constructed in this way are immediately qualified symbolically and 
function as so many structural exercises through which is built up practical mastery of the fundamental 
schemes, which organize magical practices and representations: going in and coming out, filling and 
emptying, opening and shutting, going leftwards and going rightwards, going westwards and going 
eastwards, etc. Through the magic of a world of objects which is the product of the application of the 
same schemes to the most diverse domains, a world in which each thing speaks metaphorically of all 
the others, each practice comes to be invested with an objective meaning, a meaning with which 
practices – and particularly rites – have to reckon at all times, whether to evoke or to revoke it. (...)” 
(Bourdieu 1977: 91) 
 
Furthermore, the house is an integrative locus in which the human body, interior space, and 
cosmological space are mapped onto each other both by virtue of their spatial coincidence, 
as well as by their loadedness with cosmological codes through hexis (orientational) 
schemas. 
 
“All the symbolic manipulations of body experience, starting with the displacements within a mythically 
structured space, e.g. the movements of coming in and going out, tend to impose the integration of the 
body space within the cosmic space by grasping in terms of the same concepts (...) the relationship 
between man and natural word and the complementarity and opposed states and actions of the two 
sexes (...)”(p. 91) 
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As integrative perceptual foci, these settings with multiple metaphors are not only a question 
of some domains being salient and therefore occurring repeatedly. They are also a question 
of cognitive functionality, with a view on knitting cultural experience into a fabric. Perhaps, we 
can metaphorically think of such domains of crystallization as ‘cultural attractors of meaning’, 
following a terminological a suggestion by Sperber (1996). We may assume that these work 
partly by virtue of the source’s existential importance (as in the case of the body, the house, 
or the landscape), and partly by virtue of historical precedence as a focus of attention, which, 
over time, draws more and more cultural themes under its spell. In such a more functional 
perspective, not the thematic location of the conceptual node, but the fact of unification as 
such is of primary relevance. For similar examples featuring polysemous words uniting 
disparate domains see James Howe (1977) on Cuna political metaphors. 
  
FLOATING SIGNIFIERS: CONTEXT-SHIFTING METAPHORS UNIFY A DISCOURSE 
As structuralists have long pointed out, a basic metaphor can be defined as one that recurs 
across various cultural contexts and plays a role in structuring these contexts. An effect that 
very often directly follows from such basic metaphors is the integration of the many contexts 
in which it appears. Such basic metaphors can also take on the form of what Lévi-Strauss 
(1966) called ‘floating signifiers’. These are defined by the fact that a rough-hewn basic idea 
does not have one single fixed meaning or context. Likewise, Fernandez (1986: 78ff) speaks 
of shifts of reference in artful discourse. That a unifying effect can be created, even if the 
metaphor’s meaning remains vague, is illustrated by Brenda Beck (1987: 21). She draws 
from her fieldwork in South India to show such an effect for poetry of the religious kind. Her 
example is about a mystic who once wrote elaborate poems about baked and unbaked pots. 
Although it was clear to the reader that this was intended as a metaphor, the exact referents 
remained rather opaque. In some contexts the metaphor seemed to refer to the opposition of 
male and female, in others to soul and body, in yet others to initiate and novice, while at 
times emotional themes like ‘cruel’ and ‘kind’ were evoked. This metaphor is not bound to 
one context, but shifts between contexts in the course of a narrative, although the contexts 
retain a common reference to a unifying theme provided by the (initially rather obscure) 
metaphor. In each new appearance of the metaphor the context gives it a different specific 
meaning, a new slant. At the same time, the meanings in the other contexts are recalled as 
the story progresses, and perhaps possible further meanings in yet other contexts 
anticipated. 
    We transcend basic categorization by projecting a large number of normally unrelated 
domains into a single image. Thus the distinct provinces of everyday thought are 
reintegrated. At the same time a core theme is constituted, albeit of an abstract or opaque 
kind, around which a network of meanings unfolds. The fact of being at the core is important 
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in itself, even without the concrete referents that are successively linked. A focus of attention, 
or a key notion, is thus established. (In chapter 9 I will propose an explanation for key 
concepts based on the imagery of a spatial node.) 
    Ambiguity or vagueness with respect to conventional categories can turn into a strength 
essentially, rather than a weakness. Through ambiguity a more tightly knit web of 
categorization may be suggested than conventional understandings normally warrant. 
Blumenberg (1996: 448) even deems the recourse to indefiniteness a general characteristic 
of sacral texts and adds that their rationale of survival is to ward off banal literality. This can 
be so, because the texts are credited with a power that is never risked in practice by putting 
them to the test. In other words, the major advantage of sacral metaphoricity lies in the fact 
that a sacral term will not be tested for coherence in novel contexts as easily as other terms, 
thus becoming a much more flexible floater than a conventional term pinned down by 
concretion.  
    This argument is a plausible expansion on Sperber’s ‘epidemiology of representations’, 
which speculates on cognitive criteria which make ideas historically durable. Sperber (1996: 
116) explicitly ascribes to religious representations the power of remaining stable and 
relevant, because they lend themselves to different interpretations according to the agent, 
the context, and the stage in the life-cycle. In this perspective, floating signifiers have, on 
average, a higher life-expectancy than domain specific mechanisms or symbols. The basis of 
cognitive longevity can, then, either be a total lack of concrete reference or a high level of 
schematicity uniting many referents. The more abstract a schema is, the greater are its 
chances to outlast the worldview in whose context it arose in the first place. Owing to the fact 
that various images from altogether different historical contexts share the same generic 
abstraction, abstract knowledge is more resilient to change and flexibly adaptable than 
narrative and conventional symbolisms, which, once torn from their proper context, may 
quickly fall into disuse and oblivion. 
 
5. Metaphoric scaffolding from the inchoate to the representational 
As outlined in the first chapter, metaphor is a process between sensory experience and  
‘thoughts of the body’ on the one hand and cognition and language on the other. An aspect 
of cognition that may also be called metaphoric is the way scaffolds from the sensory to the 
abstract are raised. Metaphor, now defined as a top-down or bottom-up process, rather than 
a horizontal mapping at the conceptual level only, provides a model of explaining how the 
‘raw’ experience of inchoate reality becomes a cultural image. Foreshadowing chapter 4, 
which deals with the tie between experience, body knowledge, and conceptual thought, a 
rough sketch of some of the embodiment literature is useful at this point. 
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    Laurence Kirmayer (1993: 171ff) proposes a three-tier model in which metaphor is 
assigned the central role of mediation between body and culture. According to Kirmayer, 
metaphors are the mediating structures between primary body knowledge and social 
structuring principles. Primary metaphors of the bodily realm (‘archetypes’) are given situated 
extensions into the conceptual (‘metaphor’ proper). Through metaphors in turn, experience is 
ordered by narratization into social legitimizing and structuring narratives (‘myth’). To 
Kirmayer, “[t]he perspectives of myth, metaphor and archetype capture respectively, social, 
psychological and bodily contributions to truth and meaning” (p. 175). He further elaborates 
on the mediating function that he assigns to metaphor: 
 
“Metaphors are stacked to create a scaffolding of meaning that runs in two directions to ground our 
thought and action in early synesthetic and sensorimotor experience on the one hand (...) and in social 
forms of life on the other (...)” (p.185) 
 
This scaffolding of levels makes it possible that cultural symbolic techniques act back on the 
body. An example is symbolic healing, which lies at the focal point of Kirmayer’s perspective. 
The same bodily effectiveness of symbolic techniques is true for voodoo death, though with 
an inverse orientation (Beck 1987: 14f). 
    A leading protagonist of the anthropological study of metaphor, James Fernandez, directs 
his gaze towards the stereoscopic function of metaphor, which has been called, in a famous 
phrase, ‘is and is not’ by Douglas Berggren (1961/62). Metaphor is ideal where a double 
identity is implied. Metaphor dwells on the edge of objectification, having one foot still in 
primordial and bodily experience, and one foot in an objective ‘distance’ between the human 
subject and his world. The primordial is also often identified with the natural. The following 
observation on totemism by Fernandez relates to the stereoscopic view of man as natural-
cum-social beings: 
 
“The power of totemism is that it at once preserves the sense of primordial identification processes 
and achieves a sense of separation both from nature and other social subjects. As it is so often put in 
totemic myths, ‘We once married animals (or were born from them),’ or ‘We once were animals, but 
now we know better.’” (Fernandez: 1986: 36) 
 
The general interest of Fernandez are metaphors of primary identity, especially the 
conceptual movements effected between a deficient existential state and a desired state 
(hence his recurring parlance of “predications on inchoate pronouns”, i.e. on I, you, he/she, 
we, they). Therapy, perhaps also a cultural ritual, works much the same way by predicating 
identities on the subject or a group of subjects (cf. Kirmayer 1993). 
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    It has been repeatedly observed that the realities and experiences cherished most, those 
of religion, also most profoundly elude our attempts to put them into words. A quite thorough 
statement on this fundament of the human condition is presented by Roy Rappaport (1979: 
128) in an argument for the indexical (deictic) nature of ultimate realities. Their constitutive 
nature is that they can only been demonstrated or participated in. Rappaport builds upon a 
Peircean tripartite distinction between symbolic, iconic, and indexical signs to separate three 
types of corresponding meaningfulness. Within this tripartite schema Rappaport emphasizes 
as characteristic of everyday cognition that things are categorized, distinct, and objectified, 
i.e. the subject does not participate in them to an important degree. The world is split into the 
observer and a set of distinct objects, for which different conventional symbols stand. These 
share nothing with their referent, but are arbitrary. By contrast, higher-order meaning is 
derived from the perception of deeper underlying likenesses among the apparent 
distinctions. The governing notion here is similarity, the sign mode is the iconic, meaning that 
structural features are shared. (One wonders if Rappaport had an implicit concept of image-
schema in mind, which is precisely the mechanism accounting for the imagistic kind of 
structural similarity that may obtain between different particulars.) This is what in our 
terminology may be called metaphorical activity between domains. Such activity may mold a 
fairly coherent and integrated cosmology. Finally, in highest-order meanings subject and 
object collapse into one another. They are the outcome of an identification of meaning with 
those who experience them. The corresponding sign mode is indexical – the signs are either 
effects or parts of what they signify and are no longer representational, but have been called 
‘presentational’ (see ch.4). In ritual participation such highest-order meaning may be 
experienced. I take this to be what in our terminology is the primeval source of metaphor in 
embodied, preconceptual consciousness. Any conceptual or linguistic metaphor drawing 
from that substrate of original consciousness is more secondary and alienated. Any 
objectifying rendering is bound to fail, since a mode that separates object and subject from 
the experiential continuum intrinsically (mis-)represents. In other words, there is 
consciousness before all original distinctions. It is this fundamental existential ground34 that 
metaphor of the kind discussed here reverts to. 
    In consequence, metaphor can make the purely experiential conceptually tractable. In 
grappling with the ineffable in the inchoate experience of religious or ritual states of mind-
                                                 
34 I do not believe that it is particularly fruitful to say that this eludes us because it is ‘the numinous’, 
‘the wholly Other’, as a tradition in Western phenomenology of religion going back to Rudolf Otto 
would have it. We may call such consciousness radically immanent without any qualms, and I would 
suspect that epithets of transcendental ‘otherness’ arise from a subject-bound uneasiness deeply 
imbued in Western thought, which paradoxically does not dare discard the contrastive principle of 
dualism as a means to delineate the subject as a basic ontological unit.  
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body, metaphor can make them accessible to discourse. Metaphor provides a mediating 
structure between the primary level of consciousness and conceptual cognition. What has 
been called ‘presentational’ reality in the tradition of Merleau-Ponty is tropically injected into 
discourse. Metaphor preserves much of the emotional quality, immediacy, and sensory 
associations of embodied primary knowledge. Indeed it participates in it, being an interstitial 
device of two worlds. To borrow from Turner’s (1967) celebrated model, the kind of metaphor 
we discuss now is ‘liminal’. In Fernandez’ (1986, 1974) terms, metaphor effects the insertion 
of the sensory into conceptual quality space. 
    There have been some attempts to speculate about the universal parameters of human 
quality space. Echoing Osgood’s (1964) research on the universal in affective meaning, 
Richard Shweder (1984: 36) states: 
 
“For any language, contrastive adjectives (wet vs. dry, kind vs. cruel, up vs. down, smooth vs. rough, 
fast vs. slow, strong vs. weak, etc.) display considerable redundancy and can be reduced to three 
underlying dimensions of ‘feeling tone’ or ‘connotative meaning’ (pleasantness, strain, excitement or 
evaluation, potency, activity level). These three universally mediate judgements across sensory 
modalities (synesthesia) and concrete domains (metaphor).”  
 
Basic axiological parameters of experiential quality (cf. Krzeszowski 1993) are, for instance, 
suggested by comparative linguistic research, notably by Dixon’s (1982) well-known study 
Where have all the adjectives gone? (cited in Lakoff 1987: 29). Yoruba or Igbo has only 8 
and 12 adjectives respectively, but these are non-arbitrary and refer to the most basic 
qualities that are, seemingly, linguistic, and thus perhaps experiential, universals. 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether quality space is not perhaps still cultural, even if 
it is pre-conceptual. 
 
METAPHORIC META-STATEMENTS ON THE NATURE OF SOCIAL COGNITION 
From time to time the connective function to the inchoate can also be witnessed in 
metaphor’s comment on the objectified nature of human thought and the structure of social 
discourse itself. Metaphors can be used in this way to invert a dominant mode of thought 
temporarily, both by pointing beyond it much in the way negative theology does (which is 
metaphoric par excellence), and by setting sensory images of unmediated experience in its 
place. 
    Following the well-know position expounded many times by Victor Turner, a fundamental 
human insight may be that social structure is not all there is to life. Precisely because some 
cultures are so preoccupied with the emphasis of structure, the anti-structural statement 
seeks itself a pathway in ritual ‘communitas’. Anti-structure may be at a loss for words. What 
cannot be said can be enacted. Metaphor clears the gap in Wittgenstein’s pronouncement 
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that “the boundaries of my language are the boundaries of my world”. Constraints of 
structure (structure of society, structure of language) make experiences that transcend that 
structure or form its alter ego only metaphorically expressible. In the female initiation among 
the Bemba of Zambia, described by Audrey Richards in Chisungu (1956), laboriously made 
figurines of clay are suddenly pulled apart. The figurines initially were made as explicit 
emblems of wifely and motherly obligations, of domestic and kinship duties. With ritual 
names and songs attached to them they primarily instruct the girl about her role as a woman. 
Turner (1974: 295f) takes up this example with the intention of commenting on social 
structure and some metaphorical predications on it. In his perspective one might say the 
figurines, songs, and names instruct the young woman about her ‘structural fate’. Then, with 
the breaking of the figurines, the ritual turns against structure in a sudden inversion. The 
figurines’ destruction metaphorically signifies the destruction of social structure. (Incidentally, 
this probably is a case where the social is understood as a body, as figurines in the shape of 
humans would suggest.) Turner observes:  
 
“[B]ehind it lies perhaps the (…) human impulse to assert the contrary value to structure that distances 
and distinguishes man from man and man from absolute reality, describing the continuous in 
discontinuous terms. The important thing for those who use metaphorical means is to build up as 
elaborately as they may a structure of ideas, embodied in symbols, and a structure of social positions, 
symbolically expressed, which will keep chaos at bay and create a mapped area of security. 
Elaboration may, as in Chinese cosmological schemes, become obsessional in character. Then a 
metaphorical statement is made of what lies at once between the categories of structure (“inner 
space”) and outside the total system (“outer space”). Here words prove useless, exegesis fails, and 
there is nothing left to do but to express a positive experience by a negative metaphorical act – to 
destroy the elaborate structure one has made and admit transcendence, that is, over all that one’s 
culture has been able to say about the experience of those that bear or have borne it to its present 
point in time. Actually, what is conceptually transcendent may well be experimentally immanent – 
communitas itself. (...) Here the metaphor of destruction is a nonverbal way of expressing a positive, 
continuous aspect of social reality which tends to escape the discontinuous character of most modes 
of communication, including linguistic codes.” (Turner 1974: 297-98) 
 
Let me expand on Turner’s analysis with some interpretive license: In Richards’ example, the 
actual metaphor of interest to me emerges in the form of a meta-language statement on 
cultural discourse. Seemingly, the destruction of the figurines is not a part of discourse as the 
rest of the long ritual was, it is more like a commentary on the discourse as a whole and its 
fleetingness, precisely like negative theology that must throw its lot with an encircling 
strategy and can only stage forays from the epistemic outskirts without ever pinpointing the 
ever-elusive locus of truth itself. In the example, metaphor starts working in the domain of 
structure by using its laboriously made symbols for social meaning and ends up by breaking 
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the coherence and exclusiveness of the domain. The domain structure as furthest boundary 
is called into question and a, perhaps still evasive, outside other is constituted. Thereby, the 
scope of possible consciousness is broadened, because the implicit suggestion is that if 
structure is of limited value only, something else must be there. When I say that the 
framework of the structural is called into question, I mean the following: The whole act of 
investing figurines with symbolic meaning becomes the subject of the metaphor, not only the 
symbolic content of the emblems. It is not only that the referent of the tokens is destroyed 
with these, the symbolic meaning annulled and an elaborate ritual statement simply taken 
back, as it were. The destruction of the figurines is, more centrally, a meta-level commentary 
on what has been going on before all along. It is a commentary on the very performative act 
of symbolic cultural activity as such, the acts by which the figurines were invested with 
symbolic power to stand for duties. In short, the ritual as a performative whole metaphorically 
stands for human symbolic activity per se. The very human capacity of using symbols is the 
topic, and through metaphorically breaking it participants are reconstituted as pre-symbolic 
beings! 
    To restate it: When the symbolic tokens are broken, this signifies that ultimate reality 
stands outside symbolized, objectified experience. It signifies that the act of symbolic 
process, which perhaps comes to stand for culture as a whole, is of limited power and must 
ultimately be reversed. While using an objectified symbol, the mode of the objectified is 
called into question and the ultimate relativity of cultural constructs of the mind vindicated. 
Turner’s answer to the question of why nothing is said explicitly about anti-structure in the 
ritual is this: Experiences that relativize structure are of a kind called ‘communitas’, which is 
beyond literal description by language. In other words, the statement is about an experiential 
fact, not about one easily evoked in the mind without metaphor. 
 
6. Cultural stability and cultural change 
Ideologically speaking, metaphor as such is uncommitted, fulfilling neither an intrinsically 
conservative nor an intrinsically progressive or revolutionary mission. Metaphor can be 
responsible for social upheaval and for the stability of the traditional order alike. The 
competition between ideologies is often a competition between their key metaphors. 
Metaphors can either preserve social stability by inciting conservative social action, or where 
social changes prevail they can at least create a sense of cognitive continuity in the face of 
incipient collapse. In this section I will survey a few examples showing these various social 
functions. A first aspect that deserves to be discussed is the general dialectic of political and 
cultural discourse through metaphor. This means that many cultural metaphors are not part 
of the cultural stock automatically shared by all members of the culture; instead they are 
instruments in the continuous negotiation of culture. Here is an example: 
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THE PROMOTION OF METAPHORIC MODELS AND THE DIALECTIC OF CULTURE: ‘THREE STRIKES’ IN 
U.S. LAW 
Linguistic metaphors sit in a double position within the dialectic of cultural change. They 
reflect the extant beliefs of some people, while serving as models for other people. A good 
example is the social role of spectator’s sports and their socializing function: Sports and 
games can be both mirror images and models of social life. Take as an example recent 
efforts to legislate stricter penal laws in the United States. A much-discussed law that has 
been passed is referred to the ‘three strikes and you’re out’-regulation. It decrees that any 
three delinquencies, even minor thefts or the like, must result in a life sentence. “Three 
strikes and you’re out” is a metaphor coming from baseball language, where a batter gets 
three strikes for hitting the ball, which is the precondition for entering into the running game. 
In case of failure he is sent to the bench. This tag was possibly not only attached to the law 
after the fact by journalists as a catchy headline, it may have been influential in shaping the 
ideas of the legislators, building on the basic understanding that social norms are game 
rules. 
    First, it has to be understood that the number ‘three’ is a culturally significant number. 
Many fairy tales and jokes give the protagonists three tries or guesses. If you lie three times, 
nobody will believe you anymore, as all American’s know from the tale of the wolf and the 
three little pigs. Furthermore, baseball as such is considered the national sport, the epitome 
of what it means to be American (Shore 1996). It metaphorically encodes a series of 
American cultural core-values, e.g. that endeavor is a course (around three bases) and that 
winning requires team spirit. Admittedly, the image of ‘strikes’ introduces as a culturally 
ambivalent evaluation. In the new law the word bears negative associations with actual 
criminal violence, whereas in the game a strike is what is required to go on and be 
successful. However, the collocation ‘three strikes’ is associated with three failed strikes 
rather than a successful attempt. So the metaphor has to be understood at a more abstract 
level. You get three tries before being taken out of the game for failing. 
   All in all, an existing metaphor SOCIAL RULES ARE GAME RULES together with a mythical 
belief in THREE TRIES IS ALL YOU GET is reinforced by the ‘three strikes’ legislation and the way 
talked about it. It is important to understand that the specific dialectic that draws on past 
cognitive resources in American culture is enacted by the conservative political actors, at the 
same time excluding other possible metaphors. For example, the liberal view on penal law, 
which argues that social deprivation, ignorance, and poverty should motivate affirmative 
action (perhaps through a hydraulic image of balance maintenance), is thereby circumvented 
and is rendered ‘un-American’, since it does not conform to the win-lose game model, which 
is made even more salient in the ears of the audience by the baseball terminology. Thus, a 
specific politico-moral attitude (with dire consequences for many individuals and the society 
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as a whole, one may say) is promoted in the population on the basis of harnessing a moral 
metaphor to a shared American topos (‘baseball as epitome of society’) and entrenched 
through the institutionalization of a folk-metaphor as a socio-legal reality. 
 
METAPHOR, IDEOLOGY, AND JUSTIFICATION  
Of late, there have been various works on the political and ideological key role of metaphor 
(see Howe 1977, Chilton 1984, 1987, Lakoff 1992, 1995, Rigotti 1994, Dirven 1994, 
Dirven/Frank/Ilie 2001). The example of American conservatism and liberalism, studied by 
Lakoff (1996), was already discussed at length in this chapter. Another analysis by Lakoff 
(1992) centers on the metaphors used by American politicians to justify the Gulf War in 1991. 
These include the characterization of the occupation of Kuwait as “rape” and the fairy tale 
scenario of the just war featuring a villain, a victim, and a hero, in which Hussein is the 
demonic villain (and seen in a historically unfitting analogy to Hitler), Kuwait the innocent 
victim, and America plays the role of the hero. Apart from this ‘rescue’ scenario evoked 
through metaphor there is also a scenario of ‘self-defense’ against Saddam Hussein having a 
“stranglehold” on U.S.-economy. Of course, another recurring thought pattern was the 
Clausewitzian metaphor WAR IS POLITICS PURSUED BY OTHER MEANS and the economic 
metaphor RATIONALITY IS PROFIT MAXIMIZATION, including a cost-benefit analysis. There was 
the personification by THE RULER STANDS FOR THE STATE (“pushing Saddam out”). The 
metaphor THE STATE IS A PERSON highlights the way in which states act as units, while hiding 
the internal structures of a state and the diverging interests within it. There were metaphors 
of war as a competitive game (officers saying to their crew “This is our Super Bowl”), war as 
medicine (“surgical strikes”). On the other hand, an understanding of the American war effort 
as violent crime, murder, assault, kidnapping, arson, rape, and theft remained conspicuously 
absent. Instead, America was pictured as both courageous and rational, while only the Iraqis 
were irrational, criminal, and insane. 
    Some metaphors buttress the status quo – they keep intact what Peter L. Berger (1969) 
calls the ‘sacred canopy’ in static, traditional societies. Conservatism, for example, uses 
metaphors of social balance or of a stratified system in which every individual has her place 
and forms part of a larger whole. The transition between historical political ideologies is 
reflected in their metaphors, as Rigotti (1994: 62ff) shows: Classical political thought in 
Europe emphasized metaphors of internal coherence, unity, and concord underlying 
expression like the “state ship” or the “state edifice”. More typical for modern political thought 
are military metaphors of war, in the conflict for resources or in the democratic competition 
between individuals. A conceptual image of this kind is found in Marxism, which centers on 
the class conflict and the multiple metaphor of dynamically evolving antagonisms. 
Furthermore, nationalistic ideologies heavily draw on metaphors in their discourses of identity 
 122 
and otherness. Esra Sandikcioglu (2001: 176f) describes metaphors found in the Western 
perspective of the Orient and the Arab world. This ‘we-other’ relation is centered around five 
thematic polarities: We are civilized and moral, while they are barbaric and immoral; we are 
powerful, while they are weak; we are mature and in a position to educate or teach, while 
they are immature and in need of discipline and education; we are rational, straight-thinking, 
in control over emotions, while they are irrational, emotional, unpredictable, uncontrollable; 
we are stable and promoting stability, while they are unstable, unreal, transient, and fantastic 
(also cf. René Dirven’s 1994 book Metaphor and Nation: Metaphors Afrikaners Live By). 
Polar metaphoric images are also characteristic of racism. Bruce Hawkins (2001b) shows 
that ideological Nazi writings metaphorically used an iconographic frame of reference based 
on the light spectrum, in which the notions of ‘death’ and ‘parasite’ were placed at the black 
end of the spectrum that was equated with the Jews, while ‘life’ and ‘Aryans’ were equated 
with the pole of light at the other end. 
 
METAPHOR AND THE CREATIVITY OF LANGUAGE 
The ideological function of metaphoric thought as such was exceedingly well grasped and 
depicted by George Orwell. In the nightmarish vision of his novel 1984, ‘Big-Brother’ 
totalitarianism does not by any odd chance strive to eliminate all metaphorical potential in 
language through the purge of English and its continuous replacement by ‘Newspeak’. It 
aims at clearly bounded designata, which are systematically ordered in families of 
impoverishing word-prototypes, yielding synthetic expressions such as “doubleplusungood”. 
While the internal metaphorical relation between such related words is strengthened, at the 
same time that genuinely binary relations are subsumed as one marked category and thus 
gradually abolished, previously existing external relations of the words to other domains, 
such as associative evocations, are rendered impossible. True enough, new metaphorical 
clusters are put into place, in inseparable blends of affective and cognitive meaning, instilling 
praise, awe, fear, and faith. Yet, these blends remain static. Self-sustaining clusters of 
meaning in which every atom is continuous with every other replace an open relation of 
words to experiences. Metaphor by virtue of linguistic indeterminacy and imaginative 
innovation through new conceptual links is excluded by definition. This reform is enforced as 
a public policy in order to make “thoughtcrime” impossible, even inconceivable. It is telling 
that this totalitarian policy aims at the utter conventionalization of truth, while envisaging the 
destruction of tradition as that which allows thought innovation. It aims at transforming the 
inherently imaginative nature of language. Although it has been pointed out by Paul Chilton 
(1984), rightly I believe, that taking Orwell’s ironical novel as politico-linguistic theory would 
mean embracing a too radical version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, the Orwellian vision 
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gives us a glimpse of what the world and ultimately the human mind would be without 
metaphoric indeterminacy and creativity. 
 
COPING WITH CHANGE THROUGH METAPHORS 
Metaphor is a major coping strategy when rapid social change wreaks havoc in the minds of 
traditionally oriented people. It mitigates the cognitive effects of social transformations in two 
ways: the retention of old metaphors for new realities and the creation of new metaphors to 
come to grips with or raise a bulwark against change. Concerning the former a 
commonplace, but particularly neat example can be found in Cohen’s (1994: 141) field 
research: 
 
“In Walsay, Shetland, tropic movement across domains was an effective means of coping with rapid 
and pervasive social, economic and technological change (...). Terminology originating in small open-
boat fishing would be applied to the £2m spanking new purser trawler, crammed with the latest 
technological and mechanical wizardry; or a patient would describe the high-tech surgery he had just 
endured in terms of a sheep’s ailment with which he would be familiar, as a competent crofter.” 
 
Newly created domains of everyday experience, such as high-tech, may be unfamiliar or 
even uncanny to people firmly embedded in traditional culture. Consequently, 
understandings from the formerly dominant, but now superseded domains are imported not 
only to comprehend what has happened in functional terms but also to retain a glimpse of the 
cherished aura of a bygone world. Thus metaphors can serve to cast the new in terms of the 
old: the high-tech trawler remains, in a metaphorical double vision, a simple fishing boat. 
Palmer (1996: 224) gives a similar example from the Athabascan language of the Coeur 
d’Alene native Americans in Idaho. When motorized vehicles first appeared, their tires 
became ‘wrinkled feet’, a reference to the pattern of their treads. Palmer cites an analogous 
example from the Western Apache of Arizona, originally studied by Keith Basso (1990), in 
which the entire topology of the human body is mapped onto cars and pickup trucks: The 
hood is the nose, the headlights the eyes, the windshield the forehead, the front and rear 
wheels the arms and legs. This was even extended on the items under the hood – the 
innards: The battery became the liver, the wiring the veins, the gas tank the stomach, the 
distributor the heart, the radiator the lung, and the radiator hoses the intestines. In effect, a 
whole cognitive domain came to be systematically understood in terms of another, guided 
perhaps by the underlying conceptual metaphor MOTOR VEHICLES ARE ANIMATE BEINGS. 
Obviously this systematic mapping serves the function to lexicalize a newly emergent cultural 
domain of previously unknown objects. Yet we may presume that it accomplishes a second 
objective as well: It creates a sense of cultural continuity by appropriating an external 
technical innovation into the own language, rather than succumbing to cultural change at the 
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cognitive level by taking over the English terms. The English terms are not related in an 
image of an animate whole, so that the Western Apache would progressively disown 
themselves of a poetic, integrative, as well as practical cultural schema conceiving the world 
through body part analogies. 
    In some more extreme cases, especially where change is perceived as injuriously foisted 
upon the community by external forces, we can find highly politicized key-metaphors as a 
reaction to social change. These furnish the disoriented with an explicit evaluation of the 
process of change as a whole and point towards a defensive course of action. Gustav Thaiss 
(1978) provides the interesting example of a powerful key image in the political rhetoric of the 
Islamic renaissance. The setting of his analysis is Iran shortly before and during the 
revolution, which led to the creation of the ‘Islamic republic’. In the 1970s, under conditions of 
rapid modernization and social change, Islam, for many, came to be the sole guarantor of 
orderly social interaction, predictability, as well as coherent morality and symbolic meaning. 
In reaction to this situation, Muslim leaders metaphorically depicted the Muslim umma, the 
community of believers, as a weak, violated woman. The metaphor of a ravaged woman 
captured well a widespread sentiment that resulted from the forced modernization and the 
encroaching Western values under the Shah’s regime. By the way, the metaphor of violation 
in connection to the community is by no means arbitrary, since femaleness, and particularly 
motherhood are already evoked etymologically (umm = mother). The rape metaphor 
instantiates, both, concepts of violation and concepts of defilement. Through the cultural 
force imposed by Westernization the traditional Iranian society is bereft of its integrity at the 
same time that its purity is soiled. More than that, the metaphor is particularly skillfully 
chosen concerning its entailments within the patriarchal cultural context. By allowing the 
community as a female to be ravaged by outsiders what is insinuated for Iranian men is 
effemination and a lack of virility. Sexual imagery is thus not only quite potent in this culture 
(as in many others) in providing an image of domination, it is also linked to the notion of 
honor. Being unable to avoid the rape of one’s women brings collective shame on the 
community of men who let this happen, which in turn calls for protective reaction.  
    Another aspect of femaleness for Iranian men is the depiction of woman as fickle, 
potentially adulterous, and associated with worldly pleasures. Iranian society as a whole is, 
therefore, understood as ‘having an affair’ with Western society and its fickleness. By 
implication, deeply implanted anxieties of being cuckolded are unearthed. We have here a 
prime example of metaphor’s emotional force, of which the clerics and political leaders who 
created the metaphor were very well aware. The umma as ravaged woman was an 
intentionally created piece of rhetoric to create a strong common focus for dispersed 
emotions of social discontent, enkindle nationalistic sentiment, and thereby instigate political 
action. 
 125 
    Just as they create a collective conceptual and emotional focus under transformational 
duress, metaphors can also be a central means for the preservation of the self. James 
Fernandez (1986: 10) pays considerable attention to the uses of metaphor in the 
organization and maintenance of the individual or collective self vis-à-vis the others. He 
analyzes metaphoric status strategies of positioning oneself in desirable places, disparaging 
others, turning their offensive metaphors against them, and changing the ground when one 
wants to ostensively ignore an assault. Resituating the self into more desirable positions, as 
a consequence of social change, may also be a collective strategy, as he shows in his 
analysis of the syncretistic Bwiti cult among the Fang people of Gabon. The Bwiti 
revitalization movement first emerged during the First World War as a reaction to the adverse 
situation in the colonial world (p. 17ff, see also Fernandez 1982). His fieldwork in northern 
Spain points in an identical direction, for example where he gathers evidence for the use of 
tropes to maintain identity under the pressures of the Castiliano ‘Great Tradition’ in Asturian 
language and poetry.   
    Local traditions, the unruly ‘Little Traditions’ in Robert Redfield’s idiom, always hold at their 
disposal alternative, subversive metaphors. These can serve as a means of self-assertion in 
troubled times or it can even serve as a fulcrum of social upheaval. This is demonstrated not 
only in the work of Fernandez. The power of poetry, its creative indeterminacy in drawing on 
the established conceptual order and its role in building a bridge to that which lies beyond is 
highlighted by the linguistic anthropologist Paul Friedrich (1986). Finally, it is Victor Turner 
(1974), who demonstrates an equally abiding interest for the rhetoric of poets, preachers and 
social revolutionaries throughout much of his work. Consequently, metaphors can also 
actively enable development and cultural change. As folk poetry, subversive jokes, or 
political sermon, they are the manifestoes of the illiterate. They (and other tropes) serve as a 
toehold or a point of crystallization for rebellion, because they are catchy, emotion arousing, 
and rich in imagistic power. What Turner calls ‘anti-structure’ more often than not comes in 
the garb of metaphor with the power to shake the foundations of the powers-that-be. Writing 
on mystics, Turner attributes to them a comparable potential that local traditions may nurture 
as a reaction to centralist pressure: 
 
“In my view it is no accident that (...) mystical rhetoric, charged with oxymora and metaphors, is very 
often characteristic of movements of egalitarian, popular protest during liminal periods of history when 
social, economic, and intellectual structures showing great stability and consistency over long periods 
of time begin to show signs of breaking up and become objects of questioning both in structural and 
anti-structural terms. We have been accustomed to think of mystical utterance as characterizing 
solitary individuals meditating or contemplating in mountain, desert, or monastic cell, and to see in it 
almost anything but a social fact. But the continuous operational conjunction of such language with 
movements of the communitas type, the Friends of God with the Rhineland mystics, for example, 
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leads me to think at least something of what is being uttered is referring metaphorically to extant social 
relationships. ‘Withdrawal’ there is, ’detachment’, ‘disinterest’, there is, to mention terms common to 
the mystical lexicon of many cultures, but this withdrawal is not from humanity, but from structure 
which has become too long petrified in a specific shape.” (p. 192) 
 
Some significant theoretical insights into the nature of culture can be gleaned from what has 
just been said. The school of structural-functionalism in social anthropology and sociology 
has been variously castigated, with justification we might add, on grounds of projecting only a 
static picture of society. A central inadequacy of this view results from the nature of human 
cognition itself, namely from its fundamentally metaphoric nature. In this sense, Hildegard 
Heise (1997) vehemently argues for the dynamic nature of human thought in an attempt to 
fuse social theory with recent insights stemming from neuroscience: She claims that the 
human mind is a system intrinsically open to change and adaptive, without which the 
evolutionary success of the race would have been unconceivable, and therefore social 
structure must also be a system inherently open to innovation. By no means is ideological 
discourse a free-floating automatism beyond the influence of individual actors, as many 
brands of structuralism would have it, nor is discourse – as functionalism would presuppose 
– only discourse in the service of social stability and the powers-that-be. Contrary to 
Foucault’s early work, discourse is inherently ‘surpassable’, and one principal reason for this 
should be obvious by now: There is always an ‘exterior’ to discourse precisely because so 
much of cognition is ultimately metaphoric. Apart from the many conventionalized metaphors 
that structural-functionalists focus on, there are inherently always also other metaphors 
effecting a discursive extensions into new domains and reconfiguring discourse. The 
impossibility of discursive closure, among other reasons, follows from the impossibility of 
purely literal thought. Most referents do not enter into one-to-one correspondences with 
objects, thought is no veridical mirror image of reality, nor is meaning fixed or unequivocal in 
the sense that it is determined. Instead, it is usually motivated by perception and beliefs, and 
although motivation is never arbitrary, there are usually several possible meaningful 
construals of a ‘fact’. Society cannot be cast in one mold, because there exists little that is 
literal in the simple sense (see ch.1), especially not in the realm of complex models. 
According to this perspective metaphors are the cognitive tools of insurrection and the 
cognitive motors of social innovation. 
    On the other hand, metaphors may give rise to a (new) sense of community, especially in 
cases where it has become questionable. Keeping the metaphorical nature of most language 
in mind, we can see that key-notions may be shared communally to yield a sense of unity 
without forcing an iron corset on meaning. Evidence for the multiplicity of an outwardly 
constraining social discourse comes from a study of political attitudes in the rural English 
community of Wanet by Nigel Rapport (1993). Cohen (1994: 116), to whom I owe the 
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example, summarizes it as “a microscopic study of interpretive differences, concealed in a 
shared vocabulary, among a handful of closely related individuals”. In what Cohen glosses a 
‘dialogue of the deaf’ 
 
“each of them spins the common verbal currency into individually distinctive loops of meaning which 
constitute their respective ‘world views’. These individuals believe that they share the meanings of the 
words they transact with each other, just as they believe that they think alike about their principal 
ideological compass points. (...) Yet notwithstanding their broadly similar orientations to the world and 
despite their long and intimate association with each other – the two central characters are affines and 
had been friends since childhood – (...) each imputes to these shared verbal forms significantly 
different meanings based upon their personal experience, on which their selfhood rests. The 
meanings do not just differ but, as Rapport skillfully shows, they are mutually antagonistic.” 
 
The findings of this study, again, sensitize us to an essential insight for any cognitive 
approach to culture: Shared instituted models do not automatically produce shared cognitive 
models. What is taken as literal in fact turns out to possess no one true reading. 
Nonetheless, there is consensus on the centrality of the notion, yet its individually diverging 
referents remain hidden from the interlocutors and remain unquestioned. In conclusion, my 
conjecture is that many a key-metaphor has been historically well chosen for its healthy 
balance between reference and referential indeterminacy. We have seen that metaphors 
have the remarkable power to integrate communities through shared understandings while 
giving ample leeway to individual divergences. Perhaps such metaphors that optimally 
accommodate both aspects are those that stand the test of time most successfully. 
 
SUMMARY 
Years ago we were given a first programmatic listing of ‘the missions of metaphor in culture’ 
by James Fernandez (1977), the leading authority in the anthropology of metaphor. 
Fernandez distinguished seven missions of metaphor: (1) to provide identity for inchoate 
subjects by sign-images, (2) to accomplish affective movement, (3) to ensure optimal 
allocation of subjects in social quality space and to make reference to some prelinguistic 
quality space, e.g. through synesthesia, (4) to provide a plan for ritual behavior, (5) to bridge 
gaps in causality, (6) to fill inchoate frames by incorporating experience in the form of sign 
images, and (7) to transcend the preoccupation with parts and to return to the whole. 
According to Brenda Beck’s efforts to systematize and compact this (1978: 84), metaphor 
enables a movement from an abstract concept to a concrete image; it entails reference to 
affect and/or experience; it bridges logical gaps, it relates parts to a larger whole, and it maps 
out nonverbal phenomena or behavior. 
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    In the present chapter I have taken up Fernandez’ view that metaphor carries out many 
functions in the making of culture. I have tried to systematize most of the mentioned aspects 
with reference to cognitive theory, to add others, and to bring together a number of 
interesting case studies. In sum, the present chapter discussed the following functions of 
metaphor in culture: First, as the basic general cognitive functions of metaphor its 
emotionality, inferentiality, salience, and memorability were discussed (with the latter two 
characteristics, of course, holding especially true for consciously noticed and novel 
metaphors). Moreover, I have shown that metaphorical mappings allow the solution of 
problems and the creation of explanatory frames. 
    In addition to these general cognitive functions, I have discussed the role of particularly 
powerful conceptual metaphors, which are an important route to the explanation of cultural, 
social, or political discourse. Key metaphors provide a central means of discourse, both by 
delimiting the range of what is thinkable and by enabling it. Metaphors, in some cases, 
delimit discourse by making alternative conceptualizations ‘hard to think’. A particularly 
powerful metaphor in this respect is Reddy’s CONDUIT metaphor for communication, as 
reflected in most European languages. Metaphors enable discourse, inasmuch as one 
organizing metaphor, such as the American THE NATION IS A FAMILY documented by Lakoff, 
organizes alternative political worldviews through the hierarchization of its submetaphors. I 
hypothesized that an organizing metaphor tends to be historically more stable compared to 
its more subordinate beliefs. Due to its superordinate nature it is capable of accommodating 
a certain range of specific beliefs. (In this view, it is often easier to infiltrate the old paradigms 
than to overturn and demolish them completely.) 
    Another way in which metaphors organize cultural discourse is by projecting several 
metaphors into a single nodal key-domain, like it is shown in Blier’s study of Batammaliba 
house-architecture. Nodal domains are symbol-spaces in which numerous metaphors are 
integrated through their co-occurrence in the same locus. Different aspects of the house 
become the source domains for a whole set of metaphors. The metaphors are then 
perceived as connected through this metonymical link. So-called floating signifiers, as 
described by Lévi-Strauss, fulfill a similar integrative function of metaphor. Here, a single 
source domain or a whole piece of discourse is used in many different social contexts. 
Depending on the context, the metaphor is also given different readings (i.e. projected on 
different target domains), but at the same time it makes a clear statement about the contexts 
belonging together at a higher plane of meaning. Both, in nodal key-domains and with 
floating signifiers the fact that a single metaphorical source domain is harnessed to various 
target domains intimates a neighborhood relationship between the targets. Furthermore, it 
was argued that domains can enter into a permanent relationship of mutual support. Through 
Gordon’s example of the ideology of Western medicine, I have described what I called 
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‘macro-metaphoric relations’. In these web-like structures metaphors reinforce each other 
and establish a complex model that may become fairly self-supporting at some point. This 
kind of self-stabilizing dynamic was also brought into connection with the argument that co-
activation patterns strengthen a conceptual (or neural) linkage and increase the chances of 
future activation in further contexts. 
    In addition, I have surveyed anthropological literature indicating that metaphor is 
constitutive for injecting religious experience into discourse, by grounding the otherwise 
unspeakable in language. In this context, I have spoken of the ‘scaffolding of knowledge from 
the inchoate to the representational’ (more about this in ch.4). Likewise, various studies on 
the metaphors of social revolutions by Fernandez indicate that vague misgivings of the 
masses can be funneled into a concrete understanding of a social problem through a new 
rhetoric metaphor and thus serve a similar function. 
   With regard to social dynamics, metaphor may account for, both, conceptual stability and 
change in culture. While many metaphors stabilize ideological systems, they can alternatively 
give leverage to criticism and subversion. Interestingly, metaphors can also serve the 
function of guaranteeing a degree of cognitive continuity where society itself undergoes more 
rapid change than many can cope with, as the example of the old Scottish fisherman showed 
(who explains a new target domain through a more familiar source domain). Finally, based 
on Rapport’s study of the town of Wanet it was argued that metaphors can act as a buffer for 
the diversification of worldviews and attitudes within a single community, by enabling a 
pseudo-dialogue. All in all, however, it was pointed out that metaphor, despite its 
conservative potential, is a major reason for the inherent openness and creativity of language 
and precludes the possibility of discursive closure, in favor of which social theorists 
sometimes argue. 
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Chapter 3:                                                                                      
Anthropological Theory and Metaphor 
 
This chapter deals with current issues in the study of metaphor and looks into how they 
relate to topics raised by cognitive anthropology: The first section alerts to the fact that the 
analysis of metaphor cannot be abstracted away from cultural context. A facet of this is that 
often understanding metaphor is only possible in conjunction with other tropes, or as an 
embedded part of a complex meta-trope. My special focus will lie on the relation of metaphor 
and metonymy. Methodologically the section stresses the virtues of an anthropological 
approach to tropes. 
    The second section takes a look at the relation of metaphor to culturally important ‘themes’ 
or ‘foundational schemas’. I will take a bit of a detour here in introducing a general theory of 
how ideas spread and not confine myself to metaphor in the narrow sense. However, all this 
will hopefully lead to a general insight that should not be left out in an anthropological 
treatment of metaphor. The idea is that recurring basic schemas, which spin their web 
through numerous lifeworlds, are something like cultural basic metaphors, albeit metaphors 
that are not specific to one domain. 
    The third section deals with the issue of universalism and relativism. It begins with the 
presentation of several universals that metaphor research suggests. Subsequently, I will 
argue that even partly universal metaphors are always culturally embedded in their 
behavioral, normative, evaluative, and embodied dimensions. In searching for specifics 
within universals I will present a checklist for where to look for those. Finally, I will discuss the 
ontological status of image schemas as universals and suggest a double perspective on 
basal image schemas and situatively embedded image schema compounds of high 
complexity. 
    In an effort to hew more graceful instruments of analysis from the present conglomerate of 
terminology, the final section investigates the intricate interrelation of the terms ‘schema’ and 
‘metaphor’. Basis for this is a stimulating, yet also problematic, paper by Naomi Quinn that 
set going an intense debate in the 1990s. Through a close reassessment of the debate I 
hope to make steps toward unraveling a central problem of cognition in culture: a resolution 
of the contradiction between efforts to describe cognition as situated and efforts to isolate 
basal ontological atoms across domains. 
 
1. Metaphors and polytropes 
A deplorable, but dominant tendency of much past literature on tropes was its undue 
restriction to metaphor. Only quite recently we have seen a welcome move away from 
considering metaphor in isolation in the field of cultural anthropology. Roy Wagner’s Symbols 
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That Stand For Themselves (1986) bears witness to this propitious development, but 
foremost we have to mention the various outstanding contributions in the volume edited by 
James Fernandez Beyond Metaphor (1991). The volume’s programmatic claim is best 
expressed by Terence Turner’s succinct formula that metaphors stand in structural continuity 
with other forms, tropic and non-tropic alike (1991: 126). Turner, in tandem with Paul 
Friedrich’s (1991) contribution in the same volume, proposes to speak of a complex ‘play of 
tropes’. Both build on the observation that real social settings often feature interacting, 
overlapping or nested tropes.35 Situated in cultural context, so it is argued, it makes little 
sense to consider metaphors as fundamentally apart and different from other tropes, like 
metonymy, synecdoche (as a special form of metonymy), and irony. Other arguments of a 
similar kind can be found in Sapir (1977a), Fernandez (1986, 1991), and Ohnuki-Tierney 
(1991). Just like Terence Turner all these authors emphasize the role of ritual. It is an 
essential structural principle of ritual and mythical meaning that tropes are interdependent 
and have the ability to transform into one another. And, as a corollary, often a complex trope 
operates on several cognitive levels at the same time. This high degree of interpenetration 
between tropes also means that they are as an ensemble more than the sum of their parts. 
As a result we are confronted with the limits of our terminology: clear-cut definitions of, say, 
metaphor as opposed to metonymy appear like mere academic reifications with restricted 
explanatory value for the cognitive phenomena they purport to tackle. It is the purpose of this 
section to convey an idea how these ‘polytropes’ intermesh.  
 
METAPHOR, METONYMY, AND SYNECDOCHE 
A prime focus in the field has always been the relation of metaphor and metonymy. These 
have both been seen as polar opposites as well as related phenomena, and often as both of 
these. Before we proceed I need to give a short definition of metonymy here. Typically, 
metonymy is understood as a relation between two terms on the basis of a part-whole, 
whole-part, contiguity, or cause-effect relation. Classical examples are the linguistic 
substitution of “the crown” for the king, “a sail” for a ship, “the deck-hands” for the sailors, ‘a 
house’ for a noble family. Similar sorts of symbolic substitutions are known from associative 
magic, as when a nail clipping, a hair, or some blood becomes effective for bewitching the 
person from whom they were obtained, because they are used in the person’s stead. 
     While metaphor operates on analogy, similarity, or homology, and fulfils a role of distance 
and symbolic reference, it might be said that metonymy operates more on proximity, 
incorporation, assimilation, and mutual transformation of terms (cf. Shore 1996: 201f). David 
Sapir (1977: 20) characterizes the difference between metaphor and metonymy as follows: 
 
                                                 
35 For an accessible and concise introductory overview of these see Tilley (1999). 
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“With respect to the notion of shared domain or common ground a metonymy can be taken as the 
logical inverse of a metaphor. Rather than the relationship of two terms from separate domains that 
share overlapping features it is the relationship of two terms that occupy a common domain but do not 
share common features. (...) A metonymy, it appears, emphasizes the whole, the entire domain (...) 
shared by two terms (...), and its success as a trope depends on how fully this idea of wholeness can 
be conveyed.” 
 
What does this mean? It has often been noted that metaphor has an effect on the relation 
and perhaps the proximity of two separate mental domains. The culturally conventional and 
already typified criteria of ‘sortal correctness’ are broken and a novel typification is created 
that may become conventionalized with repeated use. Also, metaphors are perhaps the most 
important means for expressing a novel intentionality (Alverson 1991: 98). However, in one 
respect metonymy goes further than metaphor. Metonymy foregrounds the idea of 
wholeness. Whereas metaphor is – in terms of ontological domains – the more separate and 
more ad hoc operation of relating two entities, metonymy unifies in a deeper sense. 
Metonymy not only creates a novel shared category, the category is explicitly reified and thus 
transcends the ad hoc status that metaphors tend to have. In being reified the source and the 
target are assigned the status of parts of a substantial continuum. Consubstantiality is the 
defining characteristic of a metonymical relation where two entities are perceived as 
members of a common domain. Metonymies make strong ontological claims and can 
account for what has been called substance ontology. In this sense Sahlins (1985: 81) 
remarks on Polynesian cosmology that it builds on a veritable substance ontology, with the 
result that speaking of metaphorical transpositions merely between the parallel code of 
nature and culture (as the familiar structuralist approaches would do) is not quite adequate 
anymore: 
 
“If the Polynesian scheme is unlike so-called totemism, as Levi -Strauss (1963) says, because of the 
genealogical continuity (or consubstantiality) between ‘supernatural’, ‘natural’ and human beings, then 
it is a universal system of differential homologies rather than of homologous differences.” [italics mine] 
 
If metonymy can be seen as a metaphor making stronger ontological claims, it is conversely 
no surprise in this light that for some authors writing on metaphor its definition comes quite 
close to that of metonymy. Sam Glucksberg and Boaz Keysar (1993) define metaphor as the 
creation of a novel superordinate category. A classic anthropological position of a similar kind 
can be found in a celebrated paper by Keith Basso (1976). However, others, such as Lakoff 
(1993), rightly criticize this model as reductionist. And indeed, a crucial problem is that the 
novel category model does not allow a distinction between source and target or their different 
functions. However, I will enter into that discussion later. For now it suffices to note that this 
claim of the superordinate category depends on the question whether the commonality 
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established by a metaphor remains transitory or whether it is reified as a concept (e.g. by 
assigning it a lexeme) and the concept is thus made a permanent category. Hence, we may 
say that an element of metonymy, that is consubstantiality, is part of any strongly reified 
metaphor. We should note that even if some metaphors constitute themselves as 
metonymies by creating a new whole (even if it is only temporary), the reverse is not true: 
Two dissimilars may be constituted as parts of a tropical whole without a shared property that 
would make them metaphoric. A metonymy need not include any metaphorical mapping. 
     The long and the short of all this is that it is unwise to deduce from our terminology a 
principled ontological or cognitive distinction of metaphor and metonymy. It is foremost 
practical considerations which indicate that this analytic distinction quickly reaches its limits. 
The ethnographic realization that metaphors can take over the mission of metonymies and 
vice versa goes back at least as far as Lévi-Strauss (1966) and Fernandez (1977). More 
empirical evidence is furnished by Tambiah (1968), who demonstrates that the analogic 
systems of Trobriand magic employ a combination of metaphor and metonymy. In an apt 
phrase Christopher Crocker (1977a: 59) says that “metaphor and metonymy are 
perspectives” – they are different ways of viewing the same thing. This realization prepares 
the ground for a later chapter, in which I intend to reframe the terms of this old terminological 
muddle by demonstrating that metaphor and metonymy are nothing but two viewing 
arrangements on a single cognitive process. 
    Before we turn away from metonymy it should be said that one has to be wary of the 
terminological inflation found with many authors, so that one does not get lost in theory. 
Metonymic principles are invoked in all the different senses that have to do with contextual 
association. A crucial distinction worth mentioning here relates to the status vis-à-vis the 
conventional categories of our mind. Metonymy can be contextual, so that outside of it the 
two referents belong to separate wholes or fall within the general divisions of domains as we 
usually conceptualize them. Therefore, a metonymic context can be either created on 
purpose, for example by ritual enactment; or, alternatively, a metonymical phrase can draw 
on the preexisting conventional domains of everyday thought. In the former case a contiguity 
is usually established as an end in itself, for example as a cosmological predication of 
wholeness, while in the latter case a given contiguity is used as a means for another end, 
especially to highlight an aspect of something in rhetoric, poetry, or simple conventional 
locutions. It is extremely important for properly understanding the terminology of tropes to 
ask ourselves this: Is a trope given as a conventional relation between domains that we can 
build on as a basis for inference or is it only created in a process yet to be described (and 
therefore more the goal we want to reach than the means toward it)? 
    The term metonymy is in part even used to designate an inherent aspect of the 
metaphorical process itself, since a carry-over of images from one domain to the other of 
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things associated with the vehicle is operative in almost any metaphor. A case in point is 
Fernandez (1977: 126) when he says of the associative power of metaphors in ritual: 
 
“An utterance of metaphor itself as well as the actions undertaken to realize it is attended by a set of 
associations which ‘belong’ to it by reason of contiguities in previous experience. The assertion of 
metaphor thus provokes a metonymous chain of elements or experiences associated with it as part to 
whole, cause to effect, or other contiguity in time or space.” 
 
After these terminological words of caution let us return to more substantive issues. Some 
authors have been concerned with the specific ways metaphor and metonymy interact in one 
setting. I will discuss two different novel suggestions for using the term synecdoche that have 
been proposed by Terence Turner and Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney in their contributions to 
Fernandez’ 1991 volume.36 The first in a more general and the other in a more specific 
sense, they define synecdoche as a trope that combines aspects of metaphor and 
metonymy. With a view on the processual nature of tropes, Ohnuki-Tierney (1991: 179, 187) 
offers a definition of synecdoche as the combination of analogy predications on the one hand 
and either part-for-whole or contiguity relations between categories on the other. 
Synecdoche is the process of two distinct semantic categories moving together as a result of 
a metaphorical predication. In this movement of ‘becoming’, synecdoche remains an 
interstitial trope between two modes of thought, because a semantic tension between two 
categories is maintained. For example, social minority groups are subsumed under the 
general ‘we’ to negate their presence, while at the same time they are set apart as 
scapegoats. This reflects a common type of synecdoche, i.e. the transformative process from 
categorial proximity to categorial inclusion engendered by metaphors. 
    Although in some contexts Turner seems to be satisfied with such a more general 
definition of synecdoche as any combination of metaphor and metonymy, he also offers a 
more specific suggestion (1991: 148ff). According to him, synecdoche could be used to 
designate a more specific relationship between metaphor and metonymy, where a part of the 
whole structurally replicates the form of the whole. A good example is the well-known 
frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan in which the giant body of the monarch is made 
up of innumerable little bodies, those of his subjects. The macrocosmic and the microcosmic 
                                                 
36 Traditionally, synecdoche was understood as a trope closely akin to metonymy proper. It referred to 
a substitution of a part for a whole, rather than an attribute situated in its proximity. I will reject such a 
definition on the simple grounds that both things can be subsumed under metonymy and that the 
difference is frequently vague. Consider the substitution of ‘a sword’ for a knight: Is the sword different 
from the person and thus a substituted attribute (‘metonymy’) or a defining criterion for the knight as 
such and thus a part-whole relation (‘synecdoche’)? The question seems difficult to answer. 
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levels of a whole (metonymy) thus also share the same form (metaphor). Another example 
would be the metrical foot of a poem that is iconically replicated on higher combinatorial 
levels, such as lines, stanzas, or the level of the whole poem (p. 153). The creative principle 
of synecdoche can be formulated abstractly: If an attribute or structure is created in one part 
and then transposed to the whole in a metonymic predication, part and whole will share the 
same attribute or structure and the whole will replicate the parts at a macrocosmic level. 
 
POLYTROPES AND PERFORMANCE 
Dan Sperber (1975: 144) writes on the social role of tropes: 
 
“[I]n interpersonal relations symbolic utterances and behavior constantly evoke what the relation may 
become and contribute to its transformation: the imaginary complicity evoked by irony against a third 
party is also an invitation to real complicity; the intensity of hyperbole is an invitation to shared 
enthusiasm; inversely, irony directed against the hearer, litotes, symbolic gestures of hauteur or of 
respect are invitations to keep one’s distance.”  
 
Tropes are, therefore, instruments of social action. This is what James Fernandez (1986) 
reminds us of in his repeated and strong emphasis on the ‘performance’ of tropes. To speak 
of the performative nature of tropes means that a trope is not in itself a metaphor, a 
metonymy, a synecdoche, a double entendre, or an act of irony, but only becomes a 
particular type of trope when used and interpreted by particular actors – in short when 
harnessed to a historical or social context purpose and invested with the intentionality of 
human purpose. Also, it is frequently the case that several tropic operations are triggered by 
a single referent, a complex of referents, or a context. Victor Turner’s (1967) classical 
formulation of the ‘multivocality of ritual symbols’ fits in well here. Turner’s theory of the ritual 
process asserts that rituals condense a score of themes into a single sequence or symbol. 
    As a case study I will summarize Bradd Shore’s (1996: 197f) treatment of the North 
American Kwakiutl and their polytropic relation to totemic animals. Shore’s synthesis of 
earlier ethnographies tries to go beyond the narrow formulations of totemism as a single 
trope that was characteristic of the past. The polytropic complex of totemic animals lets 
resonate at least three symbolic modalities that are not fully separable. The theme 
dominating the Kwakiutl universe is the act of eating and being eaten: The central ontological 
concern is not how two different things are alike, but how one becomes another in the chain 
of eating. By donating its flesh to the hunter the animal participates in the regeneration of the 
human body. The physical life of the animals is incorporated into the body, which is human 
on the outside but essentially animal within because of this. Humans and animals form “a 
single thread of life, a continuous chain of participations” (p. 197): animals take off their skins 
to become human, just as humans don these very skins as clothes and as ceremonial 
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costumes for spiritual renewal. A second great chain of life was traditionally established by 
the use of the animal skins as the primary medium of marriage exchange for the Kwakiutl. 
The animals participate in the regeneration of the human species in yet another way. They 
are used as classificatory crests – the function traditionally described as ‘totemic’. Their outer 
shape was considered a kind of soul, and these animal shapes were used as sacred crests 
which appeared as works of art and in costumes, and were one of the ways for humans to 
propagate the spiritual ancestors. Thus animals are, in Shore’s words, “a total regenerative 
artifact”. They assume a triple role: animals-as-food, animals-as-skin, and animals-as crest: 
 
“As food, the dominant symbolic modality was incorporative and participatory. (...) As skins, the 
emphasis was on symbolic mediation between human groups and the transformability of tribal 
opposition into unity through marriage. And as crests, animals entered into metaphorical relationships 
with humans and came closest to serving a genuine classificatory function.” (p. 198) 
 
It is clear that different contexts require different emphases of the three totemic modalities of 
animals. Among other things, the roles of animals are subject to seasonal shifts. However, 
speaking of a polytropic totality means that each context implies a co-presence of the other 
modes in the function of a backdrop. 
  
‘WE ARE ARARAS’ 
By way of another example I would now like to substantiate the case for a strongly 
contextualized consideration of tropes. In a fine and theoretically very deliberate critique of 
earlier ethnographies Terence Turner (1991) reanalyzes a ritual expression among the 
Bororo of central Brazil, who have been reported to make the claim ‘we are araras’ (a kind of 
red macaw) for a long time. Ever since Karl von den Steinen’s work in the last decade of the 
19th century this avian trope of the Bororo has been puzzling anthropologists and has 
stimulated repeated debate as to whether this is best described as a metonymy, a metaphor, 
or a more complex trope. Turner takes issue especially with the analysis of Christopher 
Crocker (1977b, 19852), who argues for a simple metaphor on the basis of the similarity 
between the male and the arara existential condition. The merits and problems of Crocker’s 
position I will only skirt here. It can be noted, however, that it is difficult to decide for any 
reader unacquainted with the nitty-gritty of the ethnographic details whether his analysis is 
only partially or fully at variance with Turner.37 Turner opposes to this his own version into 
                                                 
37 Crocker’s (1985: 41) position can be briefly summarized: He argues that the statement ‘we are 
araras’ metaphorically expresses the futile attempt of male Bororos to attain the pure essence of being 
and form in ritual for more than a temporary transmutation that occurs when they become a vehicle for 
the spirits called aroe. In this respect they are alike to the macaws that are believed to be entered by 
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which he skillfully weaves an argument for the plasticity of tropes that goes considerably 
beyond a sole emphasis of metaphor. 
    He begins by pointing out something that Crocker also notes, namely that in the 
expression glossed as ‘we are araras’ the copula takes on a verb form denoting existence in 
present time as opposed to permanent states of being. This lets Turner suggest that the 
more fitting gloss of the sentence would be ‘we make ourselves araras’ or ‘we become 
araras’. This points to the importance of a specific context of the assertion associated with 
the self-creation in arara form. To substantiate the claim that Bororo men make themselves 
araras and to see how the claim is motivated, Turner puts a central ceremonial context under 
scrutiny in which the men adorn themselves with a key attribute of the araras, namely their 
feathers. It will be the task of the remainder of this section to show how, in a complex 
argument, Turner contends that through this ritual context the male actors symbolically 
reproduce and define themselves and their society as Bororo. First it is important to realize 
the cosmological significance of the araras. The Bororo conceive of plumes, and above all 
red macaw plumes, as the emblem and form of spirits they call aroe. Why are araras likened 
to spirits? Apart from the role araras play as temporary host for spirits, Turner suggests that 
the feathers come to stand for inner spirits or inner essence as an emblem, because it is the 
spirits that are seen as creative principle for the external form of all things. Arara plumes are 
chosen as emblem because they are the prototypical most culturally salient exemplars of an 
external form, the most salient and prestigious ceremonial item, and the scarce resource par 
excellence of Bororo society. The externally visible red parrot plumes represent the spiritual 
world as generalized emblems for the dynamic principle of creation of an outward form that 
stands for an inner essence. Finally, plumes suggest the lightness and flying transcendence 
of spirits. This thematic linkage is also borne out by the linguistic evidence, as the word for 
plumes also means ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’, ‘ancestor’, any ‘living member of the Bororo’, and ‘any 
actor representing spirits’.  
                                                                                                                                                        
aroe who, normally being uncorporeal beings, sometimes wish to copulate and eat. However, this is 
temporary and the araras are by no means equal to the aroe: So, Crocker concludes, “even in the 
midst of the ceremony a man is just as limited an aspect of spirit and of transcendence as a macaw.” 
Crocker’s explanation why only Bororo men use the expression is that they express with it their 
existential irony about the fact that they can never fully escape their categorical belonging to a 
matrilineal identity through their projection into the domain of spirits. While without ethnographic 
reanalysis we are in no position to definitely arbitrate on this claim, Turner correctly points out that this 
explanation by Crocker is given in too ad hoc a fashion to be a very convincing reason why women are 
excluded (he does not explain why escaping from the matrilineal identity is a goal of the men and how 
it might be achieved). Turner himself contends that the expression is linked to ceremonial contexts in 
which traditionally only men perform. 
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    Thus, by donning arara plumes the Bororo play the role of spirits towards themselves. 
Ordinary men ritually make themselves into demiurgic araras by metonymically creating an 
external form of spirit-being for themselves. Arara plumes are conceived as the privileged 
medium for the materialization of human essence. By covering themselves with arara plumes 
the actors create themselves in the form of spirit-actors, they ”create themselves in the form 
of creators of social form” (p. 139). The feathered form becomes the basis of their power to 
reproduce the society. Hence, by becoming araras they become more fully human “in the 
sense of a social being capable of transcending and recreating the structure and meaning of 
social life.” (p. 150).  
    This interpretation is also supported by evidence from the neighboring Kayapó, for whom 
ceremonial dance is linked to flight and arara feathers to souls. Becoming araras figures 
centrally in Kayapó death ritual. The corpses are laid in their graves with bunches of plumes 
tied to their arms. The soul is conceived of as flying out of the grave toward the rising sun. 
Moreover, souls who take up a terrestrial afterlife as ghosts enter into the form of araras who 
are perched on rays of the sun. A similar thing occurs in the climactic rite of boys’ initiation, 
when the adult ritual companions adorn themselves in plumes and run around the inside of a 
‘nest’ created in the village plaza with outstretched arms and crying ‘ra-ra-ra-ra’ in imitation of 
the parrots. The befeathered men and women also dance in the village singing songs in 
which they assume the perspective of the high-flying arara. Like the Bororo, the Kayapó 
make themselves birds or partake of their characteristics. Any dancing ritual itself is called 
‘flying’ and the plumes are prototypically associated with flying, which in turn connotes the 
ability to transcend the everyday social world and the power to encompass and subsume it 
as a whole. We may note that this combines the primary metaphors of CONTROL IS UP and 
KNOWING IS SEEING to create KNOWING THE WHOLE AND SHAPING IT IS SEEING FROM A LOFTY 
DISTANCE. The ritual imbues the feathered dancer with the power to get outside his or her 
social identity in order to recreate it. While the Bororo do not share the Kayapó linguistic 
equation of ritual dancing as flying, their term for plumes confirms the same set of underlying 
ideas, since it also has the polysemous meanings ‘anything light’, and ‘soul’, the implication 
being that the soul can rise above the bodily form by its lightness. 
    Let us recapitulate the succession of tropic operations involved by considering the Bororo 
and Kayapó evidence together. We have seen that at an initial level the plumes detached 
from the araras stand for the parrot. Then, by donning the plumes, a quality associated with 
the birds is attached to the men. The men acquire the arara powers of ‘spirit’. Thus, the ritual 
process starts with a metonymic operation twice over. But since these acquired powers are 
different from the concrete arara powers of flight and growing feathers, a second tropic level 
of metaphor can be said to emerge. Again the feathers are the vehicle. Now, the lightness of 
the feather metaphorically comes to stand for the ability to fly and the ability to fly is in turn 
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linked to transcendence. (As we have seen plumes are also semantically linked to spirit by 
the polysemous word aroe.) To become a flying being metaphorically means to separate 
oneself from the usual constraints of the social mode of terrestrial existence, and to assume 
an external, bird’s-eye view it. Thus, donning feathered regalia creates the power to generate 
social form (p. 147).  
     There is yet another, third, level of tropical meaning that encompasses the two prior ones. 
The ceremonial dance through the social space of the villages recreates its patterns and with 
them the key transformations of social relations that are the focus of the rites of passage they 
celebrate in their dance. This recreation is achieved in the form of araras through which the 
dancers acquire the function of the creators of social form. If I read Turner’s difficult text 
correctly, social form is thereby imbued with the creative nature of spirits. Actors are creators 
of ‘araraness’, and the ritual as a whole is a creation of social ‘araraness’. Turner argues 
that, as consummation of the process, the “metaphorically related human and arara elements 
become metonymically defined as parts of a single whole of spatial and functional relations” 
(p. 148). Here, ritual action creates two distinct things as interdependent parts of a whole. 
This means that the araras and humans become part of a single order that emerges by virtue 
of the enactment. Thus, what belongs to separate orders in everyday life, like society as the 
realm of humans and nature as the realm of araras, becomes correspondingly suspended at 
a higher level created in ritual action, and merges them into interdependent parts of a single 
totality.  
    It might be concluded in general that the tropic principle of ritual is enactment that creates 
new totalities through embedding them in a single context. The spatial and functional 
proximity of humans and araras (plumes) in the enacted ritual creates a single whole that 
encompasses them. The enacted ritual form assumes the character of those who create it, 
i.e. the arara dancers. Ultimately, when the ritual transformation is achieved, a synecdochic 
relation as Turner defines it (see above) is established. In this relation the social whole, 
whose parts are dancers of spiritual arara attributes, comes to be conceptualized on a 
supraindividual level as a notion with the same spiritual attributes of all the parts: it becomes 
a society transcendentalized with spiritual ‘araraness’. 
    A general understanding enters into all this, which follows from the generic trope inherent 
in all ritual. The generic tropic nature of ritual can be seen in the fact that all ritual is effective 
by standing for something external to itself. In other words, because humans control the 
symbols of something in the ritual they control the world outside of it. In Turner’s example it is 
through acting on and recreating social space that the act of the arara dancers stipulates the 
essential identity of the ritual and the social. The direction of this enactment – the 
reproduction of social form – is enabled by a part-for-whole understanding of the ritual act in 
relation to the world. By controlling the ritual event in such a way as to create this single 
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order one makes the world outside at which the ritual is directed a controlled order. Ritual as 
such functions through the basic metaphoric understanding that AN ENACTED CONTEXT IS THE 
LARGER WORLD. 
    According to Terence Turner, the total operational structure, the fact of being a part of a 
master trope, constitutes the necessary background for the cultural construction of the 
individual tropes (p. 151-152). Or, in other words, the whole is more than an analysis of each 
of the individual parts separately would reveal. There is a dialectical relation in the sense of a 
mutual relativization and interdetermination of parts and wholes. This entails a relativity of 
domain boundaries and a simultaneous separation and integration of the two orders. The 
externality to the social order allows the araras to serve as vehicles of the transcendence of 
that order.38 If the araras were already parts of the social realm, the ritual would be pointless. 
Only by virtue of being lofty ‘spirit’ beings, the Bororos can stage the act of transcending their 
society by making themselves into such beings. On the other hand, the fully human Bororos 
have themselves this capacity to take a bird’s-eye view and recreate themselves through it. 
Turner emphasizes the necessity of domain separation, which is still salient in metaphor, and 
of domain fusion, characteristic of metonymy. In combination they form what he also calls 
synecdoche: 
 
“The synecdochic structure of the ritual process is the essential framework for maintaining the 
simultaneous separation and integration of the two orders – nature (as the order of the araras) and 
society (as the order of humans) – upon which the meaning and the efficacy of the process depends.” 
(p. 149)  
 
This example indicates the great importance of considering individual tropes in the context of 
larger structures. This is also the central import of an anthropological perspective in the study 
of tropes. Unless we want to risk a serious distortion of the pragmatic, intentional, and 
conceptual meaning of tropes we have to abstain from considering them as elementary units 
in the study of natural ethnographic settings. 
 
                                                 
38 Although Crocker (1985: 31f) shows in much detail that the macaws are the only Bororo domestic 
pets with whom people (usually women) entertain affective relations, and that this places them 
somewhere in-between the human and the animal realm, this finding need not be necessarily 
understood as standing in contradiction to Turner’s view. Many other examples from other 
ethnographies indicate that it is frequently the intermediary categories that are tropically the most 
potent ones (cf. Ohnuki-Tierney 1991: 177). 
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2. Thematicity in culture 
Modern-day cognitive anthropologists are often concerned with analyzing so-called ‘thematic 
structures’ (Strauss/Quinn 1997) or ‘foundational schemas’ (Shore 1996: ch.2) typical of a 
cultural group. The study of cultural master metaphors in cognitive linguistics, such as by 
Kövecses (2000) points in a similar direction. The underlying idea to all these notions is that 
patterns of the mind that recur in slightly modified ways across contexts form the very 
moorings of culture. Thematicity is a constitutive feature of the concept of culture and can be 
defined as the tendency of particular schemas and metaphors to be evoked in a wide variety 
of cultural contexts. This is amply illustrated in ethnographic literature, as Strauss and Quinn 
(1997: 118) state in their major theoretical work on the cognitive basis of cultural meaning: 
 
“Examples would include complexes of understanding about honor in the circum-Mediterranean area, 
as described by Bourdieu (1977) for Kabyle society, or about rivalry in Sherpa society, as described by 
Ortner (1989), about the Western discourse of normality that Michel Foucault (1972a) describes, or 
about self-reliance in the United States, which we will describe further below. As Foucault (i.e. 1979: 
23) makes clear, a theme or ‘discourse’ can spread even across contexts separated by the boundaries 
of distinct subcultures, such as those that comprise the separate professional disciplines of social 
science and penal law.“ 
 
Thematic schemas inform cultural practice and cultural representations alike and pervade 
cosmology as well as everyday cognition. This can be exemplified by another well-known 
case of thematicity presented by Marshal Sahlins (1985: 14-19) who writes about the role 
that sexuality traditionally played in Hawaii. Sex forms an integrative thematic complex that 
casts a symbolic web over numerous other lifeworlds. It goes beyond ‘ideology’ or 
‘superstructure’ and shapes the performative structures of society, being a means of material 
gain and status politics. First, beauty functions as the paradigm of the political. The esthetic 
and the moral intermesh. Hawaiian chiefs are praised in genital chants in metaphors of their 
sexual beauty. The unique beauty of the chief makes him a privileged object of universal 
affection. It institutes a relation of attraction and coherence “that is not only centered or 
hierarchical, but makes the subordination of those who behold it an act of love.” (p. 17) 
Second, sexual attachment is an important avenue of upward mobility and creates the most 
important social liaisons. Unions are sought for advantage, and sexual intrigue is a common 
means of choice. Sex guides the making of social relationships: there is a veritable ‘political 
economy of love’. Third, if we can believe Sahlins, the political structure of the kingdom as a 
whole is perceived as a precipitate of the forces of sexual attraction. He proposes that by 
Hawaiian cultural logic the “social system is thus constructed out of passion, structure out of 
sentiment” (p. 29). Finally, this thematic nexus is expressed cosmologically. Every sexual 
union recapitulates the original congress of male heavens and female earth. There is a 
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system of common descent on several planes of cosmos and society. A long genealogy of 
descent defines nobility in opposition to commoners and what is born of chiefly parents is 
another god. Because sex is linked to the theme of reproduction and that in turn forms a 
general ontology of the differentiations of substance from the primordial downwards. Sexual 
and reproductive process becomes the universal template for cosmological process. Thus, 
Sahlins’ analysis also shows that thematic schemas can result in substance ontologies. In a 
substance ontology there is a cultural representation that the whole socio-cultural process is 
dependent on the presence of a substance, which not only becomes the underlying prime 
mover of social becoming but is conceived of as an energy, an attribute, or a possession (cf. 
Sahlins 1980 for a closer analysis). One more important thing we can see from this 
characterization is that thematicity does not address particular task schemas as such, but a 
highlighted domain that informs a wide range of other domains. Instead, a range of different 
situational task schemas incorporate thematic structures in complex ways, such as Hawaiian 
sexuality, Kabyle honor, Sherpa rivalry, bio-medical, sexual and behavioral normalcy in 
Europe, or (as we shall see) American success and self-reliance.  
 
THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF THEMATICITY 
It can be asked now how thematicity comes about, both in the diachronic development of a 
culture and in the individual process of enculturation in childhood. Strauss and Quinn (1997) 
develop a cognitive theory of how a given representation becomes thematic. Their quotation 
given above continues as follows: 
 
“This thematicity that culture exhibits, again, depends upon a complex interplay between properties of 
the culturally constructed world and properties of the mind. As we will consider, conditions are only 
sometimes right for thematicity to result: Not all cultural schemas become cultural themes.” (p. 78) 
 
Therefore, culturally specific as well as universal cognitive features contribute to this. Strauss 
and Quinn offer a series of complementary answers to the question of the origin of 
thematicity. First, thematic structures may be the result of schemas learned very early in 
childhood. For example, the American concept of love in marriage of grown-ups can be 
explained on the basis of early childhood experiences of love. (see Strauss/Quinn: ch.7). 
These experiences are then metaphorically adapted to the new context of marriage, while 
retaining a great deal of those expectations learned in infancy.   
    Second, such structures result from a schema being learned in a wide variety of contexts. 
Taking the American schema of self-reliance as an example, Strauss and Quinn (p. 119) 
argue that schemas are more likely to be further generalized, if they are initially learned in a 
number of contexts. American middle-class children learn the schema of self-reliance at 
home, at school, throughout day care, and in extracurricular activities like the Scouts and 
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Little League. These institutions do not only reinforce the schema of self-reliance, they 
progressively broaden its definition, so that it is eventually transformed into an internalized 
template for the child. This means that the schema is progressively elevated to an ever-
higher level of schematicity. The schema is acquired on a higher level than any one of the 
individual contexts would specify, a level of schematicity that spans the contexts as 
underlying common denominator.  
    Third, there is a mechanism called ‘elective affinity’ – a term originating with Max Weber – 
for new rhetoric and products that appeal to a preexisting understanding. Elective affinity is a 
selection process in which people screen new cognitive input for information that fits into an 
assumption toward which one is already inclined. People pick out new information in order to 
corroborate their prior assumptions. Therefore, elective affinity is an autodynamic process 
that assimilates new information into preexisting schemas and stabilizes them in the process. 
39 As example take again the schema of self-reliance in the U.S.A. Because many Americans 
share understandings about self-reliance, the kind of public and political discourse, the 
pastimes, and the forms of entertainment that promote self-reliance ‘sell’ well. As Americans 
find it natural to be self-reliant they are unlikely to question the assertion that the United 
States must supply its own energy needs, or that welfare dependency is bad. This response 
conveys messages to the powers-that-be about which future policies to envisage, which 
products to develop, and which marketing strategies to embrace. Therefore, with prevalent 
themes there may be a self-stabilizing cyclical process of production and election. This 
closely corresponds to the dialectic of externalization and internalization of social symbols 
that Berger and Luckman (1969) describe so well. This autodynamic process can also be 
                                                 
39Pascal Boyer (1994: ch.7 and 8) has the same mechanism in mind when he talks of ad hoc 
abductive reasoning to strengthen assumptions. However, he puts the emphasis differently: He rightly 
stresses its role as a general feature about cognitive assumptions that we can posit without recourse 
to any explanation by ‘worldviews’. Abductive reasoning can strengthen relatively isolated single 
beliefs without any necessity for them to embedded in a more encompassing whole. This raises a valid 
point. Anthropologists need not automatically take recourse to arguments on the grand scale by 
invoking belief systems, when general cognitive principles of situative selection can account for the 
data. Much like Strauss and Quinn, Boyer seems to agree that such ‘elected’ assumptions can 
become cognitively entrenched. The main difference in emphasis is that Boyer underscores an 
additional aspect: As long as assumptions are situationally elected, this process of strengthening 
allows for change, because at any other time additional information may be drawn on that will lead to 
different assumptions. Let me note however that the weak point of this interesting view is that it does 
not explain in detail what it is that guides our screening and determines which filters we chose. It is 
easy enough to reintroduce the notion of ‘ideology’ or ‘worldview’ here through the back door as such 
overarching structures that govern more localized processes of cognitive selection (cf. Ortner 1990 on 
this problem). 
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reproduced in social relationships: When many people share an understanding, the powers-
that-be (in a democratic society) will tend to reproduce that understanding by catering to their 
beliefs. Dan Sperber (1996: 116), a leading figure in another influential theoretic strand that 
is centrally concerned with the question of what causes a representation to spread and 
become thematic, makes a similar point: 
 
“An increase of the density of public productions in the vicinity of an attractor [i.e. meaning attractor, 
M.K.] tends to reinforce the attractor, if only because it increases the probability that attention will be 
paid to these more numerous productions.” 
 
Spearheading a program in anthropology that builds on general cognitive principles rather 
than on ‘cultural beliefs’, Sperber (1996: 84) proposes what he calls an ‘epidemiology of 
representations’. This approach tries to find cognitive principles accounting for the fact that a 
given belief is easily remembered and can spread among a group of people. This line of 
inquiry implies that pieces of information of a certain kind tend to be picked out by people 
even without explicit instruction because they are salient or easy to remember. Sperber 
identifies a number of factors responsible for the thematic spread of a representation that are 
psychological as well as ecological: The first important factor concerns the ease of 
memorization of a particular element of knowledge. Some beliefs are more intuitively 
plausible than others, perhaps on innate grounds. For example there is a fair amount of work 
that points to a general human propensity to conceptualize living beings in terms of natural 
kinds (Hirschfeld 1994, Boyer 1994, Atran 1996). Then again, a digestible portion of salient 
information that is counter-intuitive can even enhance the ease of recall of a context. 
Religious assumptions often mix highly intuitive with some counter-intuitive beliefs to achieve 
a maximum effect, as Boyer (1993, 1994) intends to demonstrate.40 Further factors that 
contribute to the spread and stability of beliefs are the existence of background knowledge 
and a motivation to communicate the representation. Finally, the recurrence of situations in 
which the representations can be used (see above, Strauss/Quinn 1997), the existence of 
writing as a means to store memories externally (cf. Goody 1977, 1986), and the existence of 
institutions that are engaged in the transmission (cf. Boyer 1990) play a role. One more 
factor that I would add here is the affective loadedness of a representation (cf. Whitehouse 
1992, 1996b). Strauss and Quinn (1997: 132f) note that the motivational salience of a 
representation can vary considerably between individuals and that this also influences the 
                                                 
40Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Sperber (1996: 116) argue that an over-density of mental 
representations may result in a decrease of relevance, at least to conscious attention. However, the 
reverse is probably true concerning subconscious cognition, especially if we bear in mind that the 
knowledge most taken for granted is culturally the most important knowledge (cf. Bloch 1998). 
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cognitive entrenchment of the representation. Two individuals can be exposed to the same 
cultural information but care differently about it, so that they will not internalize it in the same 
way. 
 
WHAT MAKES A METAPHOR THEMATIC? 
Let us now focus on metaphorical expressions in language and on what makes them 
thematic. There are two dialectically related sides to the process that lets metaphors become 
thematic: cultural exemplars and cultural themes.  
    One important vehicle for creating shared metaphors (and schemas) is constituted by what 
Strauss and Quinn (1997: 145-152) call ‘cultural exemplars’. For example, Mother Teresa is 
the current exemplar of the selfless benefactress, and one might metaphorically call 
somebody ‘a veritable Mother Teresa’. Exemplars come into being when specific thought 
structures spill over to inform the entire context in which they are embedded. For example, a 
metaphor that originally only expressed a particular aspect of marriage can become more 
and more linked to the whole domain of marriage as it gains popularity. Once in currency, 
metaphors and other structures continue to be used just because they come so readily to 
mind in the context. They become emblematic for the whole context or domain. A sizeable 
bank of cultural exemplars is learned from first- or second-hand experience (such as stories, 
myths, life narratives, etc.). Some of them are highly culturally distinctive, others recur across 
cultures in a similar fashion and may be based on universally salient sources, such as 
landscape, body, animals, social activities, etc., even though their expression takes different 
guises in the context. Exemplars may change from generation to generation. Today Mother 
Teresa has supplanted Albert Schweitzer as the exemplar of the saintly helper of the poor. 
Cultural exemplars also supply people with a fund of analogies they use in reasoning when 
trying to understand new experiences. For example, children understand love and marriage, 
which is still beyond their ken, on the basis of the exemplar of their playmate relationships, 
as Strauss and Quinn show in an earlier work (1992). In other words, exemplars become the 
privileged source domains for metaphors that people apply to new experiences. At the same 
time that the exemplar is the expression of schema, the schema uses the exemplar as a 
vehicle for spreading. It is an easily remembered condensation rich in imagery and context 
from which a schema is extracted. I would argue that myths are the institutionalized form of 
such schematic exemplars, which people adapt to their present reality. 
    The circulation of cultural exemplars is only one of the ways in which metaphors that 
include these exemplars become widely shared themselves. Another way that metaphors 
spread is through relating to a general cultural theme, which is situated on a higher level. 
Many widespread metaphors reflect and encapsulate prominent cultural themes (1997: 156). 
For example, the manufactured product metaphor  
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“colors Americans’ understandings, not only of marriage, but of the many domains of life to which they 
apply the values of hard work, pride in one’s work, Yankee ingenuity, and other American virtues 
associated with making things that last and work well.”  
 
There is a more general cultural schema that predisposes Americans to see all kinds of 
things and relations as manufactured products. Consequently, the metaphor of manufactured 
products for marriage has spread to the domain of marriage for the same reason that any 
understanding becomes thematic – through the multiplicity of similar-but-not-identical 
experiences. I would add that the metaphor is able to colonize new domains not simply 
because it reflects a given cultural status quo, but because it reflects the normative values of 
hard work and diligence that are encoded in the status quo in specific ways. It appears that 
themes and exemplars are dialectically related. An exemplar is chosen because it fits a 
preexisting theme and the theme in turn is integrally connected with the exemplar. That is, 
one way to encode themes is by culturally typical exemplars. 
     Strauss and Quinn observe that, in general, wholly new solutions to reasoning tasks and 
new representational systems do not easily develop. Usually they evolve out of simpler 
systems over long periods of time and are modified to suit new needs. In a similar spirit 
Sperber (1996: 141) speaks of ‘parasitic information’ that locks into a preexisting schema. 
Schemas recommend themselves to new contexts with a family resemblance to the old. It is 
important to note that in the process of the thematic spread the appeal of themes is ‘grafted’ 
as they are incorporated into new schemas. The schema of success and the overarching 
appeal it has for Americans is a case in point:  
 
“Once it has been invented, the subsequent spread of a schema for reasoning about marriage will owe 
much to this broad appeal. That is, the lesson about succeeding is neither an unfamiliar nor 
unwelcome one to newlyweds, who bring with them into marriage a more general orientation to 
succeeding from the many earlier contexts in which they have learned it. Most Americans thus want 
success, and find it natural to seek success, in marriage as in so many other endeavors. It is so 
natural for Americans to think of marriage in terms of success and failure, indeed, that some of them 
experience divorce as the most acute of personal failures.” (Strauss/Quinn 1997: 179) 
 
All this notwithstanding, thematicity always remains partial. Strauss and Quinn emphasize 
this point strongly and speak of centrifugal factors of meaning construction that are opposed 
to the centripetal ones. There is no cultural dynamic guaranteeing that all the members of a 
society will come to agree on a wholly cohesive worldview, as earlier functionalist 
approaches assumed. Nothing prevents multiple or even contradictory cultural themes from 
emerging. Any cultural schema will only be culturally appropriate in certain types of 
situations. Take again self-reliance in the U.S. and how it interacts with gender roles. 
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Someone who is a self-reliant career-woman in the working place may be still expected to 
act feminine and helpless when a faucet leaks. She is, as Strauss and Quinn (p. 121) say,  
 
“unaware of the inconsistency, because her self-reliance understandings and her feminine-
helplessness understandings are represented in different parts of her neural network and are triggered 
in different contexts by very different features of experiences, so they rarely come into conflict.”  
 
They conclude that there must be a process of ‘compartmentalizing’ the social world into 
situations where thematic schemas are appropriate and such where this is not the case. 
    Quite recently Kövecses (2000: 172-181) systematically discussed sources of intra-cultural 
variation in metaphor. These include (1) the change of prototypes through time and (2) the 
existence of complementary or competing prototypes at the same time. Prototypes may shift, 
be elaborated, or change in intensity. For example, since Victorian times American 
metaphors for male friendship have changed. Speaking of ‘fervent lovers’ and ‘deep and 
burning affection’ was not uncommon in the 19th century. In the 20th century notions of 
warmth have largely replaced the heat of fire among friends. Alternative conceptual 
metaphors for a domain may also reflect that this domain has several parallel prototypes. In 
America love is understood through aspects, that of ‘ideal love’ and that of ‘typical love’. 
IDEAL LOVE IS UNITY, while TYPICAL LOVE IS AN ECONOMIC EXCHANGE. In a similar way real 
friendship and friendliness are distinguished. In real friendship the true inner self is revealed, 
while in friendliness a primarily social role of predictable pleasantness is projected. Similarly 
Lakoff (1987: 74ff) discusses a multiple prototype model of ‘mothers’, which includes a 
genetic model, a nurturance model, a marital model, and a genealogical model. A cluster of 
these combined models determines what ‘a real mother’ is. The multiple mother prototype 
also reflects developments typical of more recent times. Now there are also donor mothers, 
surrogate mothers, adoptive mothers, stepmothers, and mothers who give up their child for 
adoption. 
 
THEMATICITY AND SCHEMATICITY 
An important key to the cognitive basis of thematicity is schematic imagery. Schematic 
structures are important in understanding all kinds of cultural knowledge, including scenarios 
and metaphors. Skeletal structures in mental imagery are responsible for general thematic 
templates, by virtue of accommodating numerous concrete experiences. I will only briefly 
mention a few examples treated above or to be picked up later and leave the more detailed 
theoretical argument to later chapters: 
    In chapter 4 I will treat in detail Bradd Shore’s (1996) analysis of how the initiation process 
for Murngin boys of Northern Australia involves the repeated enaction of a foundational 
schema in the walkabout journey, in age grading rituals, and in the guise of mythic tales. 
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Together these ultimately teach novices the basic cosmological outlook of their people. 
Through repetition and ritualization specific events gradually become highly generalized 
archetypes in their minds. As such, together with multivocal semantic symbols, they become 
schematized into a general set of patterns with very strong kinesthetic associations (p. 259). 
A major aspect of the foundational schema is an inside-out and outside-in movement in a 
general spatialized template with multiple associations and a journey “through a complex 
landscape of organized categories” (p. 222f). Another well-known example comes from 
Bourdieu’s (1977) discussion of female WITHINNESS and male EXTRAVERSION schemas in 
Kabyle culture. These schemas are highly thematic and encoded in body posture, evoked 
linguistic imagery and symbolic house space alike. Across these modes of expression men 
are associated with a generalized image of dynamism and directing force to the outside, 
while women are associated with an image of stasis and directing force to the inside. A 
further example is found in the work of Sherry Ortner (1990) on the Sherpa of Nepal. She 
approaches narrative plot-structures with a view on underlying cultural schemas, which she 
calls ‘core stories’. Ortner uncovers a foundational plot that relates to a main cultural theme 
of the Sherpa, namely rivalry among men for resources and power. She describes a 
prototypical, yet flexible basic scenario of how rivalry relations pass through certain stages, 
which is found in action sequences both as acted out socially and as described in the mythic 
blueprints of social action. Likewise, Kövecses (2000) presents a detailed linguistic analysis 
that English metaphors for the various emotions such as anger, love, fear, happiness, or 
shame share a generic FORCE model that is, of course, implemented in diverse ways. He 
speaks of a ‘master metaphor’. Kövecses also indicates that at a yet higher level all the 
emotions go into a more general model where they are opposed to rationality, so that one 
acts as an ‘agonist’ and the other as an ‘antagonist’ in a shared force relation (“I was 
overcome by my emotions”).  
    This brings us to the argument why schematic imagery is so important for integrating many 
models and metaphors into a recognizable single cultural style. Let us assume that within 
any given cultural group (1) significant cross-contextual relations between a series of 
connected clusters of folk-models exist which share a kind of family resemblance. Let us also 
assume (2), as argued earlier, that many major cultural models and metaphors are imagistic 
and non-propositional. From these two assumptions it follows that what makes several 
models part of the same cluster is their shared imagistic dimension on the topmost level of 
schematicity. The rich details of the models vary from one context to another, but their 
skeletal features are recognized as related and processed in a similar way. In Ortner’s 
example this could mean that all the different cases covered by the schema of rivalry among 
men share a basic causal structure. According to Johnson (1987) this basic aspect of how 
the events unfold is mainly understood through FORCE relations, much like billiard balls 
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passing on their impetus. However it is probably not only this general aspect of event 
structure, but also the more content-related mental representations of antagonism, vying 
interests, appearing on and leaving from the contended field and the involved rise in prestige 
that involve schematic imagery. The general point made here is that imagistic schematicity 
contributes to the emergence of cross-contextual links between cultural knowledge from 
different domains. 
 
3. Cultural universals and variation in metaphor 
One of the most interesting issues from an anthropological standpoint is what the study of 
metaphor can tell us about cultural universals and variation. I will briefly survey the kinds of 
universals emerging from metaphor research. Then I will enumerate some major dimensions 
in which superficially similar metaphors diverge. Through this I aim at showing how specifics 
and universals can be integrated in a comparative framework. In closing, I will ask to what 
extent and in what sense image schemas are universal, as is implicitly claimed by many 
cognitive linguists, and discuss their explanatory and ontological status. 
    The first obvious universal is the prevalence of metaphor itself, which characterizes human 
thought as such. Beyond this we have to study the incidence of specific metaphors across 
cultures. According to my brief survey of the literature, metaphorical universals can be 
sought in several specific dimensions: (1) in the prevalence of certain source domains in 
culturally significant contexts, (2) in specific pairings of source and target domains, (3) in 
patterns of historical change in metaphor, such as grammaticalization, and (4) in construals 
of the topology of entire domains, which are independent of variation in surface language. I 
will discuss these here. (5) A final source of universals are similarities found at the generic 
level of metaphors that diverge otherwise. I will discuss this a bit later in this section when 
inquiring into the universality of image schemas. 
 
PREVALENT SOURCE DOMAINS 
Cultural anthropology testifies to the fact that some source domains attain a special role in a 
great number of cultures, (not considering the target domains for which they are used for the 
moment). A practically ubiquitous example is the body as a basic source domain for 
metaphor (Douglas 1966, 1970). Body parts, body postures and gestures, body functions 
such as sex and reproduction, fluids such as blood, sperm, saliva, or excretions are among 
the richest sources of metaphor and a major cultural preoccupation in a great number of 
cultures. Christopher Tilley (1999: 36) argues that two other things beside the body, namely 
the house and the landscape, are source domains of high productivity across many cultures. 
He explains this through the existential significance of bodies, houses, and landscapes in the 
sense that all three form containers for human dwelling in the world. Cultural symbolism can 
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very often be found in body art, how people shape and symbolically infuse their dwellings, 
and in the shaping of the landscape or the setting of orientational landmarks. While the target 
domains cover a broad spectrum, these findings show that humans craft their immediate 
environment and themselves to expressive purposes. 
    Further particularly potent sources for metaphors are animals, which can be found in the 
literature on totemism. According to Willis (1974: 9) and Crocker (1977a: 43f) this profound 
significance derives from the fact that animals have a double role in being part of our 
enduring biological heritage as human beings and, at the same time, per definition being 
outside human society. Animals are brought into human categories by an extension of the 
principles governing human social relations (Tilley 1999: 49). Besides ecological and 
experiential salience, a reason for their widespread use is their multiple potential both as 
metaphor and metonymy. Animals are, one the one hand, close to humans and figure 
prominently in social life and, on the other hand, allow for many analogies with humans 
(moving, eating, mating, dying, hierarchy, different races, having societies, etc.) The master 
metaphor here is HUMANS ARE ANIMALS, which organizes these many sub-mappings. 
    Furthermore, metaphors can be related to human modes of subsistence. Bird-David 
(1990, 1992, cited in Tilley: 1999: 50) produces case evidence for characteristic foundational 
metaphors in particular modes of subsistence. He argues that forest dwelling people, such as 
the Nayaka of South India, the Mbuti of Congo, or the Batek of Malaysia, share a central 
metaphor THE ENVIRONMENT (THE FOREST) IS A PARENT. An important aspect of this 
understanding is that the forest, like a parent, gives unconditionally and provides for humans. 
Among the neighboring cultivators of the same regions this metaphor is transformed into the 
metaphor THE ENVIRONMENT (THE LAND) IS AN ANCESTOR. The important entailment here is 
that the land, like an ancestor, only gives in return for prestations. It is an interesting 
hypothesis to check whether these metaphors are universal or near-universal within cultural 
groups sharing a subsistence mode. At any rate, they seem to be motivated by the 
environment and the typical formative experience of people living in it. 
 
UNIVERSAL SOURCE-TARGET PAIRINGS 
Another way to look for universals is to search for universal conceptual metaphors in the 
strict sense, i.e. pairings of specific source and target domains. For example, Kövecses 
(2000, 2001) presents evidence that the metaphor ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER is not 
only found in English, but also in Hungarian, Polish, Chinese, Japanese, Zulu, Wolof, and 
Tahitian with minor variations. Ning Yu (1999) discovered that event structure metaphor in 
English is also fully present in Chinese. Both languages conceive states as locations, causes 
as forces, changes as movements, actions as self-propelled movements, purposes as 
destinations, means as paths, difficulties as impediments, etc. 
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    There is a particularly interesting, but seldom mentioned cross-cultural study by Hoyt 
Alverson (1994), who compares expressions for time in English, Chinese, Hindi, and 
Setswana. He suggests some universals in experience that create a semantic repository that 
is shared between cultures. The findings based on linguistic collocations indicate that time 
concepts in all four cultures fall into the following five classes: (1) time as a partible entity, (2) 
time as causal force or effect, (3) time as medium in motion, (4) time as a course, and (5) 
time as an artifact of ascertainment of the change of time.41 There is, however, one exception 
among these four examples: In Hindi a conception of time as a linear or orbital course is not 
present. Apart from this, the results point at a common experiential motivation and thus some 
phenomenological universals in the experience of time. 
    A very similar kind of explanation comes from the study of so-called ‘primary metaphors’ 
by Joe Grady (1997). The assumption is that primary metaphors arise because many 
embodied experiences in the world are universal. Such universally acquired metaphors can 
derive from archetypal early experiences in the parent-child relationship. These include 
AFFECTION IS WARMTH, INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS, and RELATIONSHIPS ARE ENCLOSURES. 
Likewise, basic experiences with objects in infancy shape primary metaphors such as 
UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, MORE IS UP, or IMPORTANT IS BIG. Basic experiences in spatial 
movement prefigures TIME IS MOTION, STATES ARE LOCATIONS, and PURPOSES ARE DESIRED 
OBJECTS. It remains to be seen how broadly the evidence bears out these hypothesized 
universals.  
 
ONTOLOGICAL METAPHORS AND OTHER TRANSFORMATIONAL UNIVERSALS 
An intriguing type of universal has to do with the conceptual expression of one ontological 
kind in terms of another. This is expressed in the notion of ‘categorial metaphors’ proposed 
by Bernd Heine and his colleagues (Heine/Claudi/Hünnemeyer 1991, cited by Keesing 1989: 
465). Their assumption is that there are experientially salient connections between the most 
elementary ontological domains that hold universally across languages. Their findings from a 
survey of many languages indicate a universal directionality determining which domain 
classes can become a metaphorical source for other classes, and which a metaphorical 
target. There is a specific order holding between source-target pairings in ontological 
metaphors. It can be expressed in a chain as follows: 
 
     PERSON è OBJECT è SPACE è TIME è PROCESS è QUALITY 
source domain pole          target domain pole 
                                                 
41 The results for Chinese and English metaphors are corroborated by the articles of Ning Yu (1995) 
and Lakoff (1990, 1993). However, they cover only cases (3) and (4) of Alverson’s more inclusive 
survey and apparently missed examples from the other classes. 
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Quality stands at the abstract (target domain) pole, with the categories left of it becoming 
progressively more concrete. A conceptual category may be metaphorically expressed by 
any other to the left of it in the chain. Thus, a quality can always been expressed as a 
process, time, space, objects, or persons. Processes can be expressed as time, space, 
objects, and persons, and so on. As a support of this Claudi and Heine (1986) examine some 
common metaphoric relationships in the Niger-Congo language of Ewe and document a 
series of highly conventionalized equivalences between sources and targets, which shape its 
most basic ontological metaphors AN OBJECT IS A PERSON, SPACE IS AN OBJECT, A QUALITY IS 
AN OBJECT, QUALITY IS SPACE, TIME IS SPACE, A PROCESS IS SPACE, QUALITY IS A PROCESS. 
Heine (1997a) shows these to be universal. 
    Heine and his colleagues also study a diachronic language development called 
grammaticalization, i.e. how lexical forms become progressively transformed into 
grammatical categories. The process of grammaticalization is a form of diachronic metaphor. 
Lexical forms come to stand for some other linguistic function. They become progressively 
‘bleached’ of their semantic content (i.e. schematized) and come to serve as abstract 
relational functions in some contexts. For example, they explore how a volitional verb applied 
to willful human agents comes to be used for non-human entities, following the AN OBJECT IS 
A PERSON transformation. 
    Heine’s comprehensive work (1995: 131f, 1997a: 148ff) also describes other 
transformational (near-)universals. His findings indicate that the range of concepts from 
which new linguistic forms are metaphorically derived are severely restricted in cross-
linguistic comparison. Thus, if new terms for ‘east’ and ‘west’ are acquired, these terms most 
likely relate to expression for the rising and setting sun. If a definite article arises it is most 
likely derived from a demonstrative attribute. If an indefinite article arises, it is almost 
invariably derived from the cardinal numeral ‘one’. If a term for ‘front’ is introduced, it is 
almost invariably derived from a body-part noun, such as face, eye, head, breast, and the 
like. Moreover, it is very common that spatial and temporal relations come to mark logical 
relations in discourse. Heine (1997a: 150) summarizes this as follows: 
 
“This means that erstwhile expressions for spatial and temporal concepts turn into markers for 
discourse functions such as anaphora or cataphora, or into markers for conditional, causal, purposive, 
adversative, concessive, and other relations, and this again may also have the effect that adverbs and 
adpositions originally used for locative and temporal concepts tend to end up as elements whose main 
function it is to express causal subordination (...).” 
 
Universal hierarchies in modes of synesthetic metaphors seem to follow a logic quite similar 
to the ontological categories described above. It was pointed out earlier that metaphors such 
as “sweet silence” are quite natural, while “silent sweetness” occurs rarely. These and many 
 153 
other examples demonstrate that sound is more readily conceived as taste than the other 
way around. Joseph Williams (1976) and Yanna Popova (personal communication, July 14th 
2000) suggest that there is a universal modality hierarchy, such as that some senses are 
preferred as source domains and some as targets. Touch is preferred to taste, which in turn 
is preferred to smell a source domain in synesthetic mappings. Smell again is more primary 
than sound, and sound more primary than vision. This can again be expressed in a 
hierarchical chain: 
 
        TOUCH è TASTE è SMELL è SOUND è VISION 
source domain pole          target domain pole 
 
Popova argues that the hierarchy results from the experiential immediacy of modes such as 
touch, which makes them closer and thus more ‘reliable’ in an ontological sense. By contrast, 
visual information is experienced as external and existentially more remote. 
 
UNIVERSAL CONCEPTUAL TOPOLOGIES 
Another kind of hypothesis on universals concerns the complex conceptual topologies, rather 
than the study of individual utterances. One argument comes from the study of imagery that 
underlies systems of spatial prepositions, which have been of much interest to metaphor 
theorist because of their polysemous nature. Alverson (1991: 113) assumes that there are 
archetypal scenarios or lived-body experiences that serve as a basis for encoding complex 
categories in the lexicon. He proposes scenes encoded as wholes, as given in phenomenal 
experience, that “any language would encode in a small number of lexical items all of the 
basic experiential properties of this one grand scene.” The language as a whole will always 
encode the scene, even though there exist various ways of breaking up this intentional 
geometry and temporality, as well as ways of assigning the components to the lexicon. 
Specifically, the archetypal scenario is given through full and rich image schemas that are 
“ready and robust codings of certain universal, materially and perspectivally grounded 
experiences.”  
    As a case study he compares the polysemous senses of English ‘over’ to its counterparts 
in German and the South African language of Setswana, which break up the lexicon in 
divergent ways. However, he believes that the following experiential archetype is able to 
accommodate the cross-linguistic differences: 
 
“There is an experience that would in some minimal way be shared by all languages/cultures and their 
speakers – that of the immediate surface of the earth and the seeming course of sun and moon. Such 
a ‘scene’ would contain such potentialities for experience as these: (1) propinquity; (2) distance; (3) 
demarcation of spatial relationships; (4) the dial, orbit, or trajectory of sun and moon, whose light is 
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both a point and a sweep or array; (5) cloud cover; (6) altitude; (7) courses of movement/travel through 
the trajectory; (8) barriers to sensory and locomotor access; and (9) behavior of entities occupying this 
scene.” (p. 112) 
 
Based on such an archetypal experience people construct a complex multi-construal model 
(Palmer 1996) that encompasses various ways of schematization and of perspectivally 
construing a scene. 
    There are several other authors who have suggested universals in the mental scenes and 
the imagistic topologies that constitute them. An interesting result is that the topology of 
mental relations between several prepositional terms is invariant across languages in spite of 
surface variation. Gärdenfors (2000: 175-176) summarizes the work of Bowerman and 
Pedersen (1992): 
 
“In a cross-linguistic study involving thirty-eight languages, they investigated how native speakers 
described situations of containment, support, attachment, adhesion, hanging, and so forth. In 
particular, they studied the following six spatial situations: (1) support from below (for example, cup on 
table), (2) clingy attachment (band-aid on leg), (3) hanging over/against (picture on wall), (4) fixed 
attachment (handle on door), (5) point to point attachment (apple on twig), and (6) full inclusion (apple 
in bowl). (...) Different languages use different spatial expressions to express these kinds of situations. 
For example, in English (1)-(5) are covered by ‘on’ and (6) by ‘in,’ and in Dutch the prepositions used 
are ‘op’ for (1)-(2), ‘aan’ for (3)-(5), and ‘in’ for (6). Despite considerable variation in the languages 
investigated, the spatial situations were not categorized in arbitrary ways. All of them appear to be 
constrained by an underlying dimension that orders the spatial situations from (1) to (6). For example 
in no language did Bowerman and Pedersen find a term that was used for (1) and (5), but not (3).” 
 
The results indicate invariant topological groupings in the imagery underlying various 
prepositional systems, with always the same elements being conceived conceptually next to 
each other in the same overall order. 
    Another at least superficially similar argument is proposed by Anna Wierzbicka (1992: 
11ff). She holds that meaning is composed from a set of universal semantic primitives on the 
conceptual level. Wierzbicka tries to isolate irreducible meaning atoms (an ‘alphabet of 
human thought’, p.18) by constructing a sort of meta-language by which all complex 
concepts can be described. A basic concept is accepted as a semantic primitive if it proves 
itself across unrelated languages, if it is demonstrably active as a ‘building block’ in the 
construction of other concepts, and if the building blocks are lexical universal, i.e. concepts 
which have their own word (p. 12). Likely candidates include ‘think’, ‘say’, ‘know’, ‘do’, ‘thing’, 
‘person’, ‘want’, ‘like’, ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘this’, ‘something’, ‘when’, and some dozens more. The 
meta-language approach is useful for analyzing the conceptual content of culturally specific 
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concepts and their polysemous sub-versions. For example, one major meaning focus of the 
English word ‘soul’ can be decomposed as follows: 
“one of two parts of a person 
one cannot see it 
it is part of another world 
good beings are part of that world 
things are not part of that world 
because of this part a person can be a good person” (ibid, p. 36) 
 
The model helps in pinpointing conceptual elements that might be universal. When complex 
cultural concepts like the English soul, the Russian duša and the German Seele are 
compared through compounds of primitives, this may reveal a partial overlap and tell in 
which specifics the similar notions differ. Yet we have to bear in mind that semantic primitives 
never occur in isolation, but as “elaborated and augmented”, and are thus dubious as 
universals independent from more complex configurations. Note finally that the approach is 
more of an analytical observer’s model for describing similarities between languages than a 
cognitive one. It does not reflect representations as they are used, since the question of 
mental formats is bypassed through the artificial meta-language.  
 
HOW CAN UNIVERSALS BE EXPLAINED? 
Findings on universals in metaphor prompt the question what motivates them. Once cultural 
borrowing and accidental coincidence have been excluded by looking at a sufficient number 
of unrelated languages (cf. Kövecses 2001: 259), universals call for an explanation. I would 
like to argue that the common basis can be explained by co-occurrences of things, sensory 
impressions, or abstract attributes that can be experienced in any culture (experiential 
metonymies). Various kinds of experiential co-occurrence can be listed: 
(1) Universal archetypal experiences may motivate metaphors such as AFFECTION IS 
WARMTH or INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS.  
(2) Other universal archetypes may motivate a rich image-schematic scene that is 
encoded in language and underlies polysemous categories, e.g. for a proposition 
such as OVER. Yet, it cannot be simply taken for granted that just because an 
experience such as the rising sun is universal, it is the cognitive archetype from which 
the conceptual system in question results. It needs to be shown that a scene actually 
shapes the lexical system as reflected in a detailed analysis of the imagery. 
(3) Universal physiological reactions of the autonomous nervous system may 
indirectly motivate metaphors, such as in the case of emotions. In chapter 4 I will 
discuss evidence that ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER is so widespread because 
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of universal experiences of blood pressure, body heat, and respiratory intensification 
in anger. 
(4) General ontological metaphors for time, space, modality, etc. (i.e. the Kantian a 
priori structures of the experienced world) are hardly shaped through a single 
formative experience. Instead, basic ontological metaphors, such as EVENTS ARE 
JOURNEYS, MEANS ARE PATHS, or TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT, underlie many kinds of 
experience and arise from basic spatio-temporal experience. 
 
All in all, experiential universals can either stem from archetypal scenarios such as the sun 
rising or being comforted by one’s mother, or constant background structures of experience 
such as moving bodies going with the passing time. 
 
THE CULTURAL EMBEDDING OF METAPHOR  
Undoubtedly, many will take the above similarities in metaphor as evidence for cultural 
universals. While there is at least some degree of truth in this, speaking of universals can 
encourage too far-reaching conclusions, particularly since the term ‘universal’ usually means 
something different to a cognitive scientist than to a cultural anthropologist. In this sense, it is 
of crucial importance in comparing cultures to distinguish idealized metaphors from their 
particular cultural actualizations. Culturally wide-spread preoccupations with metaphoric 
themes, such as the up-down dimensions, paths, the body, animals, plants, landscapes, etc., 
should not blind us to the necessity of directing our attention to the details. Theorists should 
check systematically for a series of sources of variation. These include the way metaphorical 
meaning is embodied, the emotional, evaluative, and normative entailments of a metaphor, 
and the scope of use of a given metaphor. 
    Seemingly identical metaphors often have widely diverging practical entailments, in the 
way they are ideologically and culturally embedded. A case in point is Thomas Ots’ (1994: 
129) comparison of Chinese and German idioms of the heart as locus of emotional action. 
This means that in both cultures the heart is basically conceptualized as a container. 
Similarly, in both cultures the container can become agitated, which is hardly surprising, 
since heartbeat provides a universal base for such a conceptualization. At the same time, 
there are evaluative differences with regard to the movement inside the container: 
 
“But there is a small, yet decisive difference between the Chinese and the German idioms of the heart. 
In Chinese the rhythmic action, e.g. the pounding, beating, and jumping of the heart of joy is missing. If 
the heart jumps or palpitates (...) it refers to something negative, refers to a heart that is in fear and 
danger (...). The cultural motto of quietness and harmony that constructs a still and empty heart has 
lefts its imprint on Chinese idiomatic language.” 
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Another fine example is the expression “A rolling stone gathers no moss.” In Britain this is 
used in derogatory sense, because moss is valued and rolling mostly signifies rolling too fast. 
In the United States, on the other hand, moss has come to stand for something undesirable 
that sticks to things when one stays in one place too long. No doubt, this distinction reflects 
the cultural importance of roots in Britain versus the American valuation of mobility. 
    As these examples illustrate, we must look for the differences between similar metaphors 
foremost in their emotional, evaluative, and normative dimension. While analytically the 
metaphors share something, their experiential nature diverges, such that the jumping of the 
heart is felt differently by Germans and by Chinese (see chapter 4 for a general model of 
embodied metaphor).  
    Acknowledging the way metaphors are embedded in cultural ideological discourse and in 
the weave of meaning is a prerequisite for understanding them. A comparison originally 
made by Shore (1996: 283) illustrates the importance of a metaphor’s embedding and the 
diametrically opposed effects this can have on a seemingly identical basic metaphor. 
Juxtaposing the ethnographic evidence from Greece by Herzfeld (1987) and his own 
Samoan fieldwork (1982), Shore shows that while both Greek and Samoan codes of privacy 
operate on a spatial CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema, their orientations are opposed. On a 
sliding scale between intimate and formal relations the key association for Greeks is between 
intimacy and household privacy, i.e. insideness. In Samoa it is periphery that suggests the 
intimate, while it is the center that suggests public and formal life. Both cases share a 
common basic equation of spatial distance with social distance, but with differing points of 
reference. In the one case the relevant point of reference is the house and in the other the 
social sphere as a whole. Thus, while in a very basic way the two schemas are alike, namely 
in ascribing cultural importance to the center, either as individuality or public life, the specific 
entailments differ depending on the ideological importance attributed to individuality. 
Johnson’s (1987) and Lakoff’s (1987) basic metaphor IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL is supported by 
both examples, whereas the entailment INTIMATE IS CENTRAL is not. 
    The scope and the degree of emphasis a simple ontological metaphor receives in a culture 
and the specific concepts it occurs in may vary considerably. Take as an example MORE IS 
UP, for which Beck (1982: 90) compares Tamil, a language of South India, and American 
English. Although gaining status is viewed as up in Tamil, because it is said that “people 
climb the ladder of fame”, the loss of status is conceived in different terms. One usually says 
“a person’s light has dimmed”. This suggests that other images beside the verticality schema 
are equally or more important for expressing status. Likewise, health is not conceived on a 
vertical scale, but in terms of liquids.  Being in health is not seen as being up, but as the 
body, as its container, being filled. Poor health is seen as a liquid evaporating from the body. 
Comparison shows how wary of ethnocentric generalizations we need to be, especially 
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where metaphoric conceptualizations are deeply entrenched, as is the case for the Western 
treatment of ideas as material entities: 
“For example, in South India ideas are clearly not objects. One cannot grasp them, give them away, 
see them, taste them, or eat them. In the Tamil language ideas cannot be bounced off someone, they 
cannot be chewed, swallowed, or even turned over and examined. Instead, in Tamil ideas are said to 
grow brighter, as fire brightens when you add fuel. An idea can also rise, as the sun rises in the 
morning, or it can move like a wave does on the sea. An idea can move fast, as a horse can gallop, 
and it can decay or evaporate when little used. Hence in Tamil ideas have life, light, and even 
movement, but they have little material substance.” (p. 93) 
 
There is also evidence for cultural directionality preferences. Beck (p. 88) exemplifies this by 
comparing Tamil and Lao proverbs. Tamil proverbs commonly describe natural scenery in 
terms of the human body and, for example, liken two mountains to two breasts. By contrast, 
the Lao of Malaita tend to describe the human body in terms of natural scenery (”two breasts 
are like two mountains”). We may hypothesize that the directionality found in a cluster of 
metaphor may encode a culturally canonical perspective, such as the perspective from 
society versus the perspective from nature.  
    All this shows that cultural evaluation and fine-tuning ipso facto enters into the 
understanding of metaphors, and cannot be simply factored out. Hence, I argue against a too 
decontextualized view of cognition – cognition is what cognition does. What a metaphor 
actually does is determined by the entailments and these are drawn from culturally and 
historically situated knowledge. For this reason it is unfortunate that discourse pragmatics is 
passed over too lightly by most metaphor theorists in linguistics.  
 
SPECIFIC WITHIN UNIVERSALS 
We need an understanding of the actual complexities of cognition beyond a crude either-or 
view in the debate between universalists and relativists. A detailed analysis of basic 
metaphors embedded into social context provides perhaps the best leverage to demonstrate 
that, once one gets into the nitty-gritty of a cognitive analysis, both extreme positions prove 
to be untenable, and, to a certain degree, vacuous claims. Let us take a closer look into what 
a cognitive analysis of metaphors can actually contribute to the anthropological study of 
universals. As argued above, the relationship of shared metaphors and their cultural 
entailments deserves particular attention. Here, Emanatian (1995) and Kövecses (2000) can 
provide some valuable guidelines for further research. 
    Michelle Emanatian shows nicely how embodied metaphors for emotion can be, on the 
one hand, basically shared between cultures, and on the other hand differ once one takes a 
closer look at their scope, entailments, framing, and associated imagery. She illustrates this 
by comparing metaphors for lust and sexuality from American English and Chagga (a Bantu 
 159 
language of Tanzania). There is a striking similarity between these languages in the source 
domains that are used: For both there is considerable evidence for the two metaphors of 
‘eating’ and ‘heat’ to conceptualize lust.  
    Apparently these significant parallels in the semantic domains favored for conceptualizing 
lust are not accidental. Further confirmation that the eating metaphor is extremely 
widespread, which Emanatian mentions in passing, comes from the Cuna language of 
Panama and Mehinaku of central Brazil. It seems plausible to assume that ‘eating’ and ‘heat’ 
are experientially motivated in a similar way all over the world. For one thing, eating and 
having sex are the most salient ways in which the body is permeated by or permeates the 
external world or another body and thus both provide basic experiences of communion. In 
the case of ‘heat’ the general metonymy whereby the physiological effects of an emotion 
stand for the emotion is evident. The basic correspondence in Chagga and English 
concerning the source and target domains can be understood in this way. While this choice 
is not arbitrary, but motivated, as Emanatian argues, the cultural appropriation of the 
metaphors cannot be predicted from it. Clearly, each culture shapes how these basic 
correspondences are felt, perceived, and schematized (p. 178). Emanatian’s attempt to 
answer the question where identical primary metaphors can differ furnishes valuable clues, 
which can be generalized. 
    Cultural variations may arise in at least four important respects: First, the same metaphors 
can be either a choice from a large stock of alternative ways of conceiving a target domain, 
or only from a narrow range of cultural metaphors. Second, the basic correspondence may 
have different entailments. This means that what can be inferred from them varies culturally. 
Moreover, how productive they are can vary in degree. Third, the domains are framed 
differently. This means that which aspects of the source domain are mapped on the target 
and which are not depends on culturally specific conventions. Finally, the mappings are 
colored with rich images, depending on culturally salient or typical objects that are 
associated. Emanatian (1995: 172ff) illustrates each of these differences comparing Chagga 
and English: 
(1) The variety of different metaphors used for a given domain: Lust metaphors seem 
very rich in English. Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) show these to include SEXUALITY IS A 
PHYSICAL FORCE AND LUST IS A REACTION TO IT, LUST IS INSANITY, and SEX IS WAR. 
These source domains do not appear to be used in Chagga. In fact, according to 
Emanatian, Chagga only has a third, somewhat less systematic source domain for 
lust, which uses PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS and draws on well-known traits of various 
animal species to describe human sexual behavior. Otherwise only SEX IS EATING and 
SEX IS HEAT appear. 
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(2) Range of possible entailments used and degree of productivity of the source: As is 
always the case with metaphors, the source domain is used selectively. A source of 
variation subject to cultural constraints lies in the choice and number of traits mapped. 
For instance, in English the source domain of eating is exploited only to a much 
lesser extent than in Chagga. For Americans lust is conceived of as hunger and 
positive sexual attributes of either partner as flavor (although sweetness is more a 
trait used for women). The most obvious way the mapping is selective is in that sexual 
intercourse is not usually referred to as eating. The Chagga metaphor produces a 
much wider range of metaphorical entailments. All the entailments of the eating 
schema are used: hunger, the hunt for and sampling of food, sex as eating itself, 
nourishment and satisfaction from eating, and savoriness of the food. Nonetheless, 
there are clear constraints here as well. A woman can taste good and sweet, but not 
spicy, smoky or salty. She can be sugar honey, but not goat meat or corn gruel. A 
man may eat or taste a woman, but does not chew or swallow her. 
(3) Framing differences of the target: There are also differences in the target domains 
with respect to what is mapped and how. In English the metaphors are used for 
desire with both sexes, whereas in Chagga only male lust is conceptualized as 
hunger. Similarly, for Chagga speakers male sexuality does not involve heat. In 
contradistinction to English, heat in Chagga is typically ascribed to a desired female 
partner; it is not a trait of the person desirous himself. Heat is the sexual enthusiasm 
and skill of a woman, whereas in English it refers to lust in general, which both men 
and women can have. 
(4) Imagery differences: The imagery drawn upon to concretize the mappings differs. 
In Chagga ‘hot’ women are likened to hearth, rather than a microwave oven. Likewise 
their sweetness can be ‘sugar’ or ‘honey’, but not the (ice cream) ‘flavor of the month’. 
 
In sum, Emanatian’s article can be applauded for specifying the particular cognitive 
mechanisms that allow for differential ways of framing common metaphors. Recently 
Kövecses (2000: 165) proposed an even more refined list of potential sources for cross-
cultural variation in shared metaphors, which partly overlaps with Emanatian’s study: (1) 
variation in the content of prototypical cultural models, (2) variation in the influence of the 
broader cultural context and its key concepts, (3) variation in the scope of a conceptual 
metaphor or metonymy, (4) variation in the elaborations of conceptual metaphor or 
metonymies, (5) incidence of linguistic metaphor as opposed to a preference for 
metonymies. Since the others have been covered in the discussion of Emanatian’s article I 
will pick up the first two and the fifth points here.  
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     The first and second points both relate to cultural context and simply treat two of its 
aspects separately, namely the variation of scenario details and the contextual models that 
cause them. As concerns the variation of scenario details, it is possible to find divergent 
patterns in the expressive part of the prototypical cultural model of anger. While Chinese, 
Westerners, and Zulus (among others) seem to experience anger as a force inside oneself 
the typical cultural reaction is not identical. In China anger is not so often expressed and 
directed against another person. It is seen as a congestion of qi in the own body, which can 
be diverted to its various parts (p. 166). In the English model anger is expressed and directed 
against the perceived offender. In the Zulu model people tend less to direct anger on a 
specific target; instead they behave indiscriminately aggressive against everyone (p. 167). 
    The embedding of metaphorical models and scenarios in other more general models 
provides an explanation for the motivation of these differences (p. 168). Anger in European 
cultures is embedded in the much more inclusive model of the four humors. Anger in Japan 
relates to a model of the two selves, the personal (honne) and social self (tatemae). 
Controlling one’s anger results from the cultural standard of maintaining one’s social face, 
while hiding one’s innermost feelings. Anger in China, as mentioned above, relates to the 
broader concept of qi, which includes a model of harmony between the universal 
complementary forces of yin and yang, and views the human body as a homeostatic system. 
The broader cultural context also influences how concepts are evaluated (p. 169). In 
American culture and in many others anger has a very negative evaluation, while in Zulu 
culture it also has a positive side to it, because intense activity is culturally valued. 
    The final source of variation raised by Kövecses concerns the incidence and range of 
metonymies in cultural discourse as opposed to metaphor. He cites studies indicating that in 
the domain of anger English speakers rely heavily on metaphors, while speakers of Zulu, and 
to some extent speakers of Chinese, predominantly use metonymies for the same purpose.42 
I know of no evidence that indicates general (domain-independent) leanings toward 
metaphor or metonymy between cultures. 
    Wrapping all this up we get the following list of potential sources of variation (although the 
points intermesh, so that the analytic distinction is somewhat artificial). I will divide each main 
point into further sub-points: 
 
                                                 
42 What sort of consequences a preference for metonymies in a given domain or a culture as a whole 
has remains unclear. My conjecture is that in the case of conceptual imagery emerging from and 
retrojected into the body (such as in emotions) linguistic metonymies produce a greater sense of 
bodily immediacy. For other metonymies relating to a non-bodily experience, the same may be true in 
a weaker fashion. In many cases, however, the preference for on trope metonymy may simply emerge 
from conventionalized style patterns without entailing a great cognitive difference. 
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(1) The incidence and variability of metaphors and models used for a given domain: 
1a  How many different metaphors structure a given domain? 
1b  How different are the metaphors that are found in a single domain? Are there 
complementary or competing metaphors? Do they form clusters? 
 
(2) The systematicity of structural sub-mappings and the possible entailments of a given 
conceptual metaphor:  
2a  Which structural sub-mappings are exploited? 
2b  What is the number of entailments? 
2c  What are the specific kinds of entailment? 
 
(3) The discourse pragmatic usage and social framing of a given conceptual metaphor:  
3a  How is a metaphor applied: who says what to whom and when? 
3b  How is a metaphor embedded in more general models? 
3c  What is the evaluative dimension of the metaphor? 
 
(4) The illustrative imagery used at the level of linguistic manifestations for a given 
conceptual metaphor: 
4a  What kinds of linguistic manifestations or cultural exemplars that frame the 
conceptual metaphor? 
4b  Do the manifestations or exemplars come from the same or different domains? 
(metonymic vs. metaphoric relation) 
 
(5) General patterns in metaphor use in a culture: 
5a  What are directionality preferences manifested when studying groups of 
metaphors of a culture? 
5b  Does a given culture rely more on metaphors or metonymies?  
 
ARE IMAGE SCHEMAS UNIVERSAL? 
Questions of universalism have significant repercussions on image schema theory. For 
instance, it may be claimed that specific basic image-schematic building blocks such as 
FORCE, CONTAINER, PATH or BALANCE form part of schemas related to a certain domain in 
many or all cultures. An example for such a claim is that discourse on the human body 
universally features CONTAINER-related expressions. A more far-reaching claim is that there 
are transcultural core-schemas with an organizing role, though diversely elaborated in detail. 
Here an example is the claim that FORCE occurs as a central part of the emotion domain in 
many cultures. In this view, the model’s core part is image-schematic and motivated by 
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roughly corresponding experiences. Hence, transcultural archetypes are understood as 
imagistic topologies, which are partly shared.  
    I intend to show that all these issues are not only empirical but also epistemological in 
nature. A general theoretical problem turns around two opposed definitions of meaning, one 
analytic and one cultural. I join with Terence Turner’s (1991: 122) insightful critique of idealist 
tendencies in much of symbolic and metaphor theory. He speaks of 
 
“a tendency to regard the minimal elements, for theoretical purposes, as prior in both epistemological 
and ontological senses to the combinatorial structures in which they are incorporated in cultural 
discourse and social action.” 
 
This lays the finger on the crucial aspect of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory that is problematic: 
Centering on idealized basic metaphors too easily encourages the impression that these 
could ever be actualized just as such. The universal view embraced by much of cognitive 
science is artificial from the point of view of recent cultural anthropology, insofar as the latter 
is interested in explaining situated culture. It is an artifact of its spurious epistemological 
presuppositions. An uncritical assumption of primary experiential atoms in their own right 
means falling prey to what Clifford Geertz (1973: 37) calls a ‘stratigraphic’ view of the 
relations between culture and the human substrate. Such a view would attempt to analyze 
man by peeling off layer after layer, each complete and irreducible in itself, and revealing a 
layer of a different kind underneath. This misleads us into thinking that we can peel away 
culture, then the functional regularities of social organization, then psychological factors such 
as basic needs and finally get to physiological and neurological foundations. A similar drift is 
noticeable with image schema theory as presented by Lakoff and Johnson. There seems to 
be an implicit idea that, when we take different cultural contexts that use the same metaphor, 
we can peel away the metaphor’s cultural context (i.e. extract a single metaphor from a 
series of differing cultural contexts), uncovering it in its pure and simple state, and compare 
the essence. However, this disregards that by way of being experienced in a cultural context 
a basic metaphor is understood in a specific way, never as pure idealization. Paraphrasing 
Alverson (1994: 14), there is a necessary conflation of that which is locally, historically, and 
culturally acquired and that which is a priori to experience.  
    Therefore, locally, historically, and culturally embedded metaphors seldom permit the sort 
of universalist conclusions that characterize many idealized models in cognitive theory. Yet, 
this does not mean that searching for basic metaphors is altogether useless. Even if the 
metaphor in isolation exists only in the theory’s abstraction, this is a perfectly valid scientific 
strategy, as long as one remains aware of what can be shown by it and what cannot. For 
example, from research on primary metaphors in early childhood we might infer cross-
cultural similarities in cognitive development against the backdrop of a generalized cognitive 
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functional model. What we cannot infer are universals of phenomenological, lived, or 
contextualized meaning as such. 
    A cautious attitude towards the issue of universals has important ramifications for the 
understanding of image schemas. A universalist view is only plausible when considering 
basal image schemas and disregarding their contextual instantiations. No doubt, experiential 
motivations for CONTAINER, FORCE, BALANCE, and PATH occur in a roughly comparable 
manner everywhere, even though first spatial experiences are irreducibly cultural. Yet, 
arguably universal examples of a child seeing a rolling object knocking into an object (FORCE 
and COUNTERFORCE) will not do here. A focus on developmental motivations and a 
description of generic commonalties of these schemas means asking the wrong questions. 
Instead, a perspective on cultural performance sheds a different light on image schemas. 
Approached in this way they are situated and saturated with cultural background meaning, 
intentionally and perspectivally dynamized, and, as a rule, form complex compounds that are 
very closely tied to cultural contexts of a particular kind.  
(1) Image schemas form part of situated knowledge. Cultural idiosyncrasies enter via 
contexts of use that augment and situate the basic schemas. Although there are large 
stocks of expressions and structures with stable imagery, such as morphemes, 
words, idiomatic phrases, metaphors, or traditional narratives, each usage of a 
conventional expression implicates it in a particular social and linguistic situation 
(Palmer 1996: 39). This dependency on context must be true a fortiori between 
cultures and languages. It follows that image schemas should be analyzed relative to 
their embedding in cultural discourse styles and social settings. They should be 
understood as constituents of dynamic configurations that are more than the sum of 
the basic parts we can analytically isolate. 
(2) Image schemas express a cultural, or for that matter perhaps a personal 
intentionality. It is for this reason that Alverson (1991: 117) strongly cautions us that 
we must conceive of image schemas as significance bestowing devices, rather than 
simple mimetic abstractions from Euclidean space. They are intentional tools by 
which people make sense, and not actualistic shapes. What he means by this is that 
basically similar image schemas may be differently construed, depending on intent 
and viewpoint. Culture determines fairly stable modes of construal in bestowing 
intentionality. For example, linguistic worldviews may produce a strong bias to 
construe an image schematic scene as moving, as Palmer (1996: 148) notes for the 
Yaqui speakers of northern Mexico and Arizona, while English speakers will tend to 
construe the very same scene as static. In other words, people shown the same 
drawing will actually see it as representing a static or a moving person depending on 
culture. 
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A general methodological problem of image schema research is the incomplete match 
between words and experience. Languages carve up experience in various ways, even 
where there are archetypical patterns, setting the joints in different places and leaving 
different parts unnamed. For this reason the indirect inferences that we draw from linguistic 
metaphor allow only for weak conclusions about universals, as Hoyt Alverson (1991: 111) 
points out. Lakoff (1987) implies that image schemas are basic components of experience 
which are mapped onto particular senses of lexical items. Although he does not assume an 
invariant external reality, he implicitly assumes some invariant embodied motivations. This 
leads to a tacit and very problematic assertion that image-schematic meanings that are 
glossed by a single lexical item must therefore constitute an integral category of experience. 
Alverson notes a certain fragmentariness and lack of predictability in the way experiential 
reality is carved up by different languages, despite the fact that all languages make reference 
to the same set of image schemas. This is clearly shown by his comparative data on the 
senses of OVER in English, German, and Setswana. Languages allocate spatial experience to 
lexemes in different ways that mirror specific cultural intentionalities of experience. Even 
assuming that archetypal experiences like the sun’s trajectory create a ground of 
commensurability between cultures, language would never give us one-to-one matches 
between lexemes and experiences. Languages reflect different parts of universal experience 
by augmenting some aspects and leaving others without words. Consider as a simple 
example the perspectival imagery of grouping ourselves with other people, as reflected in the 
system of first to third person. The study of English grammar reveals an absence of a dual 
and of a distinction between inclusive and exclusive “we”, and yet both distinctions are 
conceptually available to English speakers, although they are not linguistically expressed. As 
another example Alverson mentions the English schema for OVER. There may exist many 
aspects of a mental scene relating to spatial relations that no typified sense of OVER 
captures. In contemporary English OVER prototypically expresses a specific intentional gaze, 
namely an arc that spreads outwards as it is seen from below. Yet other languages will not 
necessarily use a single lexical item to express this perspective (or, for that matter, a 
proposition), even if they will have ways of evoking such a perspective. Nor will the 
intentionalities evoked by the culturally dominant linguistic terms be identical, even if the 
basic perspectives are comparable.  
 
A DOUBLE VIEW BETWEEN BASAL AND COMPOUND SCHEMAS 
When we compare the metaphor systems of different cultures we can ask two closely related 
questions. We can ask, both, if complex schemas include similar image-schematic building 
blocks and if they share generic ontological core-schemas around which sub-schemas are 
grouped. To clarify the issue I propose two partly overlapping distinctions of cognitive 
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formats, one between compound and basal schemas, the other between the generic and 
specific level of a given schema, as expounded in chapter 1: 
    (1) The first major distinction is that between compound and basal schemas. Basal 
schemas are found in most works in the Lakoff-Johnson tradition. These are micro-analyses 
isolating small image-schematic units in linguistic metaphors. Expressions are combed for 
image schemas primitives such as CONTAINER, FORCE, BALANCE or SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, 
which are fairly simple in structure and generic. More complex and multi-level image 
schemas have not been much mentioned outside anthropology (pace Cienki’s 1997 helpful 
observations). Although the metaphors analyzed by linguists are a lot more complex than 
image schema primitives, the residual complexity is usually explained in terms of 
propositional mappings. I believe that this strategic bias towards basal image schemas 
misses some of the opportunities of image schema theory. 
     A hypothesis rarely pursued by linguists, but particularly suggestive for the study of ritual, 
myth, body techniques, and narrative is that rich multivocal meanings may be compressed 
into a multi-aspectual single image. Technically, this can be described in terms of an image 
schema transformation that Johnson (1987) calls ‘superimposition’. In other words, several 
basal constituents may be stacked onto one another to form a more complex image schema. 
In chapter 4, I will discuss a Samoan image schema compound of CENTEREDNESS, CLOSURE, 
CONTAINMENT, REST, and BALANCE (Shore 1991). The complex schema is linked to the setting 
of a chief’s presence, in which all of these elements occur as one in the same embodied 
posture. This complex superimposition of image-schematic elements is what I will call a 
‘compound in culture’ image schema. Note that the basic unit of analysis here is a situated 
compound of meaning as it is typically manifested in large sequences of discourse or 
symbolic action. This entails two other aspects: Regarding superimposition it is good to 
remind of a basic tenet of Gestalt theory, i.e. the primacy of wholes before parts. Thus the 
configuration of the parts is in all likelihood accessed as a whole from memory. Moreover, 
through being experienced in a cultural context, the basic element is intentionally understood 
and evaluated in a specific way, never as pure idealization.  
   (2) A related distinction becomes relevant when we ask whether complex superimpositions 
also include a governing ‘core’ part. This reflects the relationship between the generic level 
and the specific level of a given metaphor. It was proposed in chapter 1 that the generic level 
structure, i.e. the image-schematic skeleton, is rigged out with several sub-schematic details. 
It was also said that correspondences between several metaphors within a culture can be 
pinned down by abstracting the metaphors to a schematic level. Analogously, this procedure 
allows a comparison of metaphors between cultures. A possible hypothesis is that generic 
level ‘core’ image schemas are universal, while their details which are grouped ‘around’ them 
vary. Kövecses (2000: 190) illustrates this as follows from his research on emotions: 
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“The cultural or folk models are both generic and specific level structures. At least in the case of the 
basic emotions, the generic level schema involves ‘cause-force-response.’ In the light of the evidence 
we have so far, this schema seems to be universal. Most of the richness of human emotional 
experience is, however, given by the specific-level cultural models.” 
 
Note that Kövecses connects the experiential and felt pole of cognition with the specific level 
structures. The generic core is an interesting finding, but the phenomenal reality of a concept 
in culture, its feel, is only accessible through the schema with all its details. In brief, 
transcultural prototypes indicate partly universal motivations for a given domain, while at the 
same time allowing for cultural values that refine these. 
    The major difference between the descriptive strategies (1) and (2) is that under the 
heading of simple superimpositions we can usually treat schemas still amenable to a more or 
less full description as an integrated compound, while complex schemas, such as the generic 
emotion schema, are no more than high-level descriptions of what actually involves very 
complex details, including scenarios, even though these are put into parentheses for the time 
being.  
    What is the epistemological upshot of the distinction between the basal or ‘building-block’ 
sense and the aggregate or ‘compound in culture’ sense of the term image schema? On the 
one hand, without doubt there are important ways of understanding ontologies as basic and 
small-scale image-schemas such as CONTAINER, PATH, LINK, BALANCE, or FORCE, a fact that 
linguists highlight with a (largely implicit) view on transcontextual ‘competence’. Such findings 
on cultural competence have to be analytically reconstructed through material from several 
non-identical contexts. At the same time ontologies have to be understood through complex 
imagery aggregates (‘compound Gestalts’) of the specific setting they form part of, a fact that 
anthropologists highlight with a (more explicitly theorized) view on context-bound cultural 
‘performance’. Therefore, the ontological status of image schemas depends on which of the 
two perspectives we take. A focus on the building-block sense of image schema will 
invariably yield universals in the basal elements. Conversely, the compound sense, in which 
cognition is seen as heavily embedded in contexts, will invariably yield variation in the 
details. Much of cultural diversity of thought is the result of many creative and unique 
combinations of a reasonably small set of basic image schemas.  
    I have mentioned before the undue preponderance of analytic strategies of understanding 
image schemas at the expense of linguistic pragmatics and ethnographic empathy. To meet 
this challenge, I raise the following claim with regard to the epistemology of anthropological 
metaphor theory: If there is to be a marriage of ethnography and the study of culture with 
cognitive science this calls for a careful balance between generalizing and analytical 
strategies on the one hand and holistic, empathic, and phenomenological strategies on the 
other (cf. Lindquist 1995). The issue relates to what has been described as the problem of 
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‘etic’ and ‘emic’ meaning by anthropologists. There is agreement among most contemporary 
anthropologists that analytic (‘etic’) accounts have to closely follow specific indigenous 
(’emic’) thought patterns, even though an exact replication is neither possible nor fruitful for a 
generalizing discipline. As I have suggested in an earlier work (Kimmel 2000), cultural 
anthropology needs to cultivate a perpetually shifting double-view that instantiates 
generalizing analytical grids while remaining aware of their rich contextual basis in 
ethnography and starting from the indigenous view. This requirement of a double-view has 
clear repercussions on the understanding of image schemas in anthropology. It means that 
we need to study, both, recurrent basal schemas and cultural compounds. In effect, the two 
relate to non-identical cognitive issues. I will argue in the final section of this chapter that the 
former viewpoint is of interest for understanding how overall ontological correspondences are 
woven through thought systems, while the latter viewpoint is indispensable for understanding 
situated action. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Many authors, including almost all founding figures of cultural anthropology, have written on 
the subject of cultural relativism and universality (see, e.g., Gumperz/Levinson 1996). While 
the claim of an only nearly complete coverage of the issue would be preposterous, this 
section identified a number of sub-issues made tractable by metaphor research: We can with 
some justification speak of a number of universals with regard to specific metaphors, to 
imagistic scene construals, and to directionality patterns, as in diachronic grammaticalization 
or in synesthetic modalities, although much more empirical comparative work needs to be 
done. I argued that there are legitimate universals with respect to functional theories of 
cognition, while looking at cultural (or personal) meanings reveals a level that is ipso facto 
less universal. To get into the intricacies of cultural meaning I provided a checklist for where 
to look for variation: Metaphors differ with respect to the incidence and variability of 
metaphors and models used for a given domain, the systematicity of structural sub-mappings 
and the entailments, discourse pragmatic framing, illustrative imagery, and more general 
patterns in cultural metaphor use. Finally, I argued that a perspective on imagery calls for 
being wary of ontologizing claims. Basal image schemas should not be considered 
ontologically prior to their combinatorial variants unless there is an explicit theoretical 
justification for it. My critique occasioned the need to distinguish two senses of the term 
image schema, which I called the ‘building-block’ and the ‘compound in culture’ sense of the 
term. On this basis I appraised the hypothesis that core imagery of complex models may be 
fairly universal in some cases, although the surrounding ‘propositional’ details vary. 
Furthermore, on a methodological level I argued that the two perspectives on image 
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schemas need to complement each other in a double-view that is both genuinely 
comparative and ethnographically adequate, i.e. faithful to context-based data. 
 
4. How cultural schemas and metaphors work together 
No doubt, the analysis of cultural meaning cannot exhaust itself in the study of local 
metaphors; it must include cognitive higher-level ordering devices. Hannerz (1992: 8) puts 
this as follows: 
 
“The basic units of meaning – ‘memes’, ‘wits’, or whatever else it has been suggested they be called – 
are not easily delimited; and then of course, cultural analysis cannot occupy itself with a mere 
collection of meaning units, somehow seen as atomized and all distinctive at the same level. What 
matters more are the higher-level notions and ordering devices – ‘themes’, ‘focal concerns’, ‘galaxies’, 
‘key symbols’- which turn the collections into structures, with some degree of coherence.” 
 
The relation between local and higher cognitive structures is a major concern in recent 
metaphor theory, where there has been substantial controversy both about the relative 
definition and importance of cultural schemas (or cultural models) vis-à-vis metaphors. Better 
than anything else these two terms exemplify, as one major protagonist has it, a “territorial 
squabble between anthropologists and linguists”, one, however, that has substantial 
methodological and ontological implications. Schemas and metaphors have to a significant 
extent been understood as competing claims in the debate, whose main protagonists are 
Lakoff and Kövecses (1987), Quinn (1991), Gibbs (1994), Strauss and Quinn (1997), and 
Kövecses (1995, 1999, 2000). It is worth recounting the debate, because – even though it 
involved some misunderstandings – it is productive in clarifying one of the fundamental 
issues the cognitive sciences are grappling with. The debate was opened by Naomi Quinn 
(1987, 1991) in two papers that critiqued the claims made about the nature of metaphor by 
Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987). Quinn, who is an anthropologist, claims that their 
approach understates the variability in the use of metaphor while overstating their role in 
constructing understanding. On the basis of her fieldwork consisting of in-depth interviews 
with married couples in the United States about their representations of marriage she argues 
that without the guidelines of cultural schemas metaphors alone cannot structure 
understanding. Quinn takes issue with the fact that in Lakoff’s and Johnson’s analysis culture 
is missing, to which she assigns some sort of superordinate role in guiding the selection of 
metaphors.  
    The whole debate boils down to two related questions: (1) What sort of cognitive 
structures do we have to consider first in a cultural analysis and which have the greater 
governing power in guiding our thought? (2) Is metaphor primarily used as an expository 
device of preexisting concepts or is it constitutive of these concepts, i.e. does it constrain 
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understandings in an independent way? Ultimately, my aim here is to show that the alleged 
antagonism between conceptual metaphors and schemas is an artificial one. When we factor 
out terminological muddles and misprisions, the two sides complement each other. The 
crucial challenge is to develop a clear functional model of complex cognition that can come 
to grips with multiple interpenetrations between several crosscutting levels. As an answer to 
this, the present section aims at a conceptual framework for how marriage can be both a 
domain of a kind and ontologically linked to a wider reality and for how the terminology of 
schema and metaphor can help in attending to both of these features of human cognition. 
    Before I make my own points, we should recapitulate Quinn’s study from which she 
launches her criticism. The analysis of the interview material indicates a conceptual field that 
is clearly delineated. The occurring metaphorical expressions can be separated into eight 
groups, which correspond to different thematic fields that the couples bring up when 
describing their marriage (1991: 66, 1997: 143). All other kinds of metaphorical themes 
remain conspicuously absent. For example conceiving marriage in terms of food, such as a 
cone of ice cream that becomes consumed after a time and cannot last, does not occur in 
American thought. The occurring eight thematic groups of metaphors are lastingness (“It was 
stuck together pretty good”, “It’s that feeling of confidence we have about each other that’s 
going to keep us going”) mutual benefit (”That was really something that we got out of the 
marriage”, “Our marriage is a very good thing for both of us”), sharedness (“I felt like a 
marriage was just a partnership”, “We’re together in this”), compatibility (“The best thing 
about Bill is that he fits me so well”, “Both of our weaknesses are such that the other person 
could fill in”), effort (“She works harder at our marriage than I do”, “We had to fight our way 
back to the beginning”), difficulties (“That was one of the hard barriers to get over”, “The first 
year we were married was really a trial”, success or failure (”We knew that it was working”, 
“The marriage may be doomed”), and risk (“There’re so many odds against marriage”, “That 
marriage was in trouble”).  
    At the same time, each thematic element is instantiated by a wide variety of metaphors so 
that within each of the eight classes people use highly variable expressions. Take as 
example the theme of marital lastingness, which is cast into at least three types of metaphors 
by the speakers: Marriage is metaphorically framed as a manufactured product, that is well 
put together, structurally sound, made of good materials and with the necessary care. It is 
depicted as “shaped into something good”, with “solid foundations” or “forging together the 
best parts of each person”. A second metaphor from this group treats marriage as an 
ongoing journey undertaken together by two people. The marriage lasts as long as the two 
move onwards. A third metaphor treats marriage as two inseparable objects, a durable 
attachment, or a permanent common location. Further metaphors conceive it as a secure 
possession, an indestructible object, or a covenant with God, etc. Concerning this variability 
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Quinn observes that even in a short sequence of speech speakers effortlessly slip between 
various metaphors, “that understandings can be recast, and are constantly recast, into 
different metaphors resting on different [image] schemas” (1991: 65).  
    Quinn bases her central, but controversial theoretical claim on the variability within the 
thematic groups: Metaphors themselves can, according to her, not be the source of a shared 
cultural understanding, because how people choose from the variety of metaphors must be 
guided by something else, i.e. a more encompassing underlying structure: 
 
“Although language holds the clue to the cultural schema I will describe, the schema is far from 
isomorphic with the language, or obvious from it; certainly it is not retrievable from any given metaphor 
speakers use.” (Strauss/Quinn 1997: 144) 
 
Quinn’s alternative view is that the linguistic metaphors provide satisfactory mappings on 
independent and already existing cultural understandings, which are too multiform to arise 
from a simple image schema. Although she denies the importance of metaphors completely, 
she assigns them more of an expository than a constitutive role for thought. At several points 
in her text she takes this to mean that speakers mainly use metaphors to clarify points 
deriving from prior schema-guided ideas (1991: 76, 1997: 141). In other passages she 
softens this claim considerably (1991: 64, 93; 1997: 153ff), so that it is somewhat difficult to 
say what exactly she believes. In the closing passage of her 1991 paper she even concedes 
that “[p]erhaps there is no one kind of structure more fundamental than any other, but a 
variety of transformations of our understanding, instated for different purposes”, which is in 
fact just what I will suggest here. Describing metaphors as ‘expository’ can, then, either 
mean that metaphors are not conceptual at all or, if they are, that they are governed by a 
superordinate conceptual structure which encodes cultural knowledge about marriage 
holistically. 
    In what follows, I would first like to show that conceptual metaphor remains a just as likely 
explanatory construct for Quinn’s interview data as cultural schemas do. Second, I will trace 
ways in which both kinds of arguments are similar and propose that any demotion of 
metaphor results from a misprision of Lakoff’s theory. Third, I will propose a distinction 
between metaphors and schemas that actually makes sense and build a two-dimensional 
model on this in which they complement each other.  
 
WHAT IS NEW IN QUINN? 
In Quinn’s view, the choice of metaphors is motivated by the conceptual themes of an 
underlying cultural model. Let us have a closer look at how she arrived at her results. As I 
see it, three important levels of argument in her analysis need to be distinguished: 
There is the basic data level of the various linguistic metaphors, yet ungrouped. 
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There is the analytical level of the eight themes, which represent contextually 
enriched notions, such as lastingness or mutual benefit. Most importantly, they 
specify useful sub-segments for a detailed analysis; together they circumscribe 
the whole cultural schema. 
There is the analytical level of ontological metaphors, which represent four abstract 
groups of generic imagery types, such as OBJECT, CONTAINER, PATH, and 
PROCESS. These crosscut the themes. 
 
The Quinn’s arguments for favoring a ‘schema’ as the effective conceptual structure all have 
to do with complex overlaps between metaphors and meanings that become evident on the 
basis of the data: 
    (1) A first counter-argument against metaphor’s constitutive role, to Quinn, lies in the fact 
that alternative instantiations of the same underlying concept can be found throughout 
different metaphorical systems with different clusters of expressions (1991: 71):  
 
“ A lasting marriage can be both a well-made product and an ongoing journey, as well as a firmly held 
possession, a secure bond, and a permanent location, and that this is so can be only made explicable 
in terms of the underlying concept, independent of any of these metaphors, of marriage as lasting.” (p. 
71-72) 
 
Thus, she hypothesizes a common underlying concept more general than each metaphor, 
and encompassing all of the metaphors of a thematic group. This may be understood as a 
claim that the underlying level is coded in a metaphor-invariant and neutral format or perhaps 
‘propositionally’.  
    (2) Quinn’s (1991: 78) evidence indicates the interesting fact that metaphorical 
expressions that highlight only one aspect of the eight marriage themes are a minority; the 
most frequently chosen expressions capture two or more related themes, such as 
sharedness, lastingness, and effort. She infers that recurrent metaphors must be “satisfying 
instantiations of a ‘conventional’ or culturally shared model, capturing multiple elements of 
that model” (1991: 79). In other words, metaphors tend to be chosen to maximize their 
overlap with the thematic field as a whole. 43 A well-chosen metaphor, then, allows large 
                                                 
43 This is not to say that the cultural schema cannot involve contradictions among its thematic 
elements. Quinn’s data indicate, f or example, a frequent internal contradiction of norms that result 
from the expectations of mutual benefit and of lastingness. The contradiction turns around the 
question if either party should be free to leave if mutual fulfillment does not occur. Similarly, a couple 
must share common goals and interests, but a marriage should not encroach on the autonomous 
needs of either partner.  
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parts of a broader model to be captured. Through it as many of the thematic elements of 
marriage as possible are accessible as ‘experiential Gestalts’ (even though Quinn does not 
use this expression). For example linguistic expressions for MARRIAGE IS AN ONGOING 
JOURNEY TOGETHER accommodate all of the following themes: 
 
“Travelers can keep going (that is, their journey is a lasting one) together (and shared) over routes that 
may take them to places they might like to stay (that are mutually beneficial) and uphill or through 
rocky terrain (difficulties) over which they must struggle (make effort) to meet unknown dangers (risk).” 
(p. 78) 
 
In my understanding of Quinn’s text, metaphors are chosen because they create a more to-
the-point match with the way thought is representationally condensed at a higher level. 
   (3) Another argument for cultural schemas comes from Quinn’s analysis of reasoning 
sequences from her interviews (1991: 84-88). It appears that different linguistic metaphors 
facilitate different parts of the reasoning sequences, yet need not do the reasoning task 
alone or match it exactly. Moreover, some metaphors blend to create information that is not 
predictable from them without considering tacit cultural knowledge about marriage. To arrive 
at the intended conclusion the metaphors need to be specified and contextually related to 
one another by drawing on information that they themselves do not directly yield. Much 
remains unspoken by the interviewees, so that information has to be filled in. This indicates 
that other devices from cultural knowledge are resorted to in understanding the sequences. 
As examples of such supportive structures Quinn mentions other folk-models, such as the 
folk model about character maturation, or narrative presuppositions, such as the implicit 
expression of causality by syntactically aligning elements. In Strauss and Quinn (1997: 166f) 
she argues that schemas as mediating structure hold responsible for efficient reasoning 
because they create condensed neural networks that allow direct reasoning chains from any 
thematic part to any other, such as effort and lastingness of marriage, even if these are 
causally distant. These are just as easy to perform as more direct links, such as difficulty and 
effort. 
    (4) A final argument relates to the complexity of ontological structures in meaning. Quinn 
emphasizes that the cultural schema she posits is not of one founding by showing that each 
theme of marriage, such as lastingness, mutual benefit, or sharedness, draws on various 
kinds of image-schematic generic metaphors. These crosscut her eight themes and have no 
single distinctive ontology.44 For example, metaphors for marital lastingness may derive from 
four different generic image schemas (1991: 69-70): 
                                                 
44 For comparable findings see Kövecses’ (1995: 342) analysis of the concept of friendship in America. 
His data indicate that friendship, which is an aggregation of various ontological conceptualizations, 
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“The ‘well-made product’, ‘indestructible natural object’, and ‘secure possession’ metaphors can be 
considered to instantiate an ENTITY schema, the ’ongoing journey’ metaphor a TRAJECTORY  schema, 
the ‘inseparable objects’, ‘unbreakable bond’ and ‘covenant with God’ a RELATION schema, and the 
‘permanent location’ a CONTAINER schema. These four schemas are the bases for all metaphors in the 
talk I have analyzed.”  
 
Like the expression grouped under the lastingness theme each of the other seven themes 
draws metaphors from these four ontological categories. Following Cienki’s (1997: 13) 
slightly rephrased version these four generic categories can be described as MARRIAGE IS AN 
OBJECT, MARRIAGE IS A CONTAINER, MARRIAGE IS A PROCESS, and MARRIAGE IS A PATH. This 
indicates that the linguistic metaphors are neither reducible to a central schema nor a single 
stable assemblage of schemas. Thus, the cultural model of marriage can take expression in 
variant schematic or ontological terms. On this basis Quinn questions the argument put forth 
by Lakoff and Johnson as a key method to prove that metaphor structures understanding. 
Their method was the identification of clusters of expressions that point to a single 
metaphorical system. However, for marriage there are different metaphorical systems, each 
with its distinctive ‘cluster of expressions’. As an alleged corollary, she holds these to be 
alternative instantiations of the same underlying concept (1991: 71). 
 
EVALUATING THE CLAIMS 
What should we think of these arguments? Concerning the field-delimiting function of 
conceptual structures Quinn is on common ground with Lakoff and Johnson (1980), who 
state that metaphors always hide and highlight aspects. Quinn’s basic observation that no 
more than eight thematic groups are found is hardly surprising in this light. What is fairly new 
in her argument is that a complex field of background knowledge must be drawn on to 
understand the overall cohesion and usage of metaphors. Thus the conceptual model that 
governs the choice of metaphorical expressions in discourse perhaps has to be more 
complex than metaphor analysis usually state. 
    Another new and controversial aspect is that Quinn invests the so-called themes with the 
power of intermediate structuring devices in the conceptual hierarchy. Schemas allegedly 
preexist in a more primary format, a sort of ‘Mentalese’ (“my interviewees’ understanding of 
this story about marriage exists, for them, independently of the metaphors they use to talk 
about marriage”, p. 68). Linguistic metaphors are, then, reduced to alternative expository 
devices picking out aspects from a primary conceptual story format and putting them into 
                                                                                                                                                        
has no concept-specific source domain. Like Quinn Kövecses speculates that the same conclusion 
holds for all sorts of other examples, making multiple ontologies a rather typical case. 
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language. Such a middle level of condensed propositional themes seems to make sense as 
a working hypothesis. Yet, why such a middle level should precisely correspond to the eight 
posited ‘themes’ cannot be seen. Two considerations suggest utmost caution: First, the 
ontological status of the eight themes is prima facie that of explanatory constructs. They 
result from Quinn’s own analytic efforts to infer an underlying conceptual structure from the 
linguistic material, probably by drawing on her intuitions about reasoning domains as a 
member of the culture. Quinn introduces them as a convenient expository level of 
aggregating meaning and then starts using them ex hypothesi to illustrate overlaps, nothing 
more. To be sure, in discourse sequences sometimes also correspond to temporal chunks. 
Yet Quinn herself says that metaphors are used in a way that several themes very frequently 
intersect in one spot. Sometimes themes are described as topics through ‘non-metaphorical 
language’ by the interviewees. Yet this need not happen. We may claim that the eight 
themes are plausible because we as members of the same culture find them intuitively clear. 
Nevertheless, we also find a lot of other groupings equally intuitively plausible. I believe that 
numerous different aggregation levels might be equally real in actual cognition, depending on 
the situation and the actor’s intent: the level of themes, that of the overall model above, that 
of the metaphors below, and that of all the intermediate levels between them. Thus, there is 
enough evidence that themes can be carved up by the interviewees themselves in Quinn’s 
way, but it is both doubtful that these precise groupings are used to the exclusion of others or 
that only the level of themes affords privileged conceptual pegs. 
    The second problem with a conceptual middle level is its mental format. We do not know 
precisely what ‘propositional’ means. Moreover, propositions may be interpreted as imagistic 
condensations of the very image-schematic metaphors that Quinn tries to relegate to the 
second line (this hypothesis I will propose in chapter 8). If this view proves tenable, Quinn’s 
themes would be constituted by complex models made from various image schemas 
combined. Such an imagistic perspective clearly obviates the argument that some sort of 
‘Mentalese’ is involved. Taken as a whole, the argument of ‘one conceptual theme - many 
expository forms’ pointing at an abstract mental language is crucial in the debate, but too 
weakly corroborated.  
    Quinn’s argument of schemas as integrated reasoning frames strikes me as legitimate. 
However, it is not incompatible with research on conceptual metaphors and does certainly 
not obviate their conceptual nature. I concur with Gibbs (1991: 204-5), who argues that there 
may be patchworks of metaphors, each of which facilitates a part of the reasoning sequence: 
 
“The fact that speakers often employ a variety of metaphors in talking about marriage, sometimes 
switching quickly between tropes, does not mean that those expressions only name or refer to aspects 
of some non-metaphorical cultural model. As is the case for anger, people use different metaphors, 
even within the same narrative, because each metaphor reflects a different aspect of their 
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metaphorical understanding of some experience. One’s cognitive model of marriage may consist of 
various metaphors that capture different aspects of our understanding of marriage, such as 
compatibility, mutual benefit, and lastingness. These metaphors may be contiguously linked, perhaps 
as a kind of radial structure, yet need not be internally consistent. For example, we may at times see 
marriage as being a container but at other times as being like a manufactured product.” 
 
Kirmayer (1993: 174-5) expresses this in a similar way when he speaks of mixed metaphors 
whose coherence “stems not from any consistent extended metaphoric concept, but from a 
more specific experiential fact that is being repeatedly described from many angles.” This 
points to the fact that schemas are structured by the exposure to and participation in an 
information-rich experiential complex. 
    What about the argument of complexly intertwined ontologies in each thematic cluster? It 
is a common and recognized fact that domains feature complementary ontologies of different 
ilk. Quinn’s demonstration of four crosscutting image-schematic ontologies deserves high 
recognition for showing that even small discourse chunks mix generic ontologies. However, 
her deduction of an ‘underlying’ level and the relegation metaphor to the superficial level of 
expression is a non sequitur of ontological complexity. There are quite simply other ways to 
explain this finding. 
 
DO THESE ARGUMENTS REFUTE LAKOFF? 
I also have major doubts with regard to Quinn’s intended critique of Lakoff’s view on 
conceptual metaphor. Without wishing to disparage her achievement in clarifying key points 
of the issue and promoting more precise methods, it seems to me that Quinn’s critique 
results from a misprision of his position in most points. Metaphor, according to Lakoff, is 
manifestly conceptual and has independent power in constraining thought. Quinn introduces 
two criteria to disprove Lakoff. These are the low explanatory power of metaphors for 
inferential structures and the fluidity of linguistic metaphors in discourse: 
    First, Quinn (1991: 73) argues against Lakoff that metaphors do not give rise to 
independent inferences. In her view, not the metaphors themselves provide inferences 
directly, but the cultural models that motivate the choice of an apt metaphor. As evidence, 
she quotes interview passages, where informants elaborate metaphorically on points they 
obviously had in mind already. She is successful in showing that linguistic metaphors reflect 
existing understandings and do not typically produce new conceptual inferences ad hoc. In 
reasoning sequences speakers select their linguistic metaphors to match points they already 
have in mind (Strauss/Quinn 1997: 157). This argument is rather trivial however, since 
nobody has ever claimed that metaphors situationally constrain reasoning in the way that a 
person utters a metaphor, suddenly recognizes an entailment and is forced to the next part of 
the sequence. An explanation based on conceptual metaphor would equally assume that 
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speakers’ intentions are already in their minds before the linguistic metaphor is produced. 
Another argument by Quinn directed against Lakoff (ibid.) is that after using a metaphor 
speakers often articulate the point they want to make in non-metaphorical language. What 
legitimately follows from Quinn’s observation is that other conceptual structures, such as 
propositional statements, usually interact in a larger model with any conceptual metaphor 
and that ways of studying these in tandem with metaphor, including the necessary 
transposition and double-coding processes, ought to be sought. If intended as a more 
general point against the Lakoffian approach Quinn’s argument lacks force, however: The 
many documented literal linguistic expressions may, in principle, be constrained by a so-
called conceptual metaphor just in the same way a linguistic metaphor is. This is especially 
true when a single conceptual metaphor occupies a key position in discourse, like in the 
Lakoff (1996) study on American politics. (After all, a conceptual metaphor of high power is 
functionally nothing else but a schema and it is obvious that Lakoff does not restrict his 
notion of conceptual metaphor to small-scale conceptual entities only.) Returning to the 
marriage data, what seems most obvious at first sight are various middle-level conceptual 
metaphors. With regard to her own case study at least Quinn, then, is justified in saying 
(despite Kövecses’ suggestion discussed below) that no single conceptual metaphor 
constrains the marriage discourse entirely and in all its details. At the same time, this does 
not imply the metaphors do not constrain parts of the discourse. 
    Quinn sees a second observation as indicative of the fact that many metaphors are only 
expository (1991: 84-87): Reasoners, far from adhering to metaphorical entailments, are just 
as likely to switch metaphors in the middle of a piece of reasoning. On the one hand this 
invalidates the generalization that metaphors constitute understandings by allowing only 
inferences that follow from the most immediate metaphorical entailments. On the other hand, 
a quick switching between tropes does not logically entail that expressions refer to non-
metaphorical cultural model. It does mean that there must be a general governing device that 
represents the thought chain as a whole. In this sense Gibbs (1994: 204) proposes that there 
may be one general cognitive or cultural model for marriage that is motivated by a cluster of 
contiguously linked conceptual metaphors. Such a model may be linked through a radial 
structure model, i.e. a fuzzy set, and need not be wholly consistent.  
    For yet another reason a conceptual level of metaphor exerting some constraints cannot 
be argued away easily. Gibbs (p. 205f) rightly maintains that if people used metaphors only 
for the purpose of highlighting different parts of the cultural model, a much greater variety of 
metaphors than the relatively small number of the eight reported groups should be expected. 
The fairly limited range of conventional metaphors in the couples’ talk about marriage must 
minimally reflect (co-)constraints coming from the metaphors’ conceptual profile.  
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ANALYZING SCHEMAS AS METAPHORS 
It seems to me that there is more common ground between Quinn and her adversaries than 
either party is willing to acknowledge. Quinn herself conceded more recently that even 
though no single obligatory metaphor type exists in domains such as marriage, in other 
cases a single metaphor may encompass a whole schema (Strauss/Quinn 1997: 153). In 
some cases, like that of the CONDUIT metaphor for communication, discussed in Reddy’s 
classic article (1979), metaphors can in fact assume a governing role. She acknowledges 
that the CONDUIT metaphor is a prime example of a metaphor culturally entrenched to a 
degree that there are no alternative metaphors to choose from, so that this conceptualization 
is obligatory. (Note that the superordinate level metaphor of CONDUIT is functionally a schema 
and at the same time spans several domains, as communication is a part of most everyday 
domains.)  
    It would seem that an alternative analysis of Quinn’s cultural schema as just this kind of 
high-level metaphor with multiple entailments is quite possible. To this effect, Kövecses 
(2000: 121) argues that the UNITY metaphor underlies the American understanding of 
marriage. He maintains that the UNITY metaphor is compatible with the eight kinds of 
thematic expectations Quinn found:  
 
“Because a part by itself is not functional, people want to share their lives with others in marriage. 
Because only one or some parts fit another part, people want compatible partners in marriage. 
Because (to get a functioning whole) a part must perform its designated function, people want to fulfill 
their designated roles in a marriage relationship. Because wholes have a designated function to 
perform, marriage relationships must be lasting.” (p. 121) 
 
I will not raise possible counterarguments to this approach here. Rather, I mention it to show 
that phrasing metaphor at the right level is always an alternative for understanding complex 
cultural schemas. It is an empirical question whether such a unitary formulation in terms of 
one metaphor bears out all the necessary entailments or not. 
 
COMPLEMENTARY LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
In sum, my discussion of Quinn’s claims reveals no compelling reason to think that the 
interviews feature merely expository linguistic metaphors. Inferring conceptual metaphors 
from the interviews that have some explanatory power, at least on a local level of discourse, 
is always possible. There are good reasons to think, however, that the level of conceptual 
metaphor interacts with a yet higher level of ordering devices. Quinn introduced good 
arguments for a scene-capturing overall cognitive format that we must also include in our 
theory. When Quinn says that metaphors are repeatedly introduced because they are 
satisfying instantiations of constraints from a cultural model, this is correct in one way, but 
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too far-reaching in another: (1) It makes little sense to analyze the metaphors independent of 
the larger model that interrelates and organizes them. The metaphors are linked by a cultural 
model, an idealized cognitive model (ICM), or metaphor system, or whatever we call it. (2) 
Yet, it is not necessary to assume that all relevant constraints come from the organizing 
model only, and none from the metaphors. It is the interrelation of the two that is necessary 
to motivate people to choose particular metaphors.  
    In order to clarify the issue, I propose that cultural schemas arise as an elective affinity 
between (1) a situated scripted scenario / an experiential cluster and (2) a stock of more 
general and independently existing conventional metaphors from the mental storehouse of 
so-called ‘competence’. When people choose to focus their discourse on topics such as 
marriage the culturally available stock of metaphors is screened for matches with the 
experiential whole of marriage. This results in a conventionalized set of conceptual 
metaphors used for marriage, which are situated as a compound and exist on an 
independent competence level as individual modules. The domain of marriage is constrained 
in complex ways, so that we can tackle the matter either from the point of view of individual 
recombinable metaphors recurring across domains or from the point of view of the 
experiential structure of the whole domain at hand. 
    A major misunderstanding in the debate arises because Lakoff and Quinn have different 
understandings of the key term ‘ontology’. A critical argument by Quinn is that metaphors do 
not produce real ontologies and are therefore not conceptually potent. She addresses the 
issue in reanalyzing Kövecses and Lakoff’s work on the American model of anger (1991: 
63f). Although she accepts most of their analysis as perfectly consonant with her own 
approach, she takes issue with the conclusion of Kövecses and Lakoff that the ‘anger 
ontology’ is largely constituted by metaphors. Instead she points to the missing level of 
culture (p. 65), presumably meant as Gestalt ontologies occasioned by holistic fields of 
cultural experience.  
    It seems to me that both positions are correct, provided that we distinguish two types of 
relevant ontology.45 The understanding of anger can be governed in its situational or domain 
ontology by a cultural model and at the same time be informed in its basic or trans-domain 
ontology by metaphors. Any basic ontological metaphor, such as OBJECT, CONTAINER, PATH, 
or PROCESS cuts across a number of domains and forms part of a general cultural stock of 
                                                 
45 It is easy being misled by Lakoff and Kövecses’ talk of metaphors as ‘constitutive’ of ontology. 
However, as far as I can see ‘constitutive’ is not referring the cognitive model in all its various 
respects, but to basic ontological categories that cut across numerous domains. I agree that in the 
more extended sense of the word it is questionable whether ontology should be defined exclusively as 
an ontology of analytically separated individual parts. The notion can with equal justification describe 
the holistic field of an entire domain and what we know about it experientially.  
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ontological kinds, irrespective of their situative use (cf. Lakoff/Johnson 1980 on ‘ontological 
metaphors’). The two levels of ontology crosscut each other, though they may possibly vie 
with each other at times. It becomes evident that Quinn’s (typically anthropological) concern 
is with situational ontologies, while Lakoff and Kövecses’ concern is predominantly with 
trans-domain ontologies. Both aspects are complementary. There is no a priori reason that I 
can see why one of these two levels should carry more causality in the representational 
system than the other.  
    I propose that metaphors and schemas co-evolve. They are both mental mediating 
devices in the Vygotskian sense and both contribute to ontology in the broad sense. A very 
sensible dialectical position between metaphors and cultural schemas as mediating devices 
for understanding is advocated by Holland and Valsiner (1988: 264-65). They speak of 
models instead of schemas but mean the same thing: 
 
“Metaphors highlight and shape aspects of the model, but the meaning of the metaphor is shaped by 
what one knows of atoms of the subject matter independent of the analogy (…). Highlighted by a new 
metaphor, a cultural model may be developed in different directions, and similarly the meaning of the 
‘new’ metaphor itself may come to be elaborated in new ways (…). The metaphor and the model 
develop together in a dialectical fashion; neither determines or is determined by the other.” 
 
Furthermore, it seems sensible to claim that both mediating devices are comparable in 
cognitive generativity, albeit with different functions in a more complex model of cognition. 
 
THREE COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS 
I will now offer a model of representational architecture with three functional aspects. Two of 
them are part of the conceptual metaphor level of analysis, and one pertains to the overall 
cultural schema, ICM, or metaphor system level. 
     The two levels that emerge from the classical analysis of conceptual metaphor were first 
distinguished by George Lakoff (1987: 406), together with Zoltán Kövecses, in their study of 
American anger.46 These are now usually called a metaphor’s ‘specific’ and ‘generic’ level, 
but may also be called ‘basic’ and ‘superordinate’ levels (see chapter 1). On the one hand 
there is a generic metaphoric level of high schematicity that expresses generalized 
experiential structure of something. Generic level metaphors include the image schemas 
ENTITY, INTENSITY, LIMIT, FORCE, CONTROL, and BALANCE. These recurring elements have 
been acquired as embodied experience that occur across a great number of domains and 
they provide links to other domains that let us class anger with other entities, forces, limits, 
                                                 
46 The relevant part of Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (case study 1) was done in collaboration 
with Kövecses and also published in Holland/Quinn (1987). 
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etc. in certain respects. On the other hand there is a specific level of low schematicity and 
high concretion relatively close to the speech level. Here anger is conceived as a HOT FLUID, 
INSANITY, A BURDEN, A FIRE, A STRUGGLE. Generic metaphors are always “framed in a 
particular way in their application” (Kövecses 1995: 339). 
    Both levels assume different cognitive functions: According to Lakoff and Kövecses 
generic metaphors, which are image-schematic structures recurring across a great number 
of specific concepts, have a constitutive function. In their words, they provide the ‘anger 
ontology’. Ontology – in the sense of what I called a ‘trans-domain ontology’ – means that we 
can categorize anger as something that shares an image-schematic profile with other 
ENTITIES, FORCES, LIMITS, etc. We recognize the similarity of anger to things in other domains 
by extracting the generic level from the richer experiential schema.47 The intra-domain level 
of specific metaphor fulfills a quite different function: The detailed comprehension and the 
inferences we can draw about anger (e.g. that it is not only any entity, but one that feels like 
heat and pressure) only comes through this level. Lakoff and Kövecses (1987: 406) clearly 
realize that assuming one governing level is quite unmotivated, because separate functions 
are involved: 
 
“One is tempted to ask which is the more primary: the constitutive [generic or superordinate level] or 
the basic-level metaphors [which are rich in information and imagery]. We don’t know if this is a 
meaningful question. All we know is that both exist and have their separate functions: The basic-level 
metaphors allow us to comprehend and draw inferences about anger, using our knowledge of familiar, 
well-structured domains. The constitutive metaphors provide the bulk of the anger ontology.” 48 
 
Thus both levels, generic and specific, subsist in a metaphor, and both are cognitively 
effective in different ways. As Gary Palmer (1996: 59) has it, more abstract schemas “coexist 
with, or within, the concrete model”. Moreover, of the two levels the specific level is more 
strongly linked with the schema and its domain-specific features, whereas the superordinate 
or generic level, which bestows the general trans-domain ontology, is relatively independent 
from it. 
    The third level in the representational architecture functions to organize sets of metaphors 
into a cultural model (= ICM or metaphor system). This is the level stressed by Quinn: To 
                                                 
47 Kövecses (1999: 185) applies this to American marriage. According to him marriage can be 
understood as MARRIAGE IS THE PHYSICAL AND/OR BIOLOGICAL UNITY OF TWO COMPLEMENTARY PARTS. At 
the same time “this way of conceptualizing marriage is simply a special case of the larger process 
whereby non-physical unities in general are constituted on the analogy of more physical ones”. 
48 Nevertheless, parallel to this commendable insight they retain a more uni-directional parlance of 
‘inheritance’ from the generic to the specific level in other parts of their work (Lakoff 1993, Kövecses 
1995), which I find much more problematic. 
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understand the complexities of discourse in elaborately structured domains we need to 
hypothesize a configuration of thematic linkages which stems from the knowledge about an 
extensive experiential domain. In my understanding this structure involves the following 
features: (a) It organizes lower level models, perhaps in a scenario or a radial category, (b) it 
allows diverse construals of this domain from multiple vantages, (c) it is only partially 
integrated logically but forms an experiential and memory compound, (d) and metaphors are 
orthogonal to the model as a whole in the sense that they crosscut many such models. I 
propose that, just as specific and generic levels of a metaphor fulfill equally important 
functions, now the organizing level of cultural schemas is added and fulfills another 
indispensable function that is needed to explain complex cultural cognition. 
    On the basis of all that it seems plausible to assume the following cognitive task sharing: 
First, that relatively basic-level metaphors, such as ANGER IS A HOT FLUID, evoke experiential 
inferences; second, that metaphors on a relatively superordinate level, such as ANGER IS AN 
ENTITY, evoke cross-domain links; thirdly, that the act of choosing metaphors in complex 
domains like marriage needs a model for specifying the links among experiential inferences 
and for coordinating them in reasoning. Note that in the third respect the term inference 
pertains to the question of what goes with what within the experiential domain of marriage or, 
in other words, which of the analytically separated themes tend to occur as Gestalts and 
which Gestalts are especially common. If these Gestalts are dissolved into their parts that 
recur in differing contexts we get the individual metaphors. These in turn can also connect 
into contexts that have nothing to do with marriage, since ENTITY ontology plays a role in all 
sorts of contexts.  
    A conclusion of tremendous general significance emerges, namely that there are several 
co-present, but crosscutting ways of ordering in the mind that work together. The interaction 
involves (1) a set of metaphorical understandings at the specific level for, say, anger or 
marriage; (2) a ‘mother-model’ that links up the various metaphors, perhaps as a radial 
structure of the kind proposed by Lakoff (1987), and (3) a set of ontological linkages of the 
individual metaphorical building blocks that reach out into other domains. The functional task 
sharing between these levels is as follows: Which expressions are chosen by speakers to fit 
the experience of a specific marriage situation is constrained by the rich knowledge of 
specific level metaphors. Thus, what each metaphor means in terms of entailments is 
defined by its specific level content. How discourse parts of diverse content hang together, 
are merged and opposed, and how one can change topics is specified by a cultural schema, 
ICM, or metaphor system. Finally, what each metaphor means in relation to broader 
ontological kinds is defined by its generic ontology. Generic ontologies may also build 
bridges to further associative general knowledge of a trans-domain kind for importing it into 
discourse. General knowledge about cognitive modules, e.g. what a goal, an interest, a 
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need, a belief, a social relation, or a person is, presumably requires this generic level of 
image-schematic metaphors to a significant extent. Overall, there are three different cognitive 
functions that can be considered separately:  
(1) The generic ontology comes from image-schematic metaphors. These connect 
anger to many other locations in the cognitive landscape.  
(2) The specific entailments and inferences come from specific level metaphors 
operative in the domain only.  
(3) Finally, the alignment and combination of appropriate metaphors comes from an 
idealized cognitive model (as Lakoff calls it) or a cultural schema (as Quinn calls it.)  
 
In a co-evolved model it makes no sense to say that any one of theses levels individually 
chooses or constrains metaphor in discourse. The three aspects are not only perfectly 
compatible, but necessarily supplement one another. This does, of course, not exclude that 
cognitive operations from different levels occasionally vie with each other for power (e.g. in 
cases where strong conventionalization is absent or several possible cognitive construals of 
a situation are possible). However, it is presumably just as often competing models on the 
same level – of generic ontologies, entailments, or ordering principles – that vie for power. 
    Summing up, the generic ontology level can be depicted as inter-domain activity, while 
levels two and three are more intra-domain. The intra- and inter-domain ordering planes are 
reminiscent of the trans-contextual permutations in a word-paradigm and the contextual 
word-sequencing of the syntagm in linguistics. A more context-oriented and domain-based 
approach appeals more to anthropologists, whereas the trans-domain metaphor approach 
appeals more to cognitive semanticists who do not as strongly emphasize pragmatics. 
Ultimately however, both disciplines should study both aspects within a broader framework. 
 I maintain that we should study both aspects together. One set of studies should take 
guidance from the way everyday domains are carved up, while the other should concentrate 
on smaller constituents of such models that are shared between domains.  
    In a two-dimensional graphic representation the system of multiple linkages can be 
depicted with the trans-domain ontological correspondences in the vertical dimension and 
the model-guided coherence of a rich experiential setting in the horizontal dimension. The 
small circles represent the ontological building blocks within a broader schema. (Depending 
on our descriptive level these can either stand for simple image schemas or more complex 
conventional metaphors, albeit of still restricted scope). Looking at several schemas in 
parallel, there are multiple correspondences between the building blocks across them. These 
are indicated by the vertical connectors. 
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A SYSTEM OF MULTIPLE ASSOCIATIVE LINKAGES WITHIN AND BETWEEN SCHEMAS 
If applied to the case study on marriage the whole picture becomes even slightly more 
complex. Here embedding relations among individual linguistic expressions, middle-level 
thematic pegs (at various possible levels of condensation), and overall cultural schemas are 
involved in the first dimension. In addition, these pair variably with ontological metaphors in 
an orthogonal second dimension. Thus, both generic level metaphors and specific and 
information rich metaphors weave associative links to other domains. I propose that complex 
cultural models can be described in a theory of associative spreads both within a schema 
and between different schemas (which are never clearly demarcated anyway). Generic and 
specific levels work together in associative processes, since generic ontology extracted from 
one context can always be enriched with rich knowledge from other quarters in the cognitive 
network. Generic metaphors are the interface where richer informational structure is 
recruited. 
    Associative spreads occur in several dimensions: First, ontological metaphors cut across 
the various themes and expressions of the marriage schema (intra-schema linkages). 
Second, in regard to inter-schema linkages, ontological metaphors cut across wholly other 
schemas as well and recruit subsidiary information from them. Third, cultural schemas are 
analogously informed by rich information from other such schemas. 
     
     
     
     
     
marriage 
schema 
coherent 
domain 
interdomain 
ontologies 
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(1) Intra-schema associative links. Because a cultural schema is so complex and 
encompasses diverse themes, these necessarily share multiple local resemblances at 
selected points of intersection. Quinn’s data indicate a more complex relation between 
themes and generic ontological metaphors so that (a) each theme or even individual 
expression encompasses many alternative generic ontologies and (b) any generic ontology 
occurs across a number of themes or expressions. In addition I propose that (c) ontological 
similarities can become points of entry for more specific evocations of rich knowledge 
structures. 
    (1a) Mixed local ontologies within a theme. This first aspect, i.e. that within a given 
linguistic metaphor several ontological types can be mixed, is exemplified at length by Quinn 
(1991: 71): 
 
“(...) marriage may be an ENTITY that follows some TRAJECTORY  in the ‘ongoing journey’ metaphors, as 
in ‘We take a lot of credit for the direction it went in’; or it may be a CONTAINER of the married people on 
this TRAJECTORY , as in ‘I’d have to say ‘Stop the boat, I want to get out’ ’Metaphors such as ‘We 
wanted to continue together’ or ‘We might come to a place where we have to separate’ rest on a 
joining of the TRAJECTORY  schema with the RELATION schema. The last example, indeed, instantiates 
three schemas conjoined: the place where married people have to separate is a CONTAINER of the 
RELATION on the TRAJECTORY . In ‘You can go some place that you’d like to be at or you can not,’ the 
place reached is a CONTAINER of a different sort, this time of marital benefit. To provide one last, and 
different example, ‘We got it,’ a metaphor of marriage as an ENTITY firmly in possession, might be said 
to invoke as well the hand or other CONTAINER in which it is kept, the TRAJECTORY  of its acquisition 
(made more explicit in the metaphor ‘The marriage was up for grabs’); or the RELATION of ownership.” 
 
    (1b) Partial integration of themes through ontological metaphors. Additionally, 
ontological image schemas partially integrate metaphors from separate themes, so that they 
form fluid groupings. For example, the BEING MARRIED IS BEING INSEPARABLE OBJECTS 
metaphor expresses the same basic ontology found in the MARRIAGE IS A MANUFACTURED 
PRODUCT metaphor. Both share an ENTITY ontology and both can have parts that fit together 
well and do not break apart. Both are variants of the PART-WHOLE image schema and also 
share the more specific aspect of indestructibility. Similar local overlaps can be found with 
other pairings. Note that integrations may theoretically take place at various level of 
schematicity. For example, “That’s going to keep us going” may evoke not only the middle-
level PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS ontology, but also the high-level PROCESS ontology, which 
is shared by yet a larger group of metaphors. 
    (1c) Associations of rich knowledge between themes triggered by ontological 
similarities.  It is also of consequence that the individual metaphors may be related through 
associative chains in a way that an ontological similarity constitutes a conceptual peg for 
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evoking rich knowledge. While “That’s going to keep us going” does not explicitly include the 
journey scenario and is, at first blush, only about movement and effort, it can easily evoke 
some of the same associations as saying “Our marriage is a journey” outright, because both 
share a partial ontology of PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS. In this way the expression can 
indirectly evoke all the other structural entailments of journeys, such as sharedness, 
difficulties, and possibly compatibility and risk. Thus, by virtue of partial overlaps in their 
ontological generic structure metaphors can evoke other parts of their conceptual structure, 
too. 
    (2) Inter-schema associative links. Between largely separate schemas a series of 
possible associative linkages is possible: (a) Ontological source concepts structure other 
cultural schemas too, (b) domain related targets can be a version of a more abstract target 
category, (c) each domain draws on image-schematic understandings from subsidiary or 
neighboring domains on roughly the same abstraction level, (d) the same mechanism of 
peripherally adduced knowledge may produce rich knowledge structures from other 
schemas. 
    (2a) Associations triggered by generic ontological metaphors. That more generic 
level knowledge always coexists with or subsists within the specific level was shown above. 
Just as the generic level metaphors are used across the various marriage themes, they also 
unite marriage with other cultural contexts of occurrence. To what extent ontological building 
blocks are actually used to mediate between various cultural models is hard to say. One 
metaphor with OBJECT ontology can always trigger another such metaphor. The associative 
spread between schemas through generic ontological metaphors in most cases probably 
depends on further constraints being present because these ontological kinds such as 
OBJECT or PATH are simply to frequent to occasion useful associations.  
    (2b) Embedding in superordinate target-domains. Metaphors occurring in the marriage 
domain are embedded in superordinate metaphors that span many domains. Marriage as a 
very clear-cut target domain is at the same time part of a more abstract target domain, for 
which the same ontological characterization holds. For instance, MARRIAGE IS A CONTAINER is 
embedded into the more general metaphor of SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE CONTAINERS. After all, 
one can ‘enter’ into a treaty, just as one can ‘enter’ into society or ‘enter’ into marriage. All 
social institutions share the fact that they can be construed, among other thing, as bounded 
spaces. Likewise, the conceptualization of lastingness through MARRIAGE IS A JOURNEY would 
probably not make as much sense without the more general metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. A 
marriage is lasting if two people follow a common path on the journey of their lives and share 
their individual paths. Life as a journey and marriage as a journey are both imagistic variants 
of the PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS metaphor. 
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    (2c) Recruiting metaphors from neighboring metaphor systems on the same level. 
Related metaphors from neighboring domains that are not necessarily superordinate can 
also contribute some meaning or give rise to an associative link. An example is found in the 
marriage as a well-built product metaphor. The aspect of fitting the parts together properly 
uses the subsidiary metaphor AN EFFORT OF WILL IS A PHYSICAL EFFORT. Another example are 
the suggestive overlaps between the marriage and the self model. According to Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) the self can be metaphorically conceptualized as THE SELF IS A PHYSICAL 
OBJECT or THE SELF IS A PHYSICAL LOCATION or CONTAINER. Marriage uses these 
conceptualizations. First, the metaphor of the self as object maps onto the metaphor of unity, 
so that the two selves are understood as the inseparable objects united in marriage. This 
metaphor includes SELF CONTROL IS OBJECT POSSESSION (p. 272). On the other hand, having 
a successful marriage means possessing a valuable shared object, as in “We held on to 
what we had”. Thus MARRIAGE IS A JOINTLY POSSESSED OBJECT. The way marriage and the 
self are controlled is thus analogous. Second, the American self includes SELF CONTROL IS 
BEING IN ONE’S NORMAL LOCATION (p. 274). Metaphors of the MARRIAGE IS A CONTAINER kind 
conceive a conjugal union as a shared location (“Stop the boat, I want to get out”) easily map 
onto this understanding. After all, in marriage people are not only physically together, they 
share their selves and let them interact, which makes an imagined uni-locational space of the 
shared self quite likely. It follows that marriage can be imagined as a merger of two selves in 
a physical location.  
    (2d) Recruiting rich data from neighboring schemas. Apart from image-schematic 
metaphors, the marriage schema establishes a variety of links to rich information coming 
from other cultural schemas. For example, the manufactured product metaphor evokes other 
widespread cultural themes such as Yankee ingenuity in building and fixing objects, or the 
cultural idea that effort will ensure success. These are complex cultural beliefs spread across 
many domains. These inferences follow from the rich information encoded on the specific-
level what building things or making efforts means to Americans in terms of its cultural 
evaluation and not from a generic ontology. Possibly, such linkages to rich knowledge 
structures work through shared ontological pegs as described in (1c), which evoke other 
schemas with the same ontology, whereupon further rich knowledge from the schemas is 
adduced. The same process that is effective between the themes of a cultural schema can 
also be effective between various schemas. 
 
TRANS-DOMAIN SCENARIOS 
One aspect of the interrelation between the ‘syntagmatic’ and the ‘paradigmatic’ dimension of 
complex models has not been expressly raised in the foregoing overview: Scenarios, 
although in themselves quite complex constructs, may inform a large number of context-
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bound domains and thus constitute building blocks of cultural cognition. The above-
mentioned case studies of American anger scenario and American marriage schema furnish 
an excellent demonstration. Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) describe anger as an ‘idealized 
cognitive model’ (ICM). This ICM is a prototypical cross-domain scenario encompassing five 
phases, which specifies differing metaphor clusters for its consecutive phases and different 
aspects of the experience. The scenario-like features in the ICM guide the selection of the 
appropriate metaphors for each of its phases. The stages range from an offending event, 
anger, attempt to control the anger, and loss of temper to retributive action. In the scenario 
each of the phases has typical aspects that are highlighted by metaphors of one kind. For 
example, when speaking of the physical and emotional effect of anger the metaphor ANGER 
IS A HOT FLUID is chosen. When speaking of the social evaluation of anger people chose 
ANGER IS INSANITY. When speaking of the cause of anger people choose the metaphors THE 
CAUSE OF ANGER IS TRESPASSING and THE CAUSE OF ANGER IS PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE, and so 
on. The thematic task sharing also reveals a temporal sequencing of metaphors. For 
example, ANGER IS A HOT FLUID refers to an earlier temporal stage of anger, whereas ANGER 
IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOR refers to the actions in which anger eventually result, etc. 
    This ICM of anger occurs across many different everyday domains of experience. It is a 
part as of public life, work, friendship, relationships, or sports. Therefore the model of anger 
is a cross-domain scenario, a modular component of numerous experiential realms which is 
flexibly adapted to them: Anger in a relationship is slightly different from being angry at one’s 
boss or being angry at the kids next door. Marriage, by contrast, is more domain bound, and 
is a highly complex experiential cluster consisting of consecutive (and alternative) sub-
scenarios, anger being one among many.  
    How do these two orthogonal levels relate to each other? First, the marriage schema 
specifies in which situations a sub-scenario such as anger can occur between spouses, what 
contributes to it, where it is justified and where not, how to deal with it, and which 
repercussions on the relation can be expected according to these criteria. Second, being a 
lot more extensive that marital anger, the marriage schema connects a numerous other 
situations, experiences, expectations, needs, norms, and beliefs among each other: For 
example, there may be general schemas about what constitutes happiness, fairness, or 
responsibility that are adapted to marriage, while equally informing other domains in non-
identical but similar ways. Of course, the same happens with the anger schema in all other 
usage contexts. 
 
PROBLEMS WITH THE ONTOLOGIES USED IN COGNITIVE RESEARCH 
I have so far tried to present a model of complex cultural representations. The status of the 
model is multi-causal and not uni-directionally constraining. It captures multiple relations of 
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cultural reality as both context bound and trans-contextual. Because of these multiple 
ordering planes pitting cultural schemas against metaphors reveals itself as a false 
dichotomy. Palmer (1996: 107) arrives at the same conclusion and speaks of a “fallacy of 
exclusion”. The failure to realize this fallacy reflects a much more general problem in the 
minds of many cognitive scientists. There are two entrenched but mistaken ontological 
assumptions that run through parts of cognitive science and shape the way many of its 
protagonists construe their evidence: (1) The assumption that either the higher or the lower 
level of schematicity must be more primary in a representation than the other (generic vs. 
specific metaphors); (2) The assumption that either the structure of an experiential domain 
(represented by a schema) or basic modular constituents that reach across domains 
(represented by ontological metaphors) must be more primary.  
    Of course this raises very difficult issues of method. There has not even been any 
empirical demonstration so far of what would make the case for hierarchically ordered levels, 
much less of how to decide which level is topmost, provided that we knew we must privilege 
one among them. In this sense, Gibbs (1994: 206) argues against totalizing either-or 
positions hinging on the notion of ‘metaphor’ and offers the following methodological 
admonition: 
 
“The challenge for theorists who adhere to the position that metaphor is used primarily for talking 
about experience and does not constitute our conceptual understanding of experience is to provide 
explicit evidence that people do not think of these concepts in metaphorical ways. We should not 
simply focus on whether the mind and culture is inherently metaphorical or nonmetaphorical. Rather 
we should focus our attention on the explicit detailed examination of various concepts to determine the 
ways in which these constituted are by both metaphorical and nonmetaphorical schemes of thought.” 
 
Gibbs also points out that we do not know yet if idealized cognitive models or schemas are 
convenient fictions created by scholars to suggest regularities in human experience. This is 
correct, though the same caveat might apply to conceptual metaphors. We are thrown back 
to an argument of plausibility, an argument that we should pursue carefully while keeping our 
conceptual tools under close scrutiny. 
     I suspect that many linguists tend to prefer image schemas as primary sources of 
explanation because it appears so very plausible that they are developmentally acquired as 
basic modules. However, discussions of the ‘primariness’ of cognitive mechanisms need to 
sharply hold apart the question of developmental precedence in infant learning and the 
question which conceptual structures govern in adult cognition. Serious muddles have 
resulted from the failure to distinguish the two. The question is of importance whether infants 
first learn general cross-domain similarities on a high schematic level (such as NON-PHYSICAL 
UNITY IS PHYSICAL UNITY) and only then bring these general schemas to bear upon new 
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knowledge domains. The alternative would be that they start from the relatively ‘unfiltered’ 
experience of a domain and arrive at general level metaphors later. The answer to this 
question will differ considerably depending on the domains in question. For example, in 
learning about marriage children can draw on more abstract structures from their cultural 
stock than in learning about friendship, because a close acquaintance with marriage is only 
established at a later stage in cognitive development. I would strongly suggest that an either-
or phrasing of the question may be beside the point. Presumably, a dialectic process of co-
evolution is at work at the various stages of learning about marriage and the like, so that 
basal metaphors and experience rich schemas are acquired jointly, perhaps with one or the 
other taking the lead at certain stages, but reversing the relationship at other points. 
However, the debate about metaphors and schemas lacks sufficient developmental evidence 
(as far as I know) to actually reconstruct this process, even though Strauss and Quinn (1997) 
give some speculative thought to the role of developmental experiences of love. 
    Pending further developmental data, I believe that our present discussion must confine 
itself to the question of cognitive primariness in adults who have fully acquired the shared 
knowledge relating to marriage. After all, all the evidence discussed comes from interviews 
(Quinn 1987) or association experiments (Kövecses 1999) with adults, if we exclude, as I 
think we must, corpus-based linguistic approaches. Even if it should turn out that either 
image schemas or rich cultural contexts precede the other developmentally, the issue here is 
another one. It concerns the question which knowledge structures are more generative in an 
adult discourse as situated in culture. Concerning this question, I maintained that metaphors 
and schemas are situated on a similar level of overall generativity. 
 
SCHEMAS, METAPHORS, AND METHODOLOGICAL PITFALLS 
In conclusion I want to pinpoint some methodological pitfalls of a general kind arising from 
the foregoing discussion:  
    (1) In framing research domains, conventional expressions such as ‘marriage’ cannot a 
priori be taken as natural and exclusive units of analysis. Assuming that its designative range 
corresponds to a cluster of great conceptual density in the heads of people begs the 
question. This is no more than a heuristic hypothesis that a cognitive study has to establish 
itself. A fairly unified domain can be defined as one where conceptual elements recur 
significantly more often than in other configurations and depend on each other in larger 
inference chunks. 
    (2) Even if ‘marriage’ turns out to be a fairly distinct experiential domain, its conceptual 
counterparts are interwoven with other concepts. We cannot think of a schema belonging to 
marriage as if all of its conceptual structure were exclusively used there. Marriage feeds on 
the broader concepts of love and emotion, self, social obligation, kinship, work and livelihood, 
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folk psychology, social codex, and cultural ethics. These ipso facto flow into this domain 
while at the same time crosscutting it. Not only the interviews on marriage have to be 
analyzed for other crosscutting major themes, clusters as they occur in natural discourse 
should be also studied. 
    (3) Depicting the functional mechanisms working in a given domain as unitary is 
unwarranted. Cultural models may be partly integrated and may share prototypes (Kövecses 
2000: 122), but also exhibit internal tensions (Strauss/Quinn 1997: ch.8; Kövecses 2000: 
173-176). Gibbs (1994) mentions some new research on marriage that suggests that there 
are several overlapping models for American marriage, such as ‘ideal’ vs. ‘typical’ or ‘good’ 
vs. ‘bad’ marriages (cf. Sweetser 1987 on ‘lies’, and Lakoff 1987 of ‘mothers’). To Gibbs one 
reason for the variety of metaphors is that Americans do not have a single cultural model of 
marriage. So a schema must accommodate complex and partly contradictory internal 
relations. 
    (4) As to metaphor analysis, it always needs to be checked whether different metaphors in 
a domain facilitate different parts of a reasoning sequence in a kind of task sharing. If this is 
the case, metaphors are not to be interpreted as alternative descriptions of some underlying 
whole with an entirely identical meaning, but as complementary units covering the different 
meaning aspects of this whole. In addition, if such ontologically dissimilar metaphors overlap 
in their main meaning focus, explanations for their choice in discourse should be sought in 
pragmatic factors, before falling back on the ‘expository metaphor’ position. 
    (5) Causal claims require a clear model of cognitive functional hierarchies. Without such a 
model, expressions like “instantiations of an underlying schema” and “metaphors only name 
the parts of cultural models”, as Quinn phrases them, are gratuitous. There is no a priori 
reason to assume that metaphors are not equally located on the conceptual and prelinguistic 
level. By reason of this, hierarchical or uni-directionally causal metaphors inherent in 
formulations like ‘constitutive’, ‘motivating’, or ‘governing’ should be used with utmost care 
and may impose false choices. There is no a priori reason to assume that either metaphors 
or schemas exert causality of a one-way kind on the other. Crucially, complex discourse 
cognition arises through multiple constraints. 
    (6) One a more general level my argument is directed against the excessive reification of 
analytical devices in studying cultural cognition. We have to remain aware of both definitional 
overlaps and task sharing between models, schemas, idealized cognitive models, scripts, 
frames, scenarios, and metaphors. For the same reason we should be aware of the possible 
internal differentiations of each of these units of analysis. Specifically, I argue for two kinds of 
necessary differentiation: (a) We must abstain from reifying cognitive representations at any 
one level of schematicity or aggregation. Instead we should acknowledge multiple levels of 
aggregation that are operative at the same time. Certainly, reification is especially uncalled 
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for when it rests only on intuition, as with Quinn’s eight thematic groups. But even if a 
detailed analysis of functional task sharing between metaphors reveals the existence of 
certain clusters and units, this does not mean that they cannot also be functionally 
subdivided or aggregated into larger units for other tasks. (b) Furthermore, associative and 
ordering mechanisms of two orthogonal kinds have to be acknowledged, i.e. such that are 
intra-domain and such that are trans-domain. We should not pit cultural schemas and 
individual image-schematic ontologies against each other as alternative explanations for the 
same thing. While they are both important, they relate to different cognitive functions. 
Theorists in the past have not only been comparing apples with oranges, they have, 
sometimes unwittingly, been comparing fruit crates with pips, i.e. elements belonging to 
orthogonal functional levels or to different levels of aggregation. 
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Chapter 4:                                                                                                
Embodied Culture 
 
The focus of this chapter lies on what I have called the vertical nature of metaphor in chapter 
1, i.e. the idea that metaphor stands at the entre-deux between the pole of the referential, 
conceptual and the pole of the sensory, pre-conceptual. I will now present a general 
framework for understanding the relation between embodied and conceptual states. In doing 
so, I will emphasize the cultural nature of embodied metaphor and distinguish types of 
embodiment together with their social and cognitive function. 
 
1. Towards a merger of anthropological embodiment theory and cognitive linguistics 
The tight bond between metaphor and embodiment is a central tenet of cognitive linguistics. 
Undisputedly, Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) innovative move to adopt it as fundamental pillar 
of linguistic theory must be applauded. At the same time, the concept of embodiment 
remains undertheorized to the present day. While embodiment is being studied from various 
viewpoints in cognitive linguistics (cf. Rohrer 2001: 60-66, who surveys more than a dozen), 
it is seldom approached as a phenomenological reality. In response to this deficiency, the 
present chapter raises several unresolved or neglected issues from an anthropological 
standpoint with a view to embodiment as an experienced and phenomenological reality. 
Significantly, it will also reclaim knowledge of the body as inherently cultural and, conversely, 
culture as something that needs to be explained through bodily cognition. New 
anthropologies of the body which have grown out of feminist and medical anthropology afford 
ways of talking about embodiment that may seem a bit strange at first, but in truth only 
indicate how narrow a scope of questions cognitive linguists ask. While this narrow focus is 
often sought on purpose, the potential of image schema theory to productively merge with 
rich – if perhaps more opaque – ways of theorizing in anthropology is being overlooked. To 
meet this challenge, the present chapter introduces a strand of embodiment theory that I see 
as a valuable extension of cognitive linguistics. This is embodiment theory in medical 
anthropology and, more particularly, a recent phenomenological approach in this field. I 
suspect that to many cognitive and cultural linguists a heavy emphasis of this kind on 
embodiment may seem like a digression. Let me therefore contour in six points why 
incorporating new elements into embodiment theory is advantageous. I believe that the 
following embodiment related biases have, to some extent, hindered a full extension of 
cognitive linguistics into a full-blown theory of culture: 
    (1) First and foremost, cognitive linguistics (as far as I am familiar with it) leaves the central 
theoretical notion of ‘preconceptual’ undertheorized. What remains relatively obscure is, 
both, the exact ontological status of the preconceptual and its relation to cultural schemas 
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and the motivation of concepts. What is most emphasized, especially by Johnson (1987), is 
that metaphors developmentally stem from kinesthetic experiences at the preconceptual 
level. But what does preconceptual ‘grounding’ exactly mean? First of all, the role of 
preconceptual knowledge in adult cognition is not satisfactorily clarified: Given that pre-
conceptual knowledge comes first in ontogenetic developmental, is it superseded by other 
modes in adult cognition? Does every conceptual metaphor let preconceptual knowledge 
resonate as an immediate reality? Or can metaphoric schemas generated out of 
preconceptual knowledge later be split from their embodied origin and start an autonomous 
conceptual existence? Next, what is the role of culture in the changes that preconceptual 
structures undergo after childhood? Are the basic embodied schemas discussed by Johnson 
universal, or are they inherently culturally refined and augmented? Is there such a thing as a 
universal human physiology? Do objective symptoms correlate with similarities in the felt 
body as well? How can we explain ‘culture bound syndromes’? A final question has to do 
with methodology: How does the preconceptual manifest itself to the scientific observer and 
which method is best suited to fathom the preconceptual reality of others? Can we gain 
access to it by introspection, participant observation and empathy, psychological experiment; 
linguistic analysis, or all of these? As I see it, a number of further substantive issues results, 
simply because all the previous questions are passed over too lightly: 
    (2) While cognitive linguistics emphasizes that concepts arise from kinesthetic structures, 
it leaves undertheorized that preconceptual forms can be equally effective forms of cultural 
knowledge. Body knowledge may occur without conceptual counterparts and still be as 
motivating and action-constraining as these. Thus, we should not only speak of indirect 
experiential grounding but think about direct experiential motivation of cultural action as well. 
Moreover, because the body is often identified with the universal, it is frequently not 
understood that body knowledge is shaped by culture in the same significant way concepts 
are. Hence, it is with much justification that Bloch (1998) and Cruces/De Rada (1993) call for 
a radical broadening of the concept of cultural knowledge. Another problem in this respect is 
that relevant knowledge is bracketed out by a methodological preference for disembodied 
linguistic analysis over participant experience, which is a genuinely subjective and embodied 
method. 
    (3) Cognitive linguistics emphasizes that the basal constituents of thought are image 
schemas and that these are embodied (i.e. experienced as kinesthetic structures before they 
inform representations.) At the same time, it undertheorizes that complex conceptual models 
are also embodied in significant ways49 and, in doing so, falls prey to a grave ontological 
fallacy – a tendency to regard simple image-schematic modules as either cognitively more 
basic or ontologically more ‘real’ than complex, culture-specific packages. This problem I 
                                                 
49 George Lakoff clearly realizes this in an interview with Roberta Pires de Oliveira (2001: 38). 
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have already taken issue with in the preceding chapter, by showing that complex embodied 
schemas go far beyond modular concepts, such as the basal FORCE, PATH, BALANCE, or 
CONTAINER schemas. However, this critique becomes even more incisive in the embodiment 
perspective. How people experience schemas emotionally and what motivates them to act 
on them depends on complex representations closely tied up with a particular social setting. 
We, then, need a refined understanding of how image-schematic aggregates in conceptually 
and sensorily rich, contextualized settings guide action and how they are subjectively ‘felt’.50 
    (4) As a direct consequence of the previous point, an added emphasis on subjectivized 
methods is called for. The neglect of situative factors is an embodiment related issue, 
because it directly results from a lack of embodied ‘participant experiencing’: The 
ethnographer’s sensitivity for contextual effects comes mainly from having gone through the 
field experiences of community, joy, affliction, or initiation, the “I-witnessing” as Geertz (1988) 
calls it. True, ethnographical writing often leaves it open to speculation how exactly even the 
most excellent ethnographers arrive at their interpretations of what people feel. Yet, sharing 
embodied states with the people studied is being increasingly recognized as a sine-qua-non 
by several fieldworking authors (Stoller 1989, Laderman 1994) and has recently been 
forcefully reclaimed by Galina Lindquist (1995) for cognitive theory in the article Travelling by 
the Other’s Cognitive Maps or Going Native and Coming Back. As a fruitful complement to 
cognitive analyses of embodiment, we need to include the strengths of the ethnographic 
experience into cognitive studies. Our aim should be the combination of systematic micro-
analysis, cognitive theory, and the sensitivity that is the outcome of subjective experience. 
                                                 
50 Related to this point, if cognitive linguistics wants to be a genuine social science, it has to put more 
effort into elucidating the following two issues: First, an equal emphasis on different symbolic media is 
indispensable, perhaps together with a theory of how they interact. Language, movement, sounds, 
and visual symbols are rarely covered by linguists, although the sensitivity for this need is currently 
growing with respect to pictorial metaphor (Forceville 1998), gestures (McNeill 1992, Cienki 1998), and 
sign language for the deaf (Wilcox 1993, Taub 1997). In other important respects, such as material 
metaphor (Tilley 1999), sound metaphor (cf. Roseman’s 1991 study of musical healing and Nuckolls 
1999 review of phonological sound symbolism) or general habitus (Bourdieu 1977), only 
anthropologists have delved into the matter so far. Second, cognitive linguistics has long tended to 
disregard large-scale cognition, contextuality, and the typical anthropological concern for ‘pragmatics’. 
Happily, this state of affairs is beginning to change. Discourse-pragmatic aspects are now being slowly 
included by cognitive linguists (Irvine 1995; Palmer and Brown 1998) and so is the mutual embedding 
of models. Kövecses (2000: ch.6, p. 184) demands more attention to model-clusters surrounding 
cultural concepts. He also programmatically calls for including social, cognitive, bodily, and discourse 
pragmatic factors as equally important (p. 189). Large-scale structures are also beginning to be 
included, as recent publications on metaphor and narrative show (Werth 1999, see also Semino 1997 
and Steen 1994). 
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    (5) An inadequacy more on the theoretical side is that cognitive linguistics fails to 
differentiate kinds of conceptual objectification. The first difference that is left too implicit is 
that between concepts we have of things ‘in the world’ and concepts in which we imagine our 
own body or physiological processes. Clearly, metaphors like ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER and THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS differ with respect to how people actually ‘feel’ 
something in their bodies when thinking of them. The conceptual metaphor THEORIES ARE 
BUILDINGS is not directly felt in the body and has its imagined locus in the outside world. 
Another problem is that many cognitive linguists treat concepts that are localized and felt in 
the body in a too blanket way. Kövecses (2000: 176, 186), who studies emotions, is the only 
cognitive linguist to my knowledge to mention different possible degrees of ‘conceptualness’ / 
‘embodiedness’. He clearly sees that pride and hope are probably less motivated in the body 
than anger, fear, and lust.51 The degree of embodiedness is, then, dependent on the extent 
to which the metonymic bodily basis of an emotion is emphasized.  
    (6) Finally, the role of the emotions is left undertheorized by cognitive linguistics. This point 
relating to embodiment follows from the neglect of participant experience. To be fair, the 
otherwise productive linguistic work on emotion has only one very specific limitation: On the 
asset side of the balance Lakoff and Johnson (1999) present a firm basic recognition of its 
importance, based on findings such as Damasio’s (1994). Johnson’s work on morals and 
ethics (1993) points in the direction of emotion analysis and Kövecses’ (2000) recent work is 
successful in showing that the way people think about emotion has an amazing amount of 
conceptual structure. Yet, in all this the role of lived emotion – accessible more through the 
participant observer’s empathy than through systematic analysis of concepts – is given but 
scant attention. While linguists systematically analyze the external manifestations of emotion 
language in order to infer conceptual models underlying the words, they fail to incorporate 
the non-conceptual aspects of emotion. They deal with how people talk and think about 
emotions, but they do not ask how subjects experience them before they become an object 
of the mind. Again, for getting at aspects of emotional experience not reflected in words 
participant experience is required as complementary method to clues from emotion 
language. I hold emphatic identification with body states to be based, to a large extent, on 
subtle cues by body language, sensory impressions in context, and shared body techniques 
in ritual, work, sports, sex, and leisure practices.  
    These critical points are not to suggest that only linguists should learn from 
anthropologists. The reverse is also true. Instead of going through a similar list of 
anthropological limitations, I will just briefly recall a more general comment that applies to 
                                                 
51 Haskell’s (1989: 272), although a psychologist writing on metaphor and not a cognitive linguist, 
suggests a useful model of analogic transforms, which distinguishes various levels of sensory 
schematizing also perhaps corresponding to different levels of embodiedness. 
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embodiment as well. The strong points of anthropology lie in the holistic approach, while its 
weak points are its too fleeting concepts and often the neglect of cognitive research. 
Consequently, what I will do in this chapter is to review the central notions of the 
anthropology of embodiment and try to recast them into a language that is compatible with 
the cognitive linguistic framework. 
 
TERMINOLOGICAL PROBLEMS WITH ‘MIND’ AND ‘BODY’ 
If embodiment is really to become a new paradigm in the cognitive sciences, serious 
questions about our ingrained ways of talking about thought follow. I want to briefly address 
the relationship between the traditional view of cognition as being in the ‘mind’ and 
‘embodied cognition’. It is increasingly being realized that the two views are but the two sides 
of the same coin. A trend that points in this direction is the theoretical integration of emotions 
and other phenomena previously not classified as straightforwardly conceptual into the 
cognitive sciences. 
    I think we should take the argument seriously that the separation of mind and body cannot 
be taken for granted as an ontological principle. With a view to non-European concepts 
Csordas (1993) says that, if we do not wish to succumb to our own cultural bias, we are well 
advised to set out from a yet undifferentiated mind-body, even though terminology will not 
easily shed its objectivist bias. In a similar spirit Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) do not 
only argue for a terminological, but also for a methodological synthesis between the 
‘mindfulness tradition’ of Buddhism of the Middle Way and the cognitive sciences. Their idea 
is suggestive, if not wholly convincing, the upshot being the ‘strangification-effect’ that occurs 
where different methodologies, such as neuroscience and meditation, intersect. Be that as it 
may, I would argue that the terms mind and body can be accepted as a heuristic, once we 
abstain from claiming a principal ontological distinction. However, to assume ontological 
sameness of mind and body on principle would be just as misguided. In the 
phenomenological analysis The Absent Body (1990) Drew Leder shows that the body 
receding away from attention is also a natural experience. As long as we go on using terms 
such as ‘mind’ and ‘body’ for lack of better alternatives we need to be careful about 
ontologizing them. What we, then, should strive for on the basis of this loose and heuristic 
distinction are two things: On the one hand the causal modeling of systemic interrelations 
between mind and body in an observer’s theory is important, including evidence from the 
neurosciences. On the other hand we should take folk-models of the mind and body 
seriously, conduct phenomenological analyses as well as cross-cultural research here, and 
test for convergences or clashes with our own cognitive experts’ theories. 
    Medical and feminist anthropology, which are faced with a multitude of differing folk-
theories of the mind-body, build on yet unmade concepts and operate in an ontological 
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‘construction space’. I take this as an essential strength, because the biases inherent in our 
habitually used terminology are critically reflected: The inadequacy of scientific concepts that 
are but an extension of European folk-theories for speaking about non-Western cultural 
experiences is obvious enough. That in turn should also raise questions about the adequacy 
of our analytical models, such as the mind-body dualism or the assumption of an universal 
human body. While cognitive linguistics with its theory of experientialism avoids the major 
Cartesian pitfalls, it still starts from a universality heuristic (cf. Keesing 1992). It assumes 
significant transcultural commonalties in how people experience and interpret their bodies, 
with some evidence to back this up and more still missing. While I believe in a certain degree 
of bodily universality, most obviously as concerns some physiological symptoms (Levenson 
et al. 1992), a plethora of ethnographies goes to document an amazing variety in how people 
experience and interpret their bodies. Overall, the relation between embodiment and culture 
remains unclear and suggests wariness. It is, then, for a strategic reason that I advocate the 
medical anthropology approach in the study of embodiment: Its inherent openness and high 
self-reflexivity about ontological claims guarantees checks against prematurely reified 
concepts. 
 
SYNESTHESIA, EXPERIENTIAL METONYMIES AND THE ORIGINS OF METAPHOR 
A point of entry into embodiment theory is the notion of synesthesia (from the Greek word for 
‘feeling together’), which can be defined as embodied linkages between sensory modalities, 
i.e. vision, touch, hearing, taste, smell, and proprioception. The phenomenon of synesthesia 
points to a very basic level of embodied meaning and perhaps the origin of the nexus 
between the embodied and the conceptual. In the following I will distinguish primary 
synesthesia from culturally acquired synesthesia: 
    What I call primary synesthesia is an important bodily precondition for the recognition of 
many metaphors, or perhaps the crudest form of metaphor itself. It occurs in many 
metaphorical expressions blending two sensory modes, e.g. “a sweet melody” or “a hot 
rhythm”. However, it is based in something more primordial than language. Synesthesia 
refers to those similarities closest to the sensory-perceptual level. Take as an example that 
‘loud’ is readily likened to ‘bright’ and ‘sharp’, rather than ‘dark’ and ‘dull’. Even small children 
are capable of sensing such equivalences between sensory modes. There is nothing 
enigmatic about these similarities if we consider that high-pitched sounds are like bright 
lights, in that they activate a higher neuronal discharge rate, i.e. they are perceptually salient. 
Marks and Bornstein (1987: 59) hypothesize that several cross- or multi-modal equivalences 
of this sort are hard-wired in the sensory system through polysensory neurons and link 
visual, tactile, acoustic modes, etc. According to these two authors, experimental evidence 
reveals that some types of synesthetic couplings, such as ‘loud’ and ‘bright’, are universal at 
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a few months of age, while others are only learned until the age of ten or twelve, such as the 
equivalence of ‘big’ and ‘deep’. The latter experientially acquired type of synesthesia may 
also be called metonymic, because it is learned by co-occurrence of two attributes in a 
common context. Note that even though the equivalences are not innate, they may still be 
near-universals, since their motivation is not arbitrary: Obviously big hollow objects have a 
deep resonance all over the world. 
    What is the relevance of synesthesia? First, it is of basic importance for human orientation 
in the physical world. Developmentally, only synesthesia enables infants to acquire object 
constancy by linking sensory modes. This capacity to associate what the baby touches, 
sees, and hears is already well developed in the first months of life. In this way synesthesia 
enables stable perceptions within sensations that are always in flux. Thus, it imposes a basic 
structure of belonging together onto the human world of things. In other words, only by virtue 
of synesthesia children are able to select discrete chunks from the experiential flux in a 
meaningful way. Synesthesia is a contributing factor to the process of ontologizing the world 
into separate objects with different properties. Additionally, it seems likely that the more 
sensory modes corroborate a phenomenon, the more real it appears. Marks and Bornstein 
(p. 63) suggest that experience with synesthesia may become paradigmatic for the further 
exploration of the world: 
 
“Once children know they can map one (sensory) opponent process onto another they presumably 
can extend the process to nonsensory categories (...) Physiological mechanism of the same sort that 
subserve sensory dichotomies can also mediate more abstract semantic features, to which the 
properties of order, gradation, and polarity may also apply.” 
 
If it is true that synesthesia engenders the first recognition of polarity, this seems of particular 
import. It is my hypothesis that such mappings may produce the first clear notion that the 
world is divided into distinct domains (in this case the various sensory modes), together with 
a recognition that these domains may be systematically linked. Synesthetic mappings may 
thus prefigure metaphor. 
    In metaphoric language synesthesia is abundantly present. Frequently linguistic labels 
map onto preformed sensory equivalences, such as when we speak of a “sharp noise”. 
Especially poetry relies on such basic cross-modal similarities given in sensory experience to 
enrich its imagery. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to believe that synesthetic hard-wiring 
is responsible for observed directionality preferences in metaphor. For instance, to speak of 
a “sweet silence” makes intuitive sense, while a “silent sweetness” is more difficult to grasp 
(see ch.3). 
    It is undisputed that – sometimes quite powerful – embodied states are evoked through 
synesthetic vocabulary, such as when we speak of a “dull sensation” or a “sharp pain” 
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regarding our own body, or a “mellow day”, a “bitter experience”, and a “soft person” 
regarding things outside it. Hence, the phenomenon of ‘feeling tone’ in metaphor is partially 
accounted for by synesthesia. Synesthetic associations figure prominently especially in what 
Wheelwright (1962) and McCormac (1985) call diaphor, i.e. linguistic metaphors 
characterized by a predominantly evocational effect. (Not surprisingly, many such diaphors 
employ synesthetic vocabulary.) The same idea is expressed by James Fernandez’s (1986: 
29), who contrasts metaphors whose emphasis is primarily on the correspondence in feeling 
tone with conceptually more complex metaphors. Interestingly, the very primary level of 
cognition is central to his inquiry. ‘Feeling tone’ is perhaps a workable gloss for what he 
(1977) calls ‘the inchoate’ in culture, i.e. preconceptual and not yet objectified experience. 
With that term Fernandez emphasizes that our everyday system of semantic categories is 
not the original point of reference for many metaphors. Instead sensory immediacy is 
evoked. 
    The phenomenon of synesthesia is a good point of departure for demonstrating that there 
already is some structure in immediate evocations. There is a lucid definition of synesthesia 
by Brenda Beck (1978: 84) as “protosynthesis of sensations at a more primary level of motor 
and emotional consciousness". This highlights that synesthetic metaphor pertains to more 
than to visual, acoustic, olfactory, or haptic concepts objectified and located in the outer 
world. Instead, emotions and images of how something feels in the body are part of 
synesthesia from the start on. Synesthetic language is built on immediately ’felt’ qualities. A 
certain body posture, muscle tension, movement, readiness, or metabolic state is connected 
with a particular emotional quality, and vice versa.52  
    Haskell (1989: 273) argues that the findings on synesthesia and metaphor can serve as 
the point of entry to an entire epistemology. He starts from the observation that immediacy 
and integral consciousness are typical of synesthesia-like couplings. In this respect, Werner 
and Kaplan (1963, paraphrased in Haskell, p. 261) show that, at an early developmental 
stage, there is a relatively undifferentiated affective-sensorimotor whole in which sensory 
schemata and symbolic referents are nearly fused. Words are still heavily sensuous, not 
abstract. On this basis Haskell proposes a theory of cognitive sensory schematization in 
deep cognition, which emphasizes both the developmental role of synesthesia-like cognition 
and the role it plays in prefiguring equivalences. One interesting finding is that the early 
                                                 
52 For example, the couplings between emotions and posture may be used in acting. A comparative 
study of acting techniques in the West and India by Schechner (1986) provides some fascinating 
evidence for this. It shows that professional actors can either produce the appropriate emotions by 
performing the precise body movements that usually accompany them or produce the appropriate 
bodily reactions by inducing the accompanying emotions in their mind. Both techniques yield the same 
results and work equally well. 
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conflation relation is partly retained in some later forms of thought. Onomatopoetic language, 
poetic processes, vivid metaphor, dream symbolism, and imagery are examples “in which 
affective, sensuous, motoric, and symbolic vehicles of language and imagined productions 
are relatively undifferentiated” (p. 262). In other, more developmentally differentiated 
cognitive forms the structural pole remains, while the original affective and sensory 
properties figure less prominently. In literal language, logic, and mathematics the distance 
between symbolic vehicles and affective sensorimotor schemas has increased to the degree 
where they become functionally autonomous from the embodied basis. 
    This notwithstanding, Haskell emphasizes that deep cognition, throughout its various 
developmental stages, has an invariant underlying pattern, which he collapses into the single 
generic term of ‘analogical transform’. This includes a large number of phenomena: 
 
“stimulus generalization (neuronal and learning theories), cross-modal transfer (e.g., synesthesia), 
assimilative schematization (e.g., physiognomic expression), perceptual constancy (shape and size), 
metaphor/analogy (e.g., linguistics), transposition phenomena (e.g., changing keys in music), transfer 
of learning (e.g., education), analogical reasoning and similarity relations (e.g., logic) model (theory 
construction), and isomorphic relations (e.g., mathematics).” (p. 258-259) 
 
Towards the end of this work I will explore analogical transforms within the framework of 
image schema theory and reclaim it as a touchstone for a theory of multimedial cognition, 
which integrates the notion of cross-modal couplings with research on imagery.  
    What is the relationship between inborn structures, universal experience, and culturally 
specific experience in cross-modal linkages? Some synesthetic phenomena may be 
universal, such as a drooping posture going with mental states of depression (primary 
synesthesia). By contrast, secondary synesthetic linkages are not innate; they are shaped 
through experience, especially in early childhood. Here, cultural experiences involving 
repeated co-occurrences of body sensations, emotions, and associated qualities result in a 
synesthesia-like coupling. (Note that primary synesthesia can function as a basis for later, 
more complex cross-modal linkages, whereby the hardwired neural linkages are dynamically 
reinforced, reshaped, or extended.) 
    As I will presently show, synesthesia results in both some arguably universal and some 
culturally highly specific metaphors. As mentioned in chapter 3, the cognitive scientist Joe 
Grady (1997a) has recently argued for a stock of basic metaphors that are presumably found 
across cultures. Grady’s theory of primary metaphor posits that, since many embodied 
experiences in the world are universal, there are corresponding primary metaphors that are 
universally acquired. These include such examples as affection is warmth, intimacy is 
closeness, and RELATIONSHIPS ARE ENCLOSURES, which emerge from the early experiences in 
the parent-child relationship. Others derive from basic experiences with objects like 
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UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, MORE IS UP, or IMPORTANT IS BIG. Finally, some of the most 
basic ontological metaphors are acquired as the child learns to move, like TIME IS MOTION, 
STATES ARE LOCATIONS, and PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS. The basis for the conceptual 
metaphors in adults may thus also be described as ‘experiential metonymies’, borrowing a 
term by Shore (1991). 
    Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 46ff, 55) integrate Grady’s theory with other recent cognitive 
work that suggests that particular strong neural connections are established in early 
childhood through the repeated coactivation in everyday experience of the neural networks 
representing the source and the target domains of a primary metaphor.53 In particular, there 
is evidence by Christopher Johnson (1997) for a conflation stage in early childhood during 
which source and target are not yet differentiated into distinct domains. Since the domains 
are not experienced as separate, semi-permanent cross-domain links can emerge and thus 
create metaphoric predispositions for later life. Systematic cross-domain linkages can also 
be found in the involuntary capacity of some people to see music in colors or smell sounds. 
This is an effect of intertwined brain topologies that are either innate or result from brain 
lesions. Experiences of this kind also occur in connection with psychedelic drugs. This fact 
seems particularly suggestive for the study of ritual, where synesthetic metaphors evoke 
holistic effects often together with trance and drugs. The fusion between sensory worlds 
brought about by such sensations may be very powerful. Thus, synesthesia provides a clue 
to the integrative nature of ritual. 
    Experiential metonymies are not only created through universal childhood experiences, 
they can also be shaped by culture. Bradd Shore (1991) gives us a flavor of how acquired 
blends of experiential features are created through culturally distinct orchestrations. His 
fieldwork on Samoa illustrates how equivalences are acquired through an exposure to 
conventionally encountered clusters of sensory concepts. In Samoa, high rank is 
symbolically equated with a series of physical referents: (1) shiny skin, (2) light complexion, 
(3) large size, (4) resting posture, and (5) centrality, for example in the seating order in the 
house or the order of the house sites in the village. These five aspects are clearly distinct 
from the hard-wired sensory equivalences that I characterized above as primary synesthesia. 
Developmentally they occur much later and only to the degree that the child progressively 
acquires the conventions of her culture. They are mediated by complex contexts, such as the 
                                                 
53 A possible outcome of repeated coactivation is that entire sense modalities are linked. It was 
indicated above that conceptual metaphors such as SEEING IS TOUCHING (as in the linguistic metaphor 
“to lay eyes on”) are part of a more general notion that the visual domain can be better conceived 
through the tactile domain. In other words, there is not only a local synesthetic linkage between two 
concepts from two domains, but also a systematic linkage of the domains themselves. Such a 
generalized equivalence results from a metonymic spillover from more specific synesthetic linkages. 
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presence of a high-ranking personality, through which they are associated. However, Shore 
argues that, once these equivalences have been acquired through exposure to culturally 
predominant clusters of sensory concepts, they come to be experienced as naturally 
associated, in the same way that children universally associate acoustic pitch and size or 
color and temperature. This new type of sensory equivalences is created through the 
contiguity of attributes within a culturally orchestrated context. In other words, the attributes 
cohere metonymously. Such sensory metonymies can, but need not be lexicalized and they 
may form part of a more general concept. (Shore argues that the Polynesian concepts of 
mana and tapu are related to high rank and that the discussed experiential cluster co-defines 
them; see this chapter further below.)54  
    Let me note in a short aside that it would be worthwhile to reexamine Victor Turner’s 
(1967) theory of ritual symbols in the light of experiential metonymies. Turner was struck by 
the fact that the symbols of ritual so very frequently evoke primary experiences like breast-
feeding, nurturance, and birth. His theory focuses on how these connect with abstract social 
meanings like motherhood and matriliny. As Shore, Turner shows how many primary links 
are drawn on, so that new links of a more culturally specific kind may be forged. 
    Overall, I believe that the study of experiential metonymies of a culture through 
developmental data provides an indispensable background for all further analysis of 
metaphor. The reason for this is two-fold: Only on the basis we can find out (1) how a cultural 
world is carved up into domains, i.e. which (analytical) domains are strongly conflated and 
which are strongly distinct, and (2) which cultural contexts are prototypical for understanding 
further metaphors. 
 
PROCEDURAL AND SEMANTIC MEMORY 
Recent neurobiological work suggests the existence of two functionally and anatomically 
fairly distinct memory systems, one that is procedural and one that is declarative or semantic 
(Beck 1987: 24). Procedural memory deals with behavioral everyday functions and habitual 
activity and it stores schemas for repeated action patterns. It embodies knowledge in the 
most direct sense within the sensorimotor system. A good example for the possible 
complexity of procedural knowledge lies in the faculties of dancers or athletes, who come to 
know elaborate sequences of action ‘in their muscles’. Likewise, the participants of complex 
rituals often will not be able to give an adequate account of what they are doing when 
prompted, but at the same time excel in performance down to the minutest detail. The 
semantic system, on the other hand, is the domain where language and language-like 
                                                 
54 It should be noted that, while experiential metonymies are often embodied, they also encompass a 
pole where sensory and perceptual cross-wiring is replaced by conceptual blending. Hence, 
experiential metonymies are not always dominantly embodiment-related. 
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thought is situated.55 It is necessarily symbolically mediated, whereas the procedural system 
contains some kind of ‘immediate’ knowledge.  
    Usually procedural and semantic functions closely collaborate, so that normal everyday 
behavior results from an interaction of the two systems. For example, cognitive theorists 
speak of ‘activity signatures’ that inform the understanding, and indeed the definition, of 
objects parallel to semantic knowledge. To give a simple example cited by Beck (1987: 24), 
the notion of “chair” is distinguished from other things one can sit on by the muscular habits 
involved in sitting down and getting up again. In other words, we neither remember what a 
chair is only through a mental symbol or only through an image of a chair, but through or own 
bodily behavior with chairs as well. Nevertheless, it is important to see that the procedural 
system can handle a large amount of information by itself. It is worth drawing attention to this 
widely neglected fact (cf. Bloch 1998), especially with scientists whose lifeworlds almost 
exclusively revolve around symbolic knowledge (or so they like to think). 
    Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that sensorimotor knowledge in the procedural 
memory plays only a role in dealing with simple physical experiences, whereas ‘cultural 
knowledge’ operates by symbolic cognition in the semantic system. This point was first made 
by Bourdieu (1977), who, through his notion of habitus, develops a theory of how culture as 
knowledge is embedded in the procedural memory. Let me give a few examples: It matters 
greatly for our sense of self and our roles whether our ceilings force us to bow our heads, 
whether our dress allows only moderate freedom of movement, whether our language 
demands high self-control of the voice apparatus in the articulation process, whether 
laughing is appropriate, or whether dynamic movement is valued or if the physical articulation 
of aggression is restrained. All these parameters of culturalized body behavior and many 
more involve repeated muscular patterns that become so imbued that they circumscribe 
cultural goals, values, and restrictions. This happens without necessarily involving any 
semantic representations. Another point raised by Bourdieu, and one that he is particularly 
adamant about, is that patterns of habitus do not strictly determine the individual. Their job is 
to give a feel to culture and to constrain action within certain bounds. Habitus, then, 
delineates a field of options and motivates actions at the same time. The two major points I 
wanted to raise with reference to Bourdieu’s approach is that (1) body knowledge is culturally 
shaped and that (2) it guides action. I will take up Bourdieu a bit further along to show that 
the notion of habitus can, in fact, form an entire research paradigm through which to analyze 
the central dimensions of culture. 
                                                 
55 Frequently the two systems are also associated with the activity of one brain hemisphere, the left 
hemisphere being the semantic one in right-handed people. Studies of amnesia reveal that the 
capacities of one sphere can be impaired without the other being affected. Aphasic brain damage may 
result in similar selective impairment. 
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2. Embodiment as a paradigm in medical anthropology 
Now that some basic ideas have been related, medical anthropology’s view of embodiment 
can be introduced. My leitmotif question is this: How broad should the range of aspects 
subsumed as ‘embodiment’ be and which functional, conceptual, and typological distinctions 
warrant attention? 
    By way of introduction, I want to present an overview that differentiates aspects of 
embodiment, while at the same time giving attention to their real-life interrelations. Major 
groundwork for this has already been done by Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Margaret Lock 
(1987). Their widely influential survey on work on the body identifies three strands of thought 
associated with embodiment in anthropology. These relate to ‘the individual body’, ‘the social 
body’, and ‘the body politic’. Even though these three types of bodies studied overlap in 
practice, as theoretical viewpoints they emanate from rather disparate epistemologies and 
methods. Let us consider these in turn:  
    It is the perspective of phenomenology, recently revived in anthropology, that focuses on 
the body as lived experience. Marcel Mauss was perhaps the first anthropologist to embrace 
this perspective in his work on techniques of the body, which function as experiential triggers 
for culturally desired ends. Another perspective is that of structuralism and symbolism, for 
which the work of Mary Douglas is a prominent example. This view focuses on the human 
body as a source of symbolism with which to think about nature, culture, and society. For 
example, the body in health offers a model of organic wholeness of the society. Finally, the 
body has been identified as the locus of social practice and regulation. This viewpoint has 
been inaugurated by post-structuralism, pioneered by Michel Foucault’s analysis of the body 
as instrument of (self-)control, of surveillance, of regulated work, and of reproductive and 
sexual regulation. An equally important impetus came from Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice, notably from the notion of habitus understood as the unselfconscious orchestration 
of practices through embodied knowledge. Kirmayer (1992: 324) is well justified in saying 
that the tripartite distinction undertaken by Scheper-Hughes and Lock points ”not so much to 
three bodies as to three types of text produced by scholars. In any real event they form a 
single system.” Nevertheless, I would add that this analytic separation is one that we can 
profit from in framing questions. An inquiry into the specific interrelations between the three 
levels stimulates insights into how particular symbols evoke emotional dispositions and into 
how the inducement of particular moods, in turn, contributes to social control or other 
collective ends.56  
                                                 
56 Let me note in passing that the previously developed views on metaphor nicely accommodate all 
three perspectives. It suffices to recall that (a) much metaphor springs from the embodied reality of our 
kinesthetic being in the world, that (b) all metaphor effects a symbolic linkage between domains of 
representation or different sensory modes, and that (c) metaphor can be a powerful regulative, for 
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    The task of the following sub-sections is to survey the embodiment approach in 
anthropology. It is the relation between the embodied and the semantic, the order of the body 
and the order of the text that lies in focus. I will begin with presenting recent critiques of the 
Western ‘representationalist’ bias and then go on to suggest an alternative focus on 
‘presentational’ kinds of knowledge.  
 
CRITIQUES OF REPRESENTATIONALISM 
The phenomenological paradigm of embodiment amounts to a turn against what has been 
called the ‘representationalist’ bias. This still very dominant bias harks back to René 
Descartes, who disembodied the human mind by making a transcendental ‘ego’ the ultimate 
ground of his inquiries. However, the sole focus on ‘representation’ has recently been 
subjected to a two-fold criticism. First, there is opposition to making representations the 
dominant research preference, i.e. a strategic bias to theorize conceptual knowledge and 
neglect the development of methodologies that approach pre-conceptual knowledge. 
Second, critics also take issue with making representation – taken as an entire mode of 
knowing – the pivotal point of epistemology. The ground for this second critique has notably 
been prepared by Foucauldian and feminist discourse, where particular reifications of 
gender, sexuality, biology, emotion, and self have come under heavy attack. This has led to 
a newly growing sensitivity for the problematic relation between the existential immediacy of 
bodily experience and our objectified categories. What is more, this sensitivity allows new 
ways of self-reflecting the process of making science. 
    The general awareness of methodological problems in cultural anthropology raised by the 
trenchant self-critique of the 1980s and 1990s (see Clifford/Marcus 1986) is inseparable from 
the issue of embodiment and experience in fieldwork. Instructive in this respect is a matrix of 
differences between the mode of social practice and coherent anthropological discourse 
presented by Cruces and de Rada (1993). The disjunctive relation between field experience 
and writing ethnography implies that we first have to bridge the gulf between integrative 
experience, ‘total fact’, embodied reality, ambiguity and fuzzy categories, multiple coding, 
localness on the one hand and a propositional, analytical, serial, and pan-optical mode of 
expression on the other hand. Generally, the awareness of the role of the senses and 
sensuality in the field is growing in anthropology, as reflected by Paul Stoller’s (1989) book 
The Taste of Ethnographic Things. More generally, the role of the ethnographer as 
experiencing subject in producing ethnographies has become an issue of its own. There is 
now a distinct genre of writing ‘reflexive ethnography’, spearheaded by Paul Rabinow (1977). 
This post-modernist turn sees ethnographic activity not as the production of objectivity, but 
                                                                                                                                                        
example by channeling emotion and inciting action, by framing problems and by limiting or creating a 
field of discourse. 
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as an emergent outcome of an interaction between experiencing subjects. It has thus been 
called into question whether representation of other cultural realities is at all possible, i.e. if a 
re-description as ‘evocation’ would not be more appropriate, as Stephen Tyler (1987) has it. 
In a similar if less radical vein, two papers on ‘experience near ethnography’ by Unni Wikan 
(1991, 1994) suggests that a mode of ‘resonance’ between ethnographer and the studied 
subjects should replace aspirations to an objective gaze. Similar points have also been 
raised by the cognitive anthropologists Maurice Bloch (1991) and Galina Lindquist (1995), 
who are far from any postmodernist outlook. Both make reference to cognitive research on 
procedural knowledge and the inherent problems with putting it into words. 
    Historically, an important relativization of the representationalist paradigm stems from the 
social phenomenology of Alfred Schütz (1962). In his view objects are only constituted by a 
specific mode of attention, or, in his characteristic coinage, a particular ‘tension of 
consciousness’ (Bewußtseinsspannung). Thus, we enact a different self, depending on 
whether we are consumed in prolonged mathematical thought, we pursue our everyday 
activities, we engage in intersubjective confrontation, we sleep, we savor a religious mood, 
we are in pain, we experience ecstasy, etc. As a further consequence it is only in some 
particular modes of consciousness that a sense of objects ‘out there’ is created, while in 
others the subject-object split is not a part. 
    Another noteworthy and early incursion on traditional representationalist ground was 
launched by Charles S. Peirce’s semiotics at the turn from the 19th to the 20th century in his 
theory of sign-types. His perspective goes beyond a mere focus on signs that use a 
conventional signifier to stand for the signified (symbols). He accomplishes this by extending 
his purview to include signs that participate in the structure of what they signify (icons) and 
signs that directly point to the object they signify (indices). This broadening of the 
conventional meaning of ‘sign’ is justified in that all three sign types can be seen as carrying 
meaning. As we shall see, especially the notion of icon has been deployed in recent 
anthropological work to signify an immediate kind of participation in knowledge.  
    The most promising attempt to meet the deficiencies of a purely representationalist 
approach lies, in my opinion, in the recent revival of phenomenology. Two central claims that 
we have to take seriously originate in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception (1962). First, he shows the world is not pre-given but only constituted in 
perception. It is wrong to say that an indeterminate world impinges upon the passively 
receptive subject. A more fitting formulation is that she enacts her world. Consequently, how 
perceptions are objectified varies individually and culturally. Second, Merleau-Ponty claims 
that there is bodily knowledge of a pre-objective kind that constitutes the existential ground 
for us.  
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    In recent cultural anthropology, it was primarily the aforementioned work of Pierre 
Bourdieu (1977) Theory of Practice that redirected the field’s view to go beyond 
representation. In Bourdieu’s view, a large part of cultural practice can be understood as 
directed by embodied knowledge. Through the notion of habitus he argues for the primacy of 
the socially informed body as ground of all social life: 
 
“(T)he habitus could be considered as a subjective but not individual system of internalized structures, 
schemes of perception, conception, and action common to all members of the same group or class 
and constituting the precondition for all objectification and apperception (...)” (Bourdieu 1977: 86) 
 
Habitus promotes the “non-selfconscious orchestration of social practices”, as Bourdieu’s 
celebrated phrase has it. The embodied principles of habitus, codified as procedural 
knowledge, are beyond the grasp of consciousness. In addition, Bourdieu sees habitus as 
neither given to unpredictable novelty nor to simple mechanistic reproduction, but as a 
particular mode of perception with a particular scope and focus, a mode which is inseparable 
from social enactment. As such, habitus is inherently evaluative. For example, the capacity to 
taste is grounded in the body. Culture or social milieu determines what a person has learned 
to enjoy or even learned to perceive consciously. At the same time, taste is an embodied 
means of social distinction, for example between the upper and lower classes.  
    One central function of habitus is to define social roles, especially gender roles: For 
example, in Kabyle society masculinity and femininity is a fundamental principle of division of 
the social and symbolic world. Sexual identity emerges in the child when “it constructs its 
image of the sexual division of work between the sexes, out of the same socially defined set 
of inseparably biological and social indices” (p. 93). There is a “political mythology which 
governs all bodily experiences”. A central instance of this is the opposition of the male 
centrifugal to the female centripetal orientation, which is visible, for example, in how men and 
women walk. The female virtues of modesty, restraint, and reserve direct women 
downwards, towards the inside and the house in walking, whereas male excellence orients 
men upwards, outwards, towards other men. Likewise, sexual potency is inseparable from 
social potency. In virility as an enacted and felt embodied mode male sexuality is public but 
sublimated, while female sexuality is secret. Bourdieu’s main argument is that social and 
cultural aspirations are often expressed by body techniques, both through their symbolic and 
their disciplinary or motivating aspect. Of course, aspects of habitus often also become the 
subject of discourse. Especially, claims to national or class superiority are frequently 
consciously based on bodily and emotional restraint and commented on. Examples include 
the proverbial Prussian discipline, the countenance of nobility, or the restraint of the 
prototypical Victorian gentleman who keeps a stiff upper lip, occasionally lifting an eyebrow 
when disturbed. In conclusion, the major impact of Bourdieu’s work lies in showing explicitly 
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and in an ethnographic context which important social and cultural functions forms of 
procedurally encoded knowledge fulfil. 
 
A NEW FOCUS: PRESENTATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
“The body’s influence in thought is more presentation than representation, given in substance and 
action than imagination and reflection.” (Kirmayer 1992: 325) 
 
The case for embodiment can be stated in a fairly concise formula: The phenomenon of 
meaning cannot be reduced to signs that represent, i.e. signs that stand for something other 
than themselves. In cognitive philosophy this point has been made by Johnson (1987: 176f) 
in his trenchant critique of Objectivism. Johnson contends that meaning applies to all 
possible levels, be it the meaning of life, of a historical happening, or of a word or sentence. 
Meaning in this sense also includes bodily meaning. Analytic distinctions, as surely are 
possible, give way to a multiple usage of ‘meaning’, which makes sense because all 
‘meanings’ function jointly and serve a single end. A similar concern has been voiced by a 
number of phenomenologists who say that meaning is existentially isomorphic with, and not 
only a representation of, experience. We should be aware that what counts as meaning 
depends on the foundational metaphors of our epistemology. The crucial role of such 
paradigm-creating metaphors is brilliantly illustrated in Rorty’s critique of epistemology in the 
Cartesian tradition of Western philosophy (1979). Extending or breaking the representational 
paradigm is only possible by introducing a new key metaphor. In this sense our presentation 
metaphor is the (or one) rightful counter-image to the canonical mirror- image between 
subjective knowledge and the external world, which Rorty describes and criticizes sharply. 
    Phenomenology suggests new ways of talking about being which question our usual 
thought practices. The phenomenological view asks us as researchers to step out of our 
usual position as objective scientists, in which others are experienced analytically and from 
the outside. Instead, we are being asked to put ourselves into the shoes of the subjects 
studied. Once we relate to things the way the experiencing subject does, the following key 
idea of the phenomenology of embodied knowing, which is wholly unfamiliar to classical 
science, can begin to make sense: On the inchoate level of being there is a continuum of 
experience in which a reflexive subject does not yet stand out as separate. This means that 
perception does not automatically have a subject-object format, i.e. a way of being in the 
world that rest on a distinction of the cognizer and the cognized, an objectivizing stance. The 
subject-object way of being and perception is the natural format of everyday knowledge. Yet, 
it is non-existent in mystical experience, and only to a lesser degree in trance and some 
dream states. While is clear that in standard science, the subject-object format forms the 
basis of descriptive language – describing a state of affairs qua state means already having 
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imposed a subject-object distinction – other ways of speaking, even though opaque by 
everyday standards, exist, such as in Buddhist philosophy. 
    Saying that cognition does not immediately imply a subject-object format only restates 
what has been said with regard to the grounding of metaphor in embodied or pre-conceptual 
knowledge. As counterpart to the term ‘representational’ I will also adopt the term 
‘presentational’ here, as a growing number of authors are doing in accordance with Merleau-
Ponty’s usage. Furthermore, since we cannot neatly distinguish mind and body, I will 
occasionally adopt the terminological usage to speak of ‘mind-body’.57 
    A critical analysis of the time-honored Western epistemology reveals further important 
aspects: It has been repeatedly observed that Cartesian epistemology is biased by the 
metaphor of KNOWING IS SEEING and a corresponding devaluation of other modes of knowing. 
This metaphor is, to a large part, responsible for creating a subject-object distance and a 
sense of passive receptivity, while cutting us off from the other senses at the same time (cf. 
Lyon/Barbalet 1994: 61). By contrast, it is primarily the haptic sense that includes the whole 
body with its entire surface and that implies immediate body presence and activity in 
exploring the world. Since exploratory sense organs and performatory motor organs are 
anatomically identical, the haptic sense is also strongly linked to what has been called the 
‘sixth’, the proprioceptive sense.58 This is the sense of having an integral body, being an 
embodied entity distinct from other entities, and having a center of awareness. A pertinent 
counterbalance to the visual metaphor of epistemology is given in Thomas Csordas’ (1993: 
152) argument for an expanded concept of sensory imagery, which discontinues the 
traditional dichotomy of mental images and physical sensations: 
                                                 
57 As our language cannot be other than fundamentally dualistic, we need not have too many qualms 
about this ultimately inadequate term, which does not go beyond dualistic terminology, albeit referring 
to it negatively. 
58 Cf. Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987: 14), who argue that “all humans are endowed with self-
consciousness of mind and body, with an internal body image, and with what neurologists have 
identified as the proprioceptive or ‘sixth sense,’ or sense of body self-awareness, of mind/body 
integration, and of being in the world as separate and apart from other human beings.” This is not to 
imply a quasi-universal basis of the bodily that can be isolated as a universal substrate of culture. The 
specific way this proprioceptive sense will be instantiated can vary greatly. It can either be endowed 
with particular cultural salience and become the object of intense discourse or be left implicit. Likewise, 
it can link up with various ideologies of individualist, familist, socio-centric, or holistic kinds. Therefore, 
the proprioceptive sense has to be sharply distinguished from any reified social conception of ‘person’ 
or ‘self’. Also note that, in a phenomenological perspective, proprioception is only one mode of 
attention among several, because often human consciousness is fixed on objects external to the body, 
while body awareness fades into the background. With The Absent Body (1990) Drew Leder devotes a 
whole book to this issue. More about this anon. 
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“We would then be taking a methodological step away from an empiricist conception of imagination as 
abstract representation to a phenomenological conception of imagination as a feature of the bodily 
synthesis, which Merleau-Ponty (1962) described as characteristic of a human consciousness that 
projects itself into a cultural world.”  
 
Taking a step away from the idea that imagination is abstract representation can follow from 
attending to tactile and kinesthetic sensation and other kinds of body feeling. In other words, 
by according the other sense modalities equal status with the visual we get a more 
diversified picture of human knowing.  
    Of course, Johnson’s (1987) experimentally well-supported argument that image schemas 
guide much of our thought is in excellent keeping with all this. First, image schemas are 
multi-modal and permit transpositions, say from the auditory to the visual. Second, they are 
of kinesthetic origin and hence grounded in preconceptual knowledge ipso facto. By virtue of 
this grounding relation conceptual schemas can be transposed into proprioceptive feeling 
states and vice versa. Image schema theory is well suited to accommodate the mentioned 
phenomenological caveats to classical epistemology, because it deals even-handedly with 
conceptual and preconceptual forms of knowing. I will get back to this double nature after a 
general discussion of the methodological problem of how we can get to know what people 
feel in their bodies. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND CONSUBJECTIVITY 
A major impelling force for the abiding concern with embodiment in medical anthropology is 
of course the striking contrast of many non-European medical systems to the Objectivist and 
representationalist bias in Western biomedicine. There is a stark contrast of modes of 
knowing between the ‘medical gaze’ in biomedicine first described by Michel Foucault and 
the ways of approaching the patient characteristic of other medical systems. A fine 
ethnographical example is cited by Csordas (1994a) referring to E. Valentine Daniel’s (1984) 
article The Pulse as an Icon in Siddha Medicine. In the Siddha medical system of South Asia 
the healer, in diagnosing the pulse of a patient, synchronizes her own pulse with it and 
experiences shared pulsations. This engenders a more immediate kind of knowledge about 
the client’s health state than any rule-governed objective diagnosis by distanced observation, 
more typical of a Western doctor’s mode of attention, would do. What is more, an altogether 
different kind of sign is used here: In the terms of Peircean semiotics the pulse example 
involves a sign that participates with the signified, so that when one compares the relative 
power of indexicality and iconicity in Siddha medicine the iconic aspect is much more 
emphasized than in bio-medicine. The sign is not external to the observer any more. The 
‘objectivity’ of Western medicine is replaced by ‘consubjectivity’ (p. 144).  
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    Csordas proposes that a number of well-known anthropological issues can be given a 
similar reinterpretation. For instance, in couvade the experience of throes in men can be 
understood as attuned bodily sensations of the father to that of the pregnant woman in birth-
labor. Thereby, couvade is reconceptualized as phenomenon of embodied intersubjectivity 
instead of imitation or charade. The men actually feel the pain rather than only enacting it for 
the audience. As an example of consubjectivity from our own culture Csordas mentions the 
phenomenon of transfers from client to therapist in psychoanalytic therapy. Csordas 
expresses the interesting view that this kind of consubjectivity can serve as a guideline to 
anthropological analysis as well and thereby instate a new paradigm of an embodied 
science.  
    Similar inroads have been made elsewhere recently. With regard to the anthropological 
debates about methods of doing ethnography I have already mentioned a suggestion by 
Unni Wikan (1991) above. When she speaks of ‘resonance’ between the anthropologist and 
her informants, Wikan espouses a similar mode of consubjectivity as a basis of 
understanding. Furthermore, there is a suggestion by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) 
to include meditative methods in cognitive studies of the mind. Although clear-cut 
methodologies are not in the offing, the idea that subjectified methods should become part of 
science is currently on the rise. 
 
3. Culture, body, and meaning in a cognitive framework 
A TYPOLOGY OF CULTURAL SIGNS 
I will now set up field of differentiations that clarifies the various aspects of ‘embodiment’ in 
relation to culture. A useful metaphor is taking culture as a semiotic ‘text’, i.e. a fabric of signs 
(cf. Peirce). In an embodiment view the use of ‘sign’ as a key concept requires a broad 
definition of it, which incorporates conceptual and preconceptual signs alike. These fall into 
at least three classes and allow a series of foci: 
    (1) I will start from a notion of culturally shaped signs (i.e. carriers of meaning). These 
stand opposed to universal forms of physiology, although even in physiology variation is 
conceivable to an interesting extent. Be that as it may, physiology only becomes meaning 
through the way it is ‘lived’ or ‘interpreted’. Thus ‘objective’ biomedical measurements, such 
as blood pressure or respiration, are excluded from the typology here or only mentioned at 
the margin, because they imply a wholly different perspective altogether.59  
                                                 
59 Needless to say, in an epistemologically cautious perspective biomedicine must be treated as a 
limited construct. It is based on some assumptions that are all but self-evident to anthropologists, e.g. 
that cultural thought is simply superimposed on an invariant and universal body. For this reason, 
mainstream biomedicine cannot be the touchstone of critical theory. Despite (and precisely with regard 
to) its universalist rhetoric, it is one of many culturally shaped medical views to be analyzed in their 
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    (2) In a next step, cultural meaning so defined can be heuristically split into signs in the 
embodied mode and in the conceptual mode. In the conceptual mode the majority of signs 
stand for a thing outside the human body. These I call objectified external objects. 
Conversely, in the bodily mode signs are, more felt that cognized, i.e. they remain 
‘presentational’ and non-objectified. These signs I call non-objectified body imagery or, 
alternatively, proprioceptive body awareness. 
    (3) In addition, one distinctive subclass on the conceptual side arises through the 
objectification of bodily states, i.e. when an actor sees her own states through a conceptual 
model and, as it were, from the outside. I call this third mode, which crosscuts the other two, 
objectified body imagery. It follows from what has just been said that signs in the embodied 
mode, i.e. immediate presentational states of body awareness, may either remain non-
objectified or be objectified into concepts in addition. 
    (4) We can also look into how these modes are functionally coupled in cultural practice: 
Proprioceptive body awareness is often objectified in addition to being just felt, so that the felt 
aspect and the conceptualized aspect can be orchestrated to function together. On top of 
this, both of the prior aspects can be integrated with conceptual representations of things 
outside the body. This triangular nexus I call the interaction of non-objectified body imagery, 
objectified body imagery, and objectified external concepts. 
    (5) Furthermore, the nexus of ‘grounding’ can be examined, as in image schema theory as 
laid out by Johnson (1987) or in Haskell’s (1989) ‘analogical transforms’. This type of inquiry 
focuses on how preconceptual knowledge prefigures conceptual knowledge. The above 
types of knowledge together with their functional nexus are depicted in the graph below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
epistemological presuppositions. While its universalistic claims on physical similarities between 
cultures are obviously not totally off the mark, they must be carefully reexamined in a broader 
epistemological framework. 
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DUALISMS RECONSIDERED: THE DIALECTIC OF TEXTUALITY AND EMBODIMENT 
After this introductory game plan I will now pursue the idea that a culture can be described as 
a semiotic system and see what follows from an embodiment point of view. Most 
prominently, Paul Ricœur (1991)[1971] and Yuri Lotman (1990) have proposed viewing 
culture as a semiotic system. In cultural anthropology this perspective has been most 
eminently espoused by Clifford Geertz (1973: 448ff), who spearheaded the rise of 
interpretive anthropology and a programmatic focus on entering into the dense lattices of 
public symbology. Its virtues notwithstanding, such a viewpoint of culture as semiotic fabric of 
concepts tells only half the story. There is an embodied counterpart to conceptual signs 
(which we may call pre-conceptual signs).  
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    Our aching, craving, or sick bodies remind us that there are at least two intrinsic orders to 
experience. Lawrence Kirmayer (1992: 323) expresses this with poignancy when he says 
that “(w)ith language we construct fictions, but not all experience is fictive, subject to the 
limitless power of the imagination to transfigure and invent.” However, there are also 
interesting parallels between textual fabric and embodied experience. Thomas Csordas 
(1993: 135, citing Barthes 1986) likens embodiment to the semiotic concept of text, which 
designates “an indeterminate methodological field that exists only when caught up in 
discourse, and that is experienced only as activity and production”. Just like a text, the body 
as material entity has to be caught up in activity to author embodiment, which is defined as a 
mode of presence, not as a substance. 
    In view of all this, there should be clarity about one point that Csordas expresses in 
another paper (1994a: 12), namely that “the purpose of elaborating a paradigm of 
embodiment is then not to supplant textuality but to offer it a dialectical partner.” Such a 
dialectic view has crucial implications for our epistemology. Kirmayer (1992: 324-325) 
emphasizes that a mature paradigm of the human sciences needs to acknowledge that the 
semiotic and the bodily are neither easily collapsed nor separated: 
 
“There is an inescapable circularity between the order of the body and the order of the text. Past 
infancy, bodily experience is most conspicuously elaborated and communicated through language. 
Language, in turn, is grounded in common experiences that provide common referents for a lexicon 
and in the organization of bodily action that provides a prototype for syntactic structure (...). Any 
attempt to give autonomy to the study of either body or text, divorced from the other order of 
experience, is epistemologically naive. 
    Despite the rhetoric of holism, the epistemological circularity of body and text does not imply the two 
orders can be readily dissolved into one. Body and text (like body and mind, from which this modern 
duality is transposed, cf. Kirmayer 1988) stand in dialectical relationship to each other. And if the text 
stands for a hard-won rational order, imposed on thought through the careful composition of writing, 
the body provides a structure to thought that is, in part, extra-rational and disorderly. This extra-
rational dimension to thought carries important information about emotional, aesthetic, and moral 
value.”  
 
It is often the body that initiates this dialectic. The experience of pain and death have the 
power to insist that we “finalize or temporary constructs”, to commit ourselves to some view 
of reality (ibid., p. 325). It imposes the necessity of interpretation and impels the search for 
meaning. In such experiences the body inexorably throws us back on ‘reality’. In torture the 
incontestable reality of control over a subject is imposed via the body. Yet, even if our body 
has primacy in much experience, human existence is always a process back and forth 
between the semiotic and the body (cf. the general model proposed by Shore 1991, 1996).  
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    Heavy emphasis needs to be put on the following fact: Embodied knowledge is inherently 
shaped by culture in the same way conceptual knowledge is. Pre-conceptual does not 
necessarily imply pre-cultural. Our example of pain illustrates this: Even if, in the eyes of 
many, the example of pain seems to lend itself to a universalist conception of the body, pain 
has to be suffered, and suffering is a culturally mediated act. 
    A basic idea developed above relates to the immediate kind of knowledge, sometimes 
referred to as primal, inchoate, pre-objective, or pre-conceptual. There is intrinsic meaning to 
this level. For instance, there is the primal experience of embodied satisfaction. Quenching 
thirst or satisfying hunger or the sexual drive is meaningful at a bodily level. But phenomena 
at this level never exist in isolation. The specific significance of the physical gratification is at 
least to some degree given by the kind of social or cultural meaning in which it is embedded. 
For example, which means are appropriate for sexual conquest and what social significance 
it is given is in recognizable ways a culturally mediated issue, at the same time that sexual 
drive is something quite shared at another level. With this, our focus on preconceptual 
meaning is given a cultural twist. The body may speak for itself, but never in a sense of the 
pre-cultural. Context, notably of the cultural kind, is always necessary for disambiguating 
bodily experience. 
 
IN WHAT WAY IS EMBODIMENT CULTURAL? 
The body is appropriated by culture in two ways. (1) There are culturally elaborated ways of 
attending to the body and (2) there are cultural ways of objectification. Let us start with the 
latter. Cultural objectifications of the body have been traditionally included in the study of 
ideology, of religious beliefs, and of world-views. One the one hand, they include metaphoric 
body symbolism, such as saying that “society is an organism” or using blood, semen, feces, 
or milk as a symbol. On the other hand, they also include cultural discourse on what happens 
to the body in trance, prayer, pain, sex, including descriptive, causal, or evaluative 
dimensions. All these are ordinary cases of conceptualizing external objects, except that 
people’s bodies and physiological processes are used as a conceptual source instead of 
non-human entities. 
    While work on conceptual knowledge is hardly new, it is a lot more puzzling to hear that 
the way people attend to their body is also shaped by culture. This idea does not fit into our 
cultural view of the body as universal, a substrate separate from the mind, and from culture. 
Yet, Michael Foucault has provided abundant proof in his historical work that this view is 
itself a cultural construct, rather than an unquestionable given. This deconstructive enterprise 
in philosophy is also borne out by much substantive empirical evidence. The lived body as a 
cultural entity is illuminated by an extensive body of literature in medical anthropology. A 
good, if slightly dated overview of the evidence on culturally formed body perception can be 
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found in Scheper-Hughes/Lock (1987: 17). One group of examples relates to psychosomatic 
phenomena, like the often-debated German fixation with the bowels and its nexus to 
cleanliness and anality. This schema is not completely conscious, but may well be felt and 
enacted: In a depth-psychological perspective the implications include self-surveillance and 
self-control, and a preoccupation with orifices and boundaries in cleanliness training. Other 
research indicates how body conceptions and patients’ ‘choice’ of symptoms are related. For 
instance, people, who subconsciously consider their skin as armor to protect their vulnerable 
inside, are prone to develop rashes when feeling attacked or under duress. Moreover, body 
parts are frequently considered the seat of ailments, such as the liver in several Romance 
countries, with the effect that people localize and actually feel the pain there. (Note, however, 
that here objectifications in public discourse also come in.) So-called ‘culture-bound 
syndromes’ such as running amok in Indonesia, the fits of ‘el calor’ among central American 
women, or Victorian hysteria have also been well documented. Further related fields are 
culturally specific ways of healing, like trance and shamanism, or witchcraft related 
phenomena, such as voodoo death. Overall, many ways of imparting meaning to the body 
are primarily unconscious enactments. (The fact that they may often enter into discourse in 
addition I will turn to below.)  
   There is a suitable recent terminological suggestion by Thomas Csordas (1993: 138) for 
bringing culture and the lived body together. Csordas, who is a leading figure of 
phenomenological anthropology, introduces the term somatic modes of attention. By this he 
means the threefold nexus of culturally elaborated ways of attending to one’s own body, to 
the bodies of others, and to other people’s attention to our body. Frequently modes of 
attention are intersubjectively embedded, part of an inseparable context, such as in dance, 
team sports, and sex. Some modes of cultural awareness attribute special significance to 
bodily processes, such as pregnancy or menopause. Csordas also mentions conscious 
techniques of somatic attention, such as the imaginary rehearsal of body movements by 
athletes or attention to breath in meditation. Finally, there are characteristic somatic modes 
of attention in pathological somatization disorders, such as hyper-vigilance in hypochondria 
or tolerance for self-mortification in anorexia and bulimia. Note that the Foucauldian ‘body-
politic’, i.e. the social means of power asserted via body practices, is part-and-parcel of 
somatic modes of attention, for example in view of the diet-craze promoted by life-style 
magazines setting the standards of female beauty. 
 
‘BEING A BODY’ VS. ‘HAVING A BODY’  
There is a deeper anthropological reason for the above split into two ways of understanding 
embodiment as cultural, namely that the way people relate to their bodies has an inherent 
double-nature. The basis of my discussion is Thomas Ots’ (1994: 117) distinction of two 
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aspects of the body, identified through the two German terms Leib and Körper (both translate 
into English as ‘body). This distinction goes back at least to Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical 
anthropology and closely corresponds to Levy’s (1973) distinction between being a body and 
having a body. Levy mentions the experience of pain to illustrate the differences between the 
two viewpoints: While the foot feels pain it is I who experiences the pain. 
    For a clearer cognitive characterization of the two aspects I suggest the distinction of 
proprioceptive body awareness and objectified body imagery. Proprioceptive awareness 
refers to the intuitive and pre-objective feeling of being a body that is a container with inward 
and outward dimensions, extension, motor properties, posture, etc. It includes kinesthetic 
awareness manifested in aspects such as movement, motor readiness, muscle tension, 
metabolic flow, bladder, bowel, and blood pressure, pulse frequency, and respiration. It also 
encompasses things we know about our body when it is in rest, like a sense of limb position, 
our focus of attention within the body, or the absence or presence of pain. Objectified body 
imagery, on the other hand, refers to the aspect of realizing the possession of one’s body as 
a container in an abstract body representation as seen by an observer. Perhaps a 
representational body concept first arises through the experience of being objectified in an 
instrumental relation by others. As soon as we learn to see ourselves from the others’ point 
of view, we also acquire the ability to view ourselves instrumentally. The externalizing of 
awareness, i.e. an objectifying shift to an allocentric perspective, is preconditional for seeing 
ourselves in an instrumental relation to the world. For understanding ourselves as 
instrumentally related and contextually oriented we have to construct a projection of our 
mind-body that is externally placed among other things and people.  
    Whenever aspects of the body (i.e. not external objects) are in cognitive focus, neither 
objectified Körper nor proprioceptive Leib can ever occur to the complete exclusion of the 
other. However, the presence of conscious objectified body imagery may vary by degrees 
depending on the kind of phenomenon studied and the automatization of the cognitive task in 
question. For example, it makes a difference in terms of the conscious effort and objectified 
body focus, if we compare a soldier who is marching in file on the one hand and a meditating 
person who wills herself to start an imaginary journey through her body on the other hand. 
Marching can be experienced as a purely proprioceptive state (i.e. conscious thought may 
wander at the same time), whereas meditation, in all likelihood, cannot. The habitus of 
everyday motion is also relatively low in conscious objectified imagery, although tacit 
metaphoric cues for habitus and reflections of it are ever-present in culture (cf. Bourdieu 
1977). The two brief examples here point to the conclusion that the notion of objectified 
imagery is closely tied to the presence of a conscious process and of focal attention. 
Objectified imagery should, then, tend to occur with novice learners or during tasks that are 
inherently too complex for complete automatization. Thus, as a recruit learns to march, he 
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will perhaps have to go through the movements consciously in the beginning. After some 
time, however, the effort becomes smaller and less conscious as the proficiency in the task 
increases. In other words, the task is automatized as soon as the previously objectified 
imagery becomes transformed into a sediment of procedural knowledge. 
    Now for a discussion of the social or cultural function of objectified body imagery (Körper) 
and proprioceptive body awareness (Leib). The two aspects may stand out at different times, 
and are divergently emphasized in different cultures. The relative dominance of 
proprioceptive awareness and objectification can vary across cultural ideologies, as Thomas 
Ots (1994: 131) points out with reference to Mary Douglas and Victor Turner. Douglas (1970) 
makes an observation to the effect that in societies of a highly structured social dimension 
the Körper takes precedence over the Leib. At the other extreme stand millenarian 
movements. In part resonating the work of Victor Turner, Ots asserts that the majority of 
millenarian movements are intimately connected with an intense awareness of leibly states. 
In millenarianism it is especially ecstasy and trance that are prevalent. In revolutionary 
movements – Ots mentions the Chinese Yellow Turban uprising of the second century A.D. 
and the Boxer rebellion of the turn of the century – certain types of acute Leib-awareness are 
connected with feelings of invincibility and a complete disregard for self-preservation in 
battle. While the objectified, socially defined Körper is a function of social structure, leibly 
exigencies may be linked to Turner’s notion of anti-structure. Anti-structure may be enacted 
in three possible ways: by a retreat into the private, as anti-systemic millenarianism to sweep 
social structure away, or as regular institutionalized enactment in collective rites of 
communitas. 
    The distinction between having a Körper and being a Leib also often mirrors the split 
between ideology as dominant public discourse and ideology as private discourse that 
especially occurs in transitional periods. Ots’ own analysis of a popular new, yet controversial 
form of Chinese qi gong in the 1980s provides an apt illustration. In stark contrast to the 
traditional techniques this form gives wide berth to spontaneous, emotional outpourings, 
which run contra the cultural ideal of tranquility and harmony. According to Ots, that 
spontaneous qi gong may have to do with repressed emotions is left unmentioned in the rich 
official discourse on the phenomenon. This tendency is in keeping with the Daoist concept of 
emotion as something outward to be kept from entering the person, which in turn is part of 
the ideology of quietness, relaxation, and control. However, after some time in private, some 
practitioners admitted to Ots that they experienced a relief of pent-up frustration and that it 
was only their own spontaneous body reactions that had allowed them to become aware of 
their emotions and to see behind their own social mask. The example makes evident that 
cultural frames may diminish or even restrict the awareness of the state of the Leib. 
Moreover, in the special situations when the Leib is set free from its cultural constraints, this 
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happens in culturally recognizable ways rather than in an arbitrary fashion (Ots 1994: 133). 
Thus, more traditional forms of qi gong underwent a transformation, which took account of 
the exigencies of the modern Chinese Leib. 
    In this sub-section I have suggested rephrasing ‘having a Leib’ and ‘being a Körper’ into 
‘proprioceptive body awareness’ and ‘objectified body imagery’ for the purposes of a more 
mainstream cognitive terminology. In addition, I would recommend partially collapsing the 
two in the cognitive notion of image schema. Here is why I think this can be done: Image 
schema theory builds on the claim that humans are capable of intuitively sensing the 
isomorphism between immediate body awareness and objectified imagery of cultural models 
and metaphors. The realization of having a Körper is perhaps the first instance of creating an 
isomorphous projection out of leibly awareness. In this sense the primal act of self-
objectification is the seed of later metaphorical objectifications through CONTAINER, BALANCE, 
UP-DOWN, CENTER-PERIPHERY, etc., which are originally aspects of leibly awareness. When 
they are transformed into objectified concepts, they are first used to conceptualize one’s own 
body as seen by others (i.e. as a Körper) and then used for conceptualizing a host of non-
bodily relations in the external world. 
 
CULTURAL WAYS OF OBJECTIFYING (1): BESTOWING EXTERNAL CAUSALITY TO BODY EXPERIENCE  
We have seen that inchoate bodily experience is (partly) cultural. Now we can turn to the 
second route in which culture enters the picture, namely through the objectification of 
inchoate experience. I will discuss two related aspects of objectification in turn: First, I will 
deal with the way cultural experts such as healers attach causal interpretations to their 
clients body experiences, which are then taken over by the clients. Then, I will describe how 
predications of cultural discourse, e.g. through embodied metaphors, can be actually felt in 
the body. I propose to call this phenomenon retrojection.  
    Thomas Csordas’ (1990, 1993) work on Charismatic Christianity in North America 
provides a good example for causal objectification. His informants are participants of a 
Pentecostal healing session, in which evil spirits are cast out from several among them, for 
example the evil spirit of masturbation. As the spirits are expelled by a healer they produce 
spontaneous physical manifestations of their departure in the congregation. The case study 
of Csordas provides a relatively neat distinction between demons as reified cultural objects 
and their experiential manifestations. It is noteworthy that it is initially not the participants who 
perceive a demon inside themselves. They sense a particular thought, emotion, or behavior 
outside their control. It requires a healer, ‘an expert in objectification’, to diagnose the 
distress as case of spirit possession. In an observer’s view, we may say that they experience 
a transgression of their threshold of distress tolerance. The event has an authentic pre-
objective element, since participants experience it as spontaneous and without preordained 
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content. This is not altered by the fact that most of the participants probably already believed 
in the existence of spirits before the healing. What is more important is that all of them share 
the experience a distressing loss of control in their sexual behavior, again a cultural but – 
prior to the healing – not heavily objectified emotion. 
    In my reassessment of Csordas’ data there is an intimate relationship of presentational 
and representational. We have seen that, as demons are reified as cultural objects, a 
semantic interpretation is conferred on the act of healing. But more importantly, there is also 
a pre-objective, yet culturally determined element in the process. The spontaneous 
manifestations emerge from shared habitus and take on only a limited number of forms. For 
example, when a particular spirit departs from the possessed body with the scream of a 
hyena, Csordas interprets this as the effect of the bloodcurdling shriek, which is a deeply 
ingrained somatic component of the experience and symbolism of evil in North America. A 
second example points in the same direction. When the spirit of masturbation is expelled the 
arms are collectively flung in the air as a powerful gesture of ‘hands off’. Again, the gesture is 
spontaneous, yet in Csordas’ view the cultural bodies are expressing themselves 
autonomously in a shared symbolic act.60 
    In other respects the spiritual healing can only be understood in relation to cultural 
discourse, which is to say that the pre-objective alone cannot account for them. In the North 
American context phenomena of obsession relate to a discourse of interiority/exteriority, a 
discourse about a self-contained and bounded self in which demons transgress body 
boundaries and invade a person. Demonology is a mirror of the culturally ideal self, reifying 
its negative attributes as evil forces of intentional character. Significantly, the objectification 
as healing and release from possession dissociates the distress from the self in the 
inside/outside dimension. Thus, the objectification as a delivery from bondage may be seen 
as embedded in a cultural discourse to which it responds. The motive of delivery from 
bondage is linked to the strong cultural goal of self-control in North America, be it moral, 
sexual, occupational, etc., which is stressed in the Christian world-view. In short, exteriorizing 
                                                 
60 A deliberate theory of body as an autonomous agent of protest, refusal, and social critique is laid out 
by Scheper-Hughes (1990). She examines the symptoms of nervous trembling and seizures of 
Brazilian sugar cane workers working under unendurable conditions as metaphoric enactment of their 
legs giving way beneath them. It is important to add that the individual and cultural perspectives have 
to be jointly considered, even though the individual aspect is not elaborated here. With respect to 
healing through metaphors and suggestive techniques, Sharma (1996: 261) speaks of „an active 
appeal to images which are of both cultural and personal relevance“. They are both a product of the 
personal imagination, since some images work for one person and not for another, and a product of 
shared cultural experience. 
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the loss of control takes the burden of responsibility and guilt from the person by attributing it 
to something other than the self. 
 
CULTURAL WAYS OF OBJECTIFYING (2): RETROJECTIVE IMAGERY 
In the previous example I have described how body awareness can be cast into an 
objectified cultural model. The reverse is also possible: Part of the power of objectified 
imagery inheres in the fact that it can act back on our immediate body awareness. As a 
complementary phenomenon to ‘projections’ from embodied to conceptual states, I will call 
this ‘retrojective imagery’. Recall the above graph, in which I divided the category of 
conceptual representations into objectified external concepts and objectified body imagery. 
The latter class is cognitively special in a highly important respect: Body concepts from public 
discourse can be retrojected into the experiencing body. The body thus becomes a map on 
which imagery is inscribed. An image retrojected is thereby felt in body awareness. (By 
contrast, normal conceptual imagery is projected outward ‘into the world’ and cannot be 
sensed in the body.) We can either retroject imagery that directly conceptualizes cultural 
views of the body, or in the case of metaphorically evocative symbolism, imagery that bears 
an intuitive topological similarity to body concepts. 
    Cognitive linguistics usually fails to recognize that conceptual mappings can be 
retrojected. Paradoxically, the genuinely presentational dimension is also overlooked in much 
of medical anthropology. When one reads, for example, Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987: 
16) on what they call ‘body imagery’, although under the heading of the lived body, one 
cannot avoid the impression that they are talking only about discursively objectified 
representations, e.g. of localized character traits or localized diseases. The thrust of their 
writing misses the point that objectified imagery also has presentational reality to people.  
    Only the notion of retrojection of imagery explains why objectified images can shape body 
awareness in a culturally recognizable way and why discourse has the power to ‘go under 
our skin’. Experiences connected with muscle tonus, kinesthetic readiness, metabolic ‘flow’, 
focus of somatic attention, relaxation, or arousal are produced through a conceptual overlay. 
In this way retrojection funnels words or images into feeling states. What is more, retrojection 
explains one major avenue of how children acquire the habitus and the modes of somatic 
attention characteristic of their cultural group through an exposure to discourse. (Another 
way of acquiring habitus and somatic modes of attention, of course, is by mimicking the 
procedural schemas directly observed in others.) When children learn about body practices 
through discourse, retrojection enables them to apply cultural metaphors to their own body 
and feel the power of words within them. Thus, the notion of retrojection highlights the insight 
that our cultural choice of conceptual schemas shapes not only our image of our bodies, but 
also our body awareness. 
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    Importantly, the nexus between embodied and conceptual body images is inherently a 
two-way street. Embodied states shape conceptual schemas, and conceptual schemas 
create felt body states. I use the term ‘projection’ for the process whereby feelings and 
images in proprioceptive body awareness are objectified and give rise to conceptual 
schemas. Conversely, I use the word ‘retrojection’ when objectified conceptual schemas 
already acquired through discourse, but not yet experienced in body awareness, create a 
feeling image in the body. Thus, retrojection and projection are the two sides of the same 
coin. 
    The principle of retrojection makes it possible that the body expresses conceptual 
knowledge autonomously, as in Csordas’ Pentecostal healing example through the body in 
the ‘hands-off’ gesture and the shriek. Note also that many situations of self-reflection are 
characterized by a process of dialectical interaction, in which embodied states give rise to 
concepts and linguistic manifestations, and these are then again fed back and projected into 
the body, and so on.61 
    Here is an example for the retrojection of discourse into the body, whereby I extend on 
some past linguistic findings on English morality metaphors. According to Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999: ch.14), Johnson (1993) and Lakoff (1996) morality relates to images of a 
strong, upright, balanced, and delimited body. First, there are the two widespread metaphors 
of MORALITY IS PHYSICAL STRENGTH and MORALITY IS RESISTING A PHYSICAL FORCE (Lakoff 
                                                 
61 Typically, a body state cannot totally constrain which objectification of it ensues, nor does a single 
pre-given concept simply tell us how our body feels. Instead, there is a complex negotiation in which 
objectified concepts and non-objectified body awareness are mutually attuned to each other. The 
reason for this is that our cultural or personal stock of ideas usually suggests more than one possible 
way to perceive our bodies through the tinted glasses of a conceptual schema: If, for example, my 
inchoate state of the mind-body is that I feel vaguely dissatisfied, I can come up with a variety of 
plausible hypotheses: I haven’t eaten properly, I need movement, I’m sexually frustrated, I am 
catching a cold, I’m only being a hypochondriac, something’s bugging me (perhaps old psychic 
problems surface once again), my neck is getting stiff from too much work in front of my computer 
terminal, I want to dodge tomorrow’s obligations and take a day off, there’s too much electromagnetic 
pollution around, etc. And, surely enough, depending of which of these explanations I choose, the 
vague feeling will be funneled into a clearer feeling that focuses of the embodied aspects that are 
compatible with the chosen objectifying model. If I decide I’m sexually frustrated, I’ll stop feeling my 
stomach; if my stiff neck is the problem, a few movements and deep breaths will hopefully give me 
respite; if I’m catching a cold, my tonsils and my temples will move into focus; if I decide I’m being a 
hypochondriac, I will try to draw my attention away from my body; and if I’m being psychosomatic I will 
start thinking real hard about a possible general problem bugging me as a reason. Whichever I decide, 
in a next step the chosen interpretation will have to stand the test of my body awareness again, and so 
on in a dialectical loop. 
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1996), both an extension of EVIL IS A FORCE (“She was driven to do it by temptation”). The 
moral self maintains control over evil through exerting energy. Another aspect of moral 
strength is BEING GOOD IS BEING UPRIGHT (“He has an upright character”, “He showed 
backbone”), and conversely BEING BAD IS BEING LOW (“a real lowlife!”), DOING EVIL IS FALLING 
(as in the biblical fall). Morality means resisting the ‘pull’ of gravity downwards. 
    Kövecses (2000: 195) also shows that the folk-model of morality derives from a more 
general metaphor of BECOMING EMOTIONAL IS GIVING IN TO A FORCE. In other words, there are 
indications that the emotional self is opposed to the moral self, at least in the more 
conservative view (cf. Lakoff 1995). Being moral is equated with rational control here. Both 
emotionality and morality correspond to imagined states in a system, where forces vie for 
domination. 
    My point now is this: It would be unwarranted to understand moral strength solely in 
representational terms. It is an embodied quality – it is situated and indeed sensed in the 
body. Retrojective images hold responsible for this, with implications on actual body control. 
We maintain our posture, keep our chin up, stay put, keep our poise, we do not flinch, we pull 
ourselves together. In other words, the embodied-cum-conceptual metaphors encourage 
body control practices and ways of self-monitoring. In retrojective imagery we can bring 
together metaphor analysis and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus “as unselfconscious 
orchestration of practices”. Note that my hypothesis goes further than Johnson’s (1987) 
notion of ‘grounding’ of metaphors in kinesthetic schemas in important respects. Not only the 
basic parts of metaphor imagery are ‘assembled’ based on these schemas, the whole 
metaphor, resembling a very multifaceted schema, actually works on the body. Retrojection 
explains how morality or other schemas are encoded in terms of the lived body.  
    Additional retrojective mappings other than moral strength can be found. These are 
balance, boundedness, and unified location. The metaphor MORALITY IS BEING IN BALANCE 
(“He has an unwavering character”) focuses on stability in the same location. Boundedness 
appears together with a particular version of the PATH and the EVENT metaphor. As Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999: 304) demonstrate, moral action is seen as a movement constrained 
within permissible areas and along permissible paths (“Your behavior is deviant”, “She 
strayed from the right path”, “Keep your impulses in check”, “ Do not let your emotions run 
free”)  
    Let me suggest the following hypothesis: The aspects of boundedness and unified location 
in morality discourse can be retrojectively mapped onto the CONTAINER image of our body. 
Our bodies are spatialized and (in everyday states of the mind-body) clearly bounded 
entities. As a consequence, the realization of having committed an immoral act lets the 
embodied feeling of composure disperse. This is also in keeping with the metaphor of 
morality as physical strength. Through retrojection the body as a bounded container 
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becomes the perceived locus of this physical strength. By consequence, the realization of 
being immoral (in a person who is trying to be good) often entails an embodied felling of 
physical weakening. There is more evidence that we make the lived body the seat of morals: 
At the conceptual level people often locate morality in the body on the basis of an aspect of 
the self model called the MORAL ESSENCE metaphor. Character is conceived in terms of 
essences that are located in the body, as manifested in "She has a heart of gold”, “He 
doesn’t have a mean bone in his body” or “He’s rotten to the core” (Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 
306). Again, retrojection is possible to the effect that immorality is actually felt as being 
located inside the body.  
    The neighboring system of self metaphors also influences the morality system. This is 
SELF CONTROL IS BEING UNIFIED IN A PLACE (“Keep your composure!”, “Stay put!”, “He’s pretty 
scattered”, “Pull yourself together”), as shown by Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 276). Attentional 
self control is having the self together. ‘Subject’ and ‘Self’ need to be in the same place. Here 
retrojection is possible in the sense of the embodied centeredness and balance that is 
achieved in self control. Finally, centeredness is also linked to moral strength, which then 
would imply proper spatialization, locating our feeling-thoughts in the right space.62 In sum as 
moral actors, we keep ourselves strong and in balance. We maintain our outer boundary as 
clear and stable. We keep ourselves unified and the self contained within in its right place. 
Imagining our bodies as such helps behaving morally. Thus, we are the container of moral 
goodness, at the same time that we cognize it. It is felt in the body because particular 
experiences of the proprioceptive and kinesthetic senses emerge from representational 
imagery that is retrojected into the body. 
    The image inscribed into the body is more powerful than a symbolic image of any other 
external, inanimate, and non-subjective entity, because it affects body awareness and 
physical body states. For this reason, retrojective objectification can be used therapeutically 
(as well as for propaganda and other manipulation.) For example, a parable about another 
person told by a healer can result in immediate effects of the body states of the participant, 
perhaps without her consciously noticing the process. The heard narrative is directly 
                                                 
62 The Victorian paragon of moral superiority is illuminating here, though a slight caricature. While 
bodily restraint maintains the ‘container of superiority’, Victorians maintain a clear definition of their self 
contained within. The realm of the self-contained individual has a clear boundary from everything 
outside. In exercising emotional and sexual restraint an order untainted by the forces of chaos is 
bestowed upon the self. The prototypical Victorian maintains a balanced personality by repressing 
drives and affects that threaten the perceived self. Affects can and should be productively channeled 
(Stearns 1994). In short, there is embodied experience of morality of one’s self possessing a clear 
boundary, being a balanced entity and an ordered system. As in the previous example, these 
conceptual aspects can be funneled into proprioceptive and kinesthetic sensations. 
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projected into the own body. Conceivably, curses, voodoo death, and medical placebo 
effects work in the same way. 
    Before we turn to another issue, I would like to suggest the idea that the causality 
concepts discussed in the previous section form a larger system together with the retrojective 
imagery. Given that CAUSES ARE FORCES people can hold an overall imagistic model that 
incorporates both their inner self as container space (Lakoff/Johnson 1999) and morality as 
force relations (Kövecses 2000), and at the same time the image of an external causal force 
impinging on the self or irrupting into the self, e.g. in possession, in order to change it. 
 
INTERACTION OF MODES (1): ORCHESTRATING SYMBOLISM AND EXPERIENCE 
There is more to interaction between the embodied and the conceptual mode that the 
discussed twin phenomena of projected body imagery and retrojected conceptual imagery. In 
the majority of conceptual representations the body does not function as screen, yet, through 
symbolism, the conceptual imagery of external objects also interacts with body awareness in 
significant ways. Especially in ritual the conceptual mode and the embodied mode are jointly 
dramatized. This is nicely shown by Benjamin Colby’s (1991) work on the Japanese tea 
ceremony. The objective of the article is to show that, although the loci of representational 
and presentational imagery do not exactly coincide, the two modes produce powerful 
synergies and complement each other. Ultimately, the article reveals that the main theme of 
the tea ceremony act of incorporation, and its two complementary facets: symbolic and 
physiological. 
    The tea ceremony has been frequently held to be the epitome of Japanese culture. Its 
importance derives from its dual nature as a ceremony that is refreshing in the most direct 
bodily terms, while also achieving symbolic control over the world. The ceremony takes place 
in a tea hut in a garden that is designed as an idealization of nature. The path to the hut is 
designed in the model of a mountain trail and the hut in the model of a mountain hermitage, 
both with emphasis on simplicity, naturalness, and unobtrusive blending into the 
surroundings. The guests are lead from the mundane world to a setting that provides the 
opportunity to relax from worldly affairs. Upon entering the hut, the guests symbolically shed 
their social roles. The atmosphere that the tea-master has studiously created is silently 
admired: there is a view of the garden, the smell of incense, and flower-arrangements. The 
tea making is carried out in analogy to nature. The modulations produced by the singing 
kettle are meant to evoke perhaps a cataract, the breaking of waves, or a rainstorm. The tea 
itself has qualities that resonate with the garden outside. Its frothy green is coincidental with 
the garden green. It has a special herbal smell, which links to the smell of wet leaves and 
earth (brought out more by sprinkling water around in the garden just before the ceremony). 
The tea is made from pure water, which links to the spring in the garden for washing hands 
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and mouth before entering the hut. These three garden elements, in turn, can be linked at 
one more remove to the natural world beyond the garden. In consuming the tea, the 
participants make themselves symbolically one with nature. Coherence between the natural 
and the social world is established by the act of incorporation. This is expressed in the words 
of the tea master Soshitsu Sen, “In my own hands I hold a bowl of tea: I see all of nature 
represented in its green color. Closing my eyes I find green mountains and pure water within 
my own heart. Sitting silently alone and drinking tea I feel those become part of me.”  
    At the same time that there is oneness with nature, there also is oneness of guest and 
host. While Japanese etiquette in everyday contexts functions as an accentuation of 
hierarchic relations, an expression of ‘knowing one’s proper place’, in the ceremony etiquette 
is rendered pure form. The emphasis is on nature, while human presence is articulated only 
by artifacts or material things. This gives the guests an opportunity to gain respite from the 
anxieties of social interaction. In this anxiety-free model the rigorous etiquette of everyday 
dealings is transformed into art. Apprehensiveness is removed both by ritualization – which is 
more accentuated than the usual everyday ritualization, self-serving, and l’art pour l’art – and 
a heightened emphasis on the ecological world, both natural and artifact (p. 252). 
    This example suggests that, in the study of culture, symbolic and directly embodied 
aspects cannot be separated easily: On the one hand, the participants achieve symbolic 
control of the world. This is achieved by a symbolic act of ingestion. It is both the natural as 
well as the controlled and materialized social world that is incorporated into the body. The 
natural is incorporated through synecdoche: Tea is both metonymically part of and, as 
culturalized object, metaphorically similar to nature. The social is incorporated by the 
admiration of artifacts: the simple beauty of the teacup or an artfully calligraphed scroll on the 
wall are taken in by the senses. More than that, the ceremony as a skillfully structured 
sequence embodies culture, being a cultural artifact that is taken in. Its etiquette is art of pure 
form, not function. Hence, the society that causes anxiety is symbolically re-appropriated into 
the body, and thereby the self. In a somewhat Heideggerian vein one could say that “bodily 
within-ness is my-ness”. This pertains to food and drink, just as it does to focused sensory 
impressions, which are both ‘taken in’.  
    At the same time, a soothing and relaxing mood is incited by the substance itself, to which 
the anxiety-free context contributes. The whole ceremony establishes a state of mind that is 
contemplative and receptive to the idealization of nature. The focus of attention is on the 
senses, not on social roles or mundane concerns. The stillness of the garden setting 
produces a serene mood, which is aided by contemplative sitting as well as the control and 
artful brevity of movements exercised by the tea master. 
    Tea as a substance illustrates particularly well how the conceptual/representational and 
the embodied/presentational are interwoven. In Colby’s words, it stands at “the nodal 
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intersection of symbolic network and mood inducing substance.” Tea has high salience both 
in physical attributes and physiological effect. It was originally used as a medicine, and there 
is a symbolic contextualization of tea in Japanese culture that it is beneficial for health 
through the reduction of stress. Already through being a part of the discourse about health 
tea is, both, embodied and symbolic. In the ritual context, tea stands for nature by contiguity 
with the garden and similarity in taste, surface, and color. On the other hand, the symbolic 
could not be more concrete. The sensory is linked with the symbolic by tasting and smelling 
the frothy green liquid, which is in turn linked to nature as a whole by taste and smell. In 
ingesting the warm and soothing liquid in stillness there is attentive wholeness and 
refreshment. Incorporation as the remaking of symbolic wholeness becomes part of a 
sensory and kinesthetic style of attentiveness, or what Csordas (1993) termed a somatic 
mode of attention. 
    In summary, Colby’s analysis grasps the reincorporation of the world as a dual technique: 
embodied as sensory experience and through conceptual symbolism. The tea ceremony is 
about regeneration in the double sense, first in the sense that the everyday is transcended 
and social roles doffed, and then in the sense of experiential immediacy.63 Note that both 
                                                 
63 There is the interesting observation by Victor Turner that cultural meta-discourse often comments on 
this double-nature. Religious practitioners often have an awareness of this dialectic, which may play a 
major role in some cultural traditions. Sages and poets periodically express it. And, it becomes the 
bone of contention in the political arena every once in a while. The necessity of the to-and-fro between 
outer structure and inner experience is a grand social theme. One of Turner’s examples is the protest 
launched by Viraœaiva asceticism against the Hinduist orthodoxy of tenth to twelfth century India 
(1974: 281-84). Viraœaiva thought relates to the fact that Indian temples were originally built in the 
image of human bodies. For them the metaphor then faded, the original blueprint was forgotten, and 
the temple became a static thing that rich Brahmans believed religion was essentially about. The 
opposition of these views was expressed by the reformers as one of standing versus moving, of 
having (riches) versus being (spiritual). Viraœaiva thought, in this situation, called for a reversal and for 
the reinstatement of the human body as a temple. But the protagonists were also aware of the 
continuous transformation, which is expressed as metaphoric cycle between two states. In a 
consciously expressed metaphoric interaction, temple became body and body became temple. The 
metaphor in this experts’ discourse is one between meaning as static CONTAINER OF SOCIAL FORM and 
meaning as living CONTAINER OF EXPERIENCE. This reconciliation of the experience and structure was 
expressed in a similar way by Confucius, when expounding the correct understanding of the relation 
between jen and li. In this dual pair li, roughly, stands for social propriety and rites, jen for 
benevolence, love, and humaneness. Confucius describes jen as li’s inner dynamic, not as opposition. 
Ideally, one goes with the other (Turner 1974: 284): “Confucius seems to be saying that if men 
operated within and according to the norms of the structure without seeking to subvert those norms to 
their self-interest or factional goals, then the result in terms of peaceful, just, social coexistence would 
be similar to those produced by spontaneous, existential communitas.” Thus a conscious balance 
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aspects of Victor Turner’s famous notion of communitas are given consideration. The 
mainspring of Turner’s work is the dialectic of social structure and communitas and 
designates a particular social purpose to each phase of the ritual cycle. Social structure is 
more representational in that the actors feel suspended in a fixed symbolic web that keeps 
the urge to enact their true self at bay. Conversely communitas corresponds to the 
presentational pole where embodied immediacy flows freely. 
 
INTERACTION OF MODES (2): LEARNING CULTURE THROUGH MULTIPLE CODINGS OF PROCEDURAL 
AND SEMANTIC MEMORY 
After this treatment of the integration of symbolic and physical experience in ritual let us now 
focus on the acquisition of cultural models through multiple coding between embodied and 
conceptual modes. The embodied and conceptual modes are two levels of knowledge that 
correspond to two memory types: the procedural and the semantic. Setting out from this 
point, Shore (1996: 259) produces a fascinating study of how the two modes interact in a 
complex ethnographic setting. His basic assumption is that the foundational schemas of a 
culture will most likely exploit both layers of memory. In other words, they are encoded in 
multiple versions in order to achieve the status of a ‘total cognitive fact’.64 Shore gives an 
enlightening account of double-coding in a very detailed treatment of the Murngin aboriginals 
of Northern Australia, which he bases on a reanalysis of ethnographic materials of Warner 
and Nunn. The material focuses on a set of initiation ceremonies and deals with the 
ceremonies’ relation to a key narrative that underlies them, the creational myth of the 
Wawilak sisters. The Wawilak narrative is never told as a coherent whole to novices, indeed 
nobody except a few elders knows the whole story. Instead, its content is revealed to the 
novices in a piecemeal fashion in conjunction with the principal age-grading rites. Murngin 
                                                                                                                                                        
between embodied states and congealed social text is a millennia-old concern, which lies at the basis 
of many of the so-called Great Traditions. The examples also highlight a significant point about the 
fate of many metaphors in history. The presentational aspect of a religious metaphor, much alive in the 
original double-understanding, tends to become representationalized so that the immediate bodily 
meaning is lost and only semantics remain. 
64 Some terminological confusion may arise concerning a third frequently mentioned memory type 
called episodic memory (cf. Donald 1991). Episodic memory is the memory of specific events and 
rarely lends itself to general cultural models. While detailed episodic memories are the rough material 
that cultural schemas are made of, most meaning is the outcome of selecting patterned features. 
Meaning is not so much a product of unique memories than of similarities across events, which are 
encoded in scripts or scenarios, or similarities of symbols, which are encoded as image schemas. 
When people interpret their episodic memories, the background noise will be suppressed and 
structures selected by virtue of expectational schemas. Hence, episodic memories require the 
transformation either into semantic or into procedural memory. 
 230 
age grading rites encompass four ceremonies that take place at different points in the 
initiation cycle of male youths. For the purpose of presentation, however, it makes sense to 
start with the narrative. 
    As a unifying theme of the foundational schema, the story of the mythical Wawilak sisters 
presents a general schema for the acquisition of knowledge. On their journey through 
Murngin country the sisters perform various acts of separation or externalization. Their 
journey moves them from deep, ‘inside’ country outwards to the shore. In doing so, they 
move from ‘inside’ or ‘deep’ knowledge of creation to ‘outside’ or camp knowledge and lose 
their grasp of the original understandings. The sisters perform separation in acts of naming 
species, languages, countries, and groups. In particular, they create the two exogamous 
moieties. Separation also occurs as the younger sister gives birth, while the elder sister 
recently has given birth. The male form is created, and in consequence the two sisters are 
deprived of self-sufficiency in procreation. (This is symbolized by yet another separation: the 
outflow of menstrual blood from their bodies. Coagulated blood is believed to be life-
producing. Therefore, with menstruation male semen becomes necessary to block the 
outflow, forcing it back up the uterus and causing it to clot.) Externalization is also 
symbolized by the sisters’ expulsion from the belly of the father snake Yurlunggur. These 
acts of externalization remind of the necessity of making distinctions to order the cosmos and 
getting the relation among parts right. 
    Next, a reversal of the acts of separation happens, which is a celebration of the ultimate 
‘inside’ unity of all that had been externalized (p. 222): The named, killed, and cooked food 
species leap out of the fire and then return to their state of origin by jumping into the totemic 
well of the snake Yurlunggur. In the final state they overcome the opposition between life and 
death. The ambiguously male (because uncircumcised) infants, which have just been 
separated from the mothers, are ritually killed and steamed before they a reborn as full males 
to their clan fathers. Likewise, the children are separated from their mothers, only to be 
swallowed by the snake Yurlunggur again. Through all this Yurlunggur becomes the original 
father of the dreamtime state of unity and, at the same time, a maternal uncle of the 
differentiated and moiety-ruled social order. Through his different roles in the narrative 
Yurlunggur is a true polytrope (p. 223), representing on the one hand the distinctions 
between father and brother, father and maternal uncle, female and male, and on the other 
hand the possibility to overcome these distinctions. The same foundational template, which 
expresses this dialectical process, is present in various parts of the narrative: 
 
 “Animals are made separate, only to return to a primal wholeness. Sons are externalized into the 
world from a maternal womb, only to be reincorporated into an avuncular one. The snakes sort out 
their separate Dua [moiety] identities, only to be reincorporated into the head of their father 
Yurlunggur.” (Shore 1996: 227) 
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This recurrent template conveys a deeper general meaning. Genesis in the narrative is, in 
fact, a model of epistemogenesis. At first all things are one, but indistinct and inaccessible to 
humans. Knowledge then unfolds, as species, languages, countries, and kinship groups are 
given their names by the Wawilak sisters. Only thereby the complex relations of rule-
governed social exchange are created, which are characteristic of the real world. At the 
same time the narrative proposes that all analytical knowledge is a kind of death, because 
knowledge of the parts is only possible by sacrificing a direct apprehension of the wholeness 
of things (p. 230). The view proposed here is a kind of transformation within repetition, similar 
to the threefold Hegelian notion of aufheben (canceling out, encompassing, and lifting up at 
the same time). The individual emerges from a dreamtime state (the well of Yurlunggur of the 
narrative) into a differentiated world and will in the course of life return to the source of all 
that is sacred. Yet, this return to dreamtime is different from the condition of never having left 
it. Although the narrative is in one way a creation tale, it suggests that the sisters simply give 
voice to animal and language names that have always been there. Similarly, they do not 
compose the songs they sing, they appropriate them, as if they had always been there for 
the performing (p. 228).  
    As is constitutive of dialectical figures, there are two perspectives presented in the tale, 
one of society and of unchanging rules that govern the world, and one of the individual who 
comes into the world: 
 
“So just as the narrative proposes an outward journey that in the end goes nowhere at the same time 
as it proceeds on its outward track, it also describes a set of primal events that are also nonevents or 
preexisting facts. They are foundational models of reality that have no origin in the external world but 
do have a history in the consciousness of each initiate. These anomalies, which appear in the 
narrative structure of the myth, are thus central to the theory of knowledge that the story is proposing. 
They suggest that this narrative presents a story simultaneously from two perspectives: an ‘outer’ 
perspective of a fixed and timeless set of laws and an ‘inner’ perspective of a young boy’s coming to 
awareness of those laws. The Murngin have, in a most remarkable way, represented in a single 
complex narrative form the two births of culture.” (Shore 1996: 228-229) 
 
Interestingly, Shore argues that the double perspective view of epistemogenesis in the 
Murngin cosmology (inside-out and outside-in) is paradigmatic for his own view of how public 
models are transformed into mental models (p. 250). 
    While the narrative can be presented in the way done here, it is not learned in this way by 
Murngin novices. In practice, the Wawilak narrative is refracted into a series of abstract 
themes in each of the ceremonies, into sub-models with variable meaning. None of the rites 
is a full enactment of the myth itself. The different rites constitute distinct retellings of the 
narrative, framed in different keys. It is only from the old men’s perspective that the myth 
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narrative is reproduced in the ceremonies. In fact, only very few elders know the whole 
narrative, and it is rarely, if ever, told as such. To the novices there is no coherent narrative. 
From their perspective, the myth is gradually produced out of the rites (p. 248). A public 
cultural model is gradually transformed into a mental model of the novices through their 
experience of the rites. Instead, through repetition of the same narrative sequence in 
different versions a sequence of memorable ‘snapshots’ is produced which freeze scenes 
into archetypes, much in the same way as done in Alfred Hitchcock’s technique of freezing 
key scenes to imprint them in the viewer’s memory. There is a gradual extension of the 
multivocal key metaphors, as new layers of signification are brought to the fore in each of the 
ceremonies and as earlier meanings are deepened in a dialectical fashion. 
    Shore’s final analysis of the orchestration of different memory systems deserves detailed 
paraphrasing. Initially, only episodic memory is effective. On the one hand, the narrative is 
(partially) presented to the novices as a repetition of a literal journey undertaken by the two 
sisters, which emphasizes the concrete details of place, action, and personality. On the other 
hand, memorable events performed on the boys at key moments of their lives convey the 
complex model. As the rites proceed in time, two significant transformations occur. First, the 
specific events of the Wawilak narrative become abstracted and generalized into archetypes 
through repetition and ritualization. They become schematized as a foundational pattern with 
strong kinesthetic association, which recurs in different sequences of the rite. In this way, the 
patterns become grounded in the procedural memory as a kind of knowledge that is more 
generalized and less conscious than the episodic memories of particular events. The second 
transformation of episodic memories exploits the semantic memory faculty: The rites also 
result in discrete symbolic units being extracted from the narrative, which can be used as a 
code of general scope. Events, places agents, and objects such as the snake Yurlunggur, 
the well, the sisters, or the acts of naming and killing become language-like symbols. These 
units are multivocal, i.e. they can take on many different meanings, and they are 
recombinable into codes for numerous messages. (Even if they do not approach the flexibility 
and abstractness of natural language, they are comparable.) Shore (1996: 259-260) 
concludes: 
 
“It would seem that the cognitive power of dreamtime learning is tied not simply to the symbolic 
content of the narrative and the rites, but also to the ways in which the myth-ritual complex exploits the 
various types or ‘layers’ of memory. Beginning as events, accessible through episodic memory, the 
foundational schema emerges as a form of knowledge through (1) the construction of psychologically 
primitive motor-schemas, and (2) the simultaneous transformation of events into a self-conscious and 
manipulable code for the creation of complex propositions about the world. Moving into opposite 
directions as a bridge between structure and event, the narrative is translated simultaneously into both 
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procedural and semantic memory. Paraphrasing Marcel Mauss, one might say that the semantic and 
cognitive power of the walkabout schema is linked to its status as ‘total cognitive fact.’” 
 
In a nutshell, Shore’s model of dually-coded learning is this: The purpose of the procedural 
transformation, on the one hand, is the deep grounding of knowledge, which makes it enter 
into the pre-conscious and possibly bears upon habitus. The function of the semantic 
transformation, on the other hand, is to make for multivocality and recombinability of units of 
meaning. 
 
IS THERE PURE PRESENTATION WITH ‘EMPTY SEMANTIC CONCEPTS’? 
Adopting a cognitive terminology also helps settling old debates in anthropology, whose 
embodiment-related nature was sensed, but not properly theorized. Classical cases in point 
concern the Polynesian notion of mana or the Algonkin manitou, which whole generations of 
anthropologists have had considerable difficulty in grappling with. Why is this? The puzzling 
thing is that the central cultural importance of the concepts cannot be doubted, yet they 
appear to be, on the face of it, without clear empirical referents, internal structure, or a single 
clear-cut representation. The representationalist bias of the past has led many anthropologist 
to hypothesize ‘empty concepts’ pure and simple whenever they failed to nail down a clear 
referent. Yet, this is not a far cry from thinking them nonsensical and again raises more 
questions about the nature of meaning than it actually answers.  
    A survey of recent contributions to the debate about mana illustrates this problem: The 
concept of mana, which has for a long time been considered as central to the Polynesian 
worldview, has been variously glossed as ‘power’, ‚potency‘, ‘efficacy’, and ‘luck’. It has been 
linked to gods, chiefs, and, depending on the region, of Polynesia to men as opposed to 
women or as brothers as opposed to sisters. Mana includes physical attributes of large size, 
brightness, and shininess.65 However, how mana is conceptually understood has long 
remained elusive and hotly debated. 
                                                 
65 Many classical positions advocated the view that mana was something like a cosmological 
substance or a metaphysical principle. This tendency was put under critical scrutiny in the 1980s. 
According to Keesing (1984, 1987) and McClancey (1986), mana started out as a stative verb with the 
meaning of ‘being potent’ or ‘being efficacious’ and was used across topics of conversation, both, 
political and apolitical, supernatural and natural, mystical and practical, symbolic and pragmatic. 
McClancey points out that mana was first of all an explanatory concept for events, especially for 
explaining essential unpredictabilities and inequalities between people. From his Vanuatu fieldwork he 
comments that “[w]hen ni-Vanuatu use a mana-notion, something has occurred for which they wish to 
account” (1986: 52). It is therefore used as inferentially concept, similar to the concept of causation. 
This role as explanatory concept alone would invalidate the explanation of an “empty concept” offered 
by Pascal Boyer (1986). This would be just as wrong as saying that ‘luck’ is an empty concept.  
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    Pascal Boyer (1986) argues that exemplary social events provide an understanding of 
what mana and related vague concepts that have been variously discussed by 
anthropologists mean, such as the North American orenda and manitou: Kirmayer (1992: 
338) summarizes Boyer’s position: 
 
“Social interaction (including, for example, responding to emotions in the faces and gestures of others 
at ritual occasions where mana is immanent or manifested) shapes the meaning of mana to give it 
instrumental significance. A variety of discourses – from informal gossip to technical discussions and 
the expression of expert opinion – supply meaning to the ‘empty’ term not through ostension but 
through its use.”  
 
As Kirmayer notes, this is very close to Wittgenstein’s position on meaning subsumed under 
the notion of ‘language game’. To Wittgenstein learning the meaning of a word is learning the 
proper occasion and techniques for its use. Boyer suggests that what mana is, is learned 
through the participation in a succession of situations where mana is known to be present. 
One has to be influenced by mana to know what it is – the experience of (being subjected to) 
potency. Kirmayer proposes to couch the argument in terms of presentational knowledge, 
thereby extending Boyer’s account that uses social pragmatics as explanatory frame without 
thinking about the kind of experience involved: 
 
“To Boyer’s social account we might add that if the preeminent feature of mana terms is their 
evocations of potency or efficacy then their meaning may reside in affective processes like those that 
                                                                                                                                                        
    Furthermore, McClancey criticizes the error to infer a substance from a substantive. In a similar 
spirit, Keesing (1987: 104) cautions against attributing ‘entitivity’ too readily, because the sense of 
relations and processes is lost. Therefore, the best translation of the concept tapu, which is 
canonically a stative verb and has been subject to a similar debate, would be ‘off-limits’, since this 
implies an agent, a particular perspective, and a context. In other words, its meaning is defined by 
being embedded in a social situation, not by abstracting away from it. Both authors validate their 
critique by a survey of the literature: For Tikopia, Raymond Firth states that there is no connotation of 
an isolatable principle, a power, or a metaphysical abstraction. Likewise Douglas Oliver, an 
ethnographer of the Society Islanders, notes that there is no evidence for a generalized, all-
embracing, energetic and animalistic view of the universe. Although most anthropologists have greatly 
overemphasized the substantive forms at expense of verbal forms nominal uses of the term do exist: 
Particularly in eastern Polynesia, mana was substantivized to designate an invisible medium of power 
that could be possessed by people. This coincided with the emergence of an aristocratic class in 
Polynesia and some parts of Micronesia and with the emergence of theologians in the chief’s 
entourage who elaborated the cosmological implications of mana as metaphoric ‘power’. In Melanesia, 
where the concept originally emerged, it was seldom a validation of chiefly rank, but more probably 
designated a secret cultist knowledge that was a source of power. 
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give rise to E-P-A on the semantic differential (Osgood, May, and Miron 1975). Specifically, mana is 
potency in E-P-A – pure affective meaning that does not require further cognizing as propositional 
network or imagistic representation to be used to think with. The point remains that meaning can be 
presented in the word mana without any representation of the concept.” (p. 343, footnote 7) 
 
Mana draws together disparate events such as death, disaster, and success into one 
explanatory frame, so that they become comparable on a certain affective level. In 
Kirmayer’s view, concepts such as mana are not empty concepts but presentational and 
determined by a particular affective signature. The referent of the term is, then, a body state 
or an emotion, rather than a thing. Such ‘empty linguistic concepts’ can be designated as 
metaphors because they put an affective reality into language. Although Kirmayer can be 
applauded for this insight, he remains vague about the term presentational in various 
respects. What is missing here is that the affective dimension is also embodied and socially 
learned through motor schemas. 
    Bradd Shore (1989, 1991), a leading cognitive anthropologist and ethnographer of Samoa, 
offers an illuminating cognitive reanalysis of the matter. He proposes to synthesize mana into 
a cultural schema with the associated notions of tapu and noa and does not so much focus 
on the internal feeling associated with mana than on the motor practices that shape it. The 
feelings in question are not simply internal phenomena that somehow arise in individuals 
who are exposed to potency. They are part of a cultural schema and specifically linked to a 
style of movement. Let us see what Shore’s intention is when he proposes to understand 
mana in relation to the concepts tapu and noa. Tapu has been variously glossed as ‘sacred’, 
‘dangerous’, ‘set aside’, ‘marked’ or ‘bound’. Noa is the opposite to tapu and has been 
translated as ’secular’, ‘profane’, ‘nothing’, ‘unmarked’, ‘free’, and ‘unbound’. Mana and 
tapu/noa are “culturally orchestrated experiential schemata involving simultaneously the most 
intimate organizations of bodily experience and the most abstract political and religious 
principles” (1991: 17). In this triangle of notions tapu and noa are alternative conditions with 
relation to mana understood as generative potency. Mana is linked to a set of distinctions on 
the level of bodily schemas that go with either tapu or noa: Specifically, the tapu/noa 
opposition involves distinctions between inside/outside, stasis/movement, as well as 
muscular control/muscular relaxation. This encompassing schema is manifested in the form 
of seating postures, dance styles, and important ritual activities, which share certain 
embodied aspects among them: 
 
“The imposition of tapu on people or objects involves experiences of binding, containment, 
immobilizing, and centering in the interest of rendering these people or objects intelligible and 
redirecting personal potency for general cosmic ends. Because this schema physically embodies 
central cultural conceptions, it is related to a family of sensory concepts.” (ibid.) 
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Shore proposes that power concepts are grounded in experience through such conventional 
micro-practices as posture, movement styles, and even the orchestration of smells. Tapu and 
noa are embodied in early experience. They are constructed in practice long before they are 
articulated as abstract concepts. For example, children after a certain age are encouraged to 
sit in what is called the fâtai position, with legs crossed and arms resting on their thighs. Fâtai 
is only one of several postures that embody motor control, the containment of limbs, and 
withholding impulsive movement. The same opposition between formal containment and the 
intimate expression of motion informs a wide range of aesthetic and political practices, 
ranging from dance styles, postural attributes of different kinds of chiefs, and gender styles. 
Hence, all embodied motor schemas of this family are grounded and contextualized in 
certain social situations and practices. Furthermore, the schematic distinction between 
motion and rest triggers a series of more abstract associations: For one thing, this is 
reflected in linguistic conventions, such as when the village is equated with a sitting maiden 
in ceremonial poise. In addition, it is also articulated in highly abstract and sophisticated 
theories of powers expressed by intellectuals.  
    By consequence, the cultural schema is dually grounded in a set of abstract concepts and 
of embodied experiences at once. When tapu and noa are constructed in childhood through 
embodied practices, the subjective experiences are always partly idiosyncratic. On the other 
hand, these experiences have objectified counterparts in conventionalized public 
representations. Crucially, bodily imagery is metaphorically mapped onto social institutions. 
An example is the Samoan center-periphery dimension. Being in the center of a house or 
village is associated with social importance and with the experience of embodied 
centeredness. For example a high chief’s dance and sitting styles are characterized by 
careful centering and graceful containment of limbs as observable features. Sensory features 
associated with high rank, such as shiny and light skin, size, or spatial centrality, also come 
into play. Furthermore, high rank is equated with an appropriate physical response on the 
part of a person who encounters a chief of great mana. In his presence one must stand with 
muscular control, containment, and without impulsive movement. Both the perceptual 
features of high-ranking chiefs and the customary embodied attitudes to be in their presence 
form part of a general cultural schema. Thus, social perception and body proprioception are 
integrated into one cultural schema through which they are partly associated. There is a 
schema of containment and centering that is embodied and conceptual at the same time. 
Testifying to my above comments on how the projection of embodied imagery and the 
retrojection of conceptual imagery interact, the dialectic between social and individual 
embodiment in Samoa goes both ways: 
 
“The relation between conventionally and empirically motivated meanings deriving from internal 
meaning-constructing processes is complex and dialectical. Thus, for example, the embodiment of 
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concepts works in both directions. Not only do conventional cultural symbols derive some of their 
psychological force through physiognomic apprehension, but conventional symbols often appropriate 
bodily experience, projecting it as body symbolism in social representations.” (Shore 1991: 21-22) 
 
In summary, mana illustrates a complex interaction of several cognitive mechanisms:  
(1) A part of what mana means is learned in situations where mana is present through 
the sensory image and behavior of chiefs, including perceived motor schemas of high 
chiefs sitting centered and gracefully containing their movements. A part of mana is 
thus an objectified external schema or, from the chief’s position, objectified body 
imagery of his own body. 
(2) The meaning of mana is also associated with subjective motor schemas. A part of 
its meaning lies in the proprioceptive body awareness that goes with the fâtai sitting 
position or related postures appropriate to official settings. Kirmayer’s (1992) 
suggestion that mana draws together a specific affective signature is quite compatible 
with this. A second part of mana is thus a proprioceptive and pre-objectified schema. 
(3) Finally, the action of sitting in a contained and immobile way, both as observed in 
others and as subjectively experienced, is projected onto public conceptual 
representations, e.g. the village as sitting maiden or the village plaza as a center. In 
this way the concept is further integrated.66 
 
4. Image schemas, metaphors, and embodied culture 
I now want to narrow our focus again in order to make the relevance of the previous 
observations for metaphor theory more tangible. The question whether image schemas are 
universals was dealt with in chapter 3. Now I will develop further considerations relating to 
the nexus between complex schemas, emotion, and motivation. I will close with an 
interesting new framework and findings of metaphor research by Kövecses (2000) about the 
relation of physiology universals to cultural variation. 
 
THE DOUBLE NATURE OF IMAGE SCHEMAS  
As scientists interested in generalizing models we often picture image schemas without an 
actor and the situation in which the actors uses it. This notwithstanding, a cultural 
perspective requires us to take the fact seriously that image schemas are invariably 
embedded in contexts that give them a significance beyond their generic meaning. This 
                                                 
66 The one aspect left unexplained here is that, according to many accounts, mana draws together 
disparate events such as death, disaster, and success into one explanatory frame, which suggests 
some causal schema. Here again, perhaps a major goal is that the causes become comparable on an 
affective level. 
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means emphasizing discourse-pragmatic ‘performance’ at the expense of more abstract 
‘competence’. There is an inherent double-nature to image schemas: They are 
transcontextual mental entities, yet they are also contextual entities. I agree with Andrew 
Strathern (1996: 188-189) that a detailed phenomenological analysis of embodied metaphor 
can go hand in hand with and a comparative recognition of generic image schemas:  
 
“Demonic possession, for example, begins with an inchoate (pre-objective) feeling of loss of control 
over the body and its intentional movements (its sensorimotor coherence). This is objectified by a 
healer in terms of what Johnson calls the ‘container schema’ and is diagnosed as an intrusion across 
a boundary, to be corrected by a suitable form of embodied action in response. What emerges, then, 
is both something quite particular and also something comparable to other contexts in which the 
container schema is similarly activated [my italics]. We are not dealing here only with semantics either, 
since we are looking at ritual actions undertaken as a therapy to alter a person’s consciousness and 
therefore social relationships that flow from this consciousness.“ 
 
On the one hand, the cultural pragmatics of metaphor are captured in the ethnographic 
analysis of how the healing metaphor is enacted. On the other hand, it remains a suggestive 
and significant finding that the CONTAINER ontology appears across contexts. 
    This double-nature of image schemas bears upon their relation to emotion in an interesting 
way. That cognition and emotion can neither be separated from each other, nor from 
perception and action, has been repeatedly observed (Bruner 1986, D’Andrade 1981) and 
most impressively buttressed by recent experimental findings in cognitive science (Damasio 
1994). Gary Palmer (1996: 107) ventures the noteworthy claim that “[a]ll concepts are 
imbued, to varying degrees, with emotional values that constitute part of their imagery.” A 
somewhat similar view is supported by Osgood (1964) who maintains that there is a 
universal evaluative dimension in cognition. Mark Rollins (1989: 57f), in his turn, argues that 
emotions have a physiological-cognitive character. The problem we seem to encounter here 
is partly terminological. When we define emotions in terms of subjectively felt qualities, it may 
seem somewhat difficult to imagine how they can be part of imagery.67 However, as soon as 
we recast the problem by defining emotions as the subjective counterparts to particular 
cultural image schemas and introduce the concept of embodiment as a mediator we can 
come to grips with this terminological conundrum.  
    I have suggested in chapter 3 that the term image schema has two legitimate senses: as a 
basal schema and as a high-level Gestalt unique to a cultural setting. I now want to 
substantiate the claim that this split relates to different meanings of the term ‘embodiment’. In 
                                                 
67 Although this is a catchall definition of imagery, we can profit from it as long as we take care to 
differentiate the internal structure and format of the different imagery types that result. 
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one sense ‘embodiment’ can serve to explain the developmental origins of basal image 
schemas. Here, the basic set of building blocks of cognition is identified with simple 
kinesthetic experiences that shape them, i.e. the FORCE, CONTAINER, and BALANCE schemas. 
However, in another sense the term embodiment may legitimately refer to highly complex 
cultural schemas. Shore’s (1991) Samoan above example of a complex culturally transmitted 
motor schema is typical. Recall that the elements of posture, graceful movement, rest, and 
boundary maintenance all contribute to the very same associative network that includes the 
emotional significance of tapu and mana (which prominently share the image schema of 
bounding). I maintain that a multi-dimensional image of social and bodily experience is 
inseparably linked up with the emotional profile of the concepts. The culturally idiosyncratic 
compound of mana schema, drawing together the more basic CONTAINMENT, REST, CLOSURE, 
CENTEREDNESS, and BALANCE schemas, evokes an emotional image or is co-defined by its 
‘feeling signature’.  
    From the contrast between basal image schemas (understood as generic building blocks) 
and complex image schema compounds (understood as situated social knowledge) a highly 
consequential hypothesis follows: The more culturally embedded, the more complex, and the 
more specific a schema is, the more emotional imagery will emerge from it or resonate 
through it. In other words, emotional imagery is a characteristic and even defining element of 
the Gestalt. Mark Johnson’s (1987) basal image schemas, on the other hand, are probably 
too general to be heavily infused with a very specific emotional image. Complex and 
emotionalized imagery is tied to the equally complex social settings in which the schemas 
are acquired. Support for this can be found in Palmer’s (1996: 109) definition of emotions as 
“complex configurations of goal-driven imagery that govern feeling states and scenarios, 
including discourse scenarios.” In other words, a view of emotions as pertaining to pragmatic 
and situated social action identifies them with specific mental scenarios of which they form 
part (cf. p. 123). Furthermore, Palmer relates the view that emotions are organized in 
pragmatic and associative networks of meaning to a proposal made by Catherine Lutz in her 
study of the emotional life on Ifaluk (1988). Lutz gives a cultural-pragmatic definition of what 
it means to understand the meaning of an emotion concept, which is again reminiscent of 
Wittgenstein’s definition of word meaning. 
 
“to understand the meaning of an emotion word is to be able to envisage (and perhaps to find oneself 
able to participate in) a complicated scene with actors, actions, interpersonal relationships in a 
particular state of repair, moral points of view, facial expressions, personal and social goals, and 
sequences of events.” (p. 10) (cited in Palmer p. 108)  
 
We can characterize emotions as being directly a part of a schema in use. With a view to the 
felt aspects of the emotion Lutz is correct, while Kövecses’ findings on the generic aspects of 
 240 
the imagery in emotion concepts seem less relevant for this issue. Thus, emotions should not 
only be defined as subjective complements to mental images. We need to take into account 
that they are part of a social purpose or an individual intention, or both, that they have a 
motivational character and are of profoundly cultural nature. Far from being peripheral to it, 
emotions may actually form the central ground for situated cognition. Emotions constitute 
perhaps the closest interface of the actor and her world. This lived sense of emotional 
engagement is also reflected in Michelle Rosaldo’s (1984: 143) memorable words:  
 
“Emotions are thoughts somehow felt in ‘flushes’, pulses, ‘movements’ of our livers, minds, hearts, 
stomachs, skins. They are embodied thoughts, thoughts seeped with the apprehension that ‘I am 
involved’ (...) Emotions are about the ways in which the social world is one in which we are involved.” 
 
Kirmayer (1992: 330) perspicuously elaborates that emotions are about practical cognition in 
the sense of determining the most pressing needs in a given situation. While not being about 
the logical course of action itself to be taken in the situation, emotions are an inextricable part 
of human rationality that intertwines thought, motivation, and action. Impressive support for 
the nexus between emotion and cognition comes from recent studies on selective 
impairment in neuroscience. Damasio (1994) demonstrates that people who have lost the 
capability to be emotionally engaged in their lives also lose the ability to reason about social 
and moral issues and the ability to act. 
    In sum, I just reverted to my earlier argument that we need to attend to, both, 
transcontextual basal image schemas and complex image-schematic configurations. As a 
corollary, I proposed that felt emotion occurs as co-signatures of the latter, while the former 
are too abstract to connect with a specific emotional image. Thus, a framework that captures 
emotion as imagery should rely on discourse-pragmatic contextual analysis of complex 
schemata, possibly including methods of subjective empathy. 
 
BODY PHYSIOLOGY, CONSTRAINED CONCEPTS, AND CULTURAL CONTEXT 
It should be obvious by now that embodiment theory does not support a strongly universalist 
outlook. At the same time, it is just as obvious that people in different cultures do not 
experience their bodies in completely incommensurable ways, a fact that in turn motivates 
intercultural similarities of metaphors. I agree with Kirmayer (1993: 186) who stresses the 
need for a theory of a middle ground: 
 
“The recognition that metaphoric constructions are grounded in archetypal patterns allows us to 
preserve a measure of universality in our theories. But body-felt feelings, however simple their origin, 
are shaped by cultural and social factors from their inception.” 
 
 241 
It was said before that the universalist assumptions of biomedicine must be rejected in 
embodiment theory. It is true that the typical, physiology-centered methods are inadequate 
on their own. However, the measurement of physiological reactions can usefully complement 
the comparative study of embodiment. Studies on universal physiology should not be 
dismissed if done properly, as long as we acknowledge that they do not directly entail 
conceptual universals.  
    To clarify the issue I strongly advocate adopting Kövecses’ (2000) analytical separation of 
(1) objective physiology, (2) conceptualized physiology, and (3) metaphors. His comparative 
study of anger furnishes a fine example: 
(1) As concerns objective physiology, Kövecses cites the study of emotions by 
Levenson et al. (1992) who measured their physiological counterparts in the 
autonomic nervous system among Americans and the Minangkabau of Sumatra. It 
turned out that, at least between these two groups, anger produces measurable 
reactions of a similar kind, such as changes in the skin temperature, blood pressure, 
pulse rate, or respiration. Relevant parallels in objective physiology do, therefore, 
occur. 
(2) There are also interesting parallels in physiology as it is conceptualized across 
languages. Some basic metonymies for anger are a good indicator for conceptualized 
physiology, because they describe salient perceived aspects of the physiological 
phenomena. Kövecses’ (2000: 156ff) data from English, Chinese, Japanese, and 
Hungarian reveals that metonymical expressions relating to anger include body heat, 
internal pressure, and redness in the face and neck area in all of the four languages.  
(3) Finally, in the domain of anger there are, again, very similar metaphorical 
expressions of anger, which point to a conceptualization of an angry person as 
PRESSURIZED CONTAINER. The aspect of heat is not present in the Chinese example, 
though in the three others it augments the image and creates ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN 
A CONTAINER. The metaphors, unlike the metonymies which originate from externally 
observable features, represent salient aspects of the subjectively experienced nature 
of anger and capture it in a complex structural metaphor that highlights diverse 
features. 
 
In evaluating the evidence Kövecses (2000: 159-160) draws cautious and very sensible 
conclusions on how bodily universals might shape metaphors:  
 
“These findings give reason to believe that the actual physiology might be universal. The universality 
of actual physiology might be seen as leading to the similarities (though not equivalence) in 
conceptualized physiology (i.e., the conceptual metonymies), which might then lead to the similarity 
(though again not equivalence) in the metaphorical conceptualization of anger and its counterparts 
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(i.e., the CONTAINER metaphor) (...) It is not suggested, however, that embodiment actually produces 
the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor but that it makes a large number of other possible metaphorical 
conceptualizations either incompatible or unnatural. It would be odd to conceptualize anger as, say, 
softly falling snow, an image completely incompatible with what our bodies are like and what our 
physiology does in anger.” 
 
According to this view, physiological responses do not automatically produce metaphors, 
although they constrain them. It could be seen from the Chinese example that body heat is 
not elaborated everywhere as a salient aspect of anger. (Similarly, the native American 
language Chickasaw has the expression “I am hot” which can mean “I am angry”, but it does 
not have a rich elaboration of heat in relation to anger.) At the same time, the physiological 
responses of internal pressure and heat make the pressurized container model quite likely 
and natural. 
    Without reference to the broader cultural context Kövecses’ notion of constraint is not very 
high in its explanatory power, though. Other cultures recruit their anger metaphors from 
completely different ontological categories, in which objectivized body feelings are not a part. 
Kövecses cites Catherine Lutz’s (1988) famous study of the prevalent folk model of anger on 
Ifaluk. This folk model does not only highlight other concepts than the physiology related 
CONTAINER image, but actually downplays it. The Ifaluk concept of song strongly emphasizes 
that anger does not have the person or the body as its ontological locus. Instead, it is 
something happing in the public field, with moral and social implications. This makes it most 
evident that the choice of metaphors even for domains so strongly motivated by physiology 
as anger is just as much shaped by the cultural context and ideology it is embedded into.  
    In sum, Kövecses proposes an integrative and culturally responsible model of metaphor 
analysis, which should be widely adopted. It includes several elements: 
 
“(possibly universal) actual human physiology, conceptualized physiology (metonymy), metaphor, 
cultural model (with its schematic base structure) and the broader cultural context (...) [T]he cultural 
models of anger and its counterparts are the joint products of metaphor, metonymy, (possibly 
universal) actual physiology, and cultural context.” (p. 162) 
 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented unfamiliar ways of talking about embodiment to cognitive 
scientists. I have shown that concepts from medical anthropology can be introduced into 
cognitive theory and partly rephrased for it. (What was left unmentioned here is that other 
disciplines, such as cognitive psychology, too, may have a lot to say about embodiment.) A 
series of relevant issues for a cultural theory of metaphor, imagery, and embodiment were 
broached. My overall claim was that, with regard to a number of linguistic limitations, the 
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embodiment debate in anthropology improves our understanding of preconceptual cognition 
and broadens the scope of research in pertinent ways:  
    First, the terms ‘preconceptual’ and ‘presentational knowledge’ were fleshed out and a 
series of phenomenological approaches presented. Most generally, I criticized the 
misconception that grounding in embodiment is only a process in infant knowledge 
acquisition, while adult cognition is mainly conceptual. Various strands of research from the 
last thirty years show that the embodiment complex can be studied, either for understanding 
the source of cultural symbols (Douglas), the source of power relations (Foucault), or the 
source of lived bodily experience in culture (Csordas), while these perspectives also hang 
together. 
    Second, with regard to the general philosophical background of embodiment, I discussed 
the anti-Cartesian epistemology of the ‘presentational’ paradigm, with the purpose of 
extending the notion of cognition beyond conceptual representations. I argued that the 
subject-object format of cognition is only one among several. Also, phenomenological 
concepts are bound up with a subjectivized methodology. Subjective techniques are needed 
to complement analytical ones, a position that is not only defended by postmodernist and 
‘experience-near’ anthropology, but also emphasized by the cognitive anthropologist 
Lindquist (1995). From my point of view, the micro-analysis of cognitive linguistics and a 
more holistic emphasis on participant experiencing should go hand in hand. 
    Third, it was strongly emphasized that the body is inherently cultural in two respects – as 
inchoately felt body awareness and through objectified body concepts. Both aspects together 
enable the body to store cultural styles of behavior as habitus, i.e. as procedural schemas. 
Fascinatingly, the body can become an autonomous expressive agent of cultural knowledge, 
as indicated by the Pentecostal healing study by Csordas (1990, 1993) and the work on 
Brazilian rural laborers by Scheper-Hughes (1990). The issue of universals was briefly 
touched on to the effect that physiologically uniform body may exist in a basic sense, but 
when it comes to the subjective interpretation of physiology extreme variation is the rule, 
most visibly in culture-bound syndromes like hysteria, el calor, amok, or soul loss. 
    Fourth, various kinds of conceptual schemas and their relation to preconceptual schemas 
were analyzed. As a general framework, a tripartite distinction was suggested between (1) 
non-objectified body imagery/proprioceptive body awareness, (2) objectified body imagery, 
and (3) objectified imagery of external entities. However, as the studies by Benjamin Colby 
(1991) on the tea ceremony and Bradd Shore (1989, 1990) on mana indicate, these 
analytically distinct cognitive types work in parallel in the typical ethnographic setting. Shore 
shows how one fundamental, if complex, image schema connected between all three above-
mentioned levels of imagery, whereas Colby shows how the substance of tea can become 
the hub for merging conceptual symbols of nature and an embodied awareness of nature. It 
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was concluded that enacted metaphors characteristic of important ritual settings are crafted 
to strike all these chords in unison. Furthermore, as a specific theoretical tool for 
understanding the various cognitive transformations I suggested the complementary 
principles of projection and retrojection: When a piece of knowledge is first acquired through 
body practice, it can later be projected into a conceptual image and thereby become 
objectified. When knowledge about a culturally appropriate way of bodily conduct is first 
acquired in discourse, i.e. as an objectified body image, it can later be retrojected into the 
body to produce proprioceptive awareness. In a practical perspective, the projective 
objectification of body states is often used therapeutically by experts. In Csordas’ case study, 
masturbation was – by making it an evil spirit that has invaded the body – objectified and 
cast outside the lived body, whereby the individual conscience was eased. 
    Fifth, I argued that a cognitive and cultural perspective on embodiment greatly adds to our 
theory of knowledge acquisition. Specifically, the different memory systems used to create 
complex cultural maps were discussed. Semantic (objectified) and procedural (embodied) 
knowledge are often combined to achieve a maximum effect. The Aboriginal walkabout 
example by Shore (1996) demonstrated how repeated enaction makes for the deep 
grounding in body knowledge of the knowledge structures most cherished by a group. In 
addition, his Samoan mana example clarified that cultural metaphors can be formed on the 
level of embodied knowledge in children a long time before they become subject to 
discourse. Culturally potent metaphors may be acquired through repeated enaction. The 
upshot is that both the theoretical concept of preconceptual knowledge and the study of 
procedural schemas are indispensable to a cultural theory of learning.  
    Sixth, embodied image schemas were depicted as complex and contextual. Treating 
image schemas as basal constituents (i.e. building-blocks) of embodiment instead of dense 
in actu compounds permits only a very partial picture. While having criticized before that this 
approach creates a filter for universal aspects and neglects variation, here I took issue with 
the deficiency that lived emotion is often missing in the building-block view. Based on Gary 
Palmer (1996), I argued that complex image schemas, which are usually tied to a specific 
context, include emotion imagery. Thus, complex imagery makes children learn concepts 
together with the emotions appropriate to the context. To the extent that we devote our 
attention to situation-bound image-schematic Gestalts, together with the pragmatics of 
discourse and procedural schemas used in body techniques, emotion will come back into 
view. 
    Finally, the points developed here lead to a further clarification of the vexed issue of 
cultural variation in metaphor and cognition. In chapter 3, I already pointed out that the issue 
of universals in metaphor is vantage dependent: Our perspective yields universal aspects to 
the extent that we seek analytical abstractions and have a broad and general stock of 
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metaphoric building-blocks in mind. Universals also enter into view when speaking of general 
‘cultural competence’, i.e. transsituative knowledge skeletons in which the lived body and the 
emotions are less implicated. Yet, the more we focus on the experiential and performative 
level of a metaphor, which is linked up with a specific context, with embodiment, with 
emotion, and with intentional behavior, the fewer overlaps are found between cultures or 
individuals. A closer look at the embodied dimension reveals that seemingly universal 
metaphors allow for a significant degree of variation, depending on (1) whether the 
conceptual part of the metaphor is retrojected into the body or not and, if so, which kind of 
proprioceptive awareness it produces there, (2) which emotions and contextual memories the 
metaphor is loaded with, and (3) which kinds of behaviors are enacted on its basis. 
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Chapter 5:                                                                                                
Thought Styles and Imagery 
 
The following chapter is about high-level templates in cultural thought. My aim is two-fold. 
First of all, I want to espouse a stronger focus on a scantily treated level of inquiry in the 
study of worldviews: I submit that empirical research can eventually lead to the exploration of 
cultural ‘thought styles’ at large, which can be defined as cultural preferences for general 
mental tools from the universal human endowment and the tendency to demote others. 
Based on this definition I would then like to explore to what extent there is a relation between 
‘thought styles’ and the way mental imagery is employed. 
    The following inquiry is often tentative but produces highly pertinent research questions 
and guidelines for cognitive scientists interested in cultural comparison. I will begin with a 
definition of what I call a ‘thought style’ or ‘cognitive template’. Then I will survey some 
influential theories of the past that explain historical worldviews in terms of these. Finally, I 
will single out five basal cognitive dimensions that relate to how embodied and imagistic 
thought is used, albeit without laying claim to a comprehensive list. 
 
1. Worldviews favor specific cognitive tools 
Cognitive approaches to culture often restrict their attention to the description of particular 
cultural representations. To be sure, this lies in the interest of methodological rigor, since 
fleshing out the matter and substance of a given culture’s thoughtscape is only possible 
through a ‘bottom-up’ approach. At the same time, I believe that work in cognitive 
anthropology and linguistics can legitimately address a more generalizing level. The 
interesting question in this respect is whether particular implements of the universal human 
mind-kit are given precedence or, conversely, downplayed by a particular cultural group. 
Such a course of inquiry is not wholly new, and I adopt Mary Douglas’ (1970, 1996) popular 
term of ‘thought style’ on purpose here. However, I lend a particular twist to this endeavor 
here. While showing at which elementary level questions about cultural ontologies should be 
posed, my major aim is to explore how thought styles influence how people make use of 
imagery, rather than which specific images they use. 
    What is a ‘thought style’ or a ‘cognitive template’? I hesitate to equate a template with 
terms such as ‘foundational schema’, ‘key concept,’ or ‘cultural theme’. While all of these 
previously posited cognitive structures permeate various social contexts, there is a level on 
top of these which is more general and still less content related. I choose the name ‘template’ 
for this supra-level. To see why this line of inquiry makes sense let me briefly distinguish 
three levels of studying of cultural patterns of cognition: At a fairly specific level we can seek 
to describe well-formulated folk- and expert-theories of the cosmos, the self, ontology, 
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epistemology, and social norms. This is done by cognitive linguist, cross-cultural and social 
psychologists, and comparative philosophers. At an intermediary level, we can turn to either 
characteristic types of formative experience, such as are studied by ethnopsychology, or to 
key concepts that flexibly structure cultural knowledge across many contexts, such as are 
studied by some cognitive linguists and cognitive anthropologists. At the highest level 
anthropologists and philosophers have striven to isolate culturally dominant cognitive styles. 
Thought styles encompass many sorts of preferred perceptual and conceptual strategies of a 
general nature: They include styles of reasoning and framing knowledge (Shweder 1994), 
ways of memorizing (Whitehouse1995, Bloch 1998), preferences for a specific sensory 
modality (Wober 1966, 1976), learning and teaching stratagems (Goody 1977), dominant 
mediating devices (Wertsch 1991), or even strategies of task sharing (Hutchins 1995). For 
example, sensory experience may be highly valued or alternatively deflated; visual 
information may be preferred to auditive information, externalized written memory may be 
preferred to internal memory, learning by rote to individualized understanding, sensory 
austerity to change and sensory multiplicity, etc.  
    Thus emerges my basic hypothesis: Worldviews are shaped to an interesting extent by 
culturally variable dispositions for tapping into some capacities of the basic human cognitive 
endowment more regularly than others. In other words, thought styles bias people toward 
selectively using tools from the universal mental toolkit. At the same time other tools are 
avoided, marginalized, denigrated as techniques of knowing, or reduced to low ontological 
status. Therefore, on the view I propose here cognitive variation cannot be reduced to a 
simple matter of some people believing this while others believe that. There is more to 
variation than divergent mental belief-content. In short, the analysis of representations and 
beliefs proper needs to be supplemented by the analysis of operational tools. After these 
prefatory notes let us turn to a survey and a discussion of some of the literature on the 
subject, which shows how risky arguments of the proposed sort are.  
 
2. A selective survey of the ‘thought styles’ literature 
With the advent of cognitive anthropology and linguistics we have seen a welcome 
orientation towards rigorous micro-analysis of folk- and expert-theories/models. In earlier 
anthropology, philosophy, and history an overly generalizing style of seeing cultures as being 
characterized by dominant thought styles has a long pedigree, with many approaches 
deserving skeptical scrutiny from a present day perspective. Most non-cognitive approaches 
not only lack empirical rigor, but can be rebuked for too overarching claims or typological 
simplification. In taking a middle position I will argue that ‘thought styles’ are productive 
working hypotheses that should not be thrown overboard without urgency. At the same time 
the present lack of adequate empirical data about cognition across domains in any culture 
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suggests caution. Both, recognition of the universal human endowment and sensitivity for 
historical and situational context is called for. 
    Most of all, we should be wary of the exoticizing dichotomies between the ‘West’ and the 
‘rest’ that often come in the wake of the notion of thought styles. Lévy-Bruhl’s now seasoned 
claim about ‘how natives think’ in terms of mystical participation rather than contradiction, 
which he takes to be characteristic of civilized societies, is a case in point. However, above 
all it is studies of inference patterns originating from the two recent decades that resulted in 
problematic conclusions, in spite of a more conscientious outlook. A host of approaches 
pioneered by Cole and Scribner (1974) employ problem solving tasks from experimental 
psychology with a strong bias toward Western thought in their design and phrasing. Even 
more problematic to the point of blatant ethnocentricity are Hallpike’s (1979) contentions. Put 
in a nutshell, Halllpike applies Piagetian notions to argue that ‘primitives’ think ‘pre-
operationally’, but in doing so he builds on unreflected value judgments, violates several 
principles of the ethnographic method, and employs the highly loaded analogy between 
children’s thought and the thought of ‘primitives’ (cf. Hamill 1990: 31). Recent research 
indicates that all cultures use a common logical base, but it is not simply co-terminous with 
abstract textbook logic. It is neither neutral, dispassionate, or decontextualized nor 
necessarily a superior means of problem solving. Moreover, this common base is used to 
ends that are always embedded in cultural styles of pragmatic social factors and a 
characteristic perception of tasks, i.e. what is relevant about a situation (Hutchins 1980, 
Hamill 1990, Shweder 1991).  
    Also, recent studies of Western everyday reasoning reveal that the identification of logical 
rigor with European culture is to a large extent wishful thinking and self-idealization. With a 
deconstructive thrust, Jean Lave (1988) shows that not even Western school mathematics is 
ordinarily used for paying in supermarket situations. Folk-models operative in everyday tasks 
seldom confirm to the standards of textbook logic. Other studies argue with some conviction 
that ‘primitive magic’ is not a trait of the ‘primitives’, but alive and kicking in Western society 
(Tambiah 1990). A good example is the experimental study on the irrationality of contagion 
fears, tested for example with dead and disinfected locusts by Rozin and Comaroff (1990: 
212ff). Much evidence suggests that the belief in essences and the belief that they are 
incorporated into the body and the self in physical terms is a cultural universal. (The 
hysterical reaction to AIDS is a case in point.) 
    If that debate teaches us anything it is that, at first blush, all cultures profess patterns of 
‘primitive cognition’, yet if contextualized and understood relative to real-life exigencies all 
make sophisticated and economic use of what the universal human mind-kit affords, 
especially if measured against the yardstick of adaptation to the cultural and natural 
environment. Although we may surmise that, say, essentialist thought is to a degree 
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universal, this does not permit predictions. As so often, we have to take the middle road 
between complete arbitrariness and complete predictability and look for experientially 
motivated uses of the mind’s universal endowments. 
    There is no kind of evidence I know of to indicate that cultural thought styles differ so 
radically that some basic cognitive operations are on principle available in some cultures and 
unavailable in others. What cultural styles do is to accord preference to certain life domains 
and their cognitive techniques, while other domains are deemphasized. When the non-
preferential operations occur, as they will at least occasionally, they are accorded inferior 
ontological status. 
 
THOUGHT STYLES AND ROOT METAPHORS 
Many of the early attempts to isolate thought styles focus on philosophical systems, rather 
than everyday cognition. First in a row of several historians of philosophy, we find an early 
work of Karl Jaspers (1919). Jaspers performs a contrastive analysis of worldviews in the 
history of Western philosophy, which introduces as leitmotif the distinction between sensory 
immediacy and a level that many would call ideology. In his terms the major watershed runs 
between more ‘enthuasiast’ (i.e. experientialist) and more ‘cognitivist’ worldviews. By this he 
expresses the observation that some thinkers try to order the world into a general formal 
system while others take momentary realities for what they are in themselves without setting 
them against a heavily structured theoretical backdrop. A similar view, which is now however 
extended into the realm of the social at large, emerges Pitirim Sorokin’s diachronic socio-
historic comparison of Western cultures in Social and Cultural Dynamics (19852). Sorokin’s 
extensive study tries to operationalize different attributes of cultural epochs, such as legal 
and political system, art, morality, religion, frequency of war and social unrest, so as to place 
them on a continuum stretching between a ‘sensate’ and an ‘ideational’ pole of cultural 
orientation. Again, either the world of the soul and the mind is given prominence or the 
material world of the senses. In the field of cultural anthropology, Ruth Benedict’s (1946) 
distinction of ‘Appolinian’ and ‘Dionysian’ cultures, again points in a similar direction, which 
now revolves around the integrative notion of cultural ethos. In another classic of 
comparative culture theory, Mary Douglas contrasts ‘thought styles’ (1970), although the 
analytical apparatus she develops centers on the two scalar dimensions of group cohesion 
and self-autonomy, both with relation to cosmology, yielding her famous ‘group’ and ’grid’ 
dimensions and an overall matrix of four ideal-types of culture. 
     Other approaches focus less on broad distinctions on a bi-polar scale than on complex 
thought patterns that transcend any such model. The landmark study to win the broadest 
acclaim is arguably Michel Foucault’s Les mots et les choses (1966), which embraces a 
diachronic perspective on science and philosophy, as reflected in the sub-title “an archeology 
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of the humanities”. Foucault strives to uncover the depth structures of knowledge, albeit of a 
historically contingent kind, and, in doing so, comes up with the postulate of ordering 
templates characteristic for the epistçmç of an epoch. (These templates could also be called 
root metaphors of epistemology.) In the Renaissance this template is determined by the 
principle of iconicity and the idea that reality becomes knowable through a pre-existent 
analogy between things and things, signs and signs, and even between signs and things. 
The classical age then turns to artificial taxonomies and grammars as ordering principles, 
which are now no more natural givens, but impose a man-made cognitive order on concepts, 
even though these tableaux are conceived as nature’s mirror-image. The modern age, finally, 
breaks this optimism in ‘home-spun’ systematicity. Instead, the modern epistemic style 
chooses as its fundament of knowledge the principle of self-reflection, which entails the 
conception of man relative to his situatedness in language, and in his social and economic 
system, a situatedness that Schleiermacher, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud exemplify in their 
search of hidden principles and underlying logic of mankind. Situated self-reflexivity, of 
course, is a far more complex schema and may elude a simple description as a basic 
thought template. Therefore, Foucault’s theory thwarts any straightforward attempt to place it 
within a parsimoniously dimensioned cognitive terminology. 
    The idea of templates with a genuinely cognitive bent was perhaps first laid out as a 
systematic theory by the philosopher Stephen Pepper (1942), and has been exerting some 
influence in Anglo-Saxon academia ever since. Pepper attempts to describe the history of 
philosophy as a competition of four root metaphors, each of which is autonomous and, in the 
absence of a rival theory, self-evidently and indubitably corroborated by experience. None of 
them explains all the facts of the world, but all of them are powerful enough to act as a true 
‘world-hypothesis’ with nearly unlimited scope. None of the four root metaphors is intrinsically 
superior; instead Pepper thinks that they are simply incommensurable because they are 
based on different axioms expressed through a root metaphor. 
    It is worth going into root metaphors in more detail, especially because it is a tremendously 
useful basis for understanding the relevance of image-schematic models in thought styles, 
which form the reference point of this work. The following summary of Pepper’s approach by 
Harrell (1982: 224) highlights the very point I hold to be crucial, namely that philosophical 
systems obtain their specific profile by promoting one specific cognitive mechanism to a 
paradigmatic status: 
 
“Pepper, in his original work, found only four basic systems of knowledge in Western thought: Formism 
– in which the basic operation is classification and the relationship of the particular to the general – is a 
world hypothesis based on the intuitive recognition of similarity. Organicism – in which the basic 
operation is to compose a structure and the primary cognition is the relationship of parts to a whole – 
is a hypothesis derived from the recognition that an organism is somehow more than the sum of its 
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parts. Mechanism uses correlation as its basic operation, especially in the sense of causal implication: 
cognition identifies the relationship between particulars. Its metaphor is a simple machine, as in the 
lever. Finally, there is contextualism in which the fundamental operation is the act of attention; 
cognition is concerned with figure-ground relationships. The basic experience from which 
contextualism is derived is that the identity of a particular thing or event is altered by its context. 
Pepper calls the root metaphor here ‘the historic event’ in which it is recognized that the event is 
embedded in a complex network of facts and forces.” 
 
Even if it seems imprudent from an anthropological perspective to go along with Pepper’s 
assertion that other root-metaphors than these four are relatively inadequate either in scope 
or in precision – the two supposedly inadequate root-metaphors he discusses are ‘animism’ 
and ‘mysticism’ – he can be credited for outlining some basic cognitive operations that have 
profound repercussions on the socio-cultural sphere. Importantly, Pepper’s argument is not 
that the four relatively adequate root metaphors ignore the cognitive mechanisms of the 
others; rather they do not accord them ontological priority, but see them as derivative instead 
(1942: 142). In a cognitive view the mechanims are, then, not per se mutually exclusive in all 
relevant respects. It seems fair to say that the four root metaphors are a matter of which 
cognitive operation is promoted to the status of master mechanism around which many other 
models cluster. I would suggest that s historical opposition arose perhaps mainly because 
root metaphors tended to be harnessed to particular socio-political philosophies in which they 
were over-systematized as explanatory theories of the world at large. In terms of the 
cognitive folk-models actually used by non-philosophers I am not convinced that a similar 
dominance can be historically traced, nor that scope and precision are the most fundamental 
categories for a successful cognitive style in everyday thought (cf. Sperber 1996 on the 
importance of the accumulation of situative micro-mechanisms for the spread of beliefs). 
    One argument in Pepper’s work I strongly disagree with concerns the eclectic mixing of 
the four root-metaphors, which he considers to be essentially confusing. So far as I can see, 
this assertion sits very uneasily with the historical evidence he refers to, and stands in 
tension with his own nilly-willy admission that eclecticism can be dynamic and innovative. 
Perhaps Pepper’s attempt to construct four neat categories falls prey to the same dangers as 
Foucault who has been criticized for overemphasizing the radical nature of historical 
progression and the neglect of parallelism.68 If he fails to make a convincing case for the 
                                                 
68 In fact, the fear of mixed metaphors harking back to Aristotle is a trait of Western discourse that is 
perhaps more grounded in a style of esthetics than in truly cognitive or functional considerations. For 
example, Dale Pesmen (1991: 230) argues that mixed metaphor appears as constitutive in Kuhn’s 
work on scientific revolutions. In a critical reexamination of Pepper’s claims about mixing prohibitions 
in philosophical systems Fernandez (1986: 172) states with respect to ritual and religion: “Religious 
movements, if not any act of cultural revitalization and returning to the whole, always mix metaphors.” 
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mixing-prohibition as prerequisite for the stringency of philosophical systems, this claim must 
surely fall short of thought more generally, as Billig et al. (1988) demonstrate with regard to 
ideological dilemmas or as Strauss/Quinn (1997: ch.8) show with regard to dissonance in life 
narratives. In a view on cognition in everyday cultures we have to bear in mind that all of the 
basic operations described above are universals of the human mind, especially as concerns 
categorization and figure/ground relations. Part-whole relations are also omnipresent, but 
may conceivably vary to a great degree in their cosmological importance. Perhaps least 
universal is the tendency to conceive of the cosmos as integrated system, even though it is 
extremely widespread. By and large however, I believe that all four basic cognitive 
operations can be found in one or more relevant domains of any culture. 
    Bill Harrell, in the highly original article already quoted above, comes up with some 
interesting suggestions on how to apply Pepper’s theory in comparative cultural analysis. He 
notices an interesting convergence of Pepper’s work with the comparative grid and group 
model proposed in Mary Douglas’ acclaimed Natural Symbols (1970). Douglas tries to 
correlate types of social structure with particular cosmological beliefs. Her approach 
combines the two parameters of grid and group to create a matrix of four ideal-type societies 
depending on the degree of role ascription to the individual (grid-dimension) and the strength 
of community boundaries (group-dimension). In particular, both approaches show that the 
cultural preoccupation with boundaries differs culturally and seems to correlate with certain 
cosmological strategies. In Pepper’s theory, it is all so-called formist philosophical systems 
that are concerned with clear-cut categories and the maintenance of boundaries. 
Correspondingly, in Douglas’ theory, it is societies characterized by a strong emphasis of the 
group dimension that create a sense of community and identity by associating impurity, evil, 
danger, and chaos with those outside the group. Interestingly, both theories include 
descriptions of the dilemmas that the different types are prone to slip into. In the case of 
strong group societies the social strategies to deal with internal conflict involve externalizing 
the conflict by creating scapegoats and staging witch-hunts or pogroms or, alternatively, 
exorcising the source of spiritual empoisoning from the afflicted individual in an act of casting 
out an evil, which is conceived as an essence. 
    Mechanism in Pepper’s typology is characterized by the idea that only particulars exist and 
that there are no necessary natural (or social) laws apart from observed statistical 
correlation. Entities and things which do not have a concrete location are not accredited as 
real, neither are transcendental forms or laws. There is no metaphysical truth. Truth is 
defined as what enables an organism’s behavioral utility as she negotiates the physical 
environment. In Douglas’ perspective, such a system of mechanistic individualism is 
                                                                                                                                                        
Also see Sylvia Junko Yanagisako’s (1987) work on mixed metaphor’s among Japanese niseis that 
reflect the historical transformation of gender and kinship notions vis-à-vis their parents’ generation. 
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characterized by little importance of the community and the pursuit of egoistic interest (strong 
grid/weak group). Social relations will be instrumentally understood. There is no strong 
common moral commitment in the sense of a covenant that would limit the degree to which 
others may be instrumentalized. Social interactions are inherently contractual and based on 
mutual exchange and benefit, which reflects the mechanist root metaphor of correlation. 
There are no transcendental obligations carried out for their own sake. 
    The reader will perhaps have noticed the similarity of Pepper’s mechanism and the one 
thought template most frequently takes to characterize Western culture by scores of other 
authors, namely atomism. This tendency is given lucid expression by Frank Johnson (1985: 
113-14), together with its ontological and epistemological consequences: 
 
“Perhaps foremost is the tendency to see reality as an aggregation of parts: that is, to see objects as 
potentially divisible combinations of yet smaller objects. Such parts are not only presented in 
visualized, “real” things (e.g. trees, persons, stars), but are presumed to constitute the structure of 
immaterial “things” (e.g. thoughts, ideas, memories). Long before confirmation through the physical 
sciences, philosophical support was presented for the conviction that material reality – although not 
visible to the material eye – also was structuralized and particulate. The belief was that parts could be 
divided into yet smaller parts and pieces – molecules, atoms, elementary particles. This endorsement 
of a particulate universe of material objects is important given the western tendency toward an 
emphasis on “taking things apart” – i.e. analysis – and on the consequent process- deduction. A 
tendency accompanying the analytic mode is toward the objectification of “external” objects as existing 
separately from the observer. Observation and measurement of external reality categorizes these 
objects as “out there somewhere” rather than simultaneously “out there” and (internally and 
perceptually) “in here.” In contrast to various eastern philosophies and religions (Nakamura 1964), 
western differentiations between “inside” and “outside” versions of reality tend to accentuate the 
differences and separation between external objects and internal representations. Western personality 
theories have also tended to accentuate the boundary between the domains of intrapsychic and 
extrapsychic realities – most prominently in traditional psychoanalysis.” 
 
However, the second half of the quote makes it apparent that, apart from the tendency to 
privilege parts at the expense of wholes, there is also a connected tendency to impose 
boundaries in epistemology, which should theoretically be typical of Pepper’s formism. What 
this goes to show is that no cultural thought style can be only nearly reduced to a single 
psychological Gestalt when thoroughly analyzed, at least not with regard to a typology of four 
closed style elements. Objectivism and atomism went together for historical reasons in a at 
least one dominant Western thought style, but not of necessity.  
    We may draw two conclusions from all this. First, the argument here does not so much 
claim the complete exclusion of one thought style at the expense of the other, but 
hierarchical ordering in ontological evaluation and in usage preferences. Second, the number 
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of relevant thought-styles must be considerably higher that the four or six proposed by 
Pepper, and these are not so much exclusive or closed systems rather than individual 
elements and cognitive choices that, while subject to constraints, are combinable in more 
than one way. (Mutually exclusive systematizations and systemic closure are with much 
greater likelihood to be found in philosophical systems than in the cultural experiences 
underlying them.) Before we go into a (very incomplete) list of cognitive dimensions, let me 
say a few words about the relation between thought styles and experience. 
 
PREFERRED MODES OF BEING 
A wholly different approach to thought styles, and one I look upon very favorably, comes 
from the social phenomenology of Alfred Schütz (1962). I mentioned above the graded 
ontological status given to modes of cognition. This evaluative stratification, making some 
sorts of experience more real than others, and yet others ‘illogical’, ‘merely rhetorical’, 
‘superstition’, ‘figments of imagination’, and ‘only dreams’, can be well understood in Schütz’s 
framework. Although not intended as a comparative enterprise, it has the virtue of focusing 
on typical cultural stances towards modes of experience rather than toward beliefs in the 
narrow sense. 
    Central to Schütz’s theory is the notion of the multiplicity of social reality resulting in 
numerous partially autonomous lifeworlds. The differences between these lifeworlds are 
understood in terms of the specific ‘tension of consciousness’ that is characteristic for each 
them. These ‘finite provinces of meaning’ put different accents in the construction of reality. 
The most important ones include the world of everyday life, the world of dreams, the world of 
religion, the world of playing, the world of art, the world of science, etc. The lifeworlds are 
relatively autonomous in the sense that they do not overlap to great extent and that a ‘leap’ 
between modes of consciousness is required to move between them. 
     Equipped with Schütz’s theory, I would say that a defining feature of ontology is the 
hierarchical or otherwise evaluative order among experiential realms. Ontology’s main 
function is to assign each of these types of experiencing a particular status. For instance, 
some societies highly value dreams, while others do not believe in their revelatory nature. 
Some value science, some religion. Some value play and art, others only the everyday reality 
of work, etc. It follows that ontology must also include particular cultural attitudes toward 
different cognitive mechanisms, which in part mirror the differing lifeworlds and their 
characteristic modes of consciousness. Not infrequently one state of consciousness forms a 
single cultural paragon of knowing, such as the characteristic mix of sober detachment and 
everyday realism in modernity. 
    The distinction of consciousness types is not only reflected by the evaluation of extant 
experiential categories. Prior to that the specific fragmentation of consciousness in the 
cultural field determines how people move between lifeworlds. For example, cultures that 
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regard the dreamworld and the world of being awake as something connected will most likely 
not experience an as incisive leap between the two modes of consciousness. In cultures in 
which the everyday is deeply imbued with the religious and the typically concomitant states 
of consciousness the split of reality into the categories of the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’ is less 
likely. On these grounds we may also venture the hypothesis that people in other cultures 
perhaps do not experience Schütz’s leap between modes of consciousness as incisively as 
we do, and sometimes slip between them unnoticed. Corresponding to the shutting off of the 
‘sacred’ into rarely accessed spatial and temporal precincts, in modernity the same may hold 
for irruption of the archaic, which has been progressively removed and banned from day-to-
day life. For example death, quite apart from personal loss, is experienced as a fundamental 
shock through the irruption of something eerily real, yet unreal according to the standards of 
everyday materialism, youth fetishism, and the ‘happy consciousness’. Western culture may 
be regarded as a prime example of a fragmented culture where parts and moods of life that 
were commonplace some generations ago are displaced and lifeworlds dissociated. The 
growing social division of labor points in a similar direction. 
 
EMBODIED THOUGHT STYLES  
More at large, the fact that particular modes of experience are favored is also true with 
respect to bodily knowledge and abstract knowledge (i.e. what we called ‘presentative’ and 
‘representative’ modes in chapter 4). Notably with the rise of Western science the ‘objective’ 
disembodied and re-presentative mode was endowed with high prestige and has enjoyed 
this status for a long time. Foucault has given ample illustration for this, notably in his works 
on the clinic, the asylum, and sexuality, where he shows how the power of the jail-keeper, 
the doctor and the self-monitoring superego emerge from the disembodied and objectivized 
mode of being. 
    In an embodiment approach ‘moods’ and embodied states of being in the world must be 
seen as the precipitate of cognitive styles, if not a dialectic counterpart on an equal par. 
Cognitive styles are effective triggers for socially promoted or counter-cultural ‘moods’. The 
mood of simplicity, for example, is conducive to peace of mind, contemplation and 
inwardness. Conversely, complexity and semantic multiplicity, laden with rich but elusive 
meanings, is conducive to the play and change of moods rather than a single emotional 
focus. A double causality is operative here. Emotive styles become externalized into 
symbolic products – ‘instituted models’ in Shore’s (1996) parlance – which, in turn, are 
internalized to engender emotive associations with moods of situations, periods or epochs. 
Symbolic self-conceptions characteristic of epochs or classes grow from such colorations of 
mood and, in their turn, again spawn these moods in an incessant dialectic (see 
Berger/Luckmann 1969). 
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    What Pierre Bourdieu (1984) calls ‘distinction’ is a universal principle on the social, the 
cognitive, and the sensory level alike. Evidently, every culture creates (and is defined by) 
marked style differences – between social classes, between sexes, between age groups, 
between ritual and everyday settings, between ‘us’ and ‘them’, etc. – and cultural beliefs 
about these differences. Based on this need for distinction Bourdieu identifies different 
perceptual and sensory styles, i.e. physically inscribed realities, between social classes. 
Taste is not only what one thinks about taste or how one evaluates tastes, but what one is 
literally able to taste, e.g. which flavors a person has learnt to distinguish.  
 
3. Some examples for cognitive templates 
I have chosen five differential dimensions of thought styles for an exemplary analysis. They 
all at least partly relate to imagery and unfold along the following axes: 
(1) cultivating conscious and elaborate tropes vs. cultivating a ‘plain’ style,  
(2) iconically replicating coding structures on ever-new levels vs. enriching thought 
content on a given level, 
(3) using concrete imagery vs. using abstract schemas,  
(4) preferring sensory homogeneity vs. preferring sensory salience, and 
(5) using modular thought patterns vs. integrating the mental landscape into unique 
wholes.  
 
My main goal that I want to achieve through these examples is to demonstrate that thought 
styles relate to imagery, some more in the sensory and embodied sense and some more in 
the conceptual sense. Moreover, I want to demonstrate that imagery and its emotional 
dimension inherently constitutes and reflects socio-political and cultural trends. 
 
(1) TROPISM AND ANTI-TROPISM  
One of the basic cognitive characteristics of a culture or an epoch can be seen in its implicit 
and not seldom quite deliberate stance towards tropes. This can regard the cultural 
evaluation of artistic, aesthetic, or rhetorical means in general, a particular way of using 
analogy and metaphor as conceptual devices, and other aspects.69 In what follows the 
                                                 
69 A dimension I only want to skirt here regards the broader ontological interpretation that metaphorical 
activity is given. In their comparison of the alchemist style of metaphor use and that of modern science 
Gentner and Jeziorski (1993) show that there are a number of culturally dependent similarity types 
throughout European history. Unlike for modern scientists, for the alchemists analogy implied essential 
identity. They ascribed causal powers to metaphors, so that like was seen to influence like. Also, they 
did not use analogy as a rigorous mapping between two domains in a one-to-one correspondence. So 
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argument will be that the rejection of trope as a rhetorical or aesthetic means is a trope in 
itself, or rather what may be better termed a meta-trope. For instance, Yuri Lotman’s (1990: 
40ff) semiological work puts repeated emphasis on the role of tropes as basis of style 
formation: 
 
“There are cultural epochs, we should remember, which are wholly or largely oriented towards tropes 
and in which tropes are the obligatory markers of all artistic discourse, and indeed even of all 
discourse. On the one hand there are whole epochs when the rejection of rhetorical figures is 
artistically significant, and when, for speech to be perceived as artistic, it has to reproduce the norms 
of non-artistic speech. Examples of epochs oriented towards tropes are the mytho-poeitic period, the 
Middle Ages, the Baroque Age, Romanticism, symbolism and the avant-garde.” (Lotman 1990: 40) 
 
Rhetoric complexity and artificiality can be the basis of a particular cognitive style that grows 
into a powerful cultural template. Via experts discourse folk-models are presumably also 
influenced.  
    With respect to the history of Western culture Lotman (1990) traces how a purposeful 
cultural distinction of tropical from non-tropical or rhetoric and anti-rhetoric has been drawn. 
The graded distinction in fact produces what could be called a meta-trope, namely the style 
of non-tropicality. This includes favors simplicity, artlessness, little meaning surplus, and 
straightforward contextual cues, and a limited resonance of neighboring domains. Non-
tropicality is just as much a style as its opposite. Lotman perceives an underlying dimension 
of a universal kind, which can serve as a parameter of the cognitive analysis of culture (p. 
44): 
 
“[R]hetoricism does not belong exclusively to any cultural epochs: like the opposition ‘poetry/prose’, 
the opposition ‘rhetoricism/anti-rhetoricism’ is one of the universals of human culture. The terms of this 
opposition are mutually connected, and the semiotic activity of one of them presupposes the 
actualization of the other. (...) Against such a background the ‘anti-rhetorical text’, consisting of 
elements of direct, non-figurative semantics, comes to be perceived as meta-trope, a rhetoric figure 
which has undergone a secondary simplification, with the second language being reduced to zero. 
This ‘minus-rhetoric’, which is subjectively perceived as resembling reality and simplicity, is a mirror 
image of rhetoric and includes its aesthetic opponent in its own cultural-semiotic code. For instance, 
the artlessness of neo-realist film in fact contains a latent rhetoric, activated against a background of 
the worn-out rhetoric of pretentious pseudo-historic epics and high society comedies, a rhetoric which 
has ceased to work. In its turn the cinematic baroque of Fellini’s films rehabilitates rhetoric as the basis 
for constructing meanings of great complexity.” 
                                                                                                                                                        
the way of using metaphor and analogy and the ends of their usage differed markedly from modern 
science practices. 
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We may guess that this meta-trope is often also inscribed into the disjunction between 
specialized esthetics and everyday in a mutual distinction that pits an elaborate ‘high culture’ 
against a ‘low culture’ emphasizing simplicity. 
    A pivotal point hardly to be over-emphasized emerges in this analysis: Every cognitive 
cultural template is a figure chosen against a ground of other possibilities. Sometimes the 
ground is only an implicit potential, but more often than not the contrast is one that is 
perceived and a conscious marker of cultural self-perception, perhaps best glossed as the 
culture’s ‘ethos’. An argument to that effect is made by Roy Wagner (1986: ch.6) who 
embraces a historical perspective. Wagner claims that the central meanings and core 
symbols of an incipient historical epoch acquire their profile against the background of 
previous epochs. He illustrates this with regard to the European transition from the Middle 
Ages to the Renaissance and eventually the Age of Enlightenment. In this process present 
core symbols act against past symbols, much in the same way that different parts of a 
society, such as kinship, marriage, birth, death, social exchange relations, and cosmology 
may synchronically stand in a dialectic relation. Where the tropological style of an epoch is 
concerned, only the diachronic whole accounts for the culture’s meaning system (as far as 
the past is remembered at all and necessarily filtered and distorted by a specific 
appropriation of history, I would add.) Both Lotman and Wagner underscore that the 
cognitive style of a ritual stage or an epoch functions as a recognized marker that 
demarcates an event contrastively against other stages or other times. Bourdieu’s work on 
distinction and sensory styles also fits in here. Distinction is a culturally enacted and 
perceived fact that shapes the identity of a class vis-à-vis the others. Each ritual style, art 
style, or embodied-sensory style corresponds to a cognitive style that is always seen in 
relation to other cognitive possibilities. There are, so to speak, meta-maps of the mutual 
interdependence and relational significance of various styles of cognition that have become a 
part of the cultural stock. Although I would be reluctant to argue that past styles are absorbed 
into some kind of diffuse ‘cultural subconscious’ and are simply stored there, it seems to be 
the case that in many cultures – especially such with a historical consciousness and a 
presence of historical artifacts and writings – a present style is perceived against the 
background of what is thought to be a past style. Folk-theory always includes a dialectic 
genealogy of the present in the past, of the social classes in each other, or of oneself in ones 
neighbors. A degree of recognized contrastivity is thus inherent in every cultural style. 
 
(2) SEMANTIC ENRICHMENT AND THE ENRICHMENT OF CODES 
A related parameter for inter-, as well as intracultural comparison of thought styles can, 
again, be found in the work of Yuri Lotman (1990). He observes that it is a customary feature 
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of cultural sign systems to operate, both, on the semantic level proper and on a level of 
reference to the code. In his somewhat idiosyncratic formulation he posits a secondary mode 
of communication beside the so-called “I-s/he” mode, which has been vastly undervalued in 
the past, the “I-I” mode. This phenomenon, which may also be called autocommunication of 
a semiotic system, does not only serve the purpose of mnemonics as in inner speech. In the 
“I-s/he” mode information is transmitted and the message’s code is kept constant while the 
act of communication goes on. In contradistinction to this, the “I-I” mode is defined as an 
increase of the information of the message on a parallel level by the introduction of new 
codes for the same message. Lotman points out that different kinds of formal structure can 
serve as such code, for example in iconic phenomena. It is possible through the patterns in 
the spatial medium that a surplus value of meaning is introduced, for instance by the printed 
form of a manuscript, the layout of a poem etc. Alternatively, it is possible through patterns of 
a temporal kind, as in music or rhythmic texts as Goethe’s The Forest King, which in its 
language simulates acceleration and hoof rhythm. Alternatively, a double coding can employ 
indexical signs, which only point to another meaning that has to be known in advance. An 
example would be words reduced to indices like in early Koran scripts that could, due to a 
complete lack of diacritic signs for vowels, not be read unless known by heart. Folklore, such 
as the magic tale, would be often wholly redundant, were it not for codes on this 
supplementary level. This closely corresponds to what Lévi-Strauss dubbed the “musical 
nature of myth”, and understands myths as purely syntagmatic, a-semantic texts which are in 
fact schemas for organizing thought. However, contra Lévi-Strauss, Lotman asserts that both 
modes are needed, that actual cultures invariably oscillate between the two modes but with 
different weights. In fact Lotman ventures the opinion that relatively stable cultures diverge 
neither too far too from the one nor the other extreme, without furnishing proof, though. 
Concerning iconicity, there is widespread linguistic evidence for this phenomenon of double 
coding. More pertinent as a working hypothesis is Roy Rappaport’s (1979) claim that the 
culturally deepest meanings of religion are usually not encoded as conventional semantic 
symbols any more. Instead they reside in experiences that stand for themselves. 
 
(3) CONCRETE IMAGERY AND IMMANENT COSMOLOGY 
One culturally determined tendency in thought that is of great consequence pertains to how 
the tropes and imagery that are used in conveying cosmological ideas are instantiated. The 
distinction that is relevant here relates to analog and digital representational formats, which 
was introduced at the beginning of this work: the analog formats rich images and image-
schemas were contrasted with the digital format of so-called propositional thought. I 
endeavored to show that different metaphors employ analog and digital codes to variable 
degrees. Perhaps most interestingly, in depicting cosmological ideas cultures display varying 
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tendencies to employ image schemas in isolation. This can be shown in a comparison of 
Chinese and Western cosmology/theology. 
    It appears that there is a strong inherent tendency in Chinese thought not to rely 
exclusively on abstract characterizations of thought. Instead Chinese culture is well-known 
for its proclivity to put ideas into images and words with associative power and its ingenuity in 
doing so.70 As has often been pointed out, this tendency is very much inherent in the 
ideograms of Chinese language itself where abstract terms have multiple concrete 
associations while the imagistic quality of the original core is (at least partly) preserved in the 
act of reading a character as abstract. In the perception of the visually rich Chinese 
characters these dimensions cannot be but co-present, due to the iconic nature of the 
ideograms. The so called-radicals of the ‘characters’, i.e. recurrent basic sign-elements for 
identification which frequently hint at a part of the meaning, are responsible for this 
characteristic.  
    The abstract-cum-concrete two-dimensionality is by no means a gratuitous feature of 
Chinese writing or literary knowledge, it is intertwined with an ontological view of how the 
abstract related to the concrete, or the ‘transcendent’ to the ‘immanent’. I mean to propose 
the following hypothesis: The fact alone that cosmological thought is presented in imagery 
with high associative power carries considerable meaning in itself. This cognitive choice 
reinforces the central concepts. The manifest preference for similes and images in much 
Chinese philosophy indicates that this mode of thought attaches much importance to 
concretion. The message is as clear as it is simple: in many major strands of Chinese 
cosmology, such as (Neo-)Confucianism, Daoism, and, most of all Buddhism, it makes no 
sense to abstract away from immanent reality. Every general principle is only effective in its 
concrete manifestation in the world and not as principle as such. For instance, the important 
Neo-Confucian concepts of qi (‘energy-matter’) and li (‘pattern’) are not usually thought of as 
remote supernatural beings or as ultimate principles devoid of and situated beyond material 
reality. Instead, they are conceived of as an immanent and pervasive causal matrix that is 
manifested, both, as material reality and in the spiritual and mental world. Thus, 
transcendence is, with few exceptions, not affirmed as any ultimate principle beyond change, 
process, and form, but in a sense of ‘transcendence in immanence’. Transcendence is a 
‘plus-quality’ in phenomenal existence, an existence without which transcendence does not 
make any sense to begin with (Olds 1991: 16).  
    A similar perspective on the imagery of traditional Chinese medicine is taken by Hsu 
(1999: 211). She shows this with regard to the well-known medical doctrine that is cast in the 
imagery of the so-called Five Phases (named Fire, Water, Earth, Wood, and Metal 
respectively). In this metaphoric system a maxim such as ‘Metal gives Birth to Water’ read on 
                                                 
70 Tambiah (1990: 100) suggests the same for the Indian tradition. 
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its own tends to be empty, vague, or even meaningless. On the one hand, it is clear that 
there is a high degree of generality it the maxim, such that it can be attributed various distinct 
meanings in medical practice. On the other hand, the multiple ‘knowledge-grains’ in ‘Metal 
gives birth to Water’ are always linked to rich imagery and associations. This is the case 
despite the fact that, on the more sophisticated level of expert medical knowledge, the Five 
Elements do not even correspond closely to conventional everyday associations connected 
with the terms used, but refer to certain ways of changes instead. For example, the principle 
of ‘Wood’ centrally evokes a multi-purpose image-schema of something extended that is 
flexible and can be bent (Hsu, personal comm.) Yet, for the doctrine to be meaningful the 
level of rich imagery and associated knowledge must also resonate together with the abstract 
principles designated. 
    From all this the conclusion emerges that using metaphors rich in propositional 
associations and imagery conveys a message in itself, a message that is in keeping with the 
cosmology as a whole. The metaphoric effect which is responsible for this may be expressed 
as RICH IMAGERY IS ONTOLOGICAL CONCRETION (‘IMMANENCE’). Thus, thought disembedded 
from experience is not valued in Chinese tradition. This is the case despite the highly 
sophisticated powers of abstraction and generalization that are equally cherished in Chinese 
learned writing. Therefore, it would be completely misguided to conclude that the Chinese 
are either less capable of abstraction or less preoccupied with it. They only seem to think that 
abstraction alone is not worth much. 
    This contrasts strikingly with the millennia-old Western efforts to transcendentalize religion 
and cosmology, a tendency often brought into connection with the emergence of Judaism. 
Richard Niebuhr (1944) called the process that took place at that point in history the creation 
of ‘radical monotheism’. In fact, it is not misguided to describe this as the most revolutionary 
cognitive innovation in the history of Occidental thought. We may speak of this incisive 
change emanating from this period as the image-schematic revolution. If we follow Niebuhr, 
radical monotheism’s great achievement is to abstract from a concrete first principle and to 
posit the first principle as such, in its inherent unknowability and utter transcendence, as 
essence of the world. Transcendence as concept is grounded in the explicit instruction not to 
get implicated in concrete imagery, or at least not ascribe the highest form of reality to it 
when it occurs. To speak the true name of God (now in capitals) or invoke images of Him is 
explicitly prohibited in orthodox monotheistic religions, the strictest being orthodox Judaism. 
The crucial point is that this is only accessible to thought by conceptualizing God and his 
power by a purely image-schematic structure. One fundamental aspect of this commitment to 
radical transcendence I shall explore later under the heading of foundational structure, and 
show how it fundamentally rests on the imagistic conception of force transmission from the 
topmost ‘source’ of a stratified tree of being. With some superficial changes this structure 
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remained the underlying element of cosmological thought for three thousand years of 
Western tradition, spanning religious and secular worldviews alike. A second aspect of 
radical transcendentalism will be described later under the heading of abstract essentialism, 
for which I shall argue that it also rests on imagining the image schema container without a 
concrete content. For now it must suffice to mention these two aspects of monotheist 
tradition without entering into a closer analysis simply to underscore that Western thought 
has always exhibited a powerful tendency towards non-concrete thought and therein run 
counter to the Chinese propensity to concretize. Interestingly, the radical transcendentalism 
of Jewish and Christian religion was reinforced from other quarters as early as late antiquity, 
as an almost identical way of thinking is reflected in Greek concepts of noumenal essence. 
Not surprisingly, the cognitive predilections of monotheism perfectly blended into ancient 
Greek attempts at abstract logic. Grasping transcendence as principle was a seemly 
exercise for people who valued mathematical abstractions as Euclidean (pure) space or, 
centuries later, set theory and irrational numbers. In both decontextualized image-schemas 
rule as highest reality. It is not by pure chance that the Platonist realm of pure idea forms 
could occupy such a central space in the world-view of early Christian Gnosticism. It came in 
as the unifying notion of sciences and religion, both of which put emphasis on disembodied 
mental forms rather than experience of this world. Thus, the underlying metaphorical effect, 
in contrast to the Chinese example, is NO PROPOSITIONAL STRUCTURE IS ONTOLOGICAL 
ABSTRACTION (‘TRANSCENDENCE’). 
    One final point is worth noting. The success story of monotheistic religions may be in part 
due to the high adaptability of abstract image schemas whose concrete structure is, of sorts, 
left blank. While it was seldom the case that average people remained true to ‘radical 
monotheism’ and so completely avoided ’propositional elaborations, it seems nevertheless 
the case that the avowed preference for pure image-schematic thought put less emphasis on 
particular images and so allowed God to become the noumenon or universal logos of 
philosophy while retaining the basic schematic thought structures. The same historical 
resilience characterizes a different but related example: It is quite striking that the logic of the 
excluded middle, which is of monotheist origin, lived on in secular Western philosophy until 
recently. 
 
(4) A-STRUCTURE , PRESENTATIONAL PREFERENCE, AND THE TEMPLATE OF COGNITIVE SIMPLICITY 
Another, and related parameter of cognitive dispositions that are culturally or ideologically 
defined relates to different sensory styles. Victor Turner’s (1974: 267) interest in anti-
structural sects and separatist movements provides rich material for the discussion of this 
issue. I want to spell out some implications, which are implicitly present in Turner’s text, 
about how such movements cognitively function and how they orchestrate a marked and 
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deliberate contrast to the mainstream ideology. When Turner describes such movements as 
anti- or a-structural, this does not only mean that they are opposed to the social mainstream. 
More than that, the concept of anti-structure is closely linked to the notion of communitas. As 
Turner defines it, communitas occurs under conditions of altered states of consciousness in 
which cognitive structures relevant to everyday concerns dissolve temporarily. In other 
words, communitas is a type of experience that answers to the deep human need to doff 
social roles, masks, attires and insignia in order to enter the deeper reaches of ones 
humanity. Here all are equal and may unfold, free from such constraints that are normally 
imposed by the exigencies of social life. Typically, communitas is manifested in mystical and 
‘oceanic’ group experiences of sharing.  
    The experience of communitas is often ritually institutionalized as a process of social 
regeneration. However, in other cases where social structure has become too rigid, it is 
millenaristic and mystical movements that endorse this agenda. Values of everyday structure 
are inverted: the weak are strong spiritually, secular power is without import. A distinct 
example of a ‘weak’ local culture that institutionalizes this process as a means of spiritual 
survival is found in Barbara Myerhoff’s (1974) account of the religion of the Huichol of 
Mexico, who regularly enact a-structure in ritual. The Huichol, who by standards even of the 
impoverished rural population are poor, ritually gain access to their essential, sacred selves, 
which are so different from their everyday plight. The ritual involves the ingestion of the 
psychedelic substance of the peyote mushrooms. In this peyote pilgrimage the Huichol feel 
themselves not only to approach the Gods, they become Gods.  
    Liminality, Turner’s betwixt and between phase in the ritual passage from everyday to an 
altered world, dissolves structure: social and cognitive. Liminality is in some cases not only 
enacted in ecstatic ritual but a permanent condition in a historical epoch. In millenaristic 
movements the condition is one of pervasive liminality, as Mannheim (1929) cogently shows 
this in his analysis of the anabaptist movement of the 15th century. In the eyes of the 
participants the edenic, millennial world is impending and immediately at hand. Mannheim 
regards the same tendency typical of the transitional period of late antiquity, when many 
sects of Christian and Gnostic origin promoted such expectations. In such a ‘prophetic break’ 
things may be seen in novel and unprecedented ways. Often, the family as structural atom of 
the society and its loyalties comes under attack, mendicancy is propagated, gender 
differences are downplayed, as to bring to the fore the deeper humanity of each, sometimes 
‘group marriage’ is practiced. In particular cases, a-structure comes to stand for the 
repudiation of the sensate, the bodily, and the pleasurable. This is the case when structure is 
identified with a-spiritual hedonism and the true inward dimension is conceived as 
immaterial, such as was the case in Neo-Platonic Gnosis and Christianity.  
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    On the basis of these examples several cognitive aspects of anti-structural movements 
can be highlighted. Experiencing and thinking a-structure mesh, once again. Significantly, 
metaphors of FLUIDITY become prominent (Turner 1974: 246). Property is ‘liquidated’ and 
‘pooled’ to erase the structural cleavages that separate men in everyday life. Turner even 
hypothesizes a possible connection with water symbolism, such as in baptism. The 
metaphorical momentum in the case of fluidness concepts lies in the fact that the dissolution 
of structure is enacted and analogously conceptually represented. Moreover, the idiom of a-
structural movements is that of indigence, which symbolically comes to stand for 
renouncement of the world and its ways. Poverty is used as a metonym for a-structure, the 
disavowal of social goals. Not only riches are renounced, much more than that, there seems 
to be a general template of simplicity. Consequently, such movements strip their practices of 
ritualism and visual symbolism. Speech becomes simple and unpretentious. Elaborate, 
dramatic, and erudite ways are avoided. In short, all perceptual salience is abhorred, 
especially of such kind that was habitual in the tradition from which one has seceded. In such 
a case, the underlying metaphorical schema is perhaps INWARDNESS IS LACK OF SENSORY 
SALIENCE. Conversely, OUTWARDNESS IS RICH STRUCTURE, outwardness standing for 
worldliness. In the inward orientation, in contemplation and mystical practice, deeper reality 
is situated. Note that we have metaphors here at the very primary level of cognition. A whole 
new sensory orientation is imposed upon the experimental field. In the (a-)structure of the 
field a whole body-mind orientation is encoded. Simplicity means awareness and an inward 
focus. The anti-structure that is found in monastic life is, in this sense, best understood as 
the pursuit of cognitive simplicity. Buddhism, building on the anti-structural monastic 
paradigm, makes a special point of it in prescribing to do what one does with concentrated 
devotion and nothing else. The tendency that simple forms predispose us for mental 
awareness is in all likelihood a universal of human cognition. 
    Another closely connected basal metaphor is EQUALITY IS SENSORY HOMOGENEITY. If 
nothing about any person’s outward appearance is especially salient, there are no 
distinguishing features of high prestige and nobody enjoys social prerogatives. Brotherhood 
of man is now made externally visible, such as was oppression and dominance before. It 
deserves to be underscored that this metaphor is at the same time an immediate trigger for 
the autonomous neural system and a symbolic trigger. It is a direct trigger because no salient 
structures are visible. This is, for example, expressed in the interior of Calvinist churches in a 
conscious contrast to Roman Catholic pomposity. Sensory homogeneity is, at the same time, 
a many times precedented symbolic representation of the kind that if we all dress alike (or 
run nude all alike) we are equal. On this symbolic level the prevailing social conventional 
links between dress, etiquette, and ritualized behavior on the one hand and status on the 
other is rejected, while on the general cognitive level a style of according social preference 
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through special insignia is repudiated altogether. It is for this last reason that I believe that 
cognitive simplicity can be a general template, a general cognitive style universally pursued. 
As Turner acknowledges with an oblique glance to the work of Lévi-Strauss, the medium is 
the message here, i.e. deeper sensory codes are imbued in the individual, so that “the deep 
structure of culture and indeed of the universe” (1974: 240-41). A better characterization of 
what a foundational template is about is hard to find. 
    In summary, our discussion of anti-structural movements unveils two interesting facets: 
Cognitive styles symbolically reject the dominant social structure simply by way of contrast, 
while more specifically bringing a particular choice of thinking and feeling about the world into 
focus through the deeper social meanings encoded in thought templates. By virtue of this 
double-effect, once again the presentational reality and the representational understanding of 
a metaphoric orientation converge. The metaphors discussed here do not so much link 
domains on the conceptual level as primary and secondary levels of cognition (as defined in 
the introductory chapter on metaphor): any style of embodied perception and action already 
prefigures social thought that can be analyzed by looking at representations. 
 
(5) MODULARITY AS THE CULTURAL TEMPLATE OF MODERNITY 
A third case where a basic cognitive style becomes a cultural template is explored with verve 
by Bradd Shore (1996: ch.5 and 6): the modularity schema in North America. Modularity is 
what Shore calls a foundational schema. As such it is not dedicated to a single domain of 
social life, but underlies and organizes a number of more specific cultural models that are 
roughly analogous in form. By giving a common underlying form to superficially diverse 
cultural models a foundational schema “contributes to the sometimes ineffable sense of 
‘style’ or ‘ethos’ characteristic of a culture.” (p. 117)  
    Modularity, according to Shore, “virtually defines the cognitive landscape of modernity and 
has a lot to do with the emergence of a recognizably post-modern mentality.” Modularity is a 
‘design strategy’ that breaks complex wholes into elementary units that are understood as 
recombinable into a variety of different patterns. The examples to be examined include 
several or all of the following characteristics. First, the standardized units, which are 
employed in a building-block fashion, do not produce an irreducible and stable nature of 
wholes, they differ only as various arrangements of their basic atoms. Only surface 
arrangements are of interest, whereas there are no salient interior structures that would give 
the atom a characteristic signature of a certain type. Second, the fact that a virtually endless 
number of recombinations is permitted encourages an attitude of experimentation and 
changing and an interest in producing variation. Third, the modular system has an egalitarian 
bias, since there is no basis for preferring one configuration to another (p. 151). In short, the 
values promoted by modularity are efficiency, flexibility, expandability, and easy control. 
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    As the wealth of the following examples shows, modularity allows a full panorama of 
modern American culture: Modularity is a central feature of modern house architecture, as 
well as the planning of shopping precincts, which both display an all-purpose, reconfigurable 
use of space. It is equally constitutive of modern furniture design, which has been facilitated 
by the advent of certain materials, most notably the ever-transformable vinyl. Hamburger 
technology also grounds its success on simple and reconfigurable components. The 
structure of television shows falls into simple atomic image blocks, while broadcasting and 
commercial times are likewise sold as commodity to be bought in chunks. The most popular 
entertainment shows typically employ amusing non sequiturs that can be arranged and 
rearranged in slots, with a small number of stereotyped characters. Successful show formats 
are cloned endlessly, sitcoms use ‘guest appearances’ of familiar actors of other series and 
successful characters can even ‘spin off’ into a linked series. The consumers’ habits as well 
as the program structure of TV and multimedia result in sensory fragmentation, which is 
especially abetted by channel surfing and the spread of channel-formats pioneered by MTV. 
On the whole, the various media are becoming increasingly interchangeable in format 
(recently some popular U.S. newspapers have been designed like printed color television 
programs).  
    The advent of modern information technologies draws its huge success from modular 
designs ad philosophies. Many attempts at computer-modeling language have built on the 
Chomskian claim that syntax and semantics can be separated, with the result that language 
needs only be broken down into its basic (but intrinsically meaningless) units that are 
recombinable following a set of syntax rules. Likewise, modern text-processing permits the 
constant reshuffling of parts, of chunks of information. Information space has no natural 
topology. The anti-hierarchic and a-centrist structure of the internet is perhaps the most 
characteristic development in this respect. An endless number of tracks may be chosen to 
navigate through the net, an aspect which is also present in interactive fiction and computer 
games. The absence of a narrative center is typical of interactive hypermedia. Many authors 
have highlighted this as symptomatic and pointed out that it relates to the loss of the 
narrative center and the ‘master narrative’ in postmodern culture as a whole. 
    When we look at the field of modern American university education, students are 
encouraged to see themselves as consumers of interchangeable information chunks. The 
conception of educational structure as an integrated whole or the idea of essential 
constituents prevalent in earlier education philosophies has given way to a largely free 
choice of modules. Content and quality-based criteria are increasingly de-emphasized, and 
the limitless combinations of course modules can only be measurable quantitative ‘credits’, 
‘units’ or ‘grade-point averages’. 
 267 
    The fact that all these developments were spearheaded by the United States fits in with 
the classical American virtues of mobility, flexibility, and innovation. While social and political 
atomism has been noted as a feature of American society, this intermeshes with the 
economic development of the country from the 19th century on. For economic history, the 
assembly line is the epitome of modular approaches with its successful attempt to break 
down a complex process into simple parts of a task, which can be carried out by easily 
trained and easily replaceable unskilled workers. Shore points out that the path to industrial 
modularization was paved by a tradition of political atomism without traditionally embedded 
social relations and hierarchies. Instead the belief in voluntaristic association “made modular 
technology seem right at home” (p. 134) 
    Importantly, modularity is also reflected in the American conceptions of what constitutes a 
person. Traditionally, personality or ‘soul’ referred to an enduring essence at the center of a 
person’s being. With the impact of the modular revolution personality is increasingly defined 
in terms of an economic commodity and the social effectiveness of how one stages oneself. 
This has in turn spawned an interest in ‘impression management’, self-help books, a 
technology of ‘personal growth’ and psychotherapy, the idealization of youth and beauty (e.g. 
the slimming and body-building craze). More generally, this has created the concept of 
’lifestyle’ as the construction of identity by orchestration of surfaces, most notably regarding 
dress, activities, companions, and consumer goods. The loss of a dominant reality in virtual 
media is here mirrored by the increasing virtuality of personality, once it is defined in terms of 
exchangeable and commodified attributes. 
    On the other hand, Shore ventures the opinion that there are distinct limits for modular 
models to successfully serve as resources for human meaning (p. 158). Even though the 
question as yet stands open, I am inclined to go along with this, especially in the light of 
world-view fragmentation and the widespread crisis of meaning in modernity. Moreover, 
Shore raises well-justified cognitive points that militate in favor of the limits of modularity. For 
one thing, it is critical that, in the endless swirl of recombinable units, there are no organic 
contexts any more, whereas meaning construction requires relatively stable mental models 
or schemas to provide orientation and cognitive efficiency. It is also crucial to acknowledge 
that many of our basic perceptions only occur as experiential Gestalts, that is as whole 
configurations, and are meaningful as such. Against this basic property of human meaning 
the digital revolution has transformed everything into a unitary and simple code, which 
carries in itself no meaning unless it is retranslated into analogous perception. Shore 
mentions that the inherent dangers in the developments of modularity have also not been 
lost on a number of philosophers of modernity. We can understand in this sense Walter 
Benjamin’s warnings about the loss of ‘aura’ that accompanies the transition from hand-
made objects to mechanical mass-production. In a similar vein, Jean Baudrillard has 
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addressed the postmodern dilemma of meaning in the production of an endless flow of 
copies that have no original. Even more fundamentally, modularity is an outgrowth of the 
objectifying and reshaping cultural attitude typical of the West. Misgivings about the 
characteristic attitude that underlies modern technology have also been voiced by Martin 
Heidegger, who opposes the reductive attitude of seeing the world in terms of resources to 
be harnessed to or to be manipulated for human ends to his poetic notion of ‘indwelling’ in 
the world, which is progressively being lost in the age of modernity. 
 
CONCLUSION: THOUGHT STYLES AND IMAGERY 
I believe that each dimension of cognitive style explored in this chapter features preferences 
in imagery use, although I did not explore this in great detail. I take all five differential 
dimensions (and a series of others left unmentioned) as indicative of an important problem: 
To understand cultural variation we need to ask how imagery is generally employed by a 
social group or in an epoch at large, not only which specific images are found. 
    A general remark I made above was about sensory distinction as described by Bourdieu. 
Sensory distinction is a ubiquitous cognitive mechanism and a social practice reflected in 
discourse, which encompasses a great variety of sub-dimensions. Distinction, in my reading, 
refers to embodied styles of awareness. These go before conceptual phenomena, since they 
define what a person can consciously or elaborately perceive. Nevertheless, distinction relies 
on mental or bodily imagery in a basic sense. Children learn to taste, smell and see what 
they enhance through mental repetition. The link between sensory style and conceptual style 
may play an important role as well. Refinement and restraint in embodied practices such as 
eating or moving prefigure ways of negotiating the mental landscape (see chapter 6). The 
evaluative dimension of taste styles, however, cannot be explained in an imagistic 
framework, at least not in a straightforward manner. Perhaps there is a complex image 
compound seeped with social and esthetical values such as superiority or refinement, in 
which many sensory images are blended together with other forms of knowledge. I am also 
not fully prepared to say whether the system of contrasts implied in the social code of taste 
strongly relates to imagery. However, it would be worth exploring Krzeszowski’s (1993) work 
on axiological parameters in imagery (and perhaps Osgood’s 1964 study on the semantic 
differential technique) in this respect. 
    The general theoretical issue of evaluative imagery aside, let me render more precise the 
connection of my differential dimensions to the use of imagery: 
    (1) Tropism was defined as a preference for a non-plain style of discourse with many 
artistic markers. In my view, while this obviously has to do with the elaboration and 
complexity of the surface language, at the mental level it is mainly the outcome of a 
predisposition for connecting imagery (and propositions) from different domains in complex 
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ways. I would argue that it refers to the complexity of blends, innuendo, subtleness, 
creativity, and multivocality. Related to this, high tropism implies a number of levels of 
meaning something is given (such as evoking metonymic, metaphoric, and ironic references 
simultaneously), while low tropism conveys a clear-cut message that the intended domain of 
reference is fixed, given, and uncontroversial. My hypothesis is that tropism creates multiple 
contexts of meaning, e.g. when people are encouraged to look for more fanciful or less 
obvious meaning nexuses, such as ‘non-literal readings’. They are also encouraged to 
accept a possible tension between different readings. Another hypothesis worth exploring 
here is that tropism promotes rich imagery for its own effect more than non-tropic style. 
According to this, tropism uses colorful language and casts meaning in memorable images. 
These presumably encompass numerous facets rather than a simple core image schema 
only. Being signifying in multiple ways, a tropic construct also depends more on nuances of 
contextual expectations and has a less fixed core meaning. However, tropism is an 
extremely complex issue and only shorthand for a multifaceted array of operations, so that I 
can only hint at a research agenda here. 
    (2) Lotman’s work raises the issue of semantic enrichment and the enrichment of codes. 
Semantic enrichment refers to a treatment of meaning on a single level, mostly that of 
content, while the ‘message of the medium’ remains imperceptible or prosaic. The 
enrichment of codes, according to Lotman, means replication through iconicity between 
levels, such as content and structure. Why this is an imagery related issue I will not argue 
here. I refer the reader to the last chapter instead, where a very detailed argument is 
presented that iconicity is in fact a mapping of image schemas of two different kinds onto 
each other, namely between such evoked through content and such perceived in structure. 
    (3) By comparing Niebuhr’s work on Judaism and its historically novel thought style to 
thought in Circummediterranean Antiquity and China I tried to highlight that concrete images 
may play a larger or lesser role. Image-schematic thought can be either eliminative of or 
enriching for concrete images. The preference for image-schemas at the expense of 
concrete imagery means relegating concrete imagery to a lower ontological status or 
discouraging it for certain purposes. One possible effect is that important domains such as 
talking about supreme beings rely more on image schemas than concrete images, as was 
illustrated by the imagery strategies espoused by Judaism. I argued that this carries an 
immediate meta-message, namely that concrete and sensory knowledge has no bearing on 
a subject such as God. Transcendence is thus created. In my terms it means thinking about 
something without concrete images and moved away from sensory data. Experiential 
immediacy, on the other hand, is emphasized by worldviews that do not privilege image-
schematic thought and denigrate concrete imagery. As I tried to show through Chinese 
philosophy there are also traditions that emphasize the mingling of concrete and abstract, 
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which again carries an ontological meta-message as to how we should approach reality. In 
effect all this has to do with cultural ways of choosing and reading metaphors. First some 
linguistic metaphors seem to evoke stronger sensory imagery, while others use the linguistic 
exemplar only as a vehicle for an image-schematic skeleton, so that the choice of metaphor 
has an effect. Second, there is an evaluative dimension telling people how to read given 
metaphors. Entities such as ‘God’ are described through many metaphors and most of these 
can be read very differently. In Judaism readers are discouraged from taking concrete 
images of God as faithful to His highest reality. Not to put a too fine point on it, theology is an 
entire meta-evaluative industry pronouncing on how old texts ought to be read. Thus 
theologians are, to an important extent, not only promoters of a simple interpretation, but 
through their interpretations also promote cognitive styles. 
     (4) The major elements in Turner’s and Mannheim’s work on millenarianism were strong 
attentional focus, embodied presence, perceptual simplicity and homogeneity, conceptual 
fluidity, and inwardness. Perceptual simplicity is striven for to create attentional focus on the 
spiritual. A lack of sensory salience, as far as pompous rituals or insignia are concerned, also 
promotes the idea of brotherhood of simple people. Experiential immediacy is put into the 
place of conceptual structure, presumably linked to social conventions. In addition, fluidity 
metaphors promote the dissolution of structure. In an imagistic analysis the relevant 
dimensions emerging from these characterization are these: (a) attentional spread vs. 
attentional focus, (b) abstract conceptualness vs. embodied and sensory immediacy, and (c) 
sensory salience of single units vs. sensory homogeneity between units. Most importantly, 
simplicity and focus are sought. Perceptually (in churches, rituals, external linguistic features) 
this entails a preference for clear Gestalts. This characteristic can be recast in the terms of 
figure and ground in imagery. It means a precise figure without much blurring ground around 
it, which could divert one’s attention and create other foci for closer inspection and reflection. 
A focus on abstract concepts through complex theology or other abstract buildings of 
meaning is downplayed to begin with. Reification into permanence of complex conceptual 
Gestalts is eschewed. What there is conceptually is treated as fluid, so that embodied 
presence, which is more sensory and perceptual, takes the place of pure concepts. Within 
the modality of experiential presence a complete attentional and emotional focus is sought. 
Mental inwardness and embodied presence go hand in hand here. (Embodied and 
experientialist religions frequently feature both aspects, although techniques of meditation 
are often stronger on the mental aspect than trance versions of ‘presence’). As to 
inwardness, every man and woman is encouraged to seek a clear spiritual focus of attention 
in his or her mental life. As to presence, this can be defined as a preference for embodied 
imagery. In meditation, for example, this plays a great role. The inwardness focus also 
includes imagery of the kind I called retrojective earlier, i.e. conceptual images projected into 
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one’s own body, where they are both felt and cognized. The required focus in all cases is on 
the inner world of a human being, either on her mental processes or on her embodied states. 
In view of a continuous mind-body these are two sides of the same coin. 
    (5) Shore’s analysis of the modularity schema in the United States can also be recast in 
the theory of Gestalts. In a nutshell, modularity is a constraint on building complex Gestalts 
and reifying them into patterns that cannot be reshaped. Reification would mean that only the 
Gestalt as a whole can make sense, while sub-Gestalts lack meaning. It also means 
memorization of the configuration as a whole and the belief in an organic relationship 
between parts that cannot be ripped apart. Modularity is the opposite of that. Every complex 
Gestalt is only temporary and allows for decomposition. The template is effective for two 
levels. The social perceptual environment is constrained in such a way, but the conceptual 
environment of modernity is, too. No doubt, the constraint on permanent reification conveys a 
strong meta-message about the indefinite nature of actual and mental entities. For this 
reason mainly I argued that the postmodern tendency of deconstruction is an anti-holistic 
trend and means allowing that the parts of Gestalts may be put into new frameworks foreign 
to them for critical analysis, instead of treating meaningful entities as wholes that cannot be 
taken apart and used in de-contextualization. 
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Chapter 6:                                                                                                   
Image-schematic world-principles 
 
In this chapter I intend to demonstrate how imagistic metaphors contribute to the basic 
categories of conceptualizing the world, the self, and the nature of understanding. I also 
illustrate the fact that image schemas are used for putting together philosophical models of 
reality. The two sections of this chapter study thematic structures that (1) either flow into 
many or all domains of a culture as background defaults or (2) shape central and complex 
cosmological or epistemological models. World principles can be defined as generic image-
schemas that form a background expectation for other schemas across domains or enter into 
these as basic parts. 
 
1. Basic structures of experience and image schemas 
In this section I will scrutinize basic elements of how event structure, intentionality, social 
purpose, teleology, and the human self are understood. These can be found in data from 
many cultures and languages and are possibly as close as we can get to universals in 
thematic imagery. They are basic experiential constituents in worldviews and effective as 
defaults in many or all cultural thought domains. Comparable to the Kantian a prioris they are 
what makes it possible in the first place to think many other things; they form its necessary 
basis.  
 
PATHS AND EVENT STRUCTURE  
Among many others Tilley (1999: 178) has observed the marked frequency of paths and path 
images in thought and ceremony throughout cultures. To begin with, the passing of time is 
conceptualized as a path. Thus, history may be seen as a path. Following life may be seen 
as following a path. Destiny may be a given path one is meant to follow. Related to that we 
can see each person as following her proper path, thus letting the path also refer to personal 
identity. Finally, paths may refer to proper conduct, reflected in phrases as ‘remaining on the 
path of virtue’, not being ‘led astray’. Notably, expressions like these conceive paths as 
straight. This has the implication that the goal of proper conduct must always remain ahead 
and before one’s eyes, that the movement should be continuous, and that one must not 
waste one’s strength by digressing into other directions. This prevalence of path images 
indicates perhaps one of the most likely candidates for a transcultural universal, namely the 
event-structure metaphor (see Kemmer/Verhagen 1994). It organizes the understanding of 
purposeful action. This metaphor in which PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS is based on the PATH 
image schema and the metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS. The initial (unsatisfactory) state is 
location A and the final (desired) state is location B. The action sequence to bring about the 
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desired state is the movement from A to B. In this understanding, causes are forces, 
changes are movements, means are paths, and difficulties are impediments to motion. (For 
numerous linguistic examples organized by this conceptual metaphor see Johnson 1987: 
114, Lakoff 1987: 277, Lakoff 1993: 220). 
    In what follows, I would like to show how the event structure metaphor is of basic 
importance to the understanding of worldviews. It sheds light on the understanding of time, 
on the way man copes with contingency, and, at the same time, on the way we conceive of 
our own purpose as human beings. 
    Most basically, the temporal flow of life is best understood as a movement in space. It 
imparts direction and allows for sequential understanding. Research on time metaphors by 
Alverson (1994), Lakoff (1993), and Yu (1995) present suggestive evidence that 
understanding time as movement and humans as moving in time is universal. In some cases 
the movement of or in time is understood as unidirectional and endless, in other cases the 
circular or cyclical notions are preferred. In some languages such as Chinese, human 
behavior may be understood as keeping pace with time, being ahead of it, or lagging behind 
it. 
    Secondly, fate, contingency, and human telos are made sense of as purposeful movement 
in space. The metaphors FATE IS A PATH (“My path in life was predestined”) and FATE IS A 
FORCE (“I could not escape my fate”) yield FATE IS A PURPOSEFUL MOVEMENT ON A PATH. This 
is probably a very widespread conceptual metaphor. In attributing intentionality to fate, man 
copes with existential contingencies. Through the understanding of fate as a force (and 
perhaps as a strong person) man’s movement on the path is invested with an external 
intentionality. The German sociologist Günther Dux (1982) raises a serious point when he 
characterizes intentionality as the subjectivized deep structure of everyday life. In Dux’ view, 
a central characteristic of religion is that it thematizes this deep structure by positing an 
intentional creator or an abstract intentional logic of history. It seems plausible enough to 
assume that all sorts of teleological understandings of history are based on a path schema 
with a final state that is perfection.  
    In addition, this subjectivization template is also experienced in acting upon the 
surrounding objects, as it is prototypically encountered in work. Therefore, this is the 
complementary second aspect of the subjectivized deep structure, which makes man the 
shaper of his world. The analysis of English language shows that there is a parallel system 
for conceptualizing change, purpose, means, and problems. This dual system is based on 
the metaphor of states as objects, rather than locations. For example, expressions as “I’m in 
trouble” or “I have a headache” describe a problem as being in the same location as the 
person or they describe the problem as possession. What follows from this dual system is 
ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS REACHING A DESIRED OBJECT: “He’s hungry for success”, “I’m hunting 
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for a job”, “I reaped some rewards” (Lakoff 1993: 226-227). In some way the same basic 
image schema can be said to underlie both versions of the dual, since both locations and 
objects involve movement and the increasing coinciding between a trajector and a landmark. 
The difference is that in the one case we move into a container and in the other we move 
something to our body and incorporate it into ourselves as container. Correspondingly, the 
two duals discovered for English language by Lakoff and his students – and there probably 
are further ways of conceiving intentionality in other cultures – have two different implications 
with respect to man’s conception as agent or patient within the web of life. In the one case of 
the schema the agent is in motion and external events are the objects she encounters and 
has to interact and cope with. In the cargo cults of Melanesia, redemption will come from 
outside, just as in Christian or Jewish millenarianism. Maybe this is typical of more traditional 
forms of religious beliefs. In modern forms of ideology it is man who acts, who strives toward 
the goal. In this view, reality is ours for seizing and for incorporating. It is not coincidental that 
a humanist version, for example in Marxist garb, denies that man is to suffer fate as a 
passive patient. Instead, it is his to shape according to his needs and desires. In a manner of 
speaking we could highlight the difference like this: Are we the movers of reality or are we 
moved by reality? 
    The basic intentional structure of life is also reflected in cultural discourse and enacted in 
ritualized practice. Purposeful journeys are a universal worldview topic, be it periodic 
journeys like Christian pilgrimage, Islamic hajj, and the aboriginal walkabout, or historic 
events, such as Mohammed’s hejira, Bodhidharma’s coming to China, the Mayflower landing 
in Massachusetts, or Armstrong stepping on the moon’s surface. Thus, in different ways the 
basic message that life involves going on a journey is transported as a central understanding 
of humanity. It is in this sense a rough basic schema which not only allows for, but actually 
encourages and needs, cultural elaboration. The rough schema leaves unspecified whether 
the movement is circular or directional, what the phases of the journey are, what its purpose 
is, what the likely impediments will be and how to overcome them. 
 
PURPOSEFUL ACTION 
One more basic part of the complex metaphor of purpose-as-destination and purposeful-
action-as-straight-movement-in-a-direction is the schema of FORCE ENABLEMENT. A 
movement in space is enabled when there is no impediment to applied force, or when a 
hypothetical or existing impediment is removed. 
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(Johnson 1987: 47) 
 
In the absence of barriers the actualized force vector can be abstracted into a vector of 
sensed potential force. It derives from the corporeal experience of a felt sensation of power. 
It is directed in the sense that we kinesthetically know which way to direct our force, say 
when lifting something. 
 
 
 
 
(Johnson 1987: 47) 
 
This generic image schema of enablement lends itself to a metaphorical use as world-causal 
principle. As Johnson (1987: 53-54) puts it, there is a basic notion of a ‘permission granter’: 
 
“In the domain of social obligations and expectations the relevant forces are exerted upon us either by 
other people, by institutions, or by what we might call a ‘universal voice’. That voice is typically 
understood as conscience or moral law. (...) I would note that there is a philosophical tradition that 
implies the existence of a permission granter, even in the epistemic realm. In many Western 
philosophical treatments of knowledge, rationality, and truth, there is an underlying metaphorical 
conception of a universal voice that grants permission to move from premises to validly derived 
conclusions. This is the voice of pure reason. To reason correctly is to speak in agreement with this 
universal voice. In certain theologically oriented traditions this voice is identified with the ‘Mind of God’, 
so that reasoning well is being in tune with the Divine Logos. In nontheological traditions this voice is 
reinterpreted as that of universal reason, which provides a logos to which our reason should conform.”  
 
Reason comes as the universal logical FORCE, permitting no other conclusion. The 
universalist notion of logical and spiritual force is then often the immediate precursor of 
actual force in proselytizing those who recalcitrantly defy it. Also, especially because this 
enablement is an embodied notion, the force of knowledge and the experiential force of belief 
merge. Force may be a presentational experience of overwhelming immediacy and a 
representational FORCE schema in one. 
    In experiences of conversion or in rituals that reinstate and strengthen belief the question 
about the causal origin quite naturally leads to the notion of an enabler. The notion of an 
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enabler as preexisting entity is additionally underwritten by the intensity of religious 
experience and its intuitively evoked sense of primordial realness. This easily produces the 
conclusion that the force one experienced must have been there before, even if the access 
to it was blocked. 
    Biodynamically speaking, the body contains conduits for the flow of energy, a flow of 
energy which is positively experienced especially in religious practices. (This is compatible 
with the psychologist Abraham Maslow who speaks of embodied ‘peak experiences’ as 
‘flow’.) Not surprisingly, the associated representations also make use of the CONDUIT image 
schema, especially in the context of ENABLEMENT. In many religious views belief lets spiritual 
force or energy flow free. Belief is the enabler of life energy, unless blocked by evil forces. An 
experience is understood metaphorically in terms of force enablement and the resulting inner 
energy or balance is understood as a result of this enabling force. Receiving grace is a good 
example for a cultural notion of being the recipient of force, while saying grace amounts to 
directing one’s own force (‘faith’) towards another entity. 
    For example, in the case of Christianity the force-enablement schema merges with that of 
the conduit, in order to circumscribe a material substrate within which the force flows: The 
human body or soul is the conduit, Satan or an evil spirit the intruding impediment, and faith 
or God that which enables the force of goodness. The body as container is the terrain of this 
flow (cf. an ethnographic example from Togo and Benin by Fernandez 1986: 166). It is not by 
accident that the metaphor THE BODY IS A VESSEL OF SIN could become so influential. By 
committing certain carnal acts the body was conceived to provide access to Satan. The body 
as container became Satan’s abode, where he was free to block the flow of divine goodness. 
In this view, only by exorcism, especially by making the body uninhabitable for a 
personalized agent of evil through sustained physical punishment, the impediment could be 
removed to free the soul. 
 
THE SELF 
Mark Johnson elaborates a third important use of image schemas on the worldview level, 
namely that of self. The self can be included, in a flexible understanding, in this list of world 
principles, because I assume that the universal human action structure outlined above 
invariably has a strong perceptual focus in the individual body.71 This naturally given 
                                                 
71 In the vast anthropological literature on the subject there has been much confusion about the term 
of the self and what its relation to other concepts, such as person, individual, personality, and self-
representation, might be (for critical assessments see Spiro 1993, Harris 1989). As far as such a 
heuristic split will take us, this section is largely concerned with the cognitive consequences of being a 
centered, embodied, perspectival, and subjectivized agent, while some other important aspects are 
explicitly excluded: the self as social ascription and social actor, the self as coherent life narrative, the 
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epicenter needs to be conceptually related to everything else that exists, if only for the one 
reason that our bodies are rather clearly bounded entities. I wish to emphasize that the short 
characterizations to follow are by no means either an exclusive or even a full account of self 
models. However, they may be a reasonable starting point for understanding what may be 
widespread or perhaps even universal constituents of these complex key-notions. 
    One of the most basic experiences of being-in-the-world is that we are contained in rooms 
and spaces; it is equally basic that our bodies contain air, blood, feces, or invisible but felt 
entities like energy. The notion of mind and soul as acting within a vessel seems to intuitively 
suggest itself. Hence, to view our perceptions, thoughts, and feelings as contained within us 
seems a likely candidate for a cultural universal. It is equally intuitive to view our social 
relationships as something that contains us, just as we are spatially contained within our 
family’s space. Both of these aspects have tremendous repercussions on what it means to 
be a human and a social person, i.e. on the ‘self’. Thus, it seems natural, at least in the usual 
everyday modes of consciousness, to see ourselves in terms of layered containers with a 
center.  
    One fundamental self-model in the Western world may be depicted as follows: We usually 
superimpose a CONTAINER SCHEMA on the CENTER-PERIPHERY schema, which gives rise to a 
graded INNER-OUTER schema. Within the mapping, the inside of the container is a realm of 
(possible) control, which corresponds with the embodied experience that we have an actional 
radius. It is also a realm of sensation, which we naturally locate in the body and which has a 
causal radius of which we know that events within it will directly affect us. Center-periphery 
and container are combined to support the imposition of a subject-object orientation 
(Johnson 1987: 125). In such a representation the true self, our essence, is seen as the 
innermost part. This is the epicenter of our consciousness. It lies “deep-down”, “at our very 
heart”, “at the center of our being”. Successive layers have to be uncovered to reach into that 
core.72 Such a schema ipso facto also imposes a BOUNDARY on ourselves, demarcating the 
line where we end and the world begins. In this way a very basic distinction between self and 
                                                                                                                                                        
self in conflict between multiple social role expectations or between the idealized self-image and the 
actual self. Despite (or because of) this selective focus we have to remain acutely aware that all these 
aspects mesh in practice. Consequently, we should refrain from positing divisions of the self in a 
crudely ontologizing fashion. 
72 The folk-model of the self that has an essence is accommodated by the self as container in yet 
another way. As I shall argue at length later, any container can be imagistically actualized as 
containing a continuous substance. This operation can be used to convey the idea of an essence by 
simply reasoning that the substance is responsible for its properties. This essentialist view of the self is 
based in experience with everyday substances much in the way that the substantive nature of water 
causes things to swim or extinguish fire. 
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‘other’ is created.73 The operation of self-objectification, first described by G.H. Mead, in this 
view means shifting the perspectival center outside of the container to view it from the 
external ‘perspective of the generalized other’. Putting one’s self in another’s place, just as 
objectivizing one’s view of one’s self, quite literally means a mental switch of the imagined 
viewpoint to an external position (see Langacker 1990b on the change of perceptual field and 
perspective in mental constructs).  
    Moreover, boundary setting has profound consequences for action. The consequences of 
a relatively fixed boundary on behavior and ethics is ingeniously observed by Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch (1991: 246): 
 
“The self is seen as a territory with boundaries. The goal of the self is to bring inside the boundaries all 
of the good things while paying out as few goods as possible and conversely to remove to the outside 
of the boundaries all of the bad things while letting in as little as possible. (...) Some selves (altruists) 
and many selves in some roles (parents, teachers) may get (immaterial) goods by helping other 
selves, but they will become disappointed (even disillusioned) if those selves do not reciprocate by 
being properly helped.” 
 
What we want we incorporate, what we hate we shunt to the periphery or even relegate to 
the outside of our space. This shows that the Western self model, and probably any model in 
representing an epicentered form of consciousness, is highly conducive to notions of a 
privileged control space or personal sphere that affects the person more than other more 
distant, peripheral persons, objects, thoughts, or events. In addition to that, the fixed 
boundaries lend themselves to the concept of rational man whose primary intent it is to 
maximize the net gain in his systemic interactions, including other selves. 
    A further aspect of the self as experiential locus of attention is the notion of a loss of center 
(cf. Lakoff/Johnson 1999: 276). Diverging or alternating perceptual or inner stimuli are quite 
naturally spatialized, in that they usually impinge on the subject from different directions in 
the environment or come from different nerves of the body. Subjective control over one’s 
attention means having conscious focus, i.e. on one task or idea. In conceptual terms this is 
reflected in the container being fragmented when there are a lot of diverging demands on 
                                                 
73 We can note in passing that Foucault’s notion of the cultural ‘Other’, which is at the same time the 
self’s displaced alter, builds on the same multifaceted template. According to this model, meaningful 
cognition starts where a primal distinction is imposed. The realm of meaning is engendered by this 
imposition of a boundary, but only as operation of contrast from that which is alien and meaningless. 
Of course, these felt and thought boundaries are by no means unbreachable. In sex, ecstatic ritual, 
and meditative practice the everyday self-boundaries may either be extended in scope or dissolve 
altogether, leaving no ‘Other’. 
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one’s attention or when one is upset. That self is no longer in one single place is linguistically 
reflected in ‘pull yourself together’ or ‘scatterbrained’.  
    In many respects the image-schematic model suggested here is supported by the 
extensive analysis of the Western and Japanese self systems based on linguistic metaphors 
presented in Lakoff and Johnson (1999: ch.13). They postulate that the self cognitively 
distinguishes a landmark and a trajector, which they term the subject and the self, and that 
self-metaphors describe the relation between these two in various ways. Four out of five of 
the self metaphors analyzed by Lakoff and Johnson are compatible with the preceding ideas 
on a container-logic based self.74 First, the self as an object that can be manipulated by the 
subject (“I held myself back“, “You are pushing yourself too hard“, “Don’t lose yourself“). 
Second, the self as a location the subject is in (“I was beside myself“, “He’s down to earth“, 
“You need to step outside yourself“). Third, the self as something with an essence that the 
subject either corresponds to or not (“That wasn’t the real me yesterday“, “She went to India 
to look for her true self“). Fourth, the projection of the self onto someone else (“If I were you, 
I’d feel just awful too“). How are these metaphors compatible with our model here? The first 
two metaphors are natural aspects of the container schema, which embodies both the 
abstract structure of an object and of a location. In order to see the container as an object 
one has to externalize the perspective first, but then it makes perfect sense to think of 
‘restraining oneself’ as one would an object that is escaping. In the container as a location 
the perspective can either be from inside or from outside. The third group of metaphors 
corresponds to the idea of the container-center as true self (or, alternatively, as hidden 
negative self, which usually has the somewhat different implication of valuing the superficial 
parts as more real). The fourth group can, in fact, be seen as an extension of the self as 
location combined with the basic human faculty to shift perspective. In projectively entering 
into the other, whom we usually see as a container from the outside, we can do what we 
would do to check our own self’s inner state. To empathize with the other’s feelings or values 
we only have to fill the relevant cognitive slots with our knowledge about the other person’s 
beliefs or feelings.  
   In an anthropological perspective a lot more is to be said about the central model of the self 
as container. Obviously, the centered container can appear in other and more complex 
configurations. Especially the notion of boundary may be conceived in varying ways 
concerning its location and its permeability. Typical of many traditional societies, self-
boundaries in China used to extend into the family, according to Johnson (1985). This 
                                                 
74 The fifth group of metaphors concerning multiple selves and interacting social selves (reflected in 
metaphors of contending, communicating, obliged, or caretaking relationships of the subject to the 
self) require another model, which is less likely to be image-schematic in a simple sense, as it 
extensively draws on our complex knowledge of social relations. 
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extended self was felt to be a more basic reality than the individual in isolation. The family 
was not only seen as the fundamental unit of society in Confucian theory, the family as a 
social reality imposed strong interpersonal ties. This, it is argued, gave rise to a sense of 
extended self-boundaries or at least to highly permeable boundaries, leaving no autonomous 
entity to be jealously guarded. Confucianism articulated this in its tenet that significant others 
deepen the own selfhood.75  
    Colin Turnbull’s (1983) ethnography of the Mbuti pygmies of former Zaire reports a similar 
but more complex notion of self, which extends the center-periphery schema (cf. Cohen 
1994: 29ff). The Mbuti self is connected with a theory of ’psychological equilibrium’, in which 
the self is conceived of as a balanced sphere. Ideally, the sane person should always be in 
the middle of her sphere. Decentering happens when a person moves too fast or too violently 
either in body or in mind. The equilibrium will, in this view, gradually be restored as the 
sphere of a person catches up with her, given time. In the extreme case a person may pierce 
her sphere and lose her self by entering into the other, wrong world outside of it. Thus, in 
Mbuti psychology the balanced state in one’s sphere is a precondition of authentic selfhood. 
By extension, balanced individuals are seen as a precondition of social integrity. More 
systematically, what we have in the Mbuti world-view are the following image schematic 
elements: there is a sphere (three-dimensional CENTER-PERIPHERY) that CONTAINS a center 
                                                 
75 Here I am, of course, moving on shaky ground. Similar claims of a purely transindividual self have 
undergone severe criticism, in particular Dumont’s (1970) contrast of Western ‘individualism’ and 
Indian ‘holism’ and Geertz’ (1973) view of the Balinese self as purely publicly defined. I wholeheartedly 
join with Spiro (1993) and Ewing (1990) in their rejection of the claim that some cultures have no 
concept of individual self, which usually comes in tandem with the notion of a fundamental split 
between the West and the rest. There is no conclusive evidence that any non-Western culture should 
be completely lacking the concept of subjective agency, of an individual center of experience, initiative, 
and judgment. The claim I am trying to make is clearly more modest. While humans everywhere have 
a motivational center of will and judgment, a distinct notion of personal agency, and a locus of 
perception and feeling, their embodied sense of being a container for all this may gradually differ in 
two respects. The differences both pertain to ideological emphases on how pronouncedly the 
boundary is conceptualized and at which range the boundary is profiled in a given context. This is 
inherently a matter of degree, since it would be misleading to assume that a cognitive model could be 
identically present in all contexts. For example, in early childhood, in ecstatic ritual, or in sexual 
ecstasy the epicentered consciousness is blurred or lost. Living in an extended family will engender a 
shared sense of identity and responsibility, so that in some relevant situations the profiled boundary 
will include the family with regard to some respects of the self, but not in others. Finally, lest we 
commit the fundamental mistake to conceive of cultures as homogeneous, we also have to concede 
that ideologically promoted representations and individual experiences of the self may be in conflict 
with each other. 
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that has to be in BALANCE. The sphere has an ordered INSIDE where the self belongs and a 
chaotic OUTSIDE where there is alienation from the true self. The self has a realm, within 
which there are graded degrees of proper location depending on the distance to the center, 
and a boundary defining where true self ends.76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This model is more complex than the ones viewed before, since the superimposed balance 
schema kinesthetically maps the disruption and restoration of order and thus includes a 
notion of change in time. Negative values, such as haste and violence, are proscribed by the 
Mbuti by means of this schema. The normative center is an attractor, a basic state, in the 
spatially conceived schema. In other words, the model is more complex than those 
discussed before, because it consists not only of a static schema but includes image-
schematic transformations and their reversal, by which the Mbuti spatialize changes of the 
self between its sane and insane states. 
    It is also worth noting that there probably is a conceptual universal of the sort that 
centeredness is esthetically appealing. If this is the case, the image-schematic metaphor for 
positive norms is grounded and bodily motivated in an intuitive understanding of order. From 
such a point of view, aesthetics, basic body sensation, and moral order enter into a rather 
intimate relationship (cf. Johnson 1993). Hence, a relatively simple model is used with 
profound social implications. In this sense, a functioning society for the Mbuti depends on its 
members moving cautiously and deliberately, so as not to lose their center. Since the self as 
balanced sphere model encodes one of the central cultural values of the Mbuti, it becomes 
obvious that in a sense spatial order is also (partially) moral order. Let me note in passing 
that this MORAL IS ORDER SPATIAL ORDER metaphor may be one of the most widespread basic 
metaphors in the various cultural ideologies of the world (cf. Bourdieu 1977 on spatial hexis 
and behavioral habitus). Of course, this understanding appears in all kinds of specific 
variants, perhaps with models of hierarchy and center-periphery being the most conspicuous 
                                                 
76Data on spatial self models in English can be found in Lakoff/Johnson (1999) and Kövecses (2000), 
which include a similar landmark-trajector relation between what they call Self and Ego. Other 
metaphors of the self as a layered sphere are equally common (Hsu 1985). For example, Americans 
define friendship as their innermost self being shared (Kövecses 2000: 90f). 
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candidates, because these two are suitable for representing graded relationships and in this 
way easily accommodate scalar mappings of the value dimension. 
    In conclusion we may say that, while an embodied consciousness of ourselves as 
centered containers may be fairly universal, this is only a rudiment of the usually very 
complex notions of self. Container-like self models clearly diverge in four respects: First, how 
permeable the boundary is, i.e. how autonomous the self is, is understood in considerably 
different ways. What influences impinge on it from the outside and how the model interacts 
with others is of course extensively culturally determined. Secondly, where the boundary is 
situated varies. Thirdly, what models are superimposed on the container or how it is 
embedded in a world-view is highly divergent. And finally, the extent to which alternative 
models play a role for the members of a culture or an individual influences the relative 
importance of the container schema. For some the schema might not be very salient, even if 
it is plausible. The cultural imperatives issuing from the self model as container profoundly 
depend on all these specifications. 
 
2. Western epistemic models and image schemas 
More evidence for image schemas in basic epistemology can be found with a number of 
authors outside cognitive linguistics and anthropology. Although they are not expressly 
framed in image schema theory the approach is promising in explaining many philosophical 
models, where epistemic concepts are most recurrent and most explicit. It may be assumed 
that these quite frequently also exert their influence as folk-models that average people act 
on. 
 
FOUNDATIONAL STRUCTURES 
In many of the world’s religions there is a metaphysical conception that has become known 
as the ‘Great Chain of Being’ and that defines reality in hierarchic terms of being and value 
(Olds 1989, 1992a, 1992b). Before we look at this metaphysical model in more detail, it is 
useful to observe that it is metaphorically rooted in an everyday model concerning the 
relation of humans to ‘lower’ forms of being. Inanimate substances, plants, animals, and 
humans are placed on a vertical scale of properties, with the human species uppermost. 
While a rock has only substance, a chair adds to this a functional part-whole structure. A tree 
has both of these and in addition life. An insect has self-propulsion in addition to all these. 
Higher animals like dogs add interior states like desires and emotions to that, as well as 
limited cognitive abilities. Finally, humans have all these properties, plus reason, morality, 
aesthetics, communication, and a highly developed consciousness. At any level the highest 
properties are held to be distinctive of a species; each level is defined by the attributes and 
behaviors that distinguishes it from the next level below. This ordinal schema seems to be 
motivated by everyday knowledge in three ways. The higher levels are more complex, they 
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are less generally accessible to our perception and understanding, and they are more 
powerful (Lakoff/Turner 1989: 167-169). 
    This basic model exists in a wide variety of cultures, although it is by no means universal, 
as animistic religions with their non-patronizing relation to nature indicate. In the West a 
much more elaborate model was developed that created wide social and cosmological 
implications. The basic model of hierarchy was extended into these two spheres, where each 
level reflected the structure of the chain as a whole. For example, in the same way that 
God’s authority stood above Christ, followed by the archangels, the seraphim, the cherubim, 
etc., the pope’s authority as God’s viceroy on earth stood above the cardinals, followed by 
the archbishops, the bishops, etc. 
    In what follows I want to focus on a yet more elaborate version, which has a specific 
characteristic beyond the UP-DOWN schema by adding a superimposed ENABLEMENT schema. 
In this extended version The Great Chain of Being is what may be called the root metaphor 
of the perennial philosophy tradition that has recently come under attack77. The Great Chain 
of Being presupposes a hierarchical ontology, in which reality is construed in terms of levels 
of being and value that is characterized like this by Linda Olds (1992b: 403):  
 
“The hierarchy’s apex or source represents the transcendent God-head beyond form, from which all 
other levels descend in degrees of lesser reality, being, and goodness down to the level of matter.”  
 
Value accrues from the degree of proximity to the ultimate source of being. Everything else 
emanates from this supreme source. Of course, the God of the monotheistic religions 
exemplifies this. But what we have here is a conceptual structure that is potent in a variety of 
applications far beyond traditional religion. With respect to the entire project of Western 
philosophy this conception is present in what Rorty (1979) criticizes as the ‘foundational 
project’. Foundationalism in the secular version refers to something quite comparable to the 
Great Chain of Being of religion. What Rorty designates as foundationalism is principally a 
conception of epistemology as hierarchical system that is structured according to first 
principles from which the subordinate levels emanate. It refers to an epistemological root 
metaphor which rests on the implicit presupposition that privileged concepts which create 
knowledge exist, and, more fundamentally, that a basis of objective knowledge is possible. 
Truth in this sense is conceived of as grounded in something ultimate, it is neither fleeting 
nor circular. In this way, the notion of truth as something ipso facto absolute is part and 
parcel of the foundational project. 
                                                 
77 See the contributions in Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture 24, 1 (1989): The Great Chain of 
Being and World Religions 
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    Without any doubt, the foundational project has been a deeply implanted template for 
understanding thought in religion and philosophy for centuries. After its theological demise it 
carried on in philosophical garb. In fact, the cognitive structure was so deeply ingrained that it 
was difficult up to the 20th century to conceive that there should not be any absolute 
fundament of truth and knowledge. Perhaps the first influential opposition to it appeared with 
Nietzsche’s revolutionary characterization of truth as a ‘mobile army of metaphors’ in Truth in 
the Ultramoral Sense. As indicated before, this epistemology-cum-ontology was additionally 
underwritten by isomorphic structures of religion and politics. God and the Sovereign 
occupied the summit of a hierarchy, and both were at times quite consciously identified with 
the uppermost principles of knowledge and wisdom. This notion affected the thinking about 
knowledge as well as that about hierarchy in this world and the hereafter. It is rather obvious 
that a common structure underlies these different domains and it is not difficult to see that the 
isomorphism is image schematic. It can be depicted as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a result there is an integrated Gestalt of foundationalism. As indicated above, it is 
characterized by a causal ENABLEMENT schema, as depicted by the arrows, that is 
superimposed on the structural UP-DOWN schema. Thus, it can be simultaneously imagined 
that God is high up (i.e. inconceivably remote, difficult to reach and by virtue of KNOWING IS 
TOUCHING OR GRASPING therefore beyond everyday understanding or logic), and that He is 
the causal principle of creation, responsible for the world, and the inexhaustible source of 
love. These two aspects are better conceived of as a single Gestalt, because it does not 
require separate thoughts to grasp the principle. Since they are understood as one they 
constitute a prime example of image-schematic superimposition.  
    Especially the superimposed part is of further interest. Even if we bypass secular 
epistemology and look at religion only, ENABLEMENT as abstract image schema can serve a 
variety of mappings. What God as apex emanates can either be creation, control, wisdom, 
grace, love, or revelation. Today, contending versions of modern Christian theology, with a 
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few notable exceptions, all employ the same basic model, while simply filling out the 
unspecified slots differently. (Notably there are what could be called the two opposed control- 
and love-factions, corresponding to Christian conservatives and liberals.) Note also that the 
metaphorical conception of SOURCE can have embodied connotations, such as refreshing, 
reinvigorating, or energizing, and that the bestowal of divine love or epistemic insight may 
actually both be felt as somatic flow experience, as characterized by Abraham Maslow. 
    Even though there is one rough general schematic Gestalt for both fields, differences 
between the religious and the philosophical versions must be conceded. It may be the case 
that in secular modernity the ENABLEMENT part of the schema has undergone a partial shift 
that reflects the humanist orientation and the replacement of rationality for revelation. In the 
philosophical tradition, at least since Locke’s egalitarian bottom-up epistemology, the human 
intellect can actively advance, whereas the religious tradition often considers this 
presumptuous (see Ezrahi 1996: 74, 85 for a similar argument). For many religious people it 
is God’s revelation that must radiate downwards into the nether regions of humanity that has 
fallen from grace. The differences of the secular version, namely man as active inquirer, may 
be understood as result of a third superimposed metaphor, which merges into the 
enablement schema. This is the KNOWING IS MOVING metaphor, as in “being initiated into 
knowledge”, “we leave old ideas behind us” or “we delve into a matter”.78 In the case of 
foundational structures gaining knowledge is a movement upwards.  
 
PAN-PERSPECTIVISM AS A SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE REALITY 
Now I would like to demonstrate that both the folk-theory and experts’ theory of ‘objective 
reality’ can be explained through image-schematic construals. It would be ludicrous to think 
that laymen all hold an explicit theory of this, but obviously most people in West live by a 
notion of objective reality, quite similar to that expressed by philosophers. In social 
philosophy we have the notion of the extrapolative or regulative idea. Likewise, in much 
epistemology the concept of the thing in itself, the noumenon from Aristotle to Kant, plays a 
major role. While this can be called the epistemology of ‘Objectivism’ for philosophy, I will 
use the term ‘naive realism’ here, which pertains more to everyday thinking. (The term naive 
is not meant disparagingly here, since it is preconditional for successful coping with the 
exigencies of everyday life.) In naive realism there is a notion of reality, not in experiential 
terms but as a regulative idea of what would be in principle accessible to knowledge. That is, 
                                                 
78 Since force enablement is a version of the path and force schemas, the metaphor KNOWING IS 
MOVING quite naturally maps onto it. The knowing is moving metaphor is corroborated by other 
metaphors. It neatly maps onto the metaphor by which reaching a purpose is moving toward a spatial 
destination, onto the conception of life as a journey, and by extension onto the social accumulation of 
knowledge as a journey. 
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the totality of possible knowledge if we had a ‘God’s eye-view’. (Nietzsche calls this the 
postulate of a ‘Hinterwelt’, i.e. a ‘backworld’ or ‘otherworld’.) This by itself gives rise to the 
understanding that the world has a definite external structure. Now, how does this sense of 
reality come about? I believe that it is an everyday experience that there are parts of the 
world not accessible to our senses at a given moment, which only reveal themselves as we 
change perspective in space. Likewise, we grow into a world where it is obvious that others 
have knowledge of parts of reality we do not (yet) have, parts that are progressively 
uncovered as the child learns. Reality is what we would have if everybody who ever lived and 
will live could pool their knowledge together, and we could discount sense delusions and 
other human limitations.  
    The everyday viewpoint that we experience in vision is directional. It has a limited scope, 
boundaries, and a center of focus. It excludes other things from view. If we change 
perspectives, new things move into our view but others pass out of it. The notion of objective 
reality has to overcome these limitations. In objective reality we imagine a construal of the 
worlds from all perspectives simultaneously or a superordinate perspective combining these. 
I propose that the folk-model of subjective perspective is a generic viewing arrangement that 
has image-schematic elements (Langacker 1987). If this is correct, the notion of objective 
perspective can be understood as a complex blend in which all possible perspectives are 
added on top of one another. Objective reality is, then, a mental construct of an 
encompassing multi-vantage position, such as a single human being cannot simultaneously 
hold. Such a mental construct of pan-perspectivism can be called a ‘marginal concept’. I 
propose to define a marginal concept as a concept used whenever we posit a perfect state 
that cannot be reached in experience. 
 
MARGINAL CONCEPTS AND THE MOTIVATION OF UTOPIA 
Another form of marginal concept constructed in the mind is typically found in political 
theories as an underlying logical principle. Like the epistemic notions considered above 
political theories are inherently structured by imaginary perspectives. This is most evident in 
how people understand social and political goals of the Utopian kind. They project an ideal 
state of the world functioning as a regulative idea that motivates action. Franz Hinkelammert 
(1994) presents an intriguing analysis of the common logical topology that social theories of 
diverging provenience share. His work covers conservative thought, neo-liberal thought, 
anarchism, Soviet ideology, and even Popper’s extreme anti-Utopianism as a Utopian 
ideology in itself. He shows that all of these theories depend on the assumption of one 
particular kind of theory-constitutive state that has to be attainable at least hypothetically. 
These theory-constitutive states are (1) the perfect plausibility of a traditional worldview in 
Neo-Conservatism (e.g. Peter L. Berger), (2) the perfect spontaneous balance in economy in 
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Neo-Liberalism (e.g. Friedrich Hayek), (3) the perfect spontaneous order in social relations in 
Anarchism, and (4) the perfect planning of social and economic relations in Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. On a meta-level even (5) Karl Popper’s argument against substantive Utopias 
shares the very structure of the theories he criticizes. In other words, it assumes the 
possibility of perfect non-Utopianism and thus poses a hypothetical rationale. In all five cases 
marginal concepts organize the conception of political and social worldviews and the primary 
goals they strive for. I propose that this indicates a common cognitive principle of organizing 
their complex parts and a specific core-metaphor that condenses their logical legitimacy. The 
condensing argument may be subsumed in a spatialized metaphor or, more precisely, in a 
viewing arrangement: The viewing arrangement constitutive for the understanding of social 
ideologies is a movement before the inner eye towards a horizon that recedes as the 
subjective perspective moves ahead. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why this image makes sense can be seen if we ask how a marginal concept works. A 
marginal concept is similar to a transcendent principle, with the important addition that it is 
never really reached. Based on the conventional metaphor of PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, a 
marginal concept involves the spatial consideration of distance that cannot, in principle, be 
overcome completely. The question is how the principle of distance and ‘unreachability’ 
might be represented. One obvious possibility is a HORIZON image-schema. The horizon 
schema, in itself, is experientially most strongly motivated with regard to vision. However, 
sounds and tactile vibrations also intimate some of its structure. Sounds and other vibrations 
fade away in the same way as the distance between equidistant lines diminishes as they 
approach the horizon’s point of convergence. 
    The horizon image schema builds on PATH, LOCATION, and FORCE schemas. First, a 
version of the path metaphor is used that we could call POLITICAL GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS. 
The mapping of states on containers supports this metaphor. Consequently, UTOPIA (= A 
STATE OF PERFECTION) IS A SPATIAL REGION. This metaphor is, for instance, reflected in the 
use of spatial concepts for states, such as ‘realm’ in the Marxist slogan of transition ‘from the 
realm of necessity to the realm of freedom’. In conformity with the conceptual metaphor, a 
realm here is a space where a wholly different constitutive rule is effective. This part of the 
metaphor leads to the understanding that our POLITICAL IDEALISM IS EFFORTFUL MOVEMENT ON 
A PATH. This again is supported by the mapping of the world’s evils, or more specifically of 
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adversaries or opposing ideologies on impediments of motion. Only a strong cause (note the 
polysemy in English!) fed by great conviction and fervor (motivation is combustion energy!) 
can overcome the impediments. Secondly, the path schema is superimposed on the topology 
of the horizon schema, which gives us the metaphor UTOPIA IS A SPACE DISAPPEARING ON THE 
HORIZON. Utopia metaphorically is a point in space we a striving towards. But our actions are 
movements directed towards a spatially conceived goal that recedes at the same pace as we 
move towards it. 
    Does this model have only an analytical status or a truly cognitive status in the minds of 
actors? Admittedly many participants of Utopian movements think that their objectives are at 
hand, and not far removed at the horizon. This is notably true for millenarian movements. 
Yet, it would be unwarranted to argue that social theorist and critics of Utopianism 
consciously use the horizon schema, while the average political actor is blind to it. I propose 
that with many adherents of ideologies a conscious use of a horizon schema becomes their 
very raison d’être in the face of adversity. To know that a goal can be reached in principle 
fires the spirit of Utopia, even if this location consistently eludes us in reality and attempts to 
change the world at once are frustrated.  
    From the point of view of philosophy there is also a principled reason why socio-political 
images which aim at a complete and redeeming transformation of this-worldly evil are 
structured as marginal concepts: If we do not attempt to reach the unattainable we will not 
attain the possible. Without a regulative idea of the marginal kind most people lack 
motivation for action. As shown above, a similar imperative of orientation arises in the case 
of epistemology, where a ‘God’s eye-view’ postulate of unknown, but in principle knowable, 
reality provides a touchstone for us that enables inquisitiveness about the unknown. 
 
EVERYDAY MODELS OF KNOWLEDGE AS HORIZON AND CENTER-PERIPHERY 
As we have seen, an important model for the self in Western culture is structured according 
to a center-periphery schema with a strong concept of innermost or essential self. This 
schema is compatible with, if not logically linked, with the horizon schema. (The difference 
between them, if imagined visually, is that the center-periphery schema is visualized as seen 
from the outside and that in the horizon schema we put ourselves in our natural position of a 
viewer who is the center of converging visual sensations.79 Center-periphery and horizon 
schema involve an interesting switch of perspective that parallels George H. Mead’s dual of 
‘I’ and ‘me’ (= seeing ourselves from the other’s perspective, see also Langacker 1991).  
                                                 
79 Center-periphery is multi-modal, as it has the same structure in the sensorimotor, acoustic, and 
visual modes. Whether the horizon schema is also accessible to non-visual schemas is anybody’s 
guess. 
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    We may hypothesize that the combination of CENTER-PERIPHERY and HORIZON can be used 
in meta-representing human knowledge. This interesting idea is that the individual has a 
sense that her knowledge is structured as a space with a center and a horizon (Gerhart/Allen 
1984: 62). Her knowledge encompasses three levels that radiate outwards: First, there is the 
known-known, which means that questions can be raised and answers given to them. Then, 
there is the known-unknown, the cases when we are aware of a question and can even 
propose ways of solving it but do not know an answer yet. Finally, there is the unknown-
unknown. We can only extrapolate the existence of an unknown-unknown from past 
experience of questions or problems that we had not been aware of at first and that then 
began to rise into awareness. For this reason we always expect further such previously 
unconsidered questions to appear in the future and derive a general model of the unknown 
from it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here we have a folk-model of how knowledge functions. That a central part of this model is 
image-schematically represented seems likely. The representation of knowledge realms (or 
layers if we go inwards) is imposed on a center-periphery model, which also harmonizes with 
the center-periphery model of self. Thus, we may expect cross-buttressing and, more 
probably, projective superimposition between the self-model and the knowledge-model. This 
would work as follows: Definite knowledge, which is coextensive with our own location of 
epistemic self, is situated at the center of awareness. Possible knowledge is situated not in 
the center, but within reach. This is in accord with the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS 
GRASPING. Transcendent knowledge is situated at the horizon-periphery. This understanding 
emerges from the entailment of the spatial metaphor just mentioned which could be called 
ELUDING KNOWABILITY IS ELUDING SIGHT. 
 
k-u 
k-u 
k-u 
k-u k-k 
u-u 
k-k = the known-known 
k-u = the known-unknown 
u-u = the unknown-unknown  
 
For the basic model see 
Gerhart/Allen (1984: 142). 
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Part II:                                                                                             
The Scope of Imagery in Culture 
 
Part I aimed at a rapprochement between anthropological theorizing and the framework of 
cognitive metaphor theory. The ambition of Part II now is to bring to anthropological fruition 
another main tenet of the cognitive linguistic approach, which plays a major role in the study 
of metaphor, but also extends beyond it: The view that human thought, concrete and 
abstract, is firmly rooted in imagery. While there is a growing recognition of this general idea, 
I believe that the scope of schematic spatialized imagery in cognition is rather being 
underestimated, possibly by a long shot. The working hypothesis animating my inquiry, 
therefore, is that several previously unconsidered phenomena in cultural cognition are 
amenable to an image-schematic reading. 
    The purpose of chapter 7 is to provide a comprehensive definition of image schemas and 
to give an example-based introductory account of the many symbolic media they can be 
found in, including language, but also material symbols, such as emblems and artifacts. In 
chapter 8, I will enter into a general theoretical discussion of George Lakoff’s (1987) 
‘spatialization of form hypothesis’, which proposes nothing less than that multi-purpose 
mental tools, such as categories, feature-bundles, event-schemas, etc., also operate on the 
basis of abstract image schemas. For these tools I will introduce the technical term ‘image-
schematic co-signatures’, since they complement, organize, and facilitate sets of more 
specific mental images. The spatialization of form hypothesis raises a series of important 
questions: First, what sort of empirical and theoretical evidence is there to support the 
momentous claim that sees human thought at various levels rooted in imagery and 
substantially challenges mainstream trends in the cognitive sciences? Second, what sorts of 
phenomena can Lakoff’s hypothesis account for? Third, how can the relation between 
‘normal’ small-scale uses of imagery, as they are usually discussed in metaphor theory and 
cognitive grammar, and more generic (i.e. tool-like) schemas be understood? After this 
theoretical groundwork, in chapter 9, I will propose a theory of ontology based on highly 
schematic imagery. First, I will introduce Ronald Langacker’s (1987) Gestalt theory of the 
dynamic mental images that create language. By applying Langacker’s basic concepts to 
ethnographic evidence, I will then go through a number of recent issues raised in cognitive 
anthropology, such as essentialism, the transition between metaphor and metonymy, or 
figure-ground phenomena. I will also extensively discuss the difference between substance 
and process ontologies. In chapter 10, I will extend this analysis and study dynamic 
ontologies, e.g. through rituals that make us see the world differently. In chapters 11, 12, and 
13 I will enter into a discussion of image schemas that represent action sequences. 
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    As in Part I, a common thread running through this Part is the call for a disciplinary merger 
between anthropologists and linguists, and beyond. A rapprochement in methods and 
embracing a broad field of study is a precondition for reaping the full benefit of imagery 
theory. In the spirit of a research program as inclusive as possible, chapters 7 and 9 through 
12 will assemble evidence for half a dozen symbolic media, in which image schemas play a 
dominant role. Based on an ethnographic case study about a ritual, the concluding chapter 
13 will then present an integrated analysis of most of the previously discussed imagery 
modes and will suggest first steps towards a cognitive theory of multimediality based on 
imagery. 
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Chapter 7:                                                                                                      
More on Image Schemas 
 
This chapter has two objectives: First, I want complete the task started in chapter 1 by giving 
a full theoretical definition of image-schematic cognition on the basis of existing work in 
cognitive linguistics and psychology. Then, I want to delineate the amazing scope of cases in 
which the human mind uses schematic imagery, also including, and with special emphasis 
on, non-linguistic symbolic media. Together with the role of imagery in proprioception, which 
has extensively been treated in chapter 4, the evidence assembled here circumscribes an 
interdisciplinary paradigm of imagery studies. While no single field can be deeply entered 
into, I intend to give a near-comprehensive idea of where to look for imagistic phenomena 
other than in semantics. Together with a further extension of the field in the remaining 
chapters, this will set the ground for a model of how various image-schematic media interact 
and how, therefore, image schemas help us to understand multimedia cognition (chapter 13). 
 
1. A definition of image schemas 
“The term imagery highlights the fact that concepts originate as representations of sensory 
experience, even though they may subsequently undergo complex processes of formation and 
recombination.” (Palmer 1996: 46) 
 
EXTRACTIONS OF SKELETAL FEATURES FROM RICH IMAGES 
Two decades of cognitive semantics and a host of supporting findings in cognitive 
psychology substantiate the claim that much of human knowledge is not propositional (= 
sentence-like) or static. Instead it is structured by patterns of dynamic imagery resulting from 
the sensorimotor interactions of our body with the world. These patterns are called image 
schemas and emerge as experiential Gestalts as we manipulate objects, move our bodies 
through space, and direct our perceptual focus for various purposes (Johnson 1987, Lakoff 
1987; for an excellent summary see Gibbs and Colston 1995: 347). Cognitive linguistics has 
taken a leading role throughout the recent years in demonstrating the crucial importance of a 
series of very basic image schemas and of dynamic transformations that these can undergo 
before the mind’s eye. It is difficult to find any aspect of everyday thinking, reasoning, 
imagination, or social action that does not employ schematic structures such as CONTAINER, 
PATH, LINK, FORCE, UP-DOWN, BALANCE, CENTER-PERIPHERY, CYCLE, and many others, 
including new Gestalts that result of combinations of these. In addition, these structures can 
be mentally manipulated by a series of dynamic transformations: by ‘zooming’ in and out on 
a mental image, by scanning images in the same way we scan perceptual objects, by 
changing perspective, for example from an inside view to an outside view, by superimposing 
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two or more images, by switching between two images or merging them, by picking out 
particular segments from an image and highlighting (‘profiling’) them, or by switching 
between figure and ground of such an array. Since the rest of this work will be devoted to an 
analysis of these image schemas and image schema transformations in ontological and 
epistemological contexts, it will be good to review a number of important features of these 
mental operations. 
     It is best to start a tentative definition of image schemas with a clarification about what 
they are not: (1) they differ fundamentally from so-called propositional structures;80 and (2) 
they differ at least in degree from rich mental images. 
    First, what does it mean to say that image schemas are non-propositional mental 
structures? The basic metaphor defining the notion of ‘propositional’ is the sentence in 
language (for six definitional aspects of the term ‘propositional’ see Johnson 1987: 3). 
Thought is considered to be analogous in form to a sentence. In other words, it is seen as 
made up of a string of arbitrary discrete chunks that represent one thought atom each (their 
‘semantic’ content) and are linked by rules (the language’s ‘syntax’). Thus, propositional 
structures are held to bear no commonalties with their perceptual origins and to be encoded 
in a completely new representational language. This involves a transduction process from 
inputs into a neural system, in which symbols have arbitrary relations to the perceptual states 
that produce them. Propositional structures are what Barsalou et al. (1999: 209f) call 
‘amodal’. Image schemas, by contrast, are a perceptual symbol system and therefore 
‘modal’. Here perceptual states are not transduced into a completely new representational 
language. Instead, subsets of perceptual states are extracted to function symbolically, so that 
the extractions stand for referents in the world. They are transferred into memory, support 
higher cognitive functions, and enter into all forms of symbolic computation (ibid.). Because 
the symbols have the same structure as perceptual states, though more schematic, they can 
also be called ‘modal’. Image schemas are no sequential subject-predicate structures. They 
bear resemblance to perceptual states. And their coding format is analog, not digital, since 
they are extracted from perceptual states or creatively recombined from memory to simulate 
the structure of a possible perceptual state. 
    Second, image schemas are not rich, concrete images or mental pictures. A rich image or 
mental picture is always of some particular thing. An image schema, by contrast, contains 
only the structural features. It is a non-mimetic representation of entities. Another difference 
is that a rich image is always linked to one or more specific perceptual modalities, being 
either visual, acoustic, kinesthetic, haptic, olfactory, or gustatory. By contrast, image 
                                                 
80 It must be left open to future advances in cognitive science whether it actually makes sense to 
speak of propositional structures at all, or whether they can be collapsed into some complex array of 
analog cognition. 
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schemas are not tied to any single perceptual modality, although visual schemas seem to 
predominate, at least in our culture. It is crucial to recognize the role of image schemas in 
connecting structurally similar experiences across several modalities. They are what makes 
use recognize the similarity of an upward movement, path, or cycle that we see and an 
upward movement, path, or cycle in a piece of music. (The modalities offering the richest 
possibilities for image schemas are vision, hearing, and kinesthetic awareness, since these 
can also easily accommodate the recognition of extended temporal sequences. With respect 
to smell, taste, or tactile impressions image schemas of advanced complexity presumably 
occur only with few people.) Johnson (1987: 29) defines what a schema is, while at the same 
time explaining its functional role: 
 
“(I)n order for us to have meaningful, connected experiences that we can comprehend and reason 
about, there must be pattern and order to our actions, perceptions, and conceptions. A schema is a 
recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in, or of, these ongoing ordering activities. These patterns 
emerge as meaningful structures chiefly at the level of our bodily movements through space, our 
manipulation of objects, and our perceptual interactions.” 
 
So what are image schemas then? They are dynamic analog representations that extract 
skeletal structures from perceptual images or from rich mental pictures. Image schemas can 
take on any number of specific instantiations in varying contexts.81 They contain structural 
features common to many objects, events, body movements, and other activities. Image 
schemas are structures emerging through activity of the mind-body. Johnson (1987) purports 
to demonstrate that the knowledge of image schemas emerges out of bodily, kinesthetic 
activity. For example, even young babies pre-conceptually know the experience of being a 
CONTAINER for food, air, feces, and blood and being contained in other containers from the 
womb on. Later this pre-conceptual structure stored as knowledge of the body is used 
conceptually to structure abstract notions, such as categories. 
                                                 
81 Ultimately, the learning process leading to an abstract conceptualization is based on rich images 
and progressive moving away from their details. I would like to formulate the hypothesis that the 
overlaps between many rich images provided in illustration of an idea ultimately lead to abstraction. 
The notion of a mathematical set may serve as an illustration. When the teacher givens the image of a 
basket full of apples, then a basket full of pears, then of oranges, etc. as a means of explaining what a 
set is, the subsequent projected overlay of imagistic foils creates the image of a container with a 
number of objects inside of no particular kind. Beyond that, when the teacher explains that a container 
with two items inside is just as much a mathematical set as a container with fifty items, the student 
even learns to abstract away from concrete number and create a schematic image of an indiscriminate 
number of objects. 
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    Although image schemas are first learned as structural abstractions of percepts or rich 
images from the memory, they soon start to lead a life of their own. The patterns, after 
having been learned, may be stored independently and matched with new rich images when 
these are encountered or used purely in the abstract, as in mathematics. Even children are 
able to imagine a container, or the concept of balance, or a force in abstract without any 
perceptual input from which to abstract the structure. 
    The fact that image schemas are analog rather than digital mental structures is of some 
further relevance. Image schemas commit us to a specific perspective, just as is the case 
with real-life perception, although we may, in turn, imagistically construe the same situation 
from varying perspectives. The influential cognitive linguist Ronald Langacker (e.g. 1987a,b, 
1990a,b,c, 1991) attempts to show that language and thought generally operate on analog 
representations. If his theory is accurate, there can be no neutral or absolute perspective of 
thought, as the philosophy of Objectivism would have it. The detached and outside 
perspective on things is just a perspective like any other. Thus, image schemas always 
presume a sort of viewing arrangement.  
    Furthermore, image schemas occur as Gestalts. This means that even though their parts 
can be subjected to an analytical process of decomposition, in our mind they are stored as 
one whole that is more primary than its parts. For instance, the inside, the boundary, and the 
outside of a CONTAINER cannot be considered in isolation. In the case of such a basic 
schema the topological properties are mutually defining and constitute a whole relative to 
each other. When several simple image schemas such as CONTAINER, CENTER-PERIPHERY, 
and SCALE merge, this more complex construct again is stored as a Gestalt. Although such a 
compound image schema allows for analytical decomposition into parts that may be still 
familiar image schemas, the compound is presumably also recalled as an integral whole from 
memory, once it has been learned as a unit to optimize access speed. Such a process of 
increasing condensation into a Gestalt results when the participant schemas have repeatedly 
co-occurred in our experience. For example, recent experimental findings indicate that expert 
chess players store thousands of typical chessboard configurations, each of which can be 
economically accessed in a single image. From what we know about the powers of human 
cognition, this process of incremental aggregation can be continued to the highest levels of 
cognitive complexity. 
    Image schemas are defined more by structure than by quality. The principal reason why 
schematic shapes can be so helpful is that much of thinking is not concerned with the sheer 
matter or substratum of things but only with their structure (cf. Arnheim 1969: 129). On the 
gradient scale between rich images and image-schemas, the latter are by definition elevated 
to a higher level of schematicity, so that detail structure is cancelled out. Since qualia (= 
quality-related percepts) become ipso facto more dense the more concrete and sensory an 
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image is, as a consequence image schemas can only have a low measure of qualitative 
features by comparison. And when they do have some quality to them, they reduce rich 
quality to what may be called a common ‘quality structure’ that is shared across various 
instances of usage. 
    Image schemas are, at least very often, value-laden. Krzeszowski (1993) argues that 
many image schemas operate in polar pairs, such as WHOLE-PART, CENTER-PERIPHERY, 
BALANCE-IMBALANCE, and LINK-NO LINK. Cienki (1997: 5) extends this list and adds 
ENABLEMENT-BLOCKAGE, FULL-EMPTY, NEAR-FAR, MERGING-SPLITTING, and STRAIGHT-NOT 
STRAIGHT. Based on these polar opposites one parameter is frequently positively loaded and 
the other negatively. For example, the standard European mindset defines BALANCE, 
STRAIGHT, and LINK as positive, and their opposites as negative. Even less obviously polar 
schemas carry values, such as when in the PATH schema the goal is normally positively 
valued. Some evaluations such as the CONTAINER schema can depend on context. Thus, 
being inside can imply protection, but also breaching a taboo. 
    Furthermore, image schemas can be metaphorically extended from the physical to the 
non-physical. We can follow an argument just as we can follow a path or we can enter a 
state of anxiety just as we enter a space. We also perform inferences on the basis of image 
schemas. For example, the force of an argument is metaphorically conceptualized as 
compulsion, just as physical force constrains us in a certain direction (for an analysis of 
modal verbs in English as force images see Sweetser 1987). Similarly, categories 
conceptualized as containers allow inferences based on spatial logic. Classical container 
logic cases are transitivity or the law of the excluded-middle. If A is contained in B, and B in 
C, then it transitively follows that A is also contained in C. D must be either inside the 
container E or outside it, both at the same time or a bit of both is logically impossible. 
Therefore, we can say that image schemas embody particular patterns of spatial logic 
perceived in physical reality. 
    Arguably, at least part of the phenomenon of synesthesia must be accounted for by image 
schematic similarity. A classic experiment in Gestalt psychology shows that the word 
“MOLUMO” is associated with round images, whereas “TAKETE” evokes sharp, angular 
visual images. It seems that the sound structure of the word is iconic. Not only the sounds of 
the words taken on their own, even the movements of the speech apparatus required to 
produce them conform to this pattern. This is apparent in the necessity of swift and angular 
changes of the tongue-position for saying “TAKETE” compared to the rather round and 
flowing transitions in “MOLUMO” or the roundness of the mouth in producing the O-sounds in 
the latter. Some kinds of such synesthetic phenomena are culturally universal, as was 
argued in chapter 4, either by virtue of universal ecological topology or else by hardwiring 
(e.g. ‘loud’ is universally likened to ‘bright’ and ‘sharp’, rather than to ‘dark’ and ‘dull’.) 
 297 
    It has been said that image schemas are analog but non-mimetic representations; they 
contain less detail than percepts. How can the relationship between image schemas, rich 
images, and perceptual data be described then? First, the difference between mimetic and 
non-mimetic representations, say between a more detailed and a more abstracting copy of a 
visual image, is always only a matter of degree. Despite the differences described above 
there are some similarities between rich mental images and image schemas. Gibbs and 
Colston (1995: 356) point out that experimental studies show mental images to be typically 
less detailed than the principled contrast to image schemas formulated by Johnson (1987) 
and Lakoff (1987) would imply. They are no veridical copies of what has been perceived. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that visual images themselves are typically constructed on 
the basis of underlying concepts a person is already familiar with. As Palmer (1996: 47) says, 
existing “conceptual schemas prime our senses to respond to a limited range of sensory 
experiences, as when we scan a book looking only for certain topics.” Such schemas are like 
tinted glasses filtering reality. Therefore, the sediments of schematic knowledge from past 
experiences play a role in novel acts of perception. All this points to the conclusion that there 
is no strict separation between rich images and abstractive image schemas. Rather, they are 
situated on a sliding scale and an abstract image can often be effortlessly enriched by 
attending to it more closely, just as a rich image can become more skeletal as it recedes into 
the background of our attention. (For a good introduction to this see Palmer 1996: 47-51, and 
for a comprehensive overview of two decades of psychological research see Finke 1989). 
    Although the richest body of evidence exploring image schemas comes from the study of 
language, image schema structure can be found in all sorts of different elements of our 
experience. In what might be, loosely speaking, called ‘direct’ perception there are physical 
objects, sounds (including iconic and phonological structures of language), and the 
sequential structure of events or movements that contain image-schematic structure. 
Concerning perceptions of the kind that draw on symbolic background cognition more heavily 
there is the imagery that is (indirectly) evoked by the semantic meaning of words and other 
language-like systems. 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF BASIC IMAGE SCHEMAS 
According to Johnson and Lakoff, image schemas are embodied structures that are present 
in preconceptual experiences of our body. A few examples can show what sort of very 
commonplace and universal experiences give rise to image schemas, even in very young 
children. Parts of the descriptions given here can be found in Lakoff’s (1987: 272-76) 
introductory overview and Johnson’s (1987: 126) listing of schemas. Alan Cienki (1997) 
offers a more comprehensive list together with considerations of how they form compounds: 
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    The CONTAINER schema defines the basic distinction between in and out and is constituted 
by the topological elements of ‘interior’, ‘boundary’, and ‘exterior’. It is experientially 
motivated by experiences of the body as a container and of the body as contained in rooms 
and other spaces. It may be linked with the PART-WHOLE and the CENTER-PERIPHERY schema. 
    The PART-WHOLE schema comprises the elements ‘whole’, ‘parts’, and ‘configuration’. The 
schema is experientially motivated by the perception of our body and other objects as wholes 
with parts. In order to get around in the world we have to filter meaningful entities from the 
perceptual blur and thus distinguish particular configurations in our environment. 
    The CENTER-PERIPHERY schema comprises an entity with a ‘center’ and a ‘periphery’. The 
first motivating experience is our own body, which has central part, such as the trunk or 
head, and peripheries, such as fingers, toes, or hair. The centers are more important than 
the peripheries, because injuries to our vital organs affect us more fundamentally than those 
to the peripheral organs, i.e. we can go on living as the same entity when we cut our 
fingernails or even when we lose a limb, but not when we lose our head. Moreover, the 
periphery depends on the center, but not vice versa. 
    The LINK schema consists of two entities A and B, and a link connecting them. It is 
experientially motivated even through our first link, the umbilical cord. Throughout our infancy 
and childhood we learn to hold on to our parents and objects, either to secure our location or 
theirs. A more refined version of the schema construes it as a CONDUIT through which things 
can pass from A to B. Thus it is also related to the PATH schema. 
    The SOURCE-PATH-GOAL (or simply PATH) schema includes a starting point, an end point, a 
sequence of contiguous locations connecting the two, and a direction toward the destination. 
Every movement of our bodies starts from a place, moves into a direction, covers a 
trajectory, and lets us eventually wind up in another place. This schema may be linked with 
the FORCE schema and the LINK (or CONDUIT) schema. 
    Other important schemas shaped by our kinesthetic and bodily experience relate to FORCE 
dynamics and include BLOCKAGE, internal ENABLEMENT, COMPULSION (either as PUSHING or 
PULLING), COUNTERFORCE, RESTRAINT-REMOVAL, and ATTRACTION. The schema may occur 
within more complex ones, such as MOMENTUM, and it may be combined with other equally 
basic schemas, such as CONTAINER, to yield PENETRATION or EXPULSION. A related schema 
where force relations play a central role is BALANCE. The latter is also linked to PART-WHOLE 
and CENTER-PERIPHERY. 
    Still other schemas have to do with the relative position of two or more objects in relation 
to one another, yielding CONTACT-APARTNESS, FULL-EMPTY, UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, NEAR-
FAR. In combination with PATH a series of objects may result in LINEAR ORDER. This in turn 
may be linked with UP-DOWN or FRONT-BACK. It is worth noting that particularly (but not 
exclusively) in this group the schemas can be realized in either a static or in a dynamic 
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fashion (Cienki 1997: 6). Most of these spatial prepositions in English refer either to location 
or to motion, depending on their context (cf. “He is standing over there” vs. “He is coming 
over”).  
    A large group of fairly complex image schemas capture the basic structure of movements, 
either temporal or spatial, such as CYCLE and ITERATION, MATCHING, SPLITTING, MERGING, 
COLLECTING, ENTERING, DIPPING, CLIMBING, FALLING, COVERING, ERUPTING, CONVERGING, 
EXPANDING, ABSORBING, THROWING, POURING, etc. Some dynamic schemas are general-
purpose mechanisms employed with all sorts of schemas, such as SUPERIMPOSITION (= the 
combination of two or more schemas) and COUNT-MASS (also called MULTIPLEX-MASS), i.e. the 
‘zooming’ into and out of cognitive detail of any Gestalt image. 
    As Cienki (1997: 6f) points out, image schemas can always be realized in a dynamic or 
static fashion. For example, a PATH schema is dynamic as we are moving on it and a static 
thing when we look back on the route that we have traversed. Likewise, FULL can either be 
realized as the process of filling or as the resulting state of a full container. In general, any 
processual image schemas can be construed with ‘end point focus’, meaning that the 
resulting state is highlighted. Thus, BALANCE, often understood as a process of maintaining 
equilibrium, can also be conceived as a state achieved. The relation between processes and 
states can be explained as that between a movement and its trace. The trace, in fact, is that 
of a mental scanning activity, i.e. the memory of a movement that once took place. Although 
some image schemas are more likely to be either manifested as static or dynamic, even 
these sometimes occur in the opposite manner. For example, the canonically static 
CONTAINER schema can also be construed from a motion of an object on a cyclical path, such 
as a sheepdog running around a herd of sheep and containing them. Conversely, the 
normally dynamic COMPULSION schema can be experienced as static when blockage and 
counterforce are present, e.g. when one is pushed by a crowd, but so stuck that one is 
unable to move.  
    Image schemas occur on different levels of specificity (Clausner/Croft 1997). Some are 
more detailed and others are more abstract, although, naturally enough, none are very 
concrete because that would exclude them from our category of schemas. Simply put, the 
higher the level of schematicity, the more other mental objects can be recognized as similar 
at the expense of reduced detail structure. As was shown in chapter 1, different cognitive 
tasks have an optimal level of schematicity. It is by no means infrequent that schematization 
goes on to an extremely abstract level. On this level we find schemas, such as ENTITY, 
PROCESS, STRUCTURE, or SYSTEM, also referred to as ‘ontological metaphors’. The enormous 
importance of these schemas will be a central focus of the following chapters. For the time 
being, it is of major importance to realize that schemas of high and low schematicity stand in 
a relation of inclusion rather than in a relation of contrast. That is to say that any more 
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concrete schema, say ENTERING, will ipso facto contain the schematic structure of PROCESS 
(and, of course, a good deal of more specifically elaborated detail on top of that). By the 
same token, SPLITTING, COVERING, and EXPANDING can be subsumed under PROCESS. The 
same relation holds for STRAIGHT, SCALE, and CYCLE which are governed by PATH, and FULL-
EMPTY or CENTER-PERIPHERY which are governed by CONTAINER, etc. (Cienki 1997: 12). It is 
possible to say that on the highest level of schematicity what has been called schema 
corresponds to a basic operational type of imagery. Hence, the distinction between ENTITY 
and PROCESS emerges from a distinction of different types of scanning activity, one summary 
and static (‘end point focus’), the other sequential and dynamic. According to Langacker 
(1987a: 145), we can process a complex scene as a single configuration in which all facets 
are conceived as coexistent and simultaneous or as a series of successively transforming 
states. 
     So it would seem that there is a stock of minimal image schematic elements, each of 
which emerges in embodied experiences of several kinds. Since any individual image 
schema resides in many kinds of experience, it makes little sense to speak of a specific 
source domain any more. It is more appropriate to say that once an image schema has been 
learned (and this happens in most cases within the first months after birth) it creates 
generalized expectational patterns for novel acts of perception and thought. Thus, the image-
schematic patterns we use with such a tremendous frequency have become a fixed part of 
our stock of cognitive tools. 
 
HOW CAN WE FIND IMAGE SCHEMAS? 
The cognitive reality of image schemas can be demonstrated by several psychological 
experiments and developmental data (see the overview by Gibbs 1994: 412-417). 
Furthermore, image schemas can be inferred from linguistic data. Most importantly, they are 
powerful explanatory principles for understanding how the various meanings of polysemous 
words are related and for explaining schematic similarities responsible for metaphor 
comprehension. (In a later chapter I will present evidence that they can also suggestively 
explain the building structures of cognitive tools.) Finally, image schemas can be found in 
various sorts of non-linguistic data. These include studies of sign language (Wilcox 1993, 
Taub 1997), the study of gestural meaning (McNeill 1992, Cienki 1998), the study of 
emblems and pictures (Forceville 1998), the study of musical images (Cook 1990), and the 
study of action schemas (Bailey et al. 1998). 
    Much linguistic evidence on image schemas comes from the study of polysemy in spatial 
propositions, which of course describe the most directly kinesthetic and spatial domain. 
Claudia Brugman (1981/1988) and George Lakoff (1987) analyze the image schematic basis 
of the English preposition OVER. With regard to other English prepositions Susan Lindner 
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(1981) produces similar work on UP and OUT, while Rainer Schulze (1988, 1993, 1994) 
contributes a series of somewhat shorter articles on DOWN, (A)ROUND, and OFF. Lakoff (1987: 
460) lists image-schematic analyses of semantic features by other linguists from Cora, 
French, Indonesian, Russian, Polish, and Dutch. A recommendable and comprehensive 
theoretical treatment of the combined cognitive principles necessary to process spatial 
prepositions can be found in Annette Herskovits (1988). Her contribution is valuable for 
understanding the complex interaction between prototypical ideal-types, factors of situational 
salience and relevance, tolerance-margins, and purely conventional use-types. Her article 
also includes an overview of the spatial Gestalt principles underlying the imagery through 
which prepositions are understood. 
    Gibbs et al. (1994) are successful at showing experimentally that the different senses of 
the English word ‘stand’ are motivated by different image schemas that arise from the bodily 
experience of standing. Gibbs and Colston (1995: 351-52) summarize this: 
 
“Consider the word stand in the following sentences: Please stand at attention. He wouldn’t stand for 
such treatment. The clock stands on the mantle. The law still stands. He stands six-foot five. The part 
stands for the whole and She had a one-night stand with a stranger. Some of theses sentences refer 
to the physical act of standing (e.g., Please stand at attention, The clock stands on the mantle, He 
stands six-foot five) while others have non-physical, perhaps figurative, interpretations (e.g., We stood 
accused of the crime, The part stands for the whole, He wouldn’t stand for such treatment.)”  
 
In a preliminary experiment it was sought to determine which of a set of 12 known schemas 
reflected the participants’ intuitions about their experience of standing. They were guided 
through a series of bodily exercises to make them think about their experience of standing 
more consciously. Then they were asked to rate the degree of relatedness of the 12 
schemas to the activity of standing. The result were five schemas: BALANCE, VERTICALITY, 
CENTER-PERIPHERY, RESISTANCE, and LINKAGE. In a second experiment the participants were 
asked to sort 35 senses of ‘stand’ into groups. It turned out that physical and non-physical, 
figurative senses were often grouped together (e.g. ‘stand at attention’ was grouped with 
metaphorical senses such as ‘let the issue stand’ and ‘to stand the test of time’). In a third 
experiment the participants were again guided through exercises and then asked to rate the 
degree of relatedness between the five image schemas found in experiment 1 and the 
different expressions using ‘stand’ from experiment 2. It turned out that the image schema 
profiles for different senses of ‘stand’ from experiment 3 corresponded closely with the 
similarity ratings from experiment 2 and could predict 79% of the groupings. This revealed 
that people’s similarity judgments can be attributed to tacit understandings of how different 
image schemas motivate different patterns. This was also confirmed by a fourth experiment 
that cross-checked for context-effects due to similarities in social use and proved that these 
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do not play any important role. In sum, the experiments strongly support the hypothesis that 
the polysemous meanings of ‘stand’ are partly motivated by image schemas that arise out of 
the bodily experience of standing: different senses of the word are understood on the basis 
of an underlying image schema profile, which emphasized a certain portion of the experience 
of standing and backgrounded other portions. It is unfortunate that not more experimental 
studies of the same kind have been undertaken in the past. Due to the fact that, to a large 
extent, image schemas occur as a part of the cognitive unconscious guided experiments 
such as this, which evoke tacit knowledge, are extremely valuable. 
 
IMAGE SCHEMA TRANSFORMATIONS 
There is considerable experimental evidence for the fact that image schemas can be moved, 
rotated, projected, and otherwise deliberately manipulated in the mind, much as if they were 
physical objects. Research on mental imagery has shown how people can perform such 
kinesthetic image schema transformations. If subjects are asked to imagine simple 
geometrical shapes and rotate them in the mind, this transformation takes up some time in 
proportion with the rotation’s degree. Even the congenitally blind can perform such 
transformations with ease, if a little slower than people with sight (see Lakoff 1987: 445). 
These transformations are experientially based, i.e. they reflect important aspects of our 
kinesthetic, visual, or auditory experience.  Since a given schema may derive not from sight 
only, but also from hearing and moving, its format transcends any specific sense modality 
and can form the basis for the recognition of synesthetic effects. For a better understanding, 
you can try out several image schema transformations yourself. Mark Johnson (1987: 26) 
gives quite specific instructions for a few examples:   
 
“a) Path-focus to end-point-focus: Follow, in imagination, the path of a moving object, and then focus 
on the point where it comes to rest, or where it will come to rest. 
b) Multiplex to mass: Imagine a group of several objects. Move away (in your mind) from the group 
until the cluster of individuals starts to become a single homogeneous mass. Now move back to the 
point where the mass turns once again into a cluster. 
c) Following a trajectory: As we perceive a continuously moving object, we can mentally trace the path 
it has traversed or the trajectory it is about to traverse. 
d) Superimposition: Imagine a large sphere and a small cube. Increase the size of the cube until the 
sphere can fit inside it. Now reduce the size of the cube and put it within the sphere.” 
 
Because of its tremendous general importance a few additional words should be said about 
superimposition. In fact, superimposition is a basic feature of mental imagery. It needs to be 
understood in this context that when two or more simple image schemas can be mentally 
superimposed on one another to generate a single complex schema, this compound schema 
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again has the properties of a Gestalt. The resulting Gestalt features make possible the 
simultaneous grasp of what such a complex concept means. All sorts of complex mental 
schemas can be added to by superimposing another feature. A simpler schema will usually 
assimilate an additional facet into its Gestalt, so as to create a more complex schematic 
compound, whenever the added facet recurs across a sufficient number of the schema’s 
usage events. Later we shall examine a second, cognate type of transformation in which the 
two images imagined are not really compatible, so that they resist assimilation into a 
simultaneous image. Yet they are combined in a way that projects part of their features 
together or alternates between images. This I will call Gestalt switch. 
    There are numerous other spatial transformations that can be performed before the mind’s 
eye, some of which I will introduce later. Such transformations are present in many everyday 
cognitive tasks. The example of handling a herd of animals furnishes an example where 
several of these transformations interact (Gibbs and Colston 1995: 351). In order for a 
shepherd to successfully navigate a large flock of sheep, the prime objective is to maintain 
the cohesiveness of the herd. When one or several animals drift away from the flock, which 
is an instance of a transformation from a mass to multiplex, the shepherd must take 
corrective action. This requires her to ascertain the presumable trajectory and destination of 
the stray animals, so that the rest of the flock can be driven in a way as to reunite them. This 
task is an example of path-focus to end-point focus, where the shepherd has to calculate the 
position of two or more imagined paths in relation to each other and readjust the own path to 
counter the drifters veering off. The example of navigating an animal herd also shows that 
image schema transformations may interact with other image schemas. This is the case 
because the maintenance of the herd’s cohesion as a mass requires the practical application 
of a BALANCE schema. When animals drift away from the herd the necessary equilibrium has 
been lost and must be restored. Presumably, an experienced shepherd has a schema of the 
optimal cohesion of a flock or herd, so that it can be swiftly driven without falling apart, a 
cohesion which she tries to maintain by countering all drifting movements that threaten the 
balance. 
    One of the most frequent image schema transformations is frequently referred to as 
‘profiling’, following Langacker (1987a), but might also be called FOREGROUND-BACKGROUND. 
Profiling means picking out a segment of a mental image and foregrounding it as a focus of 
attention. The backgrounded elements remain present to a certain degree, but the 
foregrounded portions of the mental image determine the relative focus of the representation. 
The way central schemas create a unity of their derivative variants can be explained by 
different emphases of profile. Exemplary in this respect is Dewell’s (1994) critical 
reassessment of Brugman’s (1981/1988) and Lakoff’s (1987) work on the cognitive 
semantics of OVER. Before going into details, it should be said that this body of literature 
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starts from the assumption that image schemas embody the core meaning of polysemous 
lexemes that are subject to extension and specification. Dewell gives a cogent demonstration 
how the different senses of the English OVER derive from an arc-path schema that semi-
encloses a landmark below it. Through a review of Dewell’s work I intend to show that many 
senses of OVER directly correspond to different image schema transformations of the central 
schema.82 The example will allow three important observations about image schema 
transformations:  
(1) The most basic OVER uses are differently profiled variants of a simple central 
schema.  
(2) In many other cases the schematic core, nevertheless, lies embedded in a more 
complex image.  
(3) Other variants split off from the central schema by introducing additional 
schematic features and dropping some original features, thus gradually transforming 
an image schema transformation of one particular kind into derivative or kin variants 
in a chaining process.  
 
The basic schema is, if we follow Dewell, an arc-like trajectory of the following sort: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following basic OVER-expressions merely differ by virtue of evoking distinct profiles of the 
basic schema from a two-dimensional side-view perspective. For instance, “The airplane is 
flying over” corresponds to a profiling of the central region near the peak of the arc. “Sam fell 
over the cliff” corresponds to a profile of the downward trajectory of the second half of the arc 
from the intermediate peak to the end point. Likewise “The sun came up over the mountains” 
profiles the first half of the arc up to the peak. (However, such uses of OVER are relatively 
rare, because such situations do not usually imply a continuation of the path word semi-
                                                 
82 The reason why I prefer this analysis to its precursors is Dewell’s successful demonstratation that 
unnecessary explanatory features such, as the shape of the landmark and the presence of contact or 
sub-schemas (for ABOVE and ACROSS), posited by Brugman and Lakoff, can be done away with. 
Different image schema transformations – most importantly profiling – of a central arc-shaped image 
schema are sufficient to explain all the variants of OVER expressions. By eliminating the remaining 
propositional features from Brugman and Lakoff, Dewell’s analysis embraces a truly imagistic 
perspective. 
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enclosing the landmark.) “The plane should be over Baltimore by now” pauses the focus in 
‘freeze-frame’ suspension at the peak of the arc. Here OVER is nearly synonymous with 
ABOVE, except that it retains a backgrounded sense of continued motion. Other applications 
of OVER such as “Sam is over the bridge now” focus on the resulting end point of the 
movement. Although the somewhat different “Sam lives over the bridge” does not mean that 
he took the bridge to get there, a subjective mental motion that traverses the path over the 
bridge from a prior location is implied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In other expressions OVER can denote a linear-extending trajector such as in “We stretched 
the rope over the yard”. Note that, in contradistinction to ACROSS it still implies a 
backgrounded curving motion of the rope’s leading point, e.g. a lifting and dropping action. In 
metaphorical expressions such as “watch over”, “power over”, and ”grieve over” a diffuse 
covering movement over an object is implied. Some expressions do not focus on a leading 
point, as in the case of a rope, but on a leading portion of the trajector, so that a sequence of 
arcs corresponds to each point of it, as is the case for the cue in “She hit him over the head 
with a pool cue”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 stretch the rope over the yard hit over the head 
the sun rises over 
the mountains 
the plane is flying over fall over the cliff 
the plane is over Baltimore live over the bridge 
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Arc-like trajectories are not limited to a two-dimensional perspective and an idealized side-
view of the motion. A three-dimensional trajector with a leading edge is imagined in “He 
draped the sheet over the clothesline”. In the case of flowing substances the leading edge 
may be moving outward in several directions as in “She poured the syrup out over the 
pancakes”. The trajector is planar here and extends outwards in multiple directions, 
ultimately semi-enclosing the landmark in at least one of these directions. Expressions like 
“The beer ran over the sides of the glass” describe a similar multi-directional planar arc that 
is put over the glass like an over-turned bowl. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An alternative with some tendency to split off from the central schema can be seen in “We 
had to drive over a bad stretch of road” or “She walked over a field to get to the road”. Here, 
steps or the rotation of wheels are conceived as a succession of downward arc-like motions 
on a linear path, which are scanned as they unfold in time. Similarly, but less obviously than 
with rotation or steps, “He ran his finger over the scratch in the wall” evokes an oblique 
laying-down motion. It might be argued that this is a flattened version of semi-enclosure. 
Constantly exerted pressure might be kinesthetically conceived as a succession of 
downward arcs. This covering-path schema also occurs in temporal uses, such as “do it 
over” and “over Christmas”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For some OVER-expressions the tendency toward diminished importance of the central 
schema reaches the point of making it marginal. Cases such as “He held his hands over his 
walk over the field 
drape the sheets over run over pour over 
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eyes” and “She put the coat on over her dress” suggest additional accompanying images 
associated with ‘covering’. It might even be said that such planar senses of covering are in 
some respect inconsistent with the central schema. Instead of the vertical peak and fixed 
vertical orientation these senses are oriented only in relation to the landmark’s surface (i.e. 
the eyes or the dress). These expressions may be considered as related to the uses of 
planar motion discussed in the previous paragraph, but no longer very closely to the central 
schema of the arc that presumably was the original sense of OVER. The same sole 
orientation with respect to the landmarks surface is present in “He put the ring over her 
finger”, “He pulled his pants up over his navel” and “The water came up over her knees”. A 
similar example is “He walked all over the field”, where a single trajector traces a random 
multiplex of paths which may converge to ‘cover’ a landmark like an extending mass. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These split-off schemas notwithstanding, all OVER expressions can be said to share some 
sort of ‘family resemblance’ (Wittgenstein 1953). All variants relate to some other variants by 
sharing some image-schematic features with them, even if not all variants share all of the 
features. There seems to be at least one central feature that no variant of OVER easily lets go 
of. That the evoked sense of the trajector’s movement in relation to a landmark is crucial can 
be nicely illustrated when compared to ON and ABOVE. Because of this active sense of 
movement it is implied that the trajector ‘does something to’ the landmark. “A band aid over a 
hands over the 
eyes 
put the ring over the finger walk all over 
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cut implies shielding it and obscuring it from view; a band aid on a cut is simply located 
there.” (p. 374). Likewise, in the case of a sign over a door there seems to be an abstract 
predictive relation from the sign to the door, a sense of ‘closeness’ or ’influence’, whereas a 
sign above the door is simply placed on a separate, higher plane than the door without any 
predicative relation implied. Alverson (1991: 116f, 1994: 27f) independently makes the same 
observation. In his view, OVER retains a characteristic “sense of intimacy of intentional 
connection” between landmark and trajector that ABOVE lacks. Arguably, it is the inherent 
movement aspect in the OVER schema that creates a predicative relation: OVER always 
involves a scanning of either the trajector’s motion as a whole or of its extended shape with 
respect to the landmark (cf. “The tablecloth is over the table”). Another factor responsible for 
a sense of closeness is that OVER frequently suggest subjective identification with the 
landmark that is enclosed or that the movement converges on. For example, “The sky over 
us” invites a construal from the perspective of the people rather than the sky, so that an arch 
spanning the top of the oval visual field appears that conveys the feeling of covering. 
    Building on Lakoff (1987), Gary Palmer (1996: 72) specifies two different principles that 
are operative in the chaining process. ‘Instance links’ add detail to a schematic information: 
For example, “The plane flew over” is highest in schematicity, “Sam drove over the bridge” 
adds the two specifications of an extended landmark and contact, and “Sam lives over the 
hill” introduces an end-point focus on top of that. The latter are only more elaborated 
instances of the basic schema and are logically fully compatible with it. By contrast, ‘similarity 
links’ are links between slightly altered instances. For example, “The bird flew over the yard” 
is similar to “Sam drove over the bridge” because of the extended landmark, but different 
because there is no contact. They are imagistically not fully compatible. 
    Dewell’s re-analysis of OVER reveals yet another fact about image schemas that is of 
tremendous importance. Apparently, a profiled segment may come to stand for a schema of 
which it is canonically a part. For example, it can be sufficient to perceive or imagine a 
characteristic part of a trajectory to automatically reconstruct the rest of it. Often the final 
portion of a directed movement is capable of evoking the whole path that has been covered 
before. This insight seems to be of particular importance for understanding the cognitive 
force of static visual symbols. Most importantly it is only by virtue of this feature that a static 
object is capable of evoking a movement on a trajectory. A fine example would be an arrow 
on a signpost, which evokes the path that a real arrow ideally would have taken before the 
mind’s eye. 
 
2. Image schemas in a plurality of media 
After this theoretical introduction I will now attempt a first overview of the extraordinary scope 
of image-schematic thought. The aim is to show that spatialized thought is a stock item of our 
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cognitive repertory, linguistic or non-linguistic, and perhaps a touchstone of thought itself. 
Image schemas occur in many symbolic media spanning perceptual objects, mental objects, 
and embodied states. The evidence assembled here will prepare the ground for of a 
summary sketch of multimediality based on image schemas in the final chapter. I ask the 
reader for patience here, because a systematic account encompassing further loci of image 
schemas requires theoretical prerequisites from the chapters ahead. Let us start where we 
just left off after Dewell’s case study, namely momentum schemas. 
 
MORE ON TRANSFORMATIONS: MOMENTUM 
Several studies point to the fact that mental imagery is constrained by the kinesthetic 
experience of moving objects. There is an important body of empirical research that studies 
the internalized representation of physical momentum (summarized by Gibbs and Colston 
1995: 357-361). We experience visual momentum in observing the movement of heavy 
objects that continue their path even when they encounter other objects. Likewise, we 
experience kinesthetic momentum when we run at such a high speed that we cannot stop in 
time before an impediment or sharply change our direction at a corner, or when a massive 
moving object hits us. The building up of our body functions in a way that they cannot be 
stopped lets us experience internal momentum, e.g. our breath or our pulse accelerating, our 
bladder expanding, or the force of a seizure. We experience auditory momentum when 
thunder builds up to a crescendo or when the sounds of a steam engine accelerate. Both, 
crescendo in loudness and increase of tempo are frequently used in music to convey the 
idea of momentum. Thus, there seems to be a representation of momentum that is 
schematic and not linked to any specific modality. It is abstracted away from our experiences 
of seeing momentum, hearing momentum, and kinesthetically feeling momentum. We can 
presume that once the image-schematic expectation is formed and internalized into a 
transmodal image in the young child neither the visual is exactly derivative of the auditive nor 
the other way round, but both are stored in a format that correlates its similarities across 
sensory modalities. 
    In a series of studies conducted in laboratory settings sequences of static images were 
presented to the participants which appeared to be moving on a path, tilting over, or rotating. 
It was found in memory tests that the final position remembered by the subjects had 
undergone a shift in the direction of the implied motion in which an actual object with 
momentum might have come to rest. Such effects have been experimentally found for both 
visual and auditory stimuli. Parts of the evidence might be explained by the ‘good 
continuation’ principle, which is one of the classic features observed by Gestalt psychology. 
However, the quantitative differences, such as the fact that representational distortions 
increase with the implied velocity of the display, can only be predicted by a model based on 
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the specific real-world experiences with physical momentum. Presumably, representational 
momentum arises from the internalization of the principles of visual momentum, which form 
an automatic default expectation that leads to a phenomenon of ‘seeing as’ based on our 
experience. The presence of experience-based constraints on memory was further confirmed 
by additional experiments. If displacements between the phases of the presented objects 
would go beyond what could be realistically expected for real-world momentum, the effect 
would go away. Furthermore, it turned out that memory displacement was greater for 
horizontal movements than for vertical movements, which may reflect the predominance of 
vertical movement in our environment. It could also be shown that our experience of gravity 
affected the displacement. Objects going up had less momentum, presumably being slowed 
down by gravity, while objects coming down were displaced more, presumably being further 
accelerated.  
    It is not difficult to see that the MOMENTUM schema co-occurs in more complex Gestalts 
with other image schemas discussed before or can be created by the transformation of 
several such other image schemas, like LANDMARK, PATH, BLOCKAGE, REMOVAL OF BLOCKAGE, 
and GOAL. When we attend to a static object we first invoke a LANDMARK schema. As it starts 
to move we transform this into a PATH schema by also attending to the path of the landmark. 
If the movement is blocked by another object, which is then removed by the force (BLOCKAGE 
/ BLOCKAGE-REMOVAL schemas), we can determine the likely end-point of the moving object. 
In this way we transform the PATH image schema into a MOMENTUM image schema and then 
into an ENDPOINT FOCUS or GOAL schema. In line with many experimental studies that show 
the primacy of moving and temporal events, we can say in conclusion that the study of 
MOMENTUM indicates that dynamic events are represented through Gestalts incorporating a 
series of image schemas. These are often the basic units of experience. We will now turn to 
an example where momentum occurs in a political emblem and takes on a particular socio-
cultural meaning. 
 
THE IMAGE-SCHEMATIC IMPACT OF EMBLEMS 
Apart from traffic signs, ads, and logos, it is perhaps most notably political symbology that 
makes use of image-schematic dynamism of symbols. Take as an example the ancient Indo-
Iranian symbol of the swastika, which was adopted and revived by the National Socialists. 
Arnheim (1969: 143) performs a cogent analysis of the reasons why the symbol was so 
extremely well-chosen to become the notorious Fascist emblem. For one thing the black 
figure in a white and red setting helped revive colors of the German empire and thereby 
appeal to nationalism. Apart from that, its clean geometry was in keeping with the modern 
taste for functional design. For the educated it evoked the Aryan race. It was of distinctness 
and striking simplicity. In all this, at least two image-schematic mechanisms appear to be 
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significant in the swastika, if we focus on its formal features, one of them with strong 
synesthetic associations. These two features are the swastika’s tilted orientation and its 
angularity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The swastika’s tilted orientation was perfectly suited to convey the purported dynamics of the 
Nazi ‘Movement’. (Incidentally, the Communist hammer and sickle and many other emblems 
have the same tilted orientation. Similar effects are used in the non-political branch of 
publicity, in advertising.) A momentum is visible in the swastika’s shape, which follows 
directly from our prototypical experience with objects subject to gravitational pull. In contrast 
to a vertically symmetrical object, which is canonically perceived to be in rest and in a 
position of stable support, a tilted shape is in a position where, according to our everyday 
experience it must be unstable or falling if not suspended. Another association to do with 
momentum that is made possible through the emblem’s tilted position is the figure of a 
runner. A final association responsible for the momentum is due to the wheel-like shape, 
which the swastika evokes by a combination of two features. The spokes of a wheel are 
there in the radial beams, so are ‘movement lines’ that emerge from perceiving the four 
angular crossbars as ensemble. Presumably, even cultures not knowing wheels (or spokes) 
would experience the symbol as dynamic on grounds of the latter aspect only. Given that the 
image is scanned from the central point of intersection and the bars are metaphorically 
construed as an inside-out path, this should be the case because the sharp change of 
direction where the beams meet the crossbars suggests velocity (much force is needed 
experientially to change an object’s direction substantially). This again reflects the above 
observations about the MOMENTUM schema by Gibbs and Colston. 
    A second feature that is cognitively highly potent is the straight-edged angularity of the 
image. Again at least two aspects contribute here, both of which are synesthetic in nature, 
i.e. both are know from experiences in other sense modalities. The first association with 
angularity is a basic and possibly quite universal one. It says, “of edges be wary!” (note, for 
example, that danger signposts are triangular rather than round). Incisiveness and possibly 
aggression is evoked by an edge. On the other hand, if the image is put into the German 
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context of the 19th and early 20th centuries angularity might evoke an image of Prussian 
efficiency, a sharpness, simplicity, and directness together with the dynamism and vitality 
suggested by the tilted orientation. This, of course, was meant to evoke a military habitus as 
well as a particular ideological orientation of expansionism, conservatism, hierarchy, 
suprematism and strength that was traditionally further associated with Prussian angularity. 
For more evidence on the same in cosmology and art see the section below on primary 
shapes. A few additional aspects of synesthetic shapes can be gleaned from the article by 
Kennedy et al. (1993) on metaphoric devices in pictures, including a brief discussion whether 
these have intrinsic meaning or depend on social convention (p. 251ff). 
    The principles of yin and yang in Chinese cosmology can be analyzed in a similar manner. 
Yin and yang are two cosmological forces underlying matter and spirit alike. As Ohnuki-
Tierney (1991: 167) states, yin and yang represent relative proportions or degrees of 
significance rather than separate and antagonistic qualities. The two are complementary to 
each other in the sense that neither is meaningful without the other. It is not necessary to 
provide a closer description of the characteristics associated with the two poles. Instead we 
can focus on the overall process of interaction between them and see how it is imagistically 
conceived. This is best depicted in the well-known circular emblem. (I would argue that the 
process between yin and yang is understood independently of this imagistic mediating device 
through the same spatialized model of complementary yet confluent forces.) According to 
Ohnuki-Tierney, this emblem of yin and yang stands for a universe representing  
 
“a process or movement in which one principle grows in time into the other, and vice versa. When the 
small eye of yang in yin grows large enough, it becomes yang with the small eye of yin in it. The 
curved dividing line between the two halves of the iconographic image consequently is not a 
permanent line. Rather it represents a movement.” (ibid.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Several aspects of the image can be isolated, although all of them can be simultaneously 
understood through the Gestalt image:  
 313 
    First, there are the two features of roundness and closure. Both create an image of 
wholeness. The black and the white shapes in the circle represent the two forces as a part of 
a whole. As argued above, the circle is the prefect representation of wholeness across 
cultures because it merges the Gestalt law of closure with a perfectly even distribution of 
attentional weights. Neither of the two forces asserts absolute hegemony over the other, they 
are in constant slow motion, gradually changing sides. Yin and yang represent as much a 
principle of synthesis as a principle of classifying, both at the same time and thus embody 
the notion of polar or dual opposites that are not dichotomous. They are dual but not 
separate meanings because they are always a necessary part of a larger figure. If one 
separates the black and white shapes the whole figure loses its closure. The necessity of 
complementarity is thus expressed. 
    Second, there is overall balance. Taken as a whole the emblem suggests balance 
because it is regular and its two sub-shapes are perfectly congruent. There is also an overall 
balance on the level of the whole circle, because its contour is perfectly regular. Furthermore, 
it might be relevant that the two sub-shapes suggest smoothness through their soft contours, 
which is perhaps associated with balance. Where there is abrupt change one is thrown out of 
equilibrium. Edges being absent, the subparts change smoothly into one another at any 
point. 
   Third, there is local imbalance. The overall balance between the two colors contrasts with 
the local imbalance between the small eyes and their ground. Both aspects are central in the 
Chinese conceptualization of the laws of the cosmos, which assumes that any temporary 
imbalance strives towards a larger-scale (or long-time) balance. The chromatic values of 
black and white represent two perfect extremes, while making them mutually dependent in 
the emblem. This codependency is quite visual because one constitutes the contrastive 
ground for the other. A black without white seems less extreme, or is indeed inconceivable. 
    Fourth, a relationship of complementarity and structural replication obtains between the 
sub-shapes. They have exactly the same shape, only diametrically opposed color values. 
They are part of the same law of form and they are perhaps meant to embody the prototype 
of formal principles as such, although this is in all likelihood not evident from the shape itself, 
but needs comment and explanation. 
    Fifth, there is mutual embedding of either figure in the other. This accounts for the great 
significance of the two small eyes. They indicate that yin always has a yang element and vice 
versa. The whole of one kind is always also part of the other kind. Note in this respect that 
the small eyes replicate the shape of the circle on a micro-level. Any partial figure contains 
the whole, again signaling that they cannot be ripped apart.  
    Sixth, it follows that the emblem calls up a dynamized image, even though it is only a static 
picture. There are forces and movement in it. Chinese cosmology believes that, in an eternal 
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ebb and flow, yin will become yang, and yang again yin. This is represented by the small 
eyes, which can grow larger, while the large shape (their ground) becomes the smaller 
figure. I would argue that ebb and flow are not only some associated pieces of knowledge; 
instead the dynamic features are suggested by the emblem itself! This becomes clear when 
we look at the force vectors it contains. The larger head of either of the two ‘embryonic’ sub-
figures suggests a directed force and a growth vector, much like a raindrop. Perhaps it 
actually evokes our image of a drop of liquid that becomes ever larger at its lower end until it 
becomes too heavy and is suddenly gone, allowing the next drop to build up cyclically, and 
so on.83 Conversely, the small tail suggests a receding motion, and the asymptotical 
approximation to the outer shell of the circle suggests fading into infinity. Note also that 
where the tail of one shape ends it already becomes the head of the other; its contours 
literally flow into each other. This is because the outer contour of each sub-figure is part of 
the outer contour of the whole emblem. Although, in an act of figure-ground separation, we 
can see them as separate, the larger figure continues to exert its influence. Because our 
Gestalt-like mind seeks to close the imperfect shape, we are lead from the black yin (female) 
onto the other side within the whole where the white yang (male) begins. Not only the 
continuous outer contour is of relevance here, but also the relative distribution of size at 
either end. The smaller the one shape gets, the bigger the other becomes. Thus, the mutual 
transformation of the two forces is given imagistic expression. Looking at the emblem one 
easily gets the impression that the two ends constantly slip into each other in a circular 
motion. It lets the viewer imagine a dynamization of movement through the one shape 
always ‘curling’ up in the other and being encompassed on its own pointed end. Or, one’s 
attention may jump to and fro between the white and the black figures, suggesting the same 
sort of dynamization. What was figure the moment before now becomes ground, and vice 
versa, only to reversed again the next moment. Therefore, the image lets us perform 
constant figure-ground switches between the two colors defining the two sub-Gestalts. 
    Seventh, the internal complementarity between the two big shapes within the whole image 
can be given a temporal and dynamized reading as well. Arguably, our own temporal 
scanning of the emblem already prefigures this, as soon as we ‘see into’ the overall shape 
the constant metamorphic slippage, although this perception is probably only heightened 
through verbally acquired knowledge about the Chinese cosmos. If this is correct, a sub-
shape with its little eyes represents a snapshot moment in time. The other end of the circle 
represents another frozen moment, in which the same thing happens, only with changed 
roles. At each moment there is a relative dominance of yin over yang or yang over yin, which 
                                                 
83 Whether the shapes actually suggest the image of twin embryos with big eyes nesting in a womb to 
many people is anybody’s guess. If this were the case the notion of growth (and by association even 
decay) would be additionally alluded to. 
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yet is never total (so that the eye persists to become larger again at a later stage). If the sub-
shapes stand for phases, the fact that the two sub-shapes are part of this more 
encompassing imagistic Gestalt entails that there must be long-term balance between the 
phases. In this way the image as a whole can be understood as a diachronic or cyclic 
Gestalt. 
    Finally, a general ontological statement may be encoded through the hierarchical figure-
ground relationship that obtains between the two levels of the emblem. The circle as 
outermost structure is the most encompassing, so that this may be taken as ontologically 
primary. It may be understood as defining an ontological hierarchy because it constitutes the 
precondition for the embedded phases, here spatially encoded as the ground of two other 
figures. Thus, balance, overall wholeness, and polar complementarization of opposites are 
circumscribed and suggested as primary principles. These principles have priority because 
they are the preconditional ground for the differentiated sub-shapes. The ground can exist 
without the figure (or with another figure), but the figure not without its ground. 
 
EXPRESSING THE ABSTRACT 
Very frequently image schemas serve to visualize the non-physical (or express it in sound or 
movement). This is most notably the case in religious similes and scientific models. An 
important distinction needs to be drawn here. Recall that we have defined image schemas as 
skeletal abstractions from rich images, especially ones arising in the mind when it draws 
analogies between several rich images. This notwithstanding, it is significant that image 
schemas may also exist in the mind independently from rich images. This is the case when 
image schemas have been dissociated from perception and rich images in the memory 
through repeated use as independently stored mental entities. The cue for calling up an 
image schema can come from a simple feeling of the body, from a thought, from a word or 
symbol, or from the direct sensory perception of something. 
    The perhaps most strikingly recurrent image is that of the circle and the sphere. For 
example, consider its role in religious and cosmological thought. Two major meanings in 
circles are cyclical movement and wholeness. As concerns movement, samsara, the wheel 
of rebirth in the Indian tradition, employs imagery of cycles, as does the theory of 
cosmological cycles. An unrelenting and ever-active force is depicted in this image. In 
Buddhism the cruel human condition is conceived of in this image that so closely matches 
the movement of a mill grinding substance into bits. With regard to wholeness several good 
examples from Christian mystical imagery are brought together by Linda Olds (1989: 59) in 
her treatment of Hildegard of Bingen’s visions. Hildegard’s visions frequently speak of God or 
the ultimate experience as a cosmic egg, a circle, or a wheel. The same metaphorical egg 
imagery is noted by Gentner and Jeziorski (1991: 464) as used the alchemists, which, taken 
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as a whole, symbolized infinity, the universe, and the Philosophers’ Stone as a unifying 
principle. Arnheim (1969: 280) also provides ample evidence here. He comments on the 
nature of the circle as the primary image for wholeness: 
 
“Roundness is chosen spontaneously and universally for something that has no shape, no definite 
shape, or all shapes. Parmenides represents the wholeness and completeness of the world by a 
sphere, which serves merely as a container for a homogeneous, indivisible mass of consistent density, 
unstructured except for its boundary.” 
 
Arnheim continues to write at length about circle/container imagery in Christian theology 
since the Middle Ages, and how it employs the relation between center and circumference for 
the illustration of abstract ideas: 
 
“In its most static version, this relation serves only to illustrate the contrast between the very large and 
the very small. Thomas Aquinas, for example, compares God, the all-encompassing, with the 
boundary surface of the sphere, whereas the center point represents the insignificance of the creature. 
A German mystic of the seventeenth century, Johannes Scheffler, conceives of a dynamic interaction 
between the two: the circular boundary contracts towards the center when man encloses God within 
himself, and vice versa, the center expands into the circumference as man dissolves into God’s 
greatness. ‘When God lay hidden in maiden’s womb,’ Scheffler writes in one of his couplets, ‘the point 
contained the circle.’ (p. 280) 
 
A related image schematic model of radial spread and/or growth further elaborates the 
central image. Here force vectors of directional growth or energy spread are added: 
 
“The dynamic relation between center and boundary expresses itself often in the assumption that the 
sphere originates by growing from the center, and that the center remains the controlling agent. This is 
the view of Johannes Kepler, who says that the central point is the origin of the circle and gives birth 
and form to the circumference. Correspondingly he sees all the mobile powers of the planetary system 
as concentrated in, and issuing from the energy of the centrally located sun. An analogous model is 
found in Aristotle’s image of the heart as the central organ of the animal body. The heart is considered 
as the embryonic core from which the rest of the body grows and which continues to function as the 
central source of all vital energies. The vessels that distribute blood in all directions demonstrate this. 
Inversely, the sensory messages converge from the circumference of the body towards the center.” (p. 
280-81) 
 
It is also worth noting that such models can simultaneously map two or more relations. For 
example Kepler intended his image not only as an astronomical model, but integrated it with 
a parallel view of spiritual matters. The triune God is conceived as sphere, in which the 
Father is the central source of origin, whose power is transmitted through the intermediary of 
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the Holy Ghost, and spread and revealed by the Son, represented as surface, into all 
directions of the spherical boundary. God is personified as the sun, the source of light, life, 
and motion. Consequently, Trinity is seen as manifest in the cosmos. A second highly 
important general insight emerges from the example with respect to the relation of imagery 
and propositional attributes. Were it not for the metaphorical equation by virtue of shared 
structural relations between the model of God and the model of the solar system, it would not 
be possible to map further metaphorical attributes, such as light and the source of life, onto 
the model of God. Of course, these features are no more purely imagistic, i.e. they can be 
classified as propositional concepts by virtue of the fact that they draw on complex cultural 
knowledge structures. However, without the prior mapping between the imagistic structures 
of the two models a projection of a complex feature such as the source of life could not have 
been executed. The same effect can be seen in many examples to come: Propositional 
details are transported by means of imagistic similarities.  
    A great number of further examples of similar models could be given. For philosophy many 
can be found in Arnheim (1969) and Lakoff/Johnson (1999), for theology in McFague (1982) 
and Kjärgaard (1986), and for psychology in Olds (1992a) and in various contributions to the 
volume edited by Leary (1990).  
    Interestingly, many effects of imagistic similes are only effectuated by the explicit 
admonition to perform a particular type of mental scanning or image schema transformation. 
(This is similar to image schemas employed in understanding language, such as prepositions 
like OVER, which has been discussed above. However, in the cases discussed above explicit 
instructions how to construe the image may be necessary simply because similes do not 
have semantic principles and are not, as a rule, embedded as automatically triggered 
schemas in the cognitive subconscious.) With Kepler’s sphere-model of Trinity discussed 
above there is an explicit admonition that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost must be 
understood as inherent in each other. The central point is supposed to dwell in the 
circumference and the circumference in turn lies contracted in the center. In order to actually 
imagine these two imagistically separate aspects and construct a relation of identity between 
them the mind must perform a quasi-visual zooming operation by means of which the one is 
progressively transformed into the other. Thus, the admonition implying identity, which is 
phrased in words, is straight away implemented as an image-schema transformation to make 
sense of the implication within the format of the sphere-image. Another example for implicit 
scanning instructions, which I will treat at some length later, has to do with dialectical figures 
of thought. I shall argue that such figures emerge from theories that instruct to see something 
as contained in another thing from one perspective and as identical to it from the other (thus 
instructing us to superimpose the MATCHING image schema on the PART-WHOLE image 
schema, or switching between the two). 
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AUTONOMOUS VS. EMBEDDED IMAGE SCHEMAS  
In this context we can address the issue of variations in the degrees of schematicity again. 
Frequently an abstract image schema is conveyed through a rich image. In such cases we 
can say that image schemas are embedded in rich images and appear by then being extract. 
While we should harbor no doubts as to the centrality of structural ideas, such as roundness, 
rather than attributes in these images, it is also plain to see that it makes a difference 
whether we speak in pure abstractions or not. We may hypothesize that the rich image has 
some crucial advantages over pure abstractions: it is more memorable, especially to 
uneducated people and people not much given to purely abstract thought. Couched in a real-
life image the schema will also resonate with many associated concepts and a particular 
esthetic and emotional tone. (By contrast, the non-resonating esthetic style of complete 
abstraction may be called one of purity and its emotional tone one of detachment.) However, 
pure abstractions may also have an advantage over rich images with underlying schemas. 
They may be more readily applied to new, and unusual contexts, and may possibly become 
really independent from their source contexts. This is why they are so valued in mathematics, 
since mathematics purports to be a system of pure structural relations that is universally 
applicable. It might be noted parenthetically that a crucial distinction of cultural or personal 
styles emerges here. Some modes of thought prefer pure image-schematic thought to rich 
images, and vice versa. Often this reflects the rift between everyday wisdoms and expert 
styles of reasoning. Most notably, this is the case in the Western style of philosophical logic. 
However, it seems to be the case that any kind of sophisticated mathematical system rests 
on this base. 
 
INTENTIONALITY, ‘SEEING AS’, AND THE UNITY OF PERCEPTION AND COGNITION 
Image schema structure is not imposed only after the fact of perception. Things are ‘seen 
as’, ‘heard as’, or ‘felt as’ image schemas. In disagreement with the central tenet of 
empiricism, there is a fair amount of evidence to suggest that perception and cognition resist 
all attempts to tidily separate them. Arnheim (1969: 279) makes the following argument for 
primariness of image schemas in perception with reference to the forces we see in 
movements: 
 
“The forces in a visible action are part of the percept itself, not something added later as explanation, 
as David Hume thought when he asserted that ‘all events seem entirely loose and separate’ and that 
they can be seen as contiguous in time and space, but not as connected.”  
  
A moving object differs depending on whether we choose to see it ‘as’ self-propelled, ‘as’ 
drawn or ‘as’ pushed. We ‘see’ a force vector into the movement. In a phenomenological way 
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of speaking we bestow intentionality on our perceptions. Seeing a glass half full intends it 
differently than seeing it half empty. When an action in space takes place we do not see it as 
a purely geometrical and neutral occurrence, we imagine an actor into it. Alain Michotte’s 
well-known experiments show how time gaps influence the involuntary perception-cum-
interpretation of movements. If a moving object comes to touch another one that is at rest, 
and if thereupon the second object begins to move within a certain fraction of time, the 
movement will be seen as being caused by the impact. Otherwise it will be simply seen as 
released by the signal of the contact. 
    Ways of intending the world may vary depending on features of the environment that we 
have grown up in. A study by Segall, Campbell and Herskovits (1966) shows that persons 
living in carpentered environment have habits of perception that differ significantly from 
persons accustomed to a natural environment with less regular and angular features (cited in 
Beck 1982: 95). For example, Bantu people brought up in a forest context are less prone to 
the Müller-Lyer illusion than those living in a carpentered environment (cf. Pinxten 1982: 
176). Another part of the disposition of our nervous system to automatically interpret 
perceptual data is reflected in the deeply entrenched variations between cultures and 
languages. As Alverson (1994: 22f) demonstrates, any description even of a quite simple 
scene results from a selective expression of perceptual/cognitive cultural information, which 
both sees less than one might see and, at the same time, bestows an interpretation not 
provided in any direct way. By comparing Germanic and Romance languages to Bantu 
languages Alverson intends to show that the modalities of seeing are built into language. 
Imagine a spatial arrangement with a box, a tree, a pumpkin aligned in a row so that the box 
is positioned farthest from the viewer. Speakers from both language groups would agree that 
“the pumpkin is in front of me”. However, Europeans would say that the pumpkin is in front of 
the tree and the box behind it, whereas Bantu speakers would say that the tree is in front of 
the pumpkin and the box in front of the tree. This reflects the fact that, for Europeans, the 
primary anchorage for spatial relations in this visual field is relative object size: Larger 
objects coordinate the location of smaller objects. For Bantu speakers the direction of the 
gaze serves as primary anchorage and the coordination is irrespective of object size. Foreign 
to Western thought, it is also possible for Bantu speakers to reverse the scanning direction 
and say that the tree is behind the box, the pumpkin behind the tree, and the subject is 
placed behind the pumpkin. The front-back dimension can be construed from the position of 
the object furthest away. The comparison of spatial thought in a dozen linguistically widely-
distributed cultures by Pedersen et al. (1998) demonstrates that, in some other languages, 
this latter optional characteristic of Bantu is the obligatory way to construe spatial relations of 
this sort. 
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This example gives rise to the conclusion that that we ‘see’ directionality vectors or force 
attractors ‘into’ what we perceive in a culturally specific manner. It is a particular image 
schematic construal of a situation that creates a specific cultural intentionality, which is 
encoded in language. Furthermore, the example makes evident that no description of a 
scene is neutral (that is: non-intentional), as empiricists would prefer. How is it, then, that 
cultural ways of perception are imposed by differing image-schematic structurations? 
According to Talmy (1983), the language of spatial perception testifies to the presence of a 
host of image-schematic parameters. First, there is a figure-ground contrast, i.e. something 
coordinates the space, while other things are perceived in relation to the coordinates. 
Profiling a figure and backgrounding the rest is one of the most primary image schema 
effects. Second, there is a biased topology, meaning that normative orientations (such as 
upright and overturned) and directionality are imposed within the front-back, up-down and 
right-left dimensions. Third, there are relationships of attitude and proximity. Proximity can 
also be a sort of predicative relation between two objects, i.e. one is construed as belonging 
to or influencing the other. Fourth, there is an imagined perspective on the scene. 
Perspectives can switch, as the above example from Bantu shows. Fifth, there is a specific 
distribution of mental attention from the perspective point. This distribution may closely 
parallel the figure-ground distribution. Sixth, imputed to the scene is a force dynamics 
explaining what makes the scene causally appear this way and what tends to happen next 
(such as dynamic movement in a direction). I would argue that all of these features are 
present in perceptions as well as the mental images elicited by linguistic descriptions, e.g. by 
spatial prepositions. The difference is that in elicitation from memory the features will be 
more skeletal and idealized. 
    Often it is words that elicit a particular intentionality. While the word “over” signifies a 
relationship between the reference landmark and the object, “above” does not. A fly is not 
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over the fireplace, but above it, whereas a picture hung on the wall there can be said to be 
over it, because it belongs there, will remain there, and is meant to form an ensemble. 
    Apart from the subconscious patterns of culture and language, perception is also mediated 
by conscious theories. However, the question as to how far perceptions and theories may be 
held apart is tricky. In a well-known debate the following question is at stake: Did Johannes 
Kepler and Tycho Brahe see the same thing when they stood together on a hill watching the 
sun dawn? After all, we know that Brahe believed the Earth to be the static center of the 
universe, while Kepler believed that the Earth revolves around the sun. Gerhart and Russell 
(1982: ch.2) contend that both were equally deluded into seeing the sun rise higher and 
higher above the horizon at a perceptual level, however one of them had the added 
awareness that what he was seeing was actually not the case. Gerhart and Russell clearly 
perceive that this is a conflict between direct and instrumentally mediated experience.84 
Mediated experience means that either an instrument or a theory intervenes before our 
perception and interpretation of something. The authors recognize that the world is inherently 
a world of projected imaginations, largely consisting of second-order mediated experiences.85 
This being the state of affairs, instrumental data may take precedence over data of 
immediate experience where the two sources of knowledge are in disagreement. Therefore, 
Gerhart and Russell argue, Kepler saw the same natural event as Brahe, although his 
theoretical knowledge made him think of it as an illusion. However, I do not fully share the 
conclusions of Gerhart and Russell’s model that divides perception and conceptual activity 
into two stages where one simply overrules the other. I prefer to side with Norwood Russell 
Hanson’s claim that the two men were seeing different things from the start (Patterns of 
Discovery, Cambridge 1972). Viewed in the light of the above observations on the unity of 
perception and cognition, it is not unlikely that Kepler immediately attributed particular force 
vectors to his perception. We cannot rule out that his theoretical knowledge was from the 
beginning brought to bear on the way he structured his visual field into a static center (the 
sun), a dependent and revolving satellite (the Earth he was standing on) and force relations 
of attraction between the two. Such a view is borne out by many findings in cognitive science 
which indicate that expectational patterns inextricably enter into the act of perception itself. 
                                                 
84 A very simple example can be found in the well-known Müller-Lyer illusion where two shapes of the 
same length looking somewhat like  >===<  
                                                  and  <===>  
appear to be of a different length to direct perception, although if we redirect our gaze in an analytical 
attempt and compare the parts in a scaling scanning the illusion becomes evident. 
85 A ‘culturalized’ version of the same theory is presented by Robin Horton (1982: 228), who 
distinguishes universal ‘primary theory’ from widely divergent ‘secondary theories’; which are heavily 
imbued with cultural logic and involve a massively theory-mediated sort of causality. 
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Clearly, a scientific theory with which one is equipped forms such an expectational pattern. 
The position that pure perception precedes evaluation does not make any sense. Image 
schema theory explains how it is that expectational knowledge shapes percepts. This claim 
would otherwise remain opaque, because the percepts and concepts could be simply seen 
as two stages that sometimes enter into conflict. While this may be possible in other cases, I 
believe that Gerhart and Russell overlooked an important alternative in their example. 
    The insight that visual perception habitually includes superimposed images of intentional 
vectors (whether cultural or theory-dependent) lends substance to the claim that no neutral 
data exist, and that the God’s eye-view of empiricism must be rejected on principle. A unity of 
perception and cognition means that the interpretive act is just as subconscious, just as 
automatic and just as involuntary as the concept of sensory ‘data’ implies. It may also mean 
that the two acts fuse inseparably in the mind instead of being consecutive phases. Even 
though it seems legitimate to trace cultural patterns in this conglomerate, we have to abstain 
from seeing cultural interpretation as a secondary act staged on a universal ground of given 
data. Cultural perception patterns may be so deeply inscribed in our body and brain that they 
cannot be simply unlearned, i.e. they form an inextricable part of the culturally embodied 
mind. 
 
MATERIAL METAPHORS: IMAGE-SCHEMATIC PATTERNS IN ARTIFACTS 
Culture specific patterns of cognition are often reflected in objectified imagery of the public 
sphere. Such imagery has been called visual or material metaphor. This means that cultural 
artifacts are understood as bearers of image schematic structure and that subconscious (or 
perhaps even conscious) relations are drawn to image schematic patterns underlying other 
artifacts, speech patterns, or a kinesthetic style. In some cases artifacts are extensively used 
as metaphors of cosmology or as mnemonic devices that complement cosmological 
narratives. 
     An outstanding case study of material metaphors is Blier’s book The Anatomy of 
Architecture (1987). Her work furnishes superbly documented materials of the variety of 
metaphors found in the houses of the Batammaliba, who live in the border area of Togo and 
Benin. The architecturally complex houses of the Batammaliba are condensed visual 
metaphors that encapsulate aspects of the cosmos, such as the Battamaliba cosmogonic 
narrative, or ideas about the hereafter and about the realm of the sacred. In addition to that, 
a diversity of other themes, such as the psyche, family, political expression, and theatrical 
performance, are conveyed through aspects of the house. Not only is her work of rich 
descriptive value, Blier also develops a workable typology of material metaphors (p. 36-37, 
also see Tilley 1999: 41ff). Her typology provides a good opportunity to introduce different 
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visual metaphor types and find out which of them predominantly employ image schematic 
similarities. 
    In what Blier calls condensed metaphors a larger idea or form is incorporated into a 
compact but essentially complete miniature of it. This is the principal metaphorical relation of 
the Batammaliba house to the cosmos by virtue of sharing basic shape and structural 
relations with it. The house incorporates the essential features of the Earth. Like the Earth, 
each house and each room is basically circular. Apart from this fundamental image-
schematic similarity, the multi-storied houses and the cosmos share an overall structural 
part-whole relation of the same topological arrangement. Just as the cosmos is stratified into 
Sky, Earth, and Underworld, so is the house vertically divided into parts representing these 
three. Through this image-mapping between two similar relations in the up-down dimension 
other attributes of the cosmos are transferred on the house. Batammaliba architects strive for 
balance and evenness in the house, so that no main part would be larger than any other, just 
as the creator deity Kuiye – the original architect of the world – put emphasis on evenness 
and balance in the Earth’s creation. There are also non-image-schematic similarities to 
reinforce those similarities, e.g. that the terrace roof is similar to the Earth in that it has a 
thick soil surface. The house also incorporates related metaphors in many senses not 
mentioned here. This includes references that have to do with directional alignment of the 
houses axis, silhouettes of house parts, and the embedding of forms. 
     One of the most frequently occurring metaphors is that of nesting, i.e. the superimposition 
of a series of elements or the positioning of elements inside one another. This happens in 
both architectural and ritual forms, in which a sequence or embedding of themes is 
suggested through such a nested structure. It is frequently the case that the nesting 
sequence mirrors the sequential ordering of ideas in the cosmogonic narrative that 
complement the architectural form or use it as a mnemonic device. In other words, the 
nesting of parts is iconic of a temporal or logical sequence expressed in narrative. Such 
iconicity rests on image schematic relations of similarity, as every kind of iconicity intrinsically 
does. In other words, the relevant information is conveyed through a focus on the structural 
relations of the parts nested inside each other. Such a structural relation may give rise to an 
interpretation of temporal or logical precedence and conditionality. Here the characteristics of 
the image schematic operation of scanning elements in temporal sequence are important. 
What comes first in the scanning, beginning from the outside and proceeding to the inside, 
must also come first as cause or as a preexistent background of the story that is necessary 
to understand the newly introduced elements. 
     Directional affiliation is also frequently employed as a means of cosmogonic expression. 
A form is metaphorically identified on the basis of its topological orientation, the direction of 
its openings, or the placement of its parts. For example, the narrative account of the sun’s 
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movement across the sky has clear parallels in architecture and village planning. The 
house’s axis is positioned along the sun’s east-west course and marked by several 
architectural features such as two horns positioned over the entrance and the directional 
alignment of the terrace’s crosspieces. Through this the importance of the solar and creative 
deity Kuiye is reinforced. Image-schematically the imagined path of the sun is mapped onto a 
line created by orientational landmarks and onto the perceived balance of the northern and 
southern sections of the house that gives it symmetry. Both directional paths are orientated 
in the same direction with respect to the surrounding landscape, which forms a common 
landmark. In this way the propositional attributes that the paths stand for are also likened. 
Perhaps both paths can be imagined as a single image where they are superimposed and 
where the attributes of the house and the attributes of Kuiye (the sun) are identified with one 
another. A similar metaphor of directional affiliation is the split of the villages into two clans 
who generally build their houses on opposing sides of the village. This split is consistent with 
the narrative’s first two human men who were put into the sky by Kuiye to pull the sun back 
and forth. Just as there has to be balance between these two Gods for completing the daily 
cycle, there has to be a balance of ceremonial responsibilities and benefits between the 
clans, and all this is reflected in the visual balance of the village plan. Here a balance of a 
movement back and forth is mapped onto a balanced distribution of salient objects in a 
space. It may be necessary to point out in this context how it is possible that the spatial 
distribution of objects and force relations can be seen as imagistically similar. This is the 
case because the distribution of objects imparts force vectors and centers of visual 
gravitation to the space it is placed in (Arnheim 1969, 1982; Johnson 1987) and the 
distributional force vectors in the one image can be mapped on the equal path and strength 
vectors in the other. It is interesting to see that responsibilities and benefits are equally 
understood as forces and mapped onto this relation. This is most likely possible because 
social responsibilities are metaphorically understood as physical compulsion and benefits are 
seen as objects giving us strength. 
    Most interestingly, the repetitive movement of the sun is reflected in the repetition of 
architectural elements of the kind relating to the sun. Here image-schematic similarity arises 
because the repeated mental scannings necessary to visualize the same image of the sun 
along a time axis correspond to the necessity of repeated scanning movements over the 
house’s surface. In addition, we can postulate a highly abstract schema for number through 
which the human mind can liken the multiplicity of scannings to a multiplicity of images seen 
as a static perception when the house is looked at. 
    In silhouetting metaphors an object is defined through its distinctive profile and mapped on 
similar profiles. The circular silhouette representing the Earth is the most frequently recurring 
one and is found in the shapes of houses, village designs, and tombs. The creator deity 
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Kuiye chose a calabash as the template for the Earth’s silhouette. The roundness of 
calabashes, which are used as eating, drinking, and offering vessels, is associated with life, 
sustenance, and well-being, i.e. qualities the Earth plays a role in providing. (Calabashes are 
further associated with fertility, because a single calabash contains hundreds of seeds. 
Hence the essentially circular form of rooms and the house suggest fertility.) In silhouetting 
metaphors the role of image schematic structure is quite plain to see. The mapping of one 
circular image on another is again used to map the associated qualities, such as fertility, from 
the one object on the other. 
    Reversal metaphors are used to give ideas of transition concrete visual expression. A 
central cosmological reversal is that between life and death. As has been explained before, 
the calabash is associated with the Earth and life by virtue of its circular form and by virtue of 
embodying fertility. It is the case in some rituals that the calabash or similar round objects are 
turned over to represent death, that is, life’s reversal. It is particularly intriguing to try to 
understand how the notion of thematic opposites is mapped by the reversal of spatial 
orientation. One answer may be that opposite qualities are, just as opposite spatial 
orientations, metaphorically understood in terms of vying FORCES that cancel each other out. 
This would reflect prototypical experiences with physical objects, e.g. ‘up’ is the force 
opposite of ‘down’ in terms of gravitational pull. If this is correct there would be an image-
schematic representation of life and death as two opposing and struggling vectors.86 One 
interesting kind of reversal occurs when somebody makes the transition from the exterior to 
the interior of a house. The Batammaliba link many gender activities to one or the other side 
of the house, which embodies parts of the female and parts of the male body, since the 
house is an image of the androgynous deity Kuiye. The left hand of Kuiye is associated with 
men and the right hand with women. Standing inside the house the proper orientation is 
westwards and the house’s south part is therefore male and the north part female. Facing the 
houses facade from the outside the gender orientation is reversed. This reversal can be 
understood in terms of the image-schematic transformation from inside to outside 
perspective.  
    A further type of metaphor that is not in any direct sense image-schematic is skeumorphic 
metaphor. In skeumorphs a material other than the original is used for its model. Frequently 
one material is substituted for the other to represent a change in time, place, or status. 
Material texture and color are detail (rather than schematic) features of objects. However, the 
material change implied in the skeumorph seems to give rise to an abstract recognition of 
                                                 
86 Another explanation might be that the collapse of a person is associated with her being dead and 
that an upright orientation is necessary for most life forms and objects to function properly. However, 
since, in this case, the reversal can only be used for the life-death relation, but not for other binary 
opposites, this explanation is wanting. 
 326 
difference as such and an image schematic model of transition between different states. Only 
by an abstract schema a transition in quality (say, between mud and stone) can be 
recognized as similar to a spatial transition (say, the path from one place to another in a 
narrative). In order for this to be the case, the material change must presumably evoke a 
PATH schema from one state to another. In other words, states (or we might say: attributes) 
need to be metaphorically conceptualized as CONTAINERS first. Once this quite natural 
metaphor is presupposed, skeumorphs are imagistically understood as paths of transition in 
a second step. 
     The most simple, and at the same time most general, image schematic metaphors are 
what Blier calls primary shapes (p. 208-215). Batammaliba symbology knows four of these 
primary shapes, which are taken from related forms in nature and everyday life: the circle, 
the line, the fork, and the cross. Each of these shapes assumes a series of related 
metaphoric identities, by which they convey specific ontological qualities embodied by each 
type. Circular silhouettes and design employed in house architecture are intended to fulfill the 
triple role of container, protector, and renewer of life. The first two aspects are directly 
determined by the nature of the circle as boundary of inside and outside, while the third 
aspect is determined by associations with femaleness and fertility, because the woman, like 
the circle, is identified with enclosing life. Literally meaning ’bracelet’, circles are also related 
to personal identity, since bracelets and other jewelry are associated with the personal 
identity of the bearer. Ritually recreating circular patterns creates enclosures that contain and 
give definition to its inhabitants: the circle provides protective identity. Moreover, the circle is 
linked with certain aspects of time and suggests the idea of continuity, apparently because its 
closed silhouette evokes the ongoing cycles of days, weeks, months, seasons, etc. 
     The second shape, the line, has the primary ontological function of a link between two 
places or forms. In its various natural manifestations as a path, a drawn cord, the path of an 
arrow, etc. the line conveys the combined aspects of mediation, movement, and transition. 
Again, a line or longish object may reach beyond its ends and create a path or end-point 
focus and symbolize movement in this way. Linear forms mark the vertical mediation 
between the upper and lower house planes. Also, pathway signs are incorporated into the 
house facade with the purpose to help deities and worshippers identify religious sanctuaries. 
Lines traced in ritual, such as by dropping the house horn, allude to the movement of the 
spirit to the world beyond. 
    The third shape, the fork, is associated with height and support, based on tree branches 
and supporting structures in architecture. The fork symbolically reaffirms the house’s role in 
supporting and elevating the lives of the inhabitants. Social support is understood as physical 
support. This is also reflected by the fact that important elders, who play a major role in 
supporting their families as geomancers or healers, are metaphorically referred to as forked 
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supports. Furthermore, forks are associated with ladders used in ascending from one level to 
the next, and by implication with deities of the above. 
    The fourth significant shape is that of the cross. In nature the cross is defined most clearly 
by the form of two paths crossing and is thus seen to represent a marker, a meeting place, or 
a divider of space. The cross as an architectural symbol is meant to reinforce the role of the 
house as a juncture for men and women, adults and children, but also between humans and 
deities or living and dead family members. In ceremonies and healings cruciform shapes are 
used as a spatial marker for the soul where it should come to stay, which at the same time, 
again, defines a point of convergence between deities and humans.  
    It can be observed that all of these primary images, with the possible exception of the fork 
as a supportive structure, would be used in a very similar way in Western culture. This is not 
surprising, since they are motivated by much the same very basic spatial structures that are 
a part of human life everywhere in the world. Although we cannot undertake a cross-cultural 
analysis of primary forms here, we will probably not get any closer to any universal aspects 
of symbolic meaning than these simple shapes. 
 
DO METAPHORIC IMAGES VARY IN IMPACT DEPENDING ON THE SYMBOLIC MEDIUM? 
Sometimes images are assumed to play different roles depending on their symbolic medium. 
For example, Christopher Tilley (1999: 263) presents an argument for the necessity to 
differentiate between linguistic and material metaphors, in order to underline the unique 
power of the latter. However, strong caution is necessary against any such principled 
cognitive dichotomy. Let us follow Tilley’s argument to see where he goes wrong. Although 
he acknowledges that linguistic and ‘solid’ metaphor are functionally complementary, he 
seems to believe that linguistic metaphor is fundamentally digital and does not allow the 
condensed and simultaneous recognition of complex textures. He argues that ‘solid’ 
metaphor as analogous and multi-sensory Gestalt permits a greater economy of form, 
whereas entire strings of words would be required for the same effect. While I do agree that 
objects can prompt rich multi-sensory textures of smell, touch, sound, and visual image, 
there seems, in my opinion, no reason to believe that language cannot elicit equally complex 
and multi-modal representations. The problem seems to follow directly from the 
fundamentally vague view about the cognitive effect of words which underlies Tilley’s 
position. The inadequacy of this view results from only taking into account the format of the 
linguistic medium and ignoring the divergent format of the representation that is elicited by it. 
While it is obvious that spoken language comprises strings of discrete signifiers that unfold in 
time and sequence (‘digital’), I have tries to demonstrate in this chapter that the same need 
not be true of the mental representations triggered by language. First, phrases and larger 
compounds of words evoke mental imagery in a way similar to the perceptual images of 
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material metaphors. One fundamental characteristic of the view of language subscribed to 
here is that digitally coded sentences are understood as analog mental images evoked by 
words.  
    In chapter 13 evidence will be summoned to demonstrate that entire stories or pieces of 
music can be mentally condensed into one central Gestalt image (although it goes without 
saying that much detail information is bypassed in the process and needs to be recalled as a 
separate entailment.) Another later argument is that the structure of a linguistic event such as 
a poem – or, for that matter, any other event – can be understood in a single analogic image. 
Thus, both the semantic and the structural features of language are not, in principle, 
processed differently than the sensory images produced by material objects so far as the 
digital/analog contrast is concerned. 
     A related, but different argument, which is worth evaluating, claims that mental images 
are empirically relatively unconstrained, whereas material representations are more 
constrained (Tilley 1999: 268).87 According to this position, the image evoked by the word 
‘fox’ or ‘moon’ may differ considerably across individuals, while the material image affords a 
common starting point, although Tilley admits that “we may still ‘see’ very different moons or 
foxes in it”. However, the argument for the inalienable quality of things which operate 
“physically, preverbally, emotionally, evocatively” (p. 272) takes a risky tack, if it means to 
imply any sort of immediacy of perception into which no process of selection or interpretation 
enters. Consequently, this amounts to subscribing to a sort of naive realism. It should be 
open to empirically question under which exact circumstances percepts of material objects 
elicit more constrained representations than words do.  
     Yet another factor has to do with the emotional impact of objects and words. Arguably, 
non-verbal sensory prompts often have a stronger immediate emotional impact than words, 
which require a greater degree of image evocations from our memory. However, I am not 
entirely convinced that it is always the case that ‘a picture is worth a thousand words’. I 
would venture the guess that this depends on the richness of the cognitive background into 
which the stimulus is embedded. For instance, if we hear a religious narrative that evokes a 
rich background of related images and stories together with strong feelings of holiness and 
embodied states, the emotional significance may be just as deep.88 
                                                 
87This is also reminiscent of Lévi -Strauss’ claim that non-linguistic things are “good to think“ (bonnes à 
penser). 
88 There are more reasons militating against a strong dichotomy of linguistic and solid metaphors. Just 
as linguistic images, objects also elicit scanning operations, especially if they are spatially extended, 
complex (such as pieces of art) or evoke imaginary movements (e.g. arrows). Of course, it is easy to 
be misled by the impression that in an object everything is co-present, just because it is so tangible. 
Yet, it is impossible to see an object from different perspectives at the same time. Approached from 
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LINGUISTIC CLASSIFIERS AND IMAGE-SCHEMATIC SHAPE 
In some languages, words are explicitly classified according to the shape of the image they 
evoke. Semantic classifiers (usually prefixes, infixes, or suffixes) simply provide hints about 
the shape of a material thing or, in a metaphorical expression, about the shape it is 
considered most evocative of. Naturally enough, inasmuch as categories are groupings of 
many things of approximately similar shape or abstract entities evocative of it, their common 
underlying profile is schematic. Such classificatory markers can reinforce particular image-
schematic aspects of words or create specific imagistic associations for abstract words. A 
well-documented case is furnished by Blier’s (1987: 228-234) discussion of the noun 
classification system in the language of the Batammaliba just discussed. The Batammaliba 
identify each noun, i.e. any word designating a thing, by one of nine prefixes. The noun 
classes relate either to the shape or to the function of the thing designated by the noun. 
Rather than only reflecting given features impinging on the perceptual apparatus, the 
prefixes influence how the nature of the root words is perceived, e.g. whether a door is seen 
as relating to the transition from the outside to the inside or relating to the sacredness of the 
house it partakes of. This discriminative and additive function becomes clear from the fact 
that many noun roots may be combined with several prefixes depending on which aspect is 
emphasized.89 These markers add the necessary supplementary details to specify an 
object’s role in a particular mental scenario to the schematic primary image. In other words, 
the class-markers bestow a more specific intentionality on the perception: they make an 
object out of a simple thing by harnessing it to, and imbuing it with, a cultural function. Thus, 
classifiers lend a specific ontological profile to the representation of their referent by placing it 
in a particular class of things within the culturally ordered universe of the mind. 
    The Batammaliba classifier prefixes form thematic groupings, and at least some of them 
are defined by a straightforwardly image schematic pattern: The first prefix (o or u) 
designates nouns for people. The second prefix (ta) is identified with things either contained 
                                                                                                                                                        
the other side, while we can never simultaneously focus on all the details of a long text due to memory 
restrictions, we can hold some degree of complexity in simultaneous focus, just as with an object. For 
these reasons it seems that at least similar constraints apply to objects and language:  
89 Palmer (1996: 140, 142) notes the same thing for Bantu languages and Western Apache, where 
“different classifications of the same argument selectively profile various dimensions of the argument”. 
In Bantu the classifiers highlight certain features of their noun complements. For example Kiswahili 
modifies the root toto as m-toto ‘child’ (person class), ki-toto ‘childish’ (thing class), and u-toto 
‘childhood’ (abstract class). All other things being equal, in Western Apache it is the verb that is 
modified. For instance, in the expression for ‘hand me the tobacco’ the verb can either be modified 
with the marker for single elongated objects or for squarish and compact objects. In the former case 
tobacco will be understood as cigarette and in the latter as a pack of cigarettes or perhaps a pouch of 
chewing tobacco. 
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within something or enclosing something else. The third prefix (fa) designates things that are 
found outside and stands in many respects in contradistinction to the previous class. The 
fourth prefix (ku) designates places and states of being, things that serve as linkages 
between places or states of being, and surfaces. The fifth category (li) is tied to nourishment, 
fertility, and light or considered to be sacred. The sixth noun class (bu/mu) is linked to work, 
earth and plants. The seventh group classifies all distinctive spatial concepts, especially with 
their position and orientation in relation to the ground. The eighth class (la) groups things that 
are youthful or immature. Finally, the ninth class (ba) identifies fluid things. Among these 
categories it is apparent for at least five of them that simple image schemas define them. 
This is clearly the case for categories of enclosed/enclosing, non-enclosed/outside, places 
and states/links/surfaces, spatial relation concepts, and fluids. In all of these cases the prefix 
links a mnemonic reminder to the word root, as to which kind of image-schematic relation is 
relevant here. (By contrast, for people, for sacred things, for sun or fertility related things, for 
work or plant related things, and for immature things presumably more complex means of 
identification are required than a single relatively simple image schema would furnish. Here 
the mnemonic reminders indicate a more complex propositional array of knowledge.) 
    Palmer (1996: 126-147) carries together ample material to show that the classifiers of 
several other languages can be subjected to a similar analysis. The example in which 
categories are most clearly discriminated by image-schematic configuration are count nouns 
in Proto-Bantu (p. 129-132). The main spatial configurations are non-extended solid figures; 
extended solid figures; non-extended outline figures; and extended outline figures:  
 
 
 
 
 
There are also image schemas for the plurals of these categories that conceive collections of 
these basic images (with the possible exception that the plural of outline figures has no 
differentiation of extended and non-extended). For Proto-Bantu mass nouns there are similar 
differentiations of whether they are cohesive or dispersive, solid or liquid, and structurally 
homogenous or differentiated, again three image-schematic pairings. All of the classes 
include concrete as well as abstract concepts. Interestingly, if we assume that categories are 
motivated on the basis of a common image schema profile, they allow direct inferences of 
what a given abstract concept is conceived as. For instance, whistling and life are dispersive 
substances that spread just as light, darkness, or sand do; night has differentiated internal 
structure just as bridges, canoes, or faces have; dreams have a non-extended outline figure 
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together with pots, bee-stings, or journeys; and musical melodies are extended outline 
figures together with a body side, a palm of the hand, or a spider’s web (p. 130-31). 
     From his own ethnographic research Palmer reports that the Coeur d’Alene language of 
Idaho uses body part suffixes for creating image schematic classes. These include the suffix 
for head (for CONTAINERS), ear (for THINGS DISTRIBUTED ALL OVER), back (for SOLID, FLAT 
OBJECTS), hand (for BRANCHING STRUCTURES), belly (for VERTICAL FLAT SURFACES), and skin, 
hide, or blanket (for FLAT, FLEXIBLE OBJECTS). In addition suffixes for tree (for LONG, RIGID, 
CYLINDRICAL OBJECTS) and canoe (for OPEN OR CLOSED CONTAINERS) are common. The Bella 
Coola language, which belongs to the same group of Salish languages, uses a similar 
assemblage of anatomical suffixes plus a group of additional classifiers (p. 129). Intriguingly, 
these languages show that salient concrete images (of body parts) can function as the 
cultural prototype of the image-schematic category, and that, at the same time, the general 
postulate of the body as a template for the world is suggested. Generally, it can be seen that 
the different categories result from combinations of a few spatial dimensions. Coming to a 
similar conclusion, Palmer (p. 142) reviews data on the classifier system of Western Apache 
by Keith Basso who distinguishes a matrix of seven dimensions that define the thirteen class-
markers of Western Apache. The classes can be reconstructed from the dimensions 
ANIMAL/NON-ANIMAL, ENCLOSURE, STATE (SOLID, PLASTIC, LIQUID), NUMBER, RIGIDITY, LENGTH, 
and PORTABILITY. It is important to see that these are analytical primitives which do not 
govern verb selection as single dimensions, but as combinatory schemas, such as ‘single, 
solid, long rigid objects’, ‘masses or conglomerates of plastic material’, ‘uncontained liquids’, 
or ‘objects enclosed in rigid containers’, to name a few.  
    These examples show a major way in which language ontologizes by identifying all things 
with respect to a very limited number of categories and assigning a particular nature to each 
word by placing it into a province of associated things that are alike in one respect. The prefix 
system does not only define the words’ specific meanings, it also reinforces the identity of the 
category of concepts it belongs to in the very naming of each word. 
    This notwithstanding, Lakoff’s (1987) treatment of Japanese classifiers, which also 
highlights the image-schematic value of markers, at the same time shows that we should not 
push our claims too far. Even though the Japanese system features imagistic markers, such 
as for LONG AND THIN or for FLAT, it also reveals more complex principles of classification in 
addition. A full explanation requires one-to-one linkages between similar or metonymically 
associated class-members, which are progressively chained into a network. There is no 
necessity of a general image that unites all members as instances of a single schema. In the 
same vein, Palmer (1996: 132f) argues that a fuller understanding of some of the above-
mentioned Proto-Bantu categories requires such contextual cultural associations, while 
Lakoff (1987) goes even further in his analysis, presenting an example with the Australian 
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language Dyirbal where these metonymical links hold complete sway, with image-schematic 
similarities having little or no influence (see chapter 8).  
 
IMAGE SCHEMAS AND HABITUS 
Image schemas are not only found in artifacts, emblems, and linguistic imagery of various 
sorts, they are also found in the manner people move. Image schemas as dynamic, 
embodied, and kinesthetically based structures par excellence also account for the 
recognition of motor and movement styles. Image schemas in an action-oriented perspective 
are in fact what Bailey et al. (1998) call ‘executing schemas’. These contain information 
about the movements and postures of different body parts and information about the setting 
of present objects. In this perspective, thinking a movement word (such as a verb or a 
preposition) and actually performing an analog movement is cognitively very closely coupled. 
That this is borne out by introspective experience is illustrated by the following brief example. 
When rehearsing movements in sports or dance in the imagination involuntary body 
movements linked to the imagined movements may occur, so that when someone imagines 
executing a step, posture, gesture, or routine her hand may flinch, and so on. 
    It seems quite plain that the concepts of habitus as laid out by Bourdieu (1977) and that of 
image schema are closely related (see chapter 4). I am also indebted to Rudolf Arnheim’s 
seminal work Visual Thinking (1969), which was actually published some time before 
Bourdieu’s concepts gained popularity. Arnheim’s work reflects a thorough consciousness of 
the relationship between abstract thought patterns and patterns of movement. Recasting 
Arnheim’s observations in the terms of Bourdieu’s approach is not very difficult to 
accomplish. Habitus is Bourdieu’s designation for the ‘structuring structures’ that are present 
in many aspects of culture, weaving a net of homologies, and are learned through a culturally 
determined and subconsciously embedded array of patterns. 
     The concept of habitus states that cultural ways of looking, gait, posture, gesture, 
movements of the speech apparatus, and onomatopoetic features of speech itself embody 
structural codes that shape social practice. A corollary thesis states that theses structures 
stand in a relation of formal homology to the spatial division and alignment of public space, 
buildings, and artifacts. (These two aspects can be seen as testifying to the fact that 
proprioceptive body awareness and objectified imagery are immediately interwoven.) 
    I submit that all of these patterns of habitus are, in fact, image schematic to a large extent. 
I want to demonstrate this by means of a short but suggestive example given by Arnheim 
(1969: 117) on embodied patterns and their practical relevance for cultural practice. Further 
examples pointing in the direction will emerge in later chapters. Arnheim cites a study 
originally conducted by David Efron called Gesture and Environment (1941) to investigate 
the gestures of two New York City minority groups. Efron’s study contrasts a group of 
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traditionalist ghetto Jews and a group of Italian immigrants from a rural background of low 
literacy. The study shows that the character of movement patterns, i.e. what today is 
included under the heading of habitus, varies in accordance with the style of reasoning 
typical for the two different groups. According to Efron, the gestures of the Jews exhibit a 
frequent angular change of direction in their movements, which result in an intricate zigzag 
pattern. This motor-style or habitus is related to their style of thinking influenced by the 
sophistry of traditional Talmudic thinking. By comparison, the Italian immigrants exhibit a 
style of movement in which the same direction is maintained until the gestural pattern has 
been completed. This is seen as the reflection of the Italians’ clear-cut, less sophisticated, 
uni-directional style of thinking. Arnheim (p.118) goes on to point out quite explicitly the 
relation of image-schematic thought (which he calls ‘structural resemblance’) and habitus: 
 
“Gestures will act out the pursuit of an argument as though it were a prize fight, showing the weighing 
of alternatives, a subtle attack, the crushing impact of the victorious retort. This spontaneous use of 
metaphor demonstrates not only that human beings are naturally aware of the structural resemblance 
uniting physical and non-physical objects and events; one must go further and assert that the 
perceptual qualities of shape and motion are present in the very acts of thinking depicted in the 
gestures and are in fact the medium in which the thinking itself takes place. These perceptual qualities 
are not necessarily visual or only visual. In gestures, the kinesthetic experiences of pushing, pulling, 
advancing, obstructing, are likely to play an important part.” 
 
Such a perspective implies that habitus is, in many cases, not a matter of pure cultural 
convention, but that it is motivated in terms of highly general basic image schema patterns. 
Recent studies also point to the image-schematic nature of human gesture and of sign 
language for the deaf (McNeill 1992, Wilcox 1993, Taub 1997, Cienki 1998).  
    Other examples, such as Bourdieu’s (1977) characterization of gender differences in 
habitus among the Kabyle, indicate more complex image schemas culturally encoded in 
body postures. For example, the Kabyle association of femaleness and insideness is actually 
understood by the women in terms of their gendered habitus in an embodied way determined 
by a link of motor schemas and somatic states. Restraint and retraction may be aspects of a 
Kabyle version of the ENCLOSURE and STASIS schemas shaping embodied femaleness, while 
men’s embodied identity is defined relative to the complementary NON-RESTRAINT and 
DYNAMICS schemas. In a developmental view, the objectified understanding, such as that the 
inside of the house is female and the world outside male, may be more secondarily 
elaborated only after and on the basis of embodied motor schemas, as noted in chapter 4 for 
Samoan mana. 
    Under the heading of habitus we might also include the fact that body proprioception and 
objectified images of the external world can be mapped on each other by virtue of image-
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schematic similarity. This is, for example, used extensively in healing rites to affect the 
body’s function through the manipulation of symbols. René Devisch (1993: 247-48) proposes 
a reanalysis of how the ENCOMPASSMENT image schema – or so I would call it – is effective in 
a healing rite originally described in Victor Turner’s work on the Ndembu of Zambia (1967: 
41-43, 1968: 52-88).90 In the nkula cult a woman suffering from barrenness, miscarriage, 
menstrual disorders, difficult delivery, etc. is led through a ritual of redress and re-
identification with maternal values. A spirit hut ‘of the nkula shade’ is erected behind the 
patient’s house. There she is led to ritually adopt the virile behavior of the hunter and the 
warrior, as hunting and giving birth are considered analogous processes. Furthermore a 
calabash symbolizing the womb is used in which an infant’s figurine is bathed in a mixture 
from red gum until it coagulates, much as menstrual blood should coagulate in the womb to 
form a child. Devisch then directs our attention to the relationship between the patient’s body 
and the shade-hut, which Turner failed to recognize as a specific effect: 
 
“Movements in and out of the shade-hut, putting medicines in the mortar, pot, or house, and extracting 
preparations from these containers and giving them to the woman to drink or splashing them over her 
body are metaphors both for purging the patient’s body of intrusive elements and for making her an 
agent capable of inclusion and life transmission. The shade [which enters the body as a medical root 
potion identified with nkula] moreover articulates ties with uterine descent. The patient hereby 
experiences ‘embodiedness’ and embodiment, feeling contained and herself being able to contain. 
This logic intertwines the patient’s longing to be a baby and to have one, that is, to relive a fetal 
condition and symbiosis with her mother, on the one hand, with her wish to becoming herself a 
mother, on the other.” (p. 248) (my italics) 
 
If Devisch’s interpretation is correct, the ritual’s success hinges on a complex cultural image 
schema of ENCOMPASSMENT, which brings together in a single mapping the body as container 
and the hut as a container for the body. The metaphor’s enactive purpose then is to make 
the patient’s body perform the same act of containing that is performed on it, while at the 
same time the woman is identified in a double role as infant and as mother, so that the theme 
of reproduction of society from generation to generation is asserted. The basis for the 
identification of both aspects is the image-schematic ENCOMPASSMENT relation: It relates the 
woman’s proprioceptive sensation of ingestion and the ensuing images of being an agent of 
inclusion to the perception (and feeling) of being encompassed. Thus the desired habitus of 
childbearing is produced via an enacted image that is meant to work on the level of 
embodied knowledge. 
 
                                                 
90 I am indebted to Tilley (1999) whose book brought the example to my attention.  
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IMAGE SCHEMAS AND PHONOLOGY 
There is also a phonological dimension to image schemas. This includes embodied 
meanings based in movements of the speech apparatus of the producer and, in all likelihood, 
also acoustically image schemas evoked in hearing produced speech.  
    In a number of examples, the kinesthetic behavior of the speech apparatus used in 
producing sounds reflects some general kinesthetic image schemas. In a mantra a long 
“aaaa” will evoke a schema of continuity and soft progress. The spat out “ha” in the martial 
arts when beginning an action, however, evokes, a schema of quick and aggressive force. 
This is not only how these sounds are heard, this is also how the body of their producer acts 
image-schematically. In a “ha” there is a quick contraction of the diaphragm and a quick 
release and opening of the glottis and a forceful expulsion of air. In an “aaaaa” there is a 
slow and controlled release of air that lets the body vibrate, whereas the airpipe remains 
open to the same degree from the sound’s beginning to its end.  
    Janis Nuckolls’ survey of work on sound symbolism indicates a series of interesting 
phenomena. There is some evidence for an iconic relationship between intonational profiles 
and pitch that appears to be very frequent across cultures (Nuckolls 1999: 229). The 
increase in tension of the vocal cords (high pitch sounds) and the decrease of tension (falling 
or low pitch) have a near-universal tendency to be associated with the contrasting ideas of 
incompleteness and completeness. For example terminal boundaries of units such as 
clauses tend to be marked by falling pitch, while breaks in utterances as well as questions – 
i.e. situations where something will follow – tend to go with high pitch. Consider now the 
kinesthetic behavior of the speech apparatus. At least at the intermediate sound ranges 
lowering pitch requires less tension and effort of the sterno-hyoid muscle than high pitch 
(only at very low frequencies more effort is required again). Therefore, there is an iconic 
metaphor TENSION IS INCOMPLETENESS and RELAXATION IS COMPLETENESS, which is typical of 
human action in general. As long as an action is incomplete, we have to keep our bodies in 
active tension, when it is over we can relax. 
    Moreover, several studies on natural language and experiments with invented words 
indicate the diminutive symbolism of high vowels (p. 230ff). The concepts associated with 
high vowels include physical smallness, brightness or lightness, quickness, singularity or 
proximity, and attitudes such as affection, intimacy, disdain, and acquiescence. The factors 
most significantly affecting subjects’ judgments of vowel magnitude were articulatory position 
and resonance. When the high front vowel /i/ is pronounced, the tongues is raised and 
moved forward. This decreases the space between the front of the tongue and the roof of the 
mouth compared to dark vowels which require a large space. Again, it seems that this 
feature of the speech apparatus stands in image-schematic similarity to the semantic 
meanings relating to smallness, which are associated with the high vowels. 
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    Furthermore, in languages which use consonant shifts, chiefly in noun and verb roots, to 
express diminutive notions, two articulatory features of the speech apparatus are found, 
namely tonality and hardness: 
 
“Tonality involves the raising of consonantal frequency by a more forward articulation or by 
palatalization, which raises a consonant’s second formant. Hardness shifts involve a more forceful 
manner of articulation, involving more tension and muscle activity rather than a change in point of 
articulation.” (p. 232) 
 
Regarding tonality, the reduced resonance chamber when pronouncing high vowels is 
“congenial with ideas of smallness”. While the relation of hardness to diminutiveness is less 
clear, an explanation may be “that extensions of diminutive concepts, such as quickness, 
brightness, and hardness, can be reconciled with articulatory hardness”(p. 232). 
    It is well documented that some phonesthemes can give rise to a conventional sound-
meaning correspondence, such as the association of the English “glance”, “glare”, “gleam”, 
“glimmer” with something visual or the association of “ash”, “bash”, “dash”, “gash” with 
fragmentation, collision, or impact. I would like to suggest as partial explanation for this that 
image-schematic dimensions in the speech apparatus motivate some of these 
correspondences. For example, in English an initial ‘tw’ as in “twirl”,” twist”, “tweeze”, “tweak” 
suggests a twisting or pinching motion. Correspondingly, the contracting and releasing lip 
motion in producing the ‘tw’-sound requires the same kind of spatial movement used when 
we rapidly close our fingers in a pinching motion and then open them up again. If this 
observation is correct, the employed similarity is of an image-schematic kind. 
    In all the above examples it was argued that image schemas enacted by the articulatory 
apparatus are mapped onto semantically evoked image schemas. On top of this there is a 
second possible way how phonemic image schemas may be motivated, which is more 
disconnected from the speech apparatus itself, although it can provide and additional iconic 
layer to it: I would like hypothesize the existence of image schemas residing in the ‘topology’ 
of the sound profiles themselves. Inspired by findings in musicological research (Cook 1990, 
see ch.12), we may assume that imagery is evoked by intonational profiles in spoken 
language as well: It was mentioned above that rising intonational profiles are connected to 
tension in the speech apparatus and thus incompleteness, while falling intonations suggest 
relaxation and completeness, by which they mark statements, assertiveness, and 
aggressiveness. However, there is the added possibility that an intonational contour evokes 
an imaginary sound space before the mind’s eye, including a base line relative to which 
intonational changes are imagined. A possible image-schematic explanation for the 
identification of falling profiles with assertiveness is that we see upward movements as 
incomplete and further extending, while downward movements suggest a convergence on 
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the base line. The imagined base line in turn suggests the finality of the notion, and thus 
assertiveness and authority. An experiential motivation for this may be the widespread 
conventional metaphor of MORE IS UP, in which a scalar schema is imagined, which is open in 
the upward dimension but has a definitive base line. Given the universal synesthetic 
identification of ‘high’ tones with spatial height, it seems natural that low pitches should map 
onto the base region of this schema and high pitches onto upward moving contours. 
Therefore, the metaphor DOWN IS FINAL is a quite logical corollary; hence low frequencies are 
being felt as being assertive. 
 
IMAGE SCHEMAS AS CULTURAL THEMES 
In summary, this tour d’horizon of image schema usage opens up a vista on understanding 
symbolic culture. Complex image schemas can become what has been called a ‘thematic’ or 
‘foundational’ schema in a culture. In other words, themes central to a worldview, religion, or 
ideology may be condensed into one or several central image schemas. Several examples of 
schemas playing a key role in the making of worldviews have been discussed in chapter 6. 
Here, an additional aspect was introduced, namely the multiple levels of meaning that a 
single image schema can be attached to. One example was given above in the discussion of 
Kepler’s cosmological dual model of God and the solar system. In cases like this, image-
schematic similarities that span several cognitive domains are established. They close the 
gap between the domains by casting them into the same image-schematic model. Especially, 
the mirror relation between social ritual and natural processes is frequently due to image-
schematic similarity. Pierre Bourdieu (1977: 146) observes this with utmost clarity: 
 
“Rite is indeed in some cases no more than a practical mimesis of the natural process which needs to 
be facilitated: unlike metaphor and explicit analogy, mimetic representation (apomimema) establishes 
a relationship between the swelling of grain in a cooking-pot, the swelling of a pregnant woman’s belly, 
and the germination of wheat in the ground, which entails no explicit statement of the properties of the 
terms related or the principles of their relationship; the most characteristic of operations of its ‘logic’ – 
inverting, transferring, uniting, separating, etc. take the form of movements of the body, turning to the 
left or right, putting things upside down, going in, coming out, tying, cutting, etc.” 
 
Of course, ritual and nature is only one possible thematic amalgamation established by 
multivocal imagery.  
    The search for multifunctional image schemas has significant methodological implications 
for the study of cultural cognition: When in one domain or research setting a single formative 
image schema is detected in artifacts, linguistic imagery (especially in cosmological images), 
phonology, and habitus, then the analyst can assume that she has found an important or 
even foundational schema with a culturally integrative function. In chapter 13 I will unfold this 
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idea into a theory of imagery-based multimedia. There I will study how a single image-
schematic complex shapes a multivocal core-image of a ritual and how numerous different 
symbolic vehicles can be mapped onto each other for the effect of mutual reinforcement. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have drawn various theoretical strands and case studies together in order to 
define image schemas more precisely and to provide a first sketch of their ubiquity in cultural 
cognition. The definition of image schemas given here included a number of aspects. In a 
brief overview, these are:  
(a) modal (percept-like) conceptual images, which are non-propositional and use 
analog coding;  
(b) non-mimetic mental imagery with skeletal features on various possible scales of 
abstraction, but always more schematic than so-called rich images; 
(c) dynamic mental images that allow for transformations, e.g. superimposition; 
(d) combined to higher level Gestalts and often memorized as such; 
(e) intentionally construed from a vantage point and mentally invested with dynamic 
relations, e.g. force vectors in static images;  
(f) transmodal, i.e. pertaining to all perceptual senses, proprioception, and concepts; 
(g) grounded in sensorimotor experiences, either of the kinesthetic or proprioceptive 
kind; 
(h) frequently value-laden, as with axiological pairs (e.g. high-low). 
 
Furthermore, it was shown that image schemas impinge on the mind through a plurality of 
cognitive media. Image schemas may be simultaneously activated as perceptual, conceptual 
and linguistic structures, or enacted by executing motor schemas. The explanatory scope of 
the notion of image schema for cognitive phenomena is remarkable. It spans conceptual 
models in philosophy and science, conventional metaphors, linguistic polysemies, classifier 
systems, phonetics and articulatory structures, pictorial representations and artifacts, as well 
as gesture, posture, and other motor patterns. Yet other phenomena, though perhaps more 
tentative, are amenable to an explanation through image schemas, but these require some 
preliminary discussion in the chapters ahead: Eventually, they will include condensed content 
images in narratives, so-called ‘plot-genes’, but also event and action structures, the defining 
images of ontological kinds (e.g. entities and processes), and the building blocks of all sorts 
of high-level mental tools. 
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Chapter 8:                                                                                                        
The Spatialization of Form Hypothesis 
 
Two assumptions seem to be uncontroversial in cognitive linguistics: (1) that the concepts 
underlying metaphorical utterances consist of spatialized imagery (Lakoff 1987, Johnson 
1987); and more generally (2) that any small portion of thought, such as a word or sentence, 
evokes little mental movie-clips or storyboards, which again are put together from image-
schematic components. These image-schematic skeletons, then, account for the functions of 
grammar (Langacker 1987). Both assumptions pertain to the micro-level of cognition. In this 
chapter I will submit the idea that spatialized imagery can in addition be found in highly 
generic schemas, such as event structure, causality, category structure. If this is correct, not 
only local content, but also top-level, trans-domain forms are shaped through a single mental 
faculty. Taken seriously in its consequences, this does not only recast traditional accounts of 
the conceptual underpinnings of language, it is the most far-reaching claim emerging from 
cognitive linguistics on the nature of human thought at large.  
    The generic dimension of spatialized imagery is the basic assumption the rest of this 
works builds on. I will begin by laying out the basic hypothesis as suggested by George 
Lakoff and discuss its ontological status. I will then survey some existing illustrations of the 
idea, add some new ones, and present a model of how form and content schemas work 
together. Finally, I will offer some empirical evidence as well as more tentative arguments for 
the hypothesis. Together this introduces a theory of generic mental tools, which I will call 
spatialized ‘co-signatures’ of events. 
 
1. Defining the ‘spatialization of form’ hypothesis 
Quite possibly the utility of image schemas vastly surpasses the spectrum previously 
covered. Before I specify the present focus, recall that my survey in the previous chapter 
presented evidence for at least three major kinds of image schema uses: 
(1) the meaning of words and utterances is represented before the mind’s eye and 
largely builds on image schemas, especially as indicated by the study of metaphor; 
(2) artifacts and emblems are given symbolic value because of their image-schematic 
structure; 
(3) movements and motor-schemas are laden with symbolic value, again by virtue of 
image-schematic structure.  
 
All these image schema uses conform – if we exclude phonology for the moment – to what 
might be called ‘semantic’ uses. They go together in a common group because meaning 
content is conceived (i.e. small-scale, intra-domain and situationally bound representations). 
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The present chapter sets into relief an entire new category that I will loosely dub ‘image-
schematic tools’.  
 
IMAGE SCHEMAS AS MULTI-PURPOSE MENTAL TOOLS 
What is at stake here? It is a defining hypothesis of cognitive semantics that syntax cannot 
be understood independently of semantics (Langacker 1987, Gärdenfors 2000). Semantic 
and syntactic functions of language both essentially rest on the same imagistic faculties of 
the mind, namely spatialized and imagistic thought, though at different levels of schematicity. 
Image-schemas, then, comprise a scale encompassing a predominantly semantic and a 
predominantly structural (or, if need be, ‘syntactic’) pole. Our prior focus lay at the more 
semantic end of this graded continuum. The type under scrutiny now sits at the other, more 
structural pole. Characteristic of the structural pole are (1) generic and extremely abstract 
schemas (2) that appear in many individual contexts within a domain or across entire 
domains and (3) function as a bracing scaffold for local meaning units. These image 
schemas comprise a multipurpose image-schematic toolkit, in that they can be set off from 
the innumerable images not schematic enough for cross-contextual use. At the same time, 
the crucial fact to be borne in mind is that the same mental format, i.e. the same imagistic 
capacities of the human mind, are deployed in both cases, albeit on different cognitive 
levels.91 While there is clear linguistic evidence that generic schemas exist (Lakoff 1993), the 
open question is to which extent this is the case. In particular it is unclear whether only single 
– if rather large – domains such as the emotions can share a master image schema 
(Kövecses 2000), or if on top of this even the most general mental tools, such as category 
‘builders’, feature bundles (Lakoff 1987), grammar ‘builders’ (Langacker 1991, Deane 1996), 
or notions of substance ontology (cf. chapter 9), are equally image-schematic. 
    A first step is clarifying the pedigree and logical status of the claim. In his widely read 
landmark treatise Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things George Lakoff (1987) breaks new 
cognitive ground by putting forward a claim dubbed the ‘spatialization of form hypothesis’. 
Lakoff takes inspiration from Ronald Langacker’s thought expressed in the Foundations of 
Cognitive Grammar (1987a, 1991), which attempts an analysis of grammatical form in a 
kindred vein. Lakoff (1987: 283) characterizes mental operations that structure concepts as 
                                                 
91 For lack of space I will not go into the discussion as to whether this distinction is only a heuristic or 
more. For those who take this, at first glance, as a functional split going against the grain of cognitive 
linguistics, I want to underscore that this is only a distinction of degree within a unified and continuous 
human faculty. Whatever the finer functional distinctions between the two extremes of image schema 
usage, the present idea is far from reintroducing the obsolete dichotomy of ‘syntax’ and ‘semantics’ 
lying at the heart of structural linguistics, so that I do not believe myself to be fundamentally at 
variance with the broader cognitive theory this work is embedded in. 
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metaphorical mappings from physical space into conceptual space. It is the function of image 
schemas to structure what Lakoff calls ‘idealized cognitive models’: 
 
“What I will be claiming is that the same schemas structure concepts themselves. In fact, I maintain 
that image schemas define most of what we commonly mean by the term ‘structure’ when we talk 
about abstract domains. When we understand something as having an abstract structure, we 
understand that structure in terms of image schemas. (...) spatial structure is mapped into conceptual 
structure. More specifically, image schemas (which structure space) are mapped into corresponding 
abstract configurations (which structure concepts).” 
 
For a first flavor of what such tools can be, it is worth quoting the examples for spatialized 
forms that Lakoff lists: 
 
“- Categories (in general) are understood in terms of CONTAINER schemas. 
- Hierarchical Structure is understood in terms of LINK schemas. 
- Relational structure is understood in terms of LINK schemas. 
- Radial structure in categories is understood in terms of CENTER-PERIPHERY schemas. 
- Foreground-background structure is understood in terms of FRONT-BACK schemas. 
- Linear quantity scales are understood in terms of UP-DOWN schemas and LINEAR ORDER schemas.” 
(ibid.) 
 
Essentially, both Lakoff and Langacker explore the possibility that image-schematic elements 
lie at the basis of cognitive operational formats (= idealized cognitive models). It is worth 
underscoring what this means. People do not only understand the structure of particular 
concepts through image schemas, but also the prototypical structure of general-purpose 
mental mechanisms that organize, relate, and integrate groups of conceptual images. In 
other words, we make sense of (or build) our very mental tools on an experiential basis, and 
we achieve this to a large extent through the topological features of the skeletal abstractions 
of spatial knowledge we call image schemas. 
    I will adopt the shorthand term of ‘image-schematic tools’ for convenience and for 
distinction to content related image schemas.92 Technically, these can be described as 
                                                 
92 We can employ a physical object metaphor implying fixity and substance for tool formats because 
they are entrenched as expectational patterns for tasks of a particular kind (such as categorizing, 
bundling features, or understanding sequences and causal structure). Although the patterns are of 
maximum schematicity, and thus lack rich content of any kind, their overall structure recurs throughout 
experiences of various sorts. In other words, the rationale for speaking of tools is that they are multi-
purpose devices. After having been learned across many slightly different experiences, they exist on a 
mental level independent of these experiences and their content, which is of richer detail. This is to 
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maximally schematic and generic multi-purpose structures at the topmost level of the 
cognitive architecture. Intriguing though the hypothesis may be, it has been excluded from 
scrutiny by the vast majority of cognitive linguists. The reason presumably is that the general 
but hidden nature of spatialized tools makes it methodologically very difficult to say much 
about them with authority. Even though I cannot conclusively prove the existence of such 
generic tools here, I will spell out some important consequences and adduce supportive 
evidence. 
    However, Lakoff’s treatment of the spatialization of form hypothesis underspecifies critical 
issues due to the somewhat cursory nature of the relevant passages in his chef d’oeuvre. In 
a helpful attempt to clarify the situation, Langacker (1988: 391) specifies the two major 
possible ways of understanding the logical status of Lakoff’s claim. It may be interpreted  
 
“to mean that the analyst (e.g. a linguist or cognitive scientist) uses metaphors based on these 
schemas in order to describe the psychological phenomena of categorization, metaphor, and syntactic 
structure. However, this is not what L[akoff] has in mind – what he intends, I believe, is that these 
schemas are constitutive of the phenomena themselves, quite apart from any analysis.”  
 
Although I concur with the way Langacker reads Lakoff, this still leaves much open to 
debate. The only fairly secure estimate is that Lakoff intends to reach out further than a 
convenient observer’s model.93 What he seems to have in mind is a full-fledged cognitive 
theory describing subjective processes of the mind. Still, at least three different readings 
seem possible: 
    First, the hypothesis that we make sense of cognitive formats through image-schemas can 
be understood as the claim that the mind communicates to itself about the nature of its 
                                                                                                                                                        
say, they are independent even though the higher and lower levels of schematicity constantly interact 
and subsist in one another. 
93 Gärdenfors (2000: 5), in his work on conceptual spaces, distinguishes similarly between a 
‘phenomenal’ and a ‘scientific’ interpretation of the idea that conceptual thought happens in a 
spatialized or what he calls a ‘geometrical’ format. Gärdenfors would have accomplished the only 
comprehensive book on spatialized mental formats to the present day, had he not written from an 
instrumentalistic and therefore anti-phenomenal perspective. He states this straightforwardly (p. 31): 
“What is the ontological status of conceptual spaces? I view conceptual spaces as theoretical entities 
that can be used to explain and predict various empirical phenomena concerning concept formation 
(...) Since my basic methodological position is instrumentalistic, I avoid questions about how real the 
dimensions of conceptual spaces are but view them as instruments for predictive and constructive 
purposes.” Unfortunately, this is precisely not how I wish to restrict my claims here, nor what I believe 
Lakoff intended to say. I eschew the instrumentalistic position and propose to think about ways of 
testing the cognitive reality of spatialized thought instead. 
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operations in recursive representations, even if these representations are perhaps not 
exactly conscious in the strong sense. By this reading it is insufficient for mental tools (1) to 
work autonomously on the substrate level of the brain or (2) to work in a way unnoticed by 
the subject on the more representational level; they have to be subjectively ‘understood’ in 
some way, for whatever reasons and on whatever level of consciousness. This rather 
opaque line of argument is reminiscent of Lévi-Strauss’ equally elusive belief that cultures 
subconsciously address (and enact) the ‘deep structure’ of human cognition in kinship 
systems, ritual, myth, and narrative. 
    Another, a bit less controversial reading situates the claim at the level of the ‘cognitive 
unconscious’ (cf. Lakoff/Johnson 1999). The level of ‘cultural theories’, which people can 
describe recursively, need not be implied. Rather, this means that the mind uses image 
schemas subconsciously as ‘building blocks’ for multi-purpose schemas that sit at the top-
most level of the mental architecture. Modeling the mind on the metaphor of imagistic 
‘building blocks’ simply says that highly schematic image schema structures are permanently 
entrenched in the mind and customized for a class of similar tasks: Each type of these high-
level schemas would be dedicated to a specific general purpose, such as categorization of 
one particular kind. For example, one tool might be dedicated to categorization into 
Aristotelian categories, another to categorization into fuzzy categories, and yet another to 
categorization into complexly chained clusters. All tools would be automatically executed, 
with only some becoming conscious folk-theories. When this happens, the conscious 
reflection of the cognitive process and the process itself have to be identical, so that a folk-
theory does not offer a direct clue to the operative folk-model. 
    In the weakest possible reading the Lakoffian hypothesis may be understood as saying 
that in the brain (and not in mental representations) the physiological apparatus dedicated to 
spatial and imagistic cognition is also dedicated to multipurpose tools like the grammar 
faculty. Adherents of this minimal view would hold that the same local array of neural cells 
and synapses fulfils both purposes, without taking the discussion to the emergent level of 
representations. 
    If we invert their sequence, the outlined alternatives progress upwards in a hierarchical 
model of cognitive emergence rising from ‘brain’ to ‘mind’. The three types run the gamut 
from observations about the neural substrate via inferred sub-conscious representations to 
more or less conscious theories. The point is that Lakoff’s spatialization of form hypothesis 
may be conceived as relating to any level between conscious mental representations, 
subliminal representational information, and the brain substrate (or all of these at once). I 
cannot offer a conclusive solution to this puzzle lying deep at the heart of the most 
impervious, if persistent controversies about the relation between brain and mind, but I will 
get back to the issue later in this chapter.  
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    For further illustration of the ontological and methodological implications of the hypothesis 
let us look at a possible mental tool left unmentioned by Lakoff, which I hinted at in the 
opening remark of the first chapter. I said that metaphor as a cognitive operation is itself 
metaphorically understood; i.e. that all metaphors are in a way image-schematically similar to 
our mind. Allowing for simplification, all metaphors have a common underlying minimal 
structure: There are two imagistic spaces standing for the two domains or two conceptual 
spaces, and there is a directional link between the two spaces standing for one or more 
mappings, i.e. CONTAINER, LINK, and FORCE schemas (for directional movement). Metaphors 
are thus understood as a CONDUIT-like image schema. The containers represent the two 
distinct domains; the objects transferred through the conduit are the relevant part of 
experience from the source domain. 
    At first glance the following diagram will hardly come as a surprise to anyone who works 
on metaphor. To get the provocative range of the claim it has to be entirely clear that the 
following does not describe an observer’s theory, as experts on metaphor might consciously 
hold it. It is intended as an operational folk-model (or at least a core-part or prototype of it), 
which everybody uses subconsciously when formulating and understanding metaphors. 
Minimally, it is a central subpart of such a model, even though more spaces and relationships 
may be involved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is crucial to see that this depiction is not only a visualized illustration of the sort of a 
chalkboard diagram, but that our mind uses a percept-like spatialized structure like it to make 
sense of what metaphor is in general and to comprehend specific metaphors. In fact, it is not 
unlikely that the motley aggregation of phenomena identified by us as metaphor is precisely 
recognized through this common image-schematic basic structure of a transfer between two 
container-like conceptual spaces. If this hunch is accurate it means three things: (1) that our 
mind recognizes in a spatialized fashion whether two things belong to a common or nearby 
domain, (2) that, whenever they do not conform, our mind searches for a possible conduit to 
another domain to make sense of the metaphor, and (3) that we have some sort of sub-
awareness that a quasi-spatial projection between domains is involved. Any specific 
operational mechanism is recognized by its schematic features and distinguished from other 
such mechanisms, say metonymies, in our sub-awareness (i.e. an intermediate field between 
the conceptual level and the next lower level). 
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    The hypothesis of tool-schemas sets forth quite a strong claim on the nature of our 
thought. It implies that most relevant cognition occurs at an unconscious level. Most people 
might have not the least inkling about the deep structure of the metaphors they habitually use 
with considerable ease. Upon reflection, e.g. on their metaphorizing capacity, they may come 
up with wholly different theories. Yet, the argument is that they in fact use kinesthetic image 
schemas in their cognitive unconscious. Methodologically, this means that we should not 
take what people believe about their thought at face value, but rely on other clues instead. 
For a thorough discussion of the cognitive unconscious and its methodological implications 
see the first chapters of Lakoff/Johnson (1999). The intent of uncovering the deep structure 
of generic mechanisms of thought may be a risky move methodologically. Analyzing 
conceptual metaphors by marshalling clusters of linguistic manifestations sharing a common 
logic is easier with restricted examples like IDEAS ARE BUILDINGS or ARGUMENT IS WAR. For 
generic schemas linguistic evidence may be more difficult to uncover. Ideally, such high-level 
claims require a time-consuming bottom-up coverage of as many cognitive domains as 
possible. Yet, the enterprise seems not wholly unpromising if empirical studies in cognitive 
linguistics proliferate at the current pace. In addition to that, the hypothesis will have to prove 
itself at a theoretical level in competition with other micro-approaches to cognition. To my 
knowledge, it stands unchallenged to the present day.  
 
2. Examples for imagistic tools 
To see how claims about image-schematic tools can be confirmed let us review one of 
Lakoff’s best-known case studies. It is about complex categorization and hints at how claims 
about generic cognitive models can be teased out of specific linguistic data. The conceptual 
structure about to be examined is referred to as radial structure by Lakoff and is not wholly 
unrelated to Wittgenstein’s (1953) notion of ‘family resemblance’. Radial category members 
cluster around a prototypical central concept to which they are connected either directly or 
indirectly. Lakoff’s detailed discussion of the system of noun classification in the Australian 
aboriginal language of Dyirbal serves as an excellent illustration. As is the case with many 
other languages, Dyirbal grammatically classifies all nouns. All physical and abstract things 
are assigned to four mutually exclusive categories by distinct prepositional markers. Adding 
the appropriate marker is grammatically obligatory for any kind of noun. The categories seem 
to be rather arbitrary clusters of objects that have little in common at first glance. One 
category, for instance, includes women, fire, and dangerous things (hence the book’s 
flamboyant title). Lakoff argues that these puzzling categories are by no means arbitrary, but 
are motivated by a few principles. The categories have central members, i.e. they specify 
which subcategories are most typical. In addition to the basic system there are principles of 
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extension and a limited list of exceptions.94 In Dyirbal the central members for the first three 
categories are human males, human females, and edible plants, while the fourth is a residual 
category for everything that is not included in the former three. For the central members 
there is a basic opposition model that structures them with respect to one another, e.g. the 
opposition of male and female. Starting from this basic model there are associative chains by 
domains of cultural experience, mythological associations included: 
 
“- Since fish are in class I, fishing implements are in class I. 
- Since storms and rainbows are believed to be mythic men, they are in class I. 
- Since birds are believed to be female spirits, birds are in class II, except for those three species of                       
  willy-wagtails who are believed to be mythical men and are therefore in class I. 
- Since crickets are believed to be ‘old ladies’, they are in class II. 
- Since the moon is believed to be the husband of the sun, the moon is in class I and the sun is in           
  class II. 
- Since fire is in the same domain of experience as the sun, fire is in class II with the sun. 
- Those things that are believed to be instances of fire are in the same domain as fire: the stars, hot  
  coals, matches, etc.” (Lakoff 1987: 99-100) 
 
The overall structure of the model has three category centers that are each internally 
extended by chaining: 
 
“Centrality: What we have called the basic members of the category are central. Willy wagtails and the 
moon are less central members of category I than are men. Stinging vines, gar fish and the hairy mary 
grub are less central members of category II than are women. 
Chaining: Complex categories are structured by chaining; central members are linked to other 
members, which are linked to other members, and so on. For example women are linked to the sun, 
                                                 
94 Even if the prototype and the family resemblance theory of categorization are sometimes treated as 
separate, the two category types are clearly related. (1) The prototype theory is more restrictive in its 
definition, insofar as less typical members of a category are defined uniquely in terms of similarity to a 
single prototype. As we can see from Lakoff, this can be plausibly understood as a CENTER-PERIPHERY 
container with a graded SCALE representing distance. (2) The family resemblance or chaining view, on 
the other hand, is only an extension of this. It makes it possible to conceive of more complex networks 
in which there are several local centers that join up into a more extended network or none at all. Here, 
it is quite possible that two local variants of a category are equally quickly and effortlessly instantiated 
or just as easily remembered and thus do not differ in prototypicality. In my opinion it is a mistake to 
disconnect the two views from one another. A complex network is often no more than several cognate 
local prototypes considered in an overall view and, conversely, a single prototype is only a ‘zooming in’ 
on one local region within a network that is, of necessity, more extended. A large network may have a 
most central prototype, but perhaps in most complex cases none will be clearly discernible any more. 
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which is linked to sunburn, which is linked to hairy mary grub. It is by virtue of such a chain that the 
hairy mary grub is in the same category as women. (...) 
No Common Properties: Categories on the whole need not be defined by common properties. There is 
no reason to believe that the Dyirbal find anything in common among women, fire, dangerous things, 
etc. Nor do they assume, so far as it is known, that there is anything feminine about fire or danger, or 
anything fiery and dangerous about women. On the other hand, common properties seem to play a 
role in characterizing the basic schemas within a given category (edible plant, human male, human 
female).” (Lakoff 1987: 95-96) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The four classes of Dyirbal nouns with chaining in each group (from Lakoff 1987: 103) 
 
All this would mean that a certain type of propositional association between two entities or 
sub-categories, such as women and sun, is remembered by an imagistic aid as something 
having to do with a spatial link. It would also mean that the necessity of many links between 
two entities, such as women and the hairy mary grub, is remembered by another imagistic 
aid as something having to do with spatial distance. In my reading of Lakoff this points to the 
fact that certain types of associations are doubly coded. On the one hand, they, no doubt, 
contain the association in itself with respect to the primary qualities involved, whilst on the 
other hand they identify the type of structural relation between them. This second kind of 
imagistic aid in our memory is what I will call a ‘spatialized co-signature’. 
     To take a second example given by Lakoff, Japanese has a similar and quite extensive 
system of classifiers for nouns, which are based on object shape (also compare the evidence 
for Batammaliba, Proto-Bantu, Apache, Bella Coola, and Coeur d’Alene presented in the 
previous chapter). Other nouns, especially abstract and event-like ones, are classified by 
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extending a given basic model. Extensions may be metaphoric or metonymic. For example, 
phone-calls, baseball pitches, and home-runs in Japanese receive the same object marker 
as thin and long objects. This is due to the image-schematic similarity of a trajectory to such 
objects (CONDUIT schema). Other connected words, such as rounds in sports and winning 
points, are given the same markers due to contiguity within an everyday domain, the 
prototype of the long-thin marker being swords and sticks of martial arts, or, more recently, 
baseball bats. The principles of extension to derivative variants of the long and thin object 
prototypes may be several. The crucial point, however, is that in the end they produce a 
chained network of radial non-prototypical category members grouped around a prototype of, 
say, things like a pencil. Again this network may be a spatialized structure. For readers who 
are interested in details on the extension of complex categories it is worthwhile to read 
Lakoff’s (1987: 416-438) summary of the work of his student Claudia Brugman (1981/1988) 
on about one hundred related meanings of the linguistic concept OVER in English. It is argued 
that these are all linked in a chain of systematic extensions of one prototypical experience. 
According to Brugman the prototype is the configuration of one object being situated above 
another, according to Dewell’s (1994) more refined argument described in an earlier chapter, 
they are chained variants and extensions of a semi-circular arc prototype.95 Amongst other 
things, it has been questioned whether it makes sense in the highly complex case of OVER to 
speak of one or more central members in the whole network and whether the network is 
actually radial (i.e. with CENTER-PERIPHERY), since all sorts of ‘derivative’ variants are equally 
as common as the one meaning of OVER that was presumably the historical original sense. 
    These disagreements aside, the crucial point for the tool-schema argument is that the 
users of the discussed linguistic categories have at their disposal an implicit model to 
understand the structure of their categorization. And, this model is of an image schematic 
kind. In Lakoff’s Dyirbal and Japanese examples the schemas of CONTAINER, LINK, and 
CENTER-PERIPHERY create an understanding of categories with radial structure. We may 
expect the categorization models of other languages to be structured by the same basic 
tools, which are combined in different ways to suit the needs of other languages. Obviously, 
there are differences too: For example, Japanese has over a dozen classifiers, while Dyirbal 
has only four. In Japanese the categories are not related in the simple binary manner that the 
male and female category centers of Dyirbal permit, which in turn stand in combined 
opposition to vegetal food. However, some Japanese classifiers, such as the one for long 
and thin and the one for flat objects, may well be cognitively paired as contrastive 
oppositions on the local level, even if there is no overall binary structure. By the same token, 
we may expect the classifier opposition between humans and machines or humans and 
animals to be more salient than that between humans and long and thin objects and thus to 
                                                 
95 For a critical view of the theory of radial categories see Vandeloise (1990). 
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engender a local opposition. Additionally, just how complex the linking chains are may vary. 
The same goes for the general importance and function of the classifier system. These 
differences notwithstanding, on the radial categories account, systems of categorizations 
have two things in common: First, they use image schemas as structuring devices. Second, 
the image schemas occurring in a particular kind of operation, such a categorization, are 
fairly constant. Even if the models that they structure differ, their basic elements are alike.  
    Take as another example one basic aspect of grammatical structure: On the view 
proposed here, we would not understand the relation between sentences and the words they 
consist of if we did not understand them as wholes with parts that are linked by syntax. The 
nature of the propositional model of linking arguments into relations is only understood on 
this basis. Obviously this is not all it takes to understand the cognitive format of grammar. It 
involves whole series of imagistic models of basic relations. One contributing sub-model 
structures the class of nouns as radial category, with physical entities in the center and 
abstract nouns more peripherally situated. The same may be true for basic-level verbs like 
run, hit, give and more abstract verbs such as nullify, circumscribe, defrock, embezzle. As 
soon as we implicitly compare the status of these two classes, we can do this with a 
spatialized model that shows that some members are more experientially basic by placing 
them in the center. Lakoff (1987: 290) enumerates some other aspects of syntactic structure 
that are characterized by image schemas: 
 
“- Hierarchical syntactic structure (i.e., constituent structure) is characterized by PART-WHOLE schemas: 
The mother node is the whole and the daughters are the parts. 
- Head-and-modifier structures are characterized by CENTER-PERIPHERY schemas. 
- Grammatical relations and coreference relations are represented by LINK schemas. 
- Syntactic ‘distance’ is characterized by LINEAR SCALE schemas. 
- Syntactic categories, like other categories, are characterized structurally by CONTAINER schemas.” 
 
For a fuller (if very bulky) account of imagistically conceived formal features of grammar that 
includes a series of applications see Langacker (1991).  
    Another example are classical taxonomies, which are less subconscious than theoretical 
models employed on a conscious level (‘folk-theories or scientific theories). Taxonomies are 
idealized as a model that encompasses CONTAINER-like categories that are LINKed. In 
classification schemes, such as Linnaeus’ biological model, there is an UP-DOWN dimension 
and a PART-WHOLE relation: Each higher order category is a whole with the immediately lower 
categories being its parts. (In addition, what defines one category internally are again feature 
bundles, which are imagistically conceived as set members in a container, as Lakoff argues. 
See further below for details.) Lakoff (1987: 284-92) enumerates a score of other important 
model formats that are characterized by image schemas. They will be summarized further 
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below. But first I want to reexamine an example given above to make sure the difference 
between the semantic and structural poles of image schematic thought is entirely clear. 
 
3. How form and content schemas work together 
If image schemas shape the ‘form’ and the ‘content’ levels of language, it should be 
interesting to see how these two interact. I propose the following: Generally speaking the 
less schematic, but more local content schemas are fit into the more schematic but wider 
form schemas.  
    For an illustration let us take another look on Dewell’s (1994) study of OVER, which was 
described in chapter 7. Dewell’s example serves to accomplish two things: On the one hand I 
want to pinpoint the difference between semantic image schemas and image schemas used 
for structuring cognitive model formats. On the other hand I want to show how both aspects 
intermesh and present their interaction in a complex diagram. Let us return to my summary 
of Dewell’s major variants of OVER and their connections (a few minor ones are left aside) 
which are partly versions of the arc-prototype and partly semi- and fully-independent split-offs 
in a chaining of ‘family resemblances’ (CENTER-PERIPHERY and LINKS). To see how the 
diagram should be interpreted I will briefly repeat my characterization of the different chain-
linked constituents and describe their structural positioning and their links within their overall 
network. Bear in mind that the two image schema uses at issue here are, first, the individual 
semantics of a meaning variant and, second, its overall structural relation to other 
constituents.96 In the diagram the arc-prototype is placed in the (or in one) center. It 
engenders its main variants as profiling versions of itself, which are grouped right around it. 
There is the upswing-profile for expressions like “The sun is rising over the mountains”, the 
head-segment profile for expressions like “The plane is flying over”, and the downswing-
profile for expressions like “Sam fell over the cliff”. In about the same distance to the central 
schema the freeze-frame variant for expressions like “The plane is over Baltimore by now” 
and the end-profile variant for expressions like “Sam lives over the bridge” are grouped. 
There also is an extended-trajector variant for “The rope stretches over the yard”, which is a 
bit, but not far from the prototype. At about the same distance there is the variant for “She hit 
him over the head with a pool cue”. A first main derivation is the link to a group of 3-
                                                 
96 It should be emphasized that, even though the hierarchical relation in this example is fairly evident, 
the distinction between co-functional imagery and semantic imagery is not always clear-cut in absolute 
terms. We can speak of a general tool when the imagistic operation is sufficiently schematic to be 
entrenched as a multi-purpose mechanism for many instances. However, anything that is depicted in a 
given context as belonging to the pole of semantics rather than to tool-schemas may in another 
context become a tool-schema itself. Semantic images and structuring images of the co-functional sort 
are continuous with each other, subsist in each other, and can be transformed into each other. 
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dimensional versions of the arc found in expressions like “He draped the sheets over the 
clothesline”. Here the trajector is an edge and the element of covering enters. Other linked 
versions are “She poured the syrup over the pancakes” and “The beer ran over the edge of 
the glass”, in which the trajector is multi-directional and planar. The version of covering 
spawns the first semi-split-off in which the arc is no longer present: “He walks all over the 
field”. However, a close similarity regarding the aspect of covering is present here and 
motivates the closeness and derivational link to the multi-directional planar trajector. 
    There is yet another semi-split-off variant for expressions like “He walked over the field”, 
where there are semi-circular movements over a plane, which creates some similarity to the 
arc-prototype, with the difference of the movements being repeated and the overall motion 
remaining planar. Both semi-split-off versions are marked by a broken-lined and profiled 
container. In addition, the partial and full split-offs are depicted by an arrow instead of a line 
to represent the notion that a stronger, more forceful movement of the mind is necessary.  
    The fully-split-off derivative of planar covering (“He held his hand over the eyes”) is 
marked by a profiled container with a full line. This version stands in some sort of internal 
opposition relation to the arc-prototype, which is marked by a broken-lined double arrow. 
This opposition arises because the arc has been replaced by a fully planar sense here. The 
planar-covering sense again forms a local node from which other derivative versions emerge, 
only one of which has been included here (“He put the ring over her finger”). 
    However, all of these versions of OVER form a polysemous group in relation to other words. 
This elicits a CONTAINER schema within which all meanings are placed, while without it 
nearby schemas with related but in important respects contrasting meaning prototypes, such 
as ABOVE, are placed. As ABOVE and OVER stand in a somewhat contrastive relation, this is 
depicted by a double arrow for emphasis.  
    So much for the description of the different versions of OVER and their chaining and 
opposition relations. As stated above, the purpose and utility of this example lies in the fact 
that, both, semantic and structural image schema uses are present in it. The more semantic 
uses are the small individual schemas in the oval containers. Calling them semantic means 
that, upon hearing the relevant phrase with OVER in them, the mind elicits a schematic image 
not unlike the ones in our diagram in which a trajector and a landmark stand or move in a 
particular relation to another. 
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    Simultaneously, the over-all diagram specifies structural relations of similarity, distance, 
derivation, and opposition: It specifies the form of thought. It can do so by the use of image-
schematic structures: The depiction, though without doubt highly simplistic, is not merely 
intended as a convenient observer’s model – the claim is that people really think by means of 
such structural models! And, if the ‘spatialization of form’ hypothesis is right, the structural 
relations are image-schematic by nature, as the following will make plain. The structures 
used here include small CONTAINERS for the individual senses of ‘over’ and a large 
CONTAINER for the polysemous category of ‘over’ as a whole. They also include LINKS, which 
can be either strong or weak, and signify derivation or similarity. And, there are two kinds of 
OPPOSITION depicted by double-arrows. On the one hand there is an opposition of an internal 
kind between different senses of ‘over’ that form local nodes and group other senses around 
them. On the other hand there are external opposition relations between ‘over’ and other 
prepositions, especially ABOVE and ON. Finally, we have seen that there may be CENTER-
PERIPHERY relations within the overall container for ‘over’, at least if the case for a strong 
central prototype can be maintained. 
 
SPATIALIZED CO-SIGNATURES / CO-FUNCTIONAL IMAGERY OF STRUCTURAL RELATIONS  
“Thinking treats space and time, which are containers for being, as the structural categories of 
coexistence and sequence.” (Arnheim 1969: 129) 
 
The ‘spatialization of form’ hypothesis carries a massive claim about the nature of human 
cognition in it. For this reason, it is necessary to investigate where the hypothesis could lead 
us. Let us presuppose its relevance for the time being and discuss its pros and cons a bit 
later. I will begin by giving the hypothesis of form image schemas a more explicit form under 
the heading of ‘spatialized co-signatures’, which I define as bracing structures of content 
schemas. Then I will briefly enumerate a few examples that hint at the hypothesis’ possible 
scope in the analysis of complex real-life settings such as are studied in ethnographical 
accounts. 
    As a point of entry I want to spell out my elaboration of Lakoff’s formulation step by step 
and introduce a theoretical terminology that clarifies what the claim implies for Cognitive 
Science as concerns the content-form relation. (Much of Langacker’s work is evocative of 
such a view as well, although he has remained more modest in his explicit claims.) Take, 
again, the case of grammar. The cognitive linguist Leonard Talmy (1988: 165) characterizes 
the grammatical specifications of a sentence as imagistically evoking a conceptual 
scaffolding. The lexically specified conceptual material is ‘inserted’ into this skeletal 
framework where it assumes its assigned place. Thus, the knowledge of English grammar 
specifies the slots for subject, predicate, and objects of a sentence and orders the 
conceptual content of the lexical items by a default expectation about what constitutes a well-
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ordered sentence. In accordance with Langacker (1987a) and Lakoff (1987) the idea is that 
this skeletal framework is conceptualized as a quasi-spatial image. The slots for subject, 
object, and predicate correspond to the ordered and linked parts in a skeletal image of a 
sentence-whole. 
    The major claim that I will elaborate in the further course of this work is that such 
conceptual scaffolds are by no means limited either to clauses or phrases or even only to 
linguistic phenomena. Phenomena that have traditionally been the subject matter of cultural 
anthropology are amenable to an analysis of the same kind. The idea that phenomena such 
as ritual may be structured by a formal subconscious ‘grammar of thought’ is by no means 
new in cultural anthropology, if we think of Claude Lévi-Strauss and his structuralist 
successors. It should be clear, however, that the specific structural formats debated in 
cognitive linguistics differ considerably from structuralist suggestions, are far more complex 
and manifold, and require corroboration by convergent evidence from cognitive methods. 
    Let me clarify my claims: Imagine somebody who is trying to understand a complex 
sequence of a social event, say, of a public speech. First of all, the audience has 
preconceived notions (perhaps very general, but deeply entrenched) about what will follow 
and against which to crosscheck the actual speech. At the same time it must pay close 
attention to smaller parts of the speech, the figures of speech, tone, the speaker’s intentions, 
and so on. The hypothesis now is this: Parallel to the ongoing decoding and interpretation of 
words (and other, paralinguistic information) a second imagistic process is taking place, in 
which the audience tries to figure out how the perceived words fit into the general structure 
supplied by the knowledge about the event type or events in general. Because of the 
parallelism I will call this co-functional imagery or, interchangeably, imagistic memory co-
signatures. My claim is threefold:  
(1) In order to understand complex sequences, there must be a level of general 
structure cognized parallel to on-line understanding.  
(2) This level operates on ‘space logic’; it uses image-schematic devices.  
(3) The imagistic structure forms a skeletal grid into which to place the impinging 
propositional information and without which substructures would not make sense. We 
need a skeletal image of the ongoing whole to render the parts meaningful; the 
skeletal image acts as a scaffold for cognition. In a nutshell, the co-signature – itself 
being structure with slots to be filled – guides the coupling of structure and content. 
 
Co-signatures are typically mental schemas in at least four important respects: (1) They most 
often occur as defaults, (2) they allow enrichment into more detailed schemas, (3) they 
influence, and are influenced by, experiential content in a mutual trade-off, and (4) they are 
amenable to dynamical orchestration, often on the basis of manipulating the defaults. First, it 
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is plausible to believe that such co-signatures are elicited as default-scaffolds in many social 
contexts. For example we may have an expectational pattern about the typical structure of an 
event as linear, even though this default does not always hold. When the default that one 
starts out with proves incompatible with the experience, it may be changed to accommodate 
the actual state-of-affairs or even be completely replaced by a new model. Second, image-
schematic co-signatures occur at different levels of schematicity, so that a very abstract 
model may allow for the enrichment through further conceptual or experiential structures. 
Basic models can be elaborated and fleshed out once additional information is present. The 
more schematic a model is the more ways for elaboration are possible, so that a very rough 
schema can accommodate a great number of more detailed versions into its schematic 
skeleton. Third, the relationship between understanding the ongoing parts of an episode and 
expectations about the event as a whole could be best described as dialectical. One needs 
the other, and each constantly modifies the other. For example, initial defaults may be 
discarded and new ones adopted or specifying sub-models recruited, once the topic is 
clearer. On the other hand co-signatures also influence what parts of reality are actually 
perceived. Information that does not fit into any expectational slot may be totally disregarded, 
relatively neglected or partly misperceived. Fourth, defaults can be dynamically orchestrated. 
For instance, rhetoric can be used to surreptitiously change default expectations of the 
audience and arrive at a wholly different model in the end (a prime example can be found in 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar in Marc Anthony’s famous speech). I will treat dynamically 
orchestrated defaults of this sort in a later chapter.  
    The ethnographic examples of co-signatures that I will be giving depict them as abstract 
skeletons. This may give them an abstract flavor, but is well grounded in my theoretical aims. 
The sensory qualia or information which fill the slots of a co-signature in any real situation 
are not dwelt on in any detail. I bypass them on the assumption that they are real 
expectational structures, and as such true trans-contextual schemas. Of course, co-
signatures can usually be concretized, but as soon as they become expectational structures 
after an initial learning phase they must be entrenched in the mind as non-concretized 
images.  
    Why do I say ‘usually’? Co-signatures can conceivably be also used independent of any 
concrete information, so that they are not anymore co-functional to anything ongoing, but 
stand for themselves. This is the case when the nodal structure itself becomes the image for 
an abstract idea, such as INTERRELATEDNESS and HOLISM, or ESSENCE and SAMENESS. In 
other words, I propose that understanding some very abstract words involves the same 
image schema that is employed for doing real-life cognitive tasks. While folk-models tend to 
apply co-signatures in concrete contexts and probably do so unconsciously, philosophical 
systems rely heavily on making such abstract concepts conscious and injecting them into 
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discourse. This leads to a fascinating hypothesis: Abstract philosophical concepts take 
structures of everyday applied cognition and link their recurring imagistic-skeletons to words 
(cf. also Lakoff and Turner’s 1989 treatment of poetry). I will exemplify the hypothesis later.  
   In sum, then, I want to add a fourth claim about structural imagery here and with it mark a 
highly important distinction. On the one hand, co-signatures can help doing tasks by ordering 
information, so that actual information is inserted in the specified slots. On the other hand, 
what was originally a co-signature can become an autonomous concept in its own and 
become the image behind an abstract term. It is important to understand that the difference 
is one of degree, depending on how much concrete content is connoted with an abstract 
word by a person. Later examples will cover both aspects.  
 
4. Further examples 
A couple of examples for co-signatures may serve to clarify this whole hypothesis: 
    (1) A simple example of such co-functional imagery would be the basic assumption of 
causal sequence. It makes sense to assume that this is a default assumption, which is 
especially strong in the case of social events where rational human agency is assumed to be 
present. Langacker and Talmy have plausibly described the image-schematic skeleton of 
causal events as drawing on knowledge about force dynamics (see Langacker 1990c). They 
explain this through billiard balls. One ball is sent off and transmits its impetus when it strikes 
another ball and sets it into motion, this ball again hits another ball, and so on, until the 
impetus is ‘swallowed’ by a final ball in the chain. This is when a motion or event peters out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The billiard-ball model as co-functional imagery imbues experiential ‘data’ with a mode of 
interpretation and creates a way of ‘seeing as’. This may be usually the case by way of a 
default expectation. In other words, most people routinely apply the expectation that the 
events they experience involve causal links, even where they may be not entirely visible or 
phase 1: the black ball is 
sent off 
phase 2: the black ball 
bounces off the white one 
and transmits its impetus to 
a third ball 
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even not amenable to direct inspection by humans (the will of ‘God’, etc.). More about this 
will be said further down. 
     (2) Another just as basic example would be the cognitive assumption of the event as a 
container or region, which coheres as a whole and contrasts to the preceding and to the 
following experience. In the diagram below we assume a background to other things in social 
life. The operation is one of foregounding and of contrasting. It foregounds by selecting 
certain aspects from a cognitive background and bestowing a characteristic ontology on 
them that contrasts with ontologies of other kinds. Of course, in other cases the background 
may be constituted by another domain, such as the domain of natural events. We may say 
that the immediate background (by virtue of RELATED IS CLOSE) is always from the generic 
domain of the event. Certainly, this embedding domain may be itself embedded in yet other 
domains of higher generality from which they are contrasted and foregrounded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) Of course, both of the image schemas just described are well-known in the literature on 
metaphor: They have been described as CAUSAL SEQUENCE IS TRANSFERRED FORCE IMPETUS 
and EVENTS ARE CONTAINERS. If they are superimposed on one another the causal 
assumption and the container assumption add up to a default image schema for events, 
especially for social events and intentional events with human agency. This bears directly on 
a well-known type of cognitive format, as Lakoff (1987: 286) argues, namely scenarios. The 
cognitive format of scenarios is primarily structurally understood by means of the SOURCE-
PATH-GOAL schema. The primary ontological defining feature is that there is an initial state, a 
sequence of events, and a final state. Another ontological feature is that the path consists of 
PARTS that make a WHOLE by being linked. A third feature is that the links may be directional 
and the causal relation between a preceding and a subsequent part understood as FORCE 
 
event 
social 
background 
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relation in one direction. If we add these features up we get the following default model for 
events: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) In a related but slightly more complex version of the simple event schema (see 2.), two or 
more figures are isolated from a ground, instead of a simple figure-ground distinction. The 
linguistic theory of ‘mental spaces’ developed by Gilles Fauconnier (1985, 1997) and Mark 
Turner (1996) provides a basic model of multiple spaces highlighted in the mind, together 
with a wealth of examples. His theory proposes a spatialized analysis of how people 
structure the logical interrelations of complex sentences or discourse sequences in their 
mind. Just as real life events occur in different spaces, we can also assign spaces to mental 
scenes evoked through language to differentiate their logical, modal, or temporal status. 
Fauconnier (1997: 38-39) gives the following definition of how people construct and move 
between mental spaces when they engage in discourse or thought: 
 
“At any given stage of the discourse one of the spaces is the base for the system, and one of the 
spaces (possibly the same one) is in focus. Construction at the next stage will be relative either to 
Base Space or Focus Space. Metaphorically speaking, the discourse participants move through the 
space lattice; their viewpoint and their focus shift as they go from one space to the next.“ 
 
What if this movement through a spatial lattice is not only metaphorical but is a mental 
journey in spatial images? Included into the spatialization of form hypothesis, Fauconnier’s 
model would have the status of co-functional imagery. 
    In order to signal the relative position of a thought in the lattice there are grammatical cue 
expressions that Fauconnier calls ‘space builders’. Here are some: “in 1929”, “in that story”, 
“actually”, “in reality”, “in Susan’s opinion”, “Susan believes...”, “Max hopes...”, “If it rains...”. 
All of these space builders let us place a new mental space on our mental stage, a space in 
 
event 
social 
background 
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which the scene introduced by the builder will be situated and which contrasts with other 
spaces. For example the space builder ‘maybe’ sets up a possibility space, while ‘he thinks’ 
sets up belief space, and ‘if’ a hypothetical space. Often there are counterfactual spaces 
which enable us to make sense of expressions such as “You know the sister Webster 
doesn’t have? Well, she does not know how lucky she is” (p. 121).  
    Consider a more complex example: “Achilles sees a tortoise. He chases it. He thinks that 
the tortoise is slow and that he will catch it. But it is fast. If the tortoise had been slow, 
Achilles would have caught it. Maybe the tortoise is really a hare” (p. 44). We move just as 
effortlessly between actual spaces, to belief spaces, hypothetic spaces, counterfactual 
spaces, future spaces, etc. in most real life discourse situations as we do in this slightly 
awkward example. It deserves to be reiterated that not only one, but several spaces are set 
off as a figure from a ground, just as in the event schema. Consider the following figure that 
shows how we mentally separate different kinds of spaces. The arrows indicate a few 
examples of possible linkages between spaces. These ‘identity connectors’ (see Turner 
1996: 122) either establish the identity of whole spaces or of particular events, actors, or 
actions that form part of their mental scenes (so that we might even use several of them 
between two spaces to indicate that some but not all entities are connected). For example, 
they connect the images of a person between the real setting at hand and imagined settings 
that have not taken place in the past, or such that might possibly take place in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In my reading the mental spaces approach amounts to a theory of ontology types operating 
on co-functional imagery that uses spatial logic with the elements of apartness, coincidence, 
and linkage. The basic idea is that DIFFERENT ONTOLOGIES ARE SPATIALLY APART while THE 
SAME ONTOLOGY COINCIDES IN A SINGLE SPACE. To give just one example, the ontological 
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characteristics of real and imagined, which relate to a cultural model of reality and fantasy, 
are understood through the co-functional imagery of event spaces (this is reflected in 
expressions such as ‘the realm of fantasy’ or ‘the world of everyday reality’). 
   Linguistic methods yield some suggestive evidence that spatial logic is actually applied. An 
excellent example for spatial logic applied to sentences is that of so-called epistemic 
distance, which Fauconnier (1997: 93) proposes as an explanation for why the English 
language uses past tense forms in two different ways. The past tense form can mark prior 
time simple propositions (‘You went fishing yesterday’). Alternatively, ‘went’ is used to mark 
something that Fauconnier calls epistemic distance in conditional clauses (‘If you went 
fishing tomorrow, you would have food for me’). In either case it marks a distal space relative 
to the ‘here and now’ space. This may require explanation for the second example, which 
 
“takes a negative stance toward the event, and may be used even if we know that you are not going 
fishing. It is then interpreted as a counterfactual. In both cases, a hypothetical mental space is 
constructed, but the tense is used to specify not its time relation to its parent [which may but need not 
be the base space], but rather its epistemic distance.” (p. 93-94) 
 
Hence, epistemic distance may be read as an effect of the metaphor WE DO NOT KNOW FAR-
OFF THINGS AS WELL AS NEAR THINGS. For this reason the two uses of the past tense forms are 
schematically related because EPISTEMIC DISTANCE AND TEMPORAL DISTANCE ARE BOTH 
SPATIAL DISTANCE. 
    (5) There is a further group of important functions of the basic impetus chain that is 
important in religious rituals and other forms of entitling agents to a privileged function. This 
is congruent with suggestions made by Lawson and McCauley (1990: 110ff) on the cognitive 
features of religious beliefs. They note that religious rituals frequently feature chains of 
enablement for sacred functions from a supreme superhuman agent down to a priest. They 
hypothesize that there is a filtering model in our mind with which we distinguish religious 
actors who are ritually entitled from those who are not. I would argue that we conceptualize 
the structure in a similar way by representing it as a spatialized co-signature. In this case we 
would conceptualize an idealized chain of agents stretching from the original source of 
religious power and blessing to the performing agent, either directly or via intermediaries. So 
there would be an impetus chain stretching from the source to the recipient, who is thus 
vested with her or his special ritual powers. Plausibly, this is metaphorically understood 
through our physical and embodied experiences with force and energy. Possibly other 
embodied experiences than impetus that also have to do with energy enter into this, such as 
our experience of ingesting energy through food, receiving energy through warmth, and 
perhaps through healing action. In any case, some image of directional flow within our body 
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or between bodies will be involved, which might be considered a cognate of the impetus 
image. 
    This can be compared to the universal ‘truth granter’ conceptualized as BLOCKAGE 
REMOVAL and to truth as COMPELLING FORCE, as analyzed by Johnson (1987). On this basis, I 
would argue that all other kinds of vesting a social actor with a special function conforms to 
the same schema as well, for example in the case of conceptualizing legal titles. It is 
probably not by pure chance that we speak of the Law (with a capital ‘L’) as a transcendental 
source of rights from which individual laws derive through a force chain of enabling 
entitlement. Both the religious and the legal cases show that the impetus chain can be 
combined with other image-schematic models: Both God and the Law are not only 
understood as a first mover, but also as an essence from which everything else emanates. 
The uppermost element is at the same time one with a quality that includes all lower 
qualities. (I will argue further below that such essences are conceptualized as image 
schemas of a container with a homogenous, but abstract content that is responsible for its 
ontological features.) For example, Law as general first principle implicitly is seen as already 
including all specific laws emanating from it. What is transferred in the downward chain is not 
only a movement, but also a determining quality that is bestowed by the ontological nature of 
the prime mover. 
    The example also shows that not only the temporal structure of events can be coded by 
co-functional imagery, but that other modalities in which we perceive an event also can, such 
as a priest having been ritually ‘enabled’. Thus, the effect of past blessings, ordinations, etc. 
may be present in the way a religious or legal state of affairs is perceived. According to 
Lawson and McCauley’s theory, religious actors are identified as legitimate by implying a 
cognitive model of ontological enablement. The imagery in this case would stand for the 
notion of a quality like ‘blessed’, ‘chosen’, or ‘ordained’ being moved from a transcendental 
source to a ritual recipient. Note that the carrier of such an ontological quality from the source 
to the recipient is often a ritual object symbolizing the quality, such as the host or holy water. 
Also note that such an ontological chain can serve to define an agent’s permanent ritual 
status. The original ordination of a priest is conceptualized by such a model, perhaps even in 
a quite conscious way. More than that, the model is evoked to conceptualize the permanent 
quality of having been ordained as a rightful incumbent of the office. (The intricate 
differences in imagistic emphasis between the continuous form of the concept, i.e. ‘being 
ordained’, and its perfective form, i.e. ‘ordained’, within this basic model will be explained 
later.) A non-physical quality is permanently ascribed to the person as defining attribute of 
priesthood. Believers permanently perceive an ordained priest through such a cognitive 
model, since it is defining of the concept ‘priest’ as such. 
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    In placing the figure in a vertical orientation I bring into play the conventional spatial 
metaphor POWERFUL IS UP, which nicely maps onto the conceptualization of a force’s origin 
and figures prominently in many conceptualizations of the divine and transcendental all over 
the world. 
    It is interesting to note that this also provides a new perspective on the so-called meta-
representational ability of the human mind, as proposed by Sperber (1975, 1982, 1985, 
1996). He puts forward an explanation of beliefs in dragons and other concepts embedded in 
complex cultural theories, without resorting to the simple label of primitive irrationalism. 
According to this theory, people hold representations like the existence of dragons, the 
Trinity dogma, or the theory of relativity and usually believe in their truth without knowing 
their exact content, simply because there are justified social reasons for accepting the belief 
(the experts say so, etc.).97 People hold a second-order epistemo-ontological belief about 
                                                 
97 Different kinds of mental modules treat information from different sources and of different sorts in 
ways different in principle. Sperber (1996: 70-71) contrasts everyday empirical knowledge with 
religious beliefs:  
“I assume that we have a disposition to develop a certain form of empirical knowledge that could be 
characterized as follows: 
-It consists in representations which are simply stored in encyclopaedic memory and which are treated 
by the mind as true descriptions of the mind just because they are so stored. 
-These representations are formulated in the language of basic concepts; thus, you cannot have this 
kind of knowledge about atoms, viruses, mana or democracy (which, I assume, do not fall under basic 
concepts.) 
 -They are automatically tested for mutual consistency and, in particular, for consistency with 
perceptual inputs.” 
ritual 
actor 
transcendental 
source 
 363 
these vaguely formed concepts, namely that they are true. What sort of representation this 
meta-belief evokes is left unexplained by Sperber. At the same time he also fails to specify 
what lies behind mental ‘modules’, which seem to be based on the metaphorical notion of 
different tools or different storage facilities in the brain substrate. The just mentioned chain of 
ontological enablement could at least explain how people conceptualize the truth status of 
these vague notions through a co-functional image-schematic model. When an accepted 
experts’ opinion warrants a conclusion, this is fact represented as belief enablement, so that 
whenever this co-functional image is attached to the vague belief it is acceptable. This also 
opens the intriguing possibility to conceive the schematic image for the truth status of 
understood and not-understood concepts as identical. (Perhaps the difference simply is that 
the understood image is inserted into the schematic containers that are hierarchically 
chained here in the one case, and left blurred or reduced to a token in the other.) As a 
consequence, we can hypothesize that Sperber’s meta-representations simply result from a 
more generally applied image-schematic metaphor for truth. The instances of the metaphor 
merely differ in that we now have, instead of a compelling conceptual force, a communicative 
force. The metaphor linking these two would then be THE FORCE OF FACTS (TRUTH) IS A SOCIAL 
FORCE, rendering both ways of conceptualizing truth schematically similar: truth as a 
compelling force chain of factual knowledge and as a force chain of compelling 
communicative acts. 
     (6) As Lakoff (1987) argues, feature bundles, that is collections of properties of 
something, are structurally understood as the contents of the same container (they are 
blended in a single space, yielding a multi-feature quality). In this way we get a co-signature 
for the fact that they ontologically belong together. When we enumerate the attributes of a 
thing, we do so by putting them in a common container in our mind. The same is also 
possible on a larger scale, not between features of a single concept, but between several 
concepts that are related through a model. Suppose, for example, a situation where three 
known terms are linked to a central half-understood term to define this term. I will extensively 
argue in chapter 9 for the existence of an important learning default based on such concept 
bundles, with a conceptual node representing something not adequately understood. 
    These are very simple and very basic examples. There are a score of other skeletal 
imagistic structures people can bring to bear on their ongoing interpretation of an event or 
state, some of which reflect highly specific cultural models. Some more examples are to 
follow, without any claim of providing a comprehensive list. Let me mention a final possible 
                                                                                                                                                        
    Only at this level of primary concepts these rules obtain. Other forms have greater flexibility and 
weaker filter mechanisms. Intuitive beliefs of this level have to be distinguished from the second order 
level of reflective beliefs. When beliefs on this second-order level are successful in spite of being 
counter-intuitive, it is because their embedding makes them plausible. 
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corollary of seeing features as spaces that could be suggestive for further study. Spatial logic 
could be used to embed features into successive containers, whereby the smaller containers 
share the attributes of the larger, but backgrounded containers of which they are part.  
    Suggestive evidence for spatialized logic in memorization abounds: The mnemotechnics 
harking back to Greek antiquity make use of the image of the mind as a house with rooms 
through which one wanders and where one can stop to examine the details. Recent 
techniques like ‘mindmapping’ even visualize these structural Gestalts in a tangible way. 
Likewise, object oriented programming in the computer sciences makes use of spatially 
structuring operators as objects being embedded in one another within various layers of 
schematicity. Although all these are in a sense artificial and consciously acquired expert 
techniques, it is highly suggestive that scientists, computer programmers, administrators, and 
business people find it useful to structure their knowledge in the same way that the co-
functional imagery of the cognitive unconscious works according to my hypothesis. What 
object oriented programming allows the programmer to do is to imagine exactly the same 
kind of co-functional imagery to build an overall mental map of the program and its features, 
which are inherited down into lower-level containers, while additional (in a cognitive 
terminology we may say: less schematic) features are added for specification.  
    This is suggestive for religious empowerment as well as the mentioned impetus chain. 
Some of the models mentioned above could also be analyzed in this perspective. Most 
notably, the ‘embedded’ statements that McCauley and Lawson focus on display a spatial 
logic. As an alternative to impetus chains the more inclusive containers could represent 
causal preconditions. By this logic, they are instantiated as a background, because they are 
a precondition. They are not in focus in the ritual at hand, but whenever one asks for its 
enabling conditions, this larger background could be activated more strongly. The feature of 
this background which is inherited down to the priest could be called godliness or holiness, 
which he participates in by virtue of being in the overall background space. Of course, such a 
background may include a large number of different figures, just as any premise can be used 
to make several different points. I will trace this perspective in much greater detail in the next 
chapter where I will introduce the term ‘realm’, which stands for a distinctive feature or ’rule’. 
The background containers hypothesized here would fall under that term. 
    A final word on the main intention motivating this chapter and the ideas set forth. The 
acknowledged purpose of my main hypothesis, as outlined here, is to stimulate 
ethnographers, linguists, and social psychologists to interpret their data in terms of co-
functional imagery and to find further support for its cognitive reality. After these examples 
we can return to some theoretical implications again. 
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PROPOSITIONS AS COMPRESSED IMAGERY 
Interestingly, if the spatialization of form hypothesis were valid, it would provide an avenue 
towards an explanation of what propositional models actually are. Spatialization of form 
implies, or is at least consistent with, the assumption that propositions are only a particular 
complex and schematic sort of imagery. Even hard-nosed skeptics doubting the 
meaningfulness of the term ‘propositional thought’ will at least concede that conventional 
expressions need not consciously involve concrete imagery. Gary Palmer, who is 
representative of this position more than anybody else, concedes (1996: 105): 
 
“Of course, behind propositional logic you also find imagery, but people nevertheless use such deeply 
entrenched conventional expressions in discourse and everyday reasoning without necessarily 
activating the originating body of concrete imagery.” 
 
Conventional verbal predications of the abstract sort somehow permit us to bypass concrete 
imagery, even though it may remain available if needed. The imagery is merely left 
unactivated in the proposition, although it is in principle accessible or at least was available 
when the concept was first experientially acquired.98 Concomitantly, Palmer claims that 
abstract predications, which he calls ‘postulates’, only differ from images by degree (ibid.). 
They lie toward the abstract end of the abstraction continuum. This continuum, which starts 
with rich images, covers image schemas, and finally extends to include propositions, 
compounds a single mental format.  
    Let me proceed step by step. First, what can a theoretical model look like that supports the 
assumption that abstract and complex knowledge is imagistic? Coming from the field of 
psychology, Barsalou and his collaborators (1999: 211f) contribute a general framework of 
what is called ‘perceptual symbols systems’, which integrates perceptual and conceptual 
knowledge of various kinds into a single picture. The theory’s name is intended to suggest 
that concepts share the structure of percepts. It has the following seven core assumptions: 
    (1) The processing of perceptual symbols often occurs unconsciously. Although conscious 
images may accompany them, they need not do so. 
    (2) Perceptual symbols are schematic and contain only fragments of perceptual states. 
The basic mechanism of selective attention extracts a very small subset of information in a 
perceptual state and transfers it to long-term memory for later use as a symbol. The resulting 
                                                 
98 This notwithstanding, there are exceptions: In very abstract systems of thought a concept takes on a 
life of its own, and the circumstance under which it was formed are forgotten. This is called conceptual 
reification or hypostasis. In our imagistic theory it can be defined as an abstract concept for which the 
originating imagery has been forgotten. 
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schematic symbol contains only the extracted information (e.g. the shape of an entity, 
filtering out its color, position, etc.). 
    (3) Perceptual symbols are multimodal and can represent any aspect of experience. They 
include all five sensory modalities, proprioception, and introspection. Most notably, 
introspection also affords perceptual memories. Perceptual symbols extracted from 
introspection, such as cognitive states and affects, can be stored for later use and play a 
central role in explaining abstract concepts. 
    (4) Perceptual symbols enter into simulation competence. They do not reside in memory 
independently of one another. Instead, they become integrated in systems that allow the 
cognitive system to simulate entities and events in the absence of percepts. Having an 
adequate concept of something, then, means having an acceptable degree of competence in 
simulating it. 
    (5) Perceptual symbols are productive. A finite number of perceptual symbols can be used 
to construct an infinite number of perceptual symbols by using combinatoric and recursive 
mechanisms. This enables the construction of representations of entities and events never 
experienced directly. Information is added back to schematic representations. This is the 
inverse process of symbol formation, where information is filtered out of perceptual 
representations in order to produce schematic perceptual symbols.  
    (6) Perceptual symbols represent propositions used to describe and interpret situations. 
Simulated perceptual symbols are mapped into a perceived or imagined situation, which can 
be construed in a large number of ways by virtue of this. 
    (7) Perceptual symbols represent abstract concepts directly. Most abstract concepts are 
understood directly in terms of the relevant perceptual experience. Contrary to the belief of 
many cognitive linguists, metaphor does not constitute the primary representation of abstract 
concepts. When it applies, it guides, embellishes, and construes the experience. 
    This last point on abstract concepts together with the fifth point deserves further 
discussion. I believe we have to distinguish two kinds of abstractions. Some abstract 
concepts, to be sure, condense concrete experience and can be understood in terms of it 
(such as when we speak of ‘vehicle’ based on the perceptual experience of cars, carts, 
bicycles, trains, etc.). Other abstract concepts, however, are creatively arrived at. They are 
schematic constructions of entities and events never experienced, as in theology, 
philosophy, and mathematics. A sensible reading of what Barsalou and his collaborators say 
about abstract knowledge and the role of metaphor can, then, only be this:  
(1) The meaning foci set by metaphor guide how peripheral pieces of information are 
drawn together when abstract concepts are represented. 
(2) Type I abstractions, i.e. such that are grounded in experience, are directly 
understood in terms of perceptual experience. This happens selectively though, as is 
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always the case for abstract perceptual symbols. In this process, metaphor, if present, 
guides what aspects flow into the reconstruction and which remain unrecruited. 
(3) Type II abstractions, i.e. such that are largely the product of creative fancy, are 
grounded in a virtual blend of conceptual elements. Each of these constituent 
elements may be individually grounded in perceptual experience, while the blend is 
not. Again, metaphor, if present, guides what aspects flow into the reconstruction and 
which remain unrecruited. 
 
Following the above ideas by Palmer (1996) and Barsalou et al. (1999), I would now like to 
present a parsimonious explanation for the relationship between imagery and propositions. I 
would like to propose that propositional expressions are in fact a result of imagistically highly 
condensed knowledge and a reduction of imagistic detail. Note that the metaphor 
‘propositional’ (= language-like, akin in structure to sentences) is usually invoked for any 
mental representation that is so complex as to elude straightforward depiction as an analog 
format, either as rich image or image schema. The representations are elusive because 
multiple dimensions are included and a vast amount of information is condensed into a single 
representation.  
    Here is a tentative description of complex concepts based on imagery. Suppose first that 
complex concepts activate vast neural arrays of linked sub-concepts. Suppose further that 
these neural arrays are represented as spatial images of linked entities filling a virtual mental 
scenery on a corresponding cognitive level (i.e. the spatialization of form hypothesis). 
Suppose thirdly that our mental horizon on this spatialized array is necessarily restricted in 
scope: One has to chose between either taking a relatively local structure in one’s attentional 
focus for examining the details or scanning the wider structure at the price of losing sight of 
these details. Suppose fourthly that complex concepts consist of a set of what Fauconnier 
terms ‘mental spaces’. These have external and internal characteristics. According to 
Fauconnier (1997: 39), they are “internally structured by frames and cognitive models and 
externally linked by connectors, that relate elements across spaces, and more generally 
structures across spaces”. 
    If these assumptions are true, it follows that in order to form an image of complex 
concepts, we have to broaden our mental scope and zoom away from the details specified 
by the frames and cognitive models. In the resulting ‘low resolution’ image that goes with the 
widened scope necessary to grasp its spatial extension (perhaps in many dimensions) in a 
complex concept, only a relatively schematic overall structure of the connectors is mentally 
retained. Thus, conceptual condensation is analogous to spatial condensation that results 
from zooming out from a spatio-conceptual array. In other words, the qualitative value of the 
images is backgrounded. Only their logical implications and connector specifications to other 
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concepts are retained in the foreground. Qualitative or ‘rich’ detail is eliminated, only 
structural features are retained.  
    In the extreme case not even a schematic image of the individual concept is called up any 
more, only its network position relative to other concepts is retained. On this (and only this) 
level of abstraction structuralism is correct that no links to sensory qualities are necessary for 
defining a concept, only its relation to other equally abstract entities is in focus. In this 
extreme case of abstraction only a pure token of the image remains. Such a token might be 
what Langacker (1987a) calls a nominal profile. (Remember his assumption that a mental 
array of any degree of complexity can be treated as a thing-like mental region, by 
foregrounding the fact that all the subparts cohere within a boundary, while backgrounding 
the internal complexity within the boundary.) Presumably there are functional reasons for this 
conceptual condensation: It makes for higher access speed, as a great number of implied 
concepts are packed into the region as links or implications without creating an information 
overflow by considering all of their qualitative traits. If all this is true, abstraction serves to 
create a relatively simple and manageable image of complex cognitive arrays. A simplified 
token image is, then, much like file compression in a computer through which recurrent 
elements are recoded as simpler symbols. Thus, a complex configuration is processed as a 
simple shape, although the highly complex structure behind the token can be reconstructed 
at demand. Concentrating on a particular feature, on the other hand, makes its rich 
structures apparent and the background fade away. (The expression ‘concentration’, by the 
way, itself is evidence for the fact that the European folk-model of finding details in overall 
arrays is conceived as a spatial narrowing process, presumably modeled on visual focusing.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Schema of sub-model linkages, either of concrete images (as in a category) or of a 
host of imagistic sub-models (as in a frame of high internal complexi ty). The balloon 
specifies the internal structure of one of the sub-models, which is backgrounded or lost 
in the shift to a large scope, but can be reconstructed again. Similar balloons with a 
similar sort of internal structure could be added for all the other parts. 
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This hypothesis seamlessly fits the spatialization of form claim. Spatialized forms have been 
defined as essentially being about the conceptual organization and about links between the 
parts of a complex conceptual compound, like a category and its members. At this 
conceptual level the internal structure of the category members is canceled out. Here the 
mind attends to large-scale relations between these entities, regardless of the specific 
imagery we might attach to them. If we go beyond that level which specifies rich or at least 
skeletal internal structure, we get to the level of pure mental tokens and links between such 
tokens. Mental form and content are only different by degree of schematicity, but both are 
imagistic. We get to the form level automatically once we adjust the focus and zoom out to a 
sufficiently large scope and low resolution of a mental array. Propositional models are, as 
stated above, one sort of mental form at the one far end of the imagistic abstraction 
continuum. Propositions understood as abstract imagery are spatialized form models of the 
most schematic kind and the kind most extensive in scope, since they specify only tokens for 
images and their links. 
     Consequently, no propositional schema is purely non-imagistic only because the rich 
imagery is lost. At least the inferential and associative relations between sub-concepts 
remain present in such representations, and they are, according to my theory, represented 
as image-schematic LINKS (and perhaps FORCE) between ENTITIES in quite spatialized ways. 
 
COMPRESSED IMAGERY AND THE STUDY OF METAPHOR 
In chapters 3 and 4 I called attention to the fact that image schema compounds in complex 
metaphor systems need to be studied. The above framework allows a characterization of the 
relation between complex metaphor systems and memory. It is generally acknowledged that 
domains regularly feature extensive sets of metaphors that are part of a single memory 
compound. Yet, how master metaphors and the host of intricate sub-schemas that they 
organize hang together is unclear. How do various metaphors employed in a domain cohere 
in memory? We can reason that, at least in some cases, domains are in fact imagistic arrays 
of their constituent metaphors. These arrays are similar to what Fillmore (1975, 1976) terms 
a ‘frame’. Arrays or frames of cohering metaphors may be taken to characterize the memory 
landscape of cultural competence (whereas individual metaphors are flashlights on how 
people conceive a matter in a given situation, i.e. cultural performance). Two observations 
make this hypothesis plausible. Metaphors are often combined in a short discourse fragment, 
where they shape a mosaic of imagery (cf. Quinn 1991). Where metaphor sets are not 
blended in a single situation they may possibly cohere as elements of extended discourse. 
This entails a single memory Gestalt with many aspects that can be selectively highlighted.  
    A suggestive framework developed for the purposes of cognitive anthropology and 
discourse analysis is that of MacLaury’s (1995) ‘vantage theory’, which is based on 
 370 
Langacker’s notion of focal adjustment. The theory assumes that cultural and linguistic 
competence for a given domain involves a series of perspectives, (1) between which people 
change according to the discourse situation and their intent, and (2) some of which may be 
more prototypical and common than others (i.e. majority and minority perspectives). 
Accordingly, a metaphor employed in a given situation concomitantly evokes an array of 
related metaphors, which function as background knowledge or alternative options. Moving 
between different vantages, then, means performing an imagistic figure-ground switch. Each 
vantage is a figure, which has the others of the same Gestalt – or frame – as a ground.  
    Vantage theory can nicely accommodate some recent findings on metaphor ‘duals’ by 
Lakoff (1990, 1993) and Yu (1995). They demonstrate that time in English and Chinese is 
understood as TIME PASSING IS THE MOTION OF AN OBJECT and TIME PASSING IS MOTION OVER A 
LANDSCAPE. In the former case the observer is imagined as static with time moving relative to 
her (”Time is flying by”), whereas in the second case the observer is moving herself (“We’re 
coming up on Christmas”). (In fact Chinese has a third type, in which observer and time 
move in the same direction and she checks if she is keeping pace, moving ahead, or falling 
back.) A mixing of the types can occur at the discourse or even at the sentence level, 
indicating that speakers switch between vantages effortlessly. The cultural discourse frame 
of time is, then, a spatialized mental setting in which the observer can adjust her position and 
assume several roles relative to landmarks. My proposed model sits very comfortably with 
the data on duals. It remains to be shown if more complex topics also go into a single model 
with many vantages, but at least in the case of experts who know a subject very well this 
seems more than likely. 
 
5. Evidence for the spatialization of form hypothesis 
Although Lakoff’s hypothesis will need more explicit justification in the future, as Langacker 
(1988: 392) also notes in a commendable, sympathetic, and yet critical review paper, it can 
be made plausible on account of several arguments. At present, four types of evidence can 
be marshaled in favor of the spatialization of form hypothesis: A first line of reasoning comes 
from its explanatory power for linguistic phenomena. As second group of arguments relate to 
the cognitive substrate and can be summoned from neurological evidence and from 
modeling efforts in artificial intelligence. A third type of argument concerns the theoretical 
advantages in defining cognitive forms as continuous with cognitive content in an embedded 
hierarchy of schematic images. This may be relevant both to explaining the specific cultural 
schemas as parts of a generic family and to explaining the relation between everyday and 
experts’ theories. An additional, but more tentative, line of reasoning aims at showing that 
folk-theories and expert-theories may hold clues about mental tools operative in the cognitive 
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subconscious, in the sense of sharing their rough and most basic structure, but lacking their 
details. I will go through these four bodies of evidence one by one. 
 
(1) INDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS INFERRED FROM LINGUISTIC PATTERNS 
The first sort of argument is inductive and comes from linguistics. Grammar is one important 
example of a formal structure that can be interpreted under the hypothesis. The assumption 
that grammar operates on a spatial logic can predict a number of actually found inferential 
patterns very well. This is shown in considerable detail by Paul Deane (1996: 118ff), who 
studies human grammar as image-schematic form. Following the programmatic claims of 
cognitive semantics, Deane raises doubts that grammatical competence emerges from a 
specific linguistic module. Instead, he hypothesizes that it stems from the general cognitive 
ability of spatial thought.99 I will not attempt to go into the more intricate details of Deane’s 
linguistic argument or to evaluate its merits. It shall suffice to show what sort of general 
argument is possible from an analysis of grammatical structure, such as so-called ‘head 
structures’. 
    Grammar is the relationship obtaining between the parts of phrases. The spatialization of 
form hypothesis predicts grammar to be constituted by spatialized LINK, PART-WHOLE, and 
CENTER-PERIPHERY schemas. These three are the constitutive aspects of the schema for 
physical OBJECTS. If this is correct, we can predict that inferential properties in the world of 
objects can be transferred to grammar. Phrases are subject to the rules of inference that 
apply to complex wholes in the physical world. The inferential properties of physical linkages, 
such as transitivity, should carry over to grammar: If A is linked to B and B is linked to C, then 
A is linked to C (p. 103). The same logic should be true for part-whole relationships. If A is 
linked to B and B has parts, then A is linked to at least one part of B (p. 116). These and 
other parts of spatial logic can be found in the relation between phrase constituents, so that 
this provides first hints that phrase structure is conceptualized as spatial structure. 
    Furthermore, it follows directly from the logic of the LINK schema that what linguists call a 
‘head-phrase’ can be understood as a CORE PART schema. The core part “is central in the 
network of mutual linkage relations which define the whole. Like an airline hub, it is 
impossible to get from one point to another without passing through it.” (p. 117) As an 
example Deane considers the simple phrase “will see me unwillingly” (i.e. a specifier, a head, 
a complement, and a modifier). A look at the possible smaller-scale linkage relations reveals 
that “will see”, “see me”, and “see unwillingly” can appear independently to form two-word 
units of meaning. By contrast, the other pairings “will unwillingly”, “will me”, and “me 
unwillingly” do not make any sense on their own. Once these possible pairings are thought of 
                                                 
99 According to Langacker (1987a) the only special property of language is its symbolic character, i.e. 
the pairing of semantic and phonological poles. 
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as links – the most basic assumption of the spatialization of form hypothesis – it follows 
naturally that the head (‘see’) instantiates a CORE PART schema (p. 118). The linguistic head, 
conceptualized as core node, is available whenever any part of the phrase is processed, so 
that the properties of the whole phrase are marked on the head. The core parts establish the 
identity of the whole. Deane argues that an entity and its core part must automatically belong 
to the same linguistic category type. 
    Other important aspects of the physical core part schema can explain features of both 
core and peripheral parts: 
 
“Thus far we have focused on geometrical aspects of centrality: the fact that core parts mediate the 
mental paths which connect, and thus integrate, peripheral parts with the whole of which they form a 
part. But there are other properties experientially associated with centrality. Consider the human body, 
for example. Central parts of the human body (e.g., the various parts of the torso) are characteristically 
massive, compact, and rigidly joined. Relatively peripheral parts (arms, legs, head) are typically light 
and flexible in comparison to the core. This is true not just of the parts of the human body but is typical 
of most objects encountered in daily life. Trees, for example, have their most massive and rigid part in 
the center (the trunk); as we move out from the trunk to the branches, then to leaves, the parts are 
less massive and more flexibly attached. 
    Both massiveness and flexibility are directly relevant to the force-dynamic schemas which underlie 
linkage and hence the PART and CORE PART schemata. The more massive something is, the more 
difficult it is to move, and hence the more its location is fixed. The more rigidly attached it is to the 
immediately surrounding parts, the more difficult it is to move independently: thus its location is more 
and more predictable if not identifiable with the location of the whole of which it forms a part. 
Conversely, a light object only flexibly attached to the whole is much less predictable. (...) peripheral 
parts come much closer to being independent objects. (...) These results are at least partly a result of 
the very nature of linkage: entities in the center are multiply linked, and each link constrains their 
location. Peripheral parts are linked more sparsely to the whole, and so their location is far less 
constrained.” (p. 123) 
 
When the CENTER-PERIPHERY schema is transferred from physical space to mental space, 
the central concepts are those whose values are relatively determinate, while peripheral 
concepts are those whose values are less predictable and more subject to shift. 
    In terms of semantic analysis this would mean that the greater the semantic flexibility of a 
concept, the more peripheral it is. In semantics there is a graded difference between 
schematically unsaturated concepts that are variable in reference and essentially complete 
concepts. For instance, a verb like “eat” is relatively unsaturated and unspecified, since the 
nature of the designated action is different between, say, eating an apple and eating 
spaghetti. A noun like “tiger”, “water”, or “gold”, on the other hand, is relatively context-
independent in meaning. Deane proposes that this can be mapped through the CORE PART 
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schema, whereby the fixed reference expressions are central and the variable expressions 
more peripheral (p. 124f). Furthermore Deane proposes that the spatialization of form claim 
predicts the centrality of phonological form, where there are relations of adjacency, 
sequence, and prominence (p. 126). Supposing that heads are understood as phonological 
centers, the nearer a phrase is phonologically to the head the more central and salient it 
should be. Thus, Deane claims that the spatialization of form hypothesis predicts not only 
head-structures in grammar, but also semantic and phonological phenomena. Prototypical 
phrases are reasonably those in which these three mappings reinforce each other. 
     To be sure, the logical viability of Deane’s argument depends on certain ontological 
assumptions about disjunctive levels of theorizing cognition. In Deane’s view a link can be 
thought of as activation spread. Note that this is a concept usually employed at the neural 
level. In the brain substrate neural cells work in terms of links, relative distances, and shifting 
‘weights’ created by the activation total from firing neighbors. By implication, this neural 
architecture has local nodes and peripheries, competing regions, and ‘force distributions’. 
However, Deane intends his argument to be at least primarily about mental concepts. These 
concepts can become available for processing either because they are in the center of focus 
to begin with or because they have been activated by adjacent concepts (p. 129).  
    Thus, Deane seems to implicitly base this model on an analogy to neural activation spread 
when speaking of the conceptual level. Langacker (1988), for one, expresses grave doubts 
about the idea that neural activation spread works just the way that links work within a 
conceptual entity. The problem as I see it is that the implied middle-level of unconscious 
cognition is not adequately modeled here in their relation to conscious ideas on the one hand 
and to brain activity on the other. Hence, activation spread can be quite easily interpreted 
both as a conceptual inference and as a neuronal link, which, in a simplified model, underlies 
the activation responsible for the inference. In my view, a placement between the neuronal 
and the representational levels remains too elusive without a stronger theoretical grounding 
in a model of the cognitive architecture. Without such grounding it can backfire as an 
argument for the spatialization of form hypothesis, because it opens the doors to 
‘materialistic eliminativism’, as proposed by Paul Churchland and others. According to this 
position, once our models of the brain become sophisticated enough, links and activation 
spreads in the brain substrate are able to account for our linguistic data without a need for an 
intervening level of spatialized representations. Where neural networks do the job, 
spatialized concepts are not necessary for an explanation any more. The functions taken by 
the CORE PART schema could be explained away through neural activation clusters. Thus, 
additional evidence is needed to corroborate the spatialization of form hypothesis in its 
strong version, which we defined as pertaining to conceptual representations. 
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(2) ARGUMENTS BASED ON FINDINGS ABOUT THE NEURAL SUBSTRATE 
Alternatively, the matter can be illuminated by looking at the substrate of cognition, namely 
either the human brain or artificial intelligence networks modeled on it. Correspondingly, 
there are two kinds of empirical evidence that come from neuroscience and artificial 
intelligence respectively. Both present structurally analogous evidence: 
    The most important body of evidence related to the neural substrate has, again, been 
assembled by Paul Deane (1991, 1996) and deals with the grammar faculty (just as his 
above arguments from linguistic patterns do). He brings to bear a great amount of evidence 
in support of his theory through an extensive survey of neurological studies. As already 
outlined, grammar under the ‘spatialization of form’ view is ultimately spatial and structured in 
terms of basic image schemas. Deane (1991: 362) contends the following: 
 
“According to this view, the comprehension of abstract concepts crucially involves neural structures 
which are in the first instance processors of high-level spatial structures (e.g., basic image schemas). 
However, in human beings these structures can be diverted to the processing of other, more abstract 
kinds of information. The result is a situation in which spatial and abstract concepts are represented in 
a single format due to their common neural substrate. The common format allows for the emergence 
of explicit metaphors that preserve image-schematic structure as hypothesized by Lakoff (1990). As a 
result abstracts concepts (including grammatical competence) are directly homologous to high-level 
spatial concepts even though there need be no explicit cognitive representation of the similarities.” 
 
The spatialization of form hypothesis makes very strong claims about the relation between 
grammar and cognition (p. 363-64): 
 
“(i) According to the hypothesis, the acquisition of grammatical competence occurs when linguistic 
information is routed and processed by spatial centers in the brain. 
(ii) Specifically, it is claimed that linguistic expressions are processed as if they were objects with 
internal structural configurations. That is, they are processed in terms of certain basic image schemas, 
namely part-whole and linkage schemas critical to the recognition of the configurations which define 
complex physical objects. 
(iii) But as Johnson (1987) argues at length, image schemas are basically embodied schemas, high 
level schemas which function as cognitive models of the body and its interaction with the 
environment.”  
 
The hypothesis predicts an association between grammar and cognitive abilities, such as 
object recognition, spatial structure, and body awareness – especially the modeling of bodily 
movement and position in space. At the level of the neurological substrate such a connection 
can be established. Strikingly, there is a brain region called the inferior parietal lobe which is 
crucial to grammar and all other of the above functions. The neuropathological evidence 
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surveyed by Deane shows that damages of that region can result in disruptions of linguistic 
functioning, such as global aphasia, agrammatism, alexia, and agraphia. It can also 
specifically result in semantic aphasia, which involves an inability to compose the meaning of 
phrases where that process depends on the interpretation of spatial concepts. The inferior 
parietal lobe has precisely the functions predicted by the spatialization of form hypothesis, 
including Johnson’s assumptions about knowledge being linked to bodily experience: First, 
the inferior parietal lobe is recognized as the seat of bodily awareness. Brain damages of 
that region can result in postural disorders, hemiparesis, one-sided body neglect, 
hemianesthesia, pain asymboly, phantom limbs, and even the failure to recognize a limb as 
being part of one’s body. Second, the inferior parietal lobe functions in the high-level, cross-
modal integration of somatic and sensory information. Dysfunctions due to damage also 
include hemianopia, one-sided visual neglect, the inability to use visual information to guide 
body movement, metamorphopsia (shape distortion), and visual perseveration. Third, the 
inferior parietal lobe is responsible for high-level representations of spatial relationships. This 
is indicated by the inability to copy constructional patterns as a symptom of damage to the 
region. Deane also cites studies that show that the inferior parietal lobe functions to 
represent spatial information independent of sensory modality. Fourth, the region is also 
crucial to recognition of everyday objects as Gestalts. One of the most frequent symptoms of 
damage is visual agnosia, i.e. the complete inability to recognize objects. Interestingly some 
patients are able to correctly represent the parts but distort the spatial relationships between 
them or fail to represent them. Finally, crucial evidence comes from patients with damages to 
the left inferior parietal lobe, which is specialized both in language and forethought (abstract 
planning). Both of these require the capacity to represent abstract sequences of actions. 
Such patients often suffer from the inability to coordinate more complex actions, although 
they can perform simple ones (ideomotor apraxia). 
    Deane (1991: 366) suggests that the entire complex of symptoms allows a unified 
interpretation that is perfectly consistent with the central claims of cognitive semantics, 
namely that the inferior parietal lobe is the seat of image-schematic thought. Each damage in 
the region can be analyzed as a disruption of a particular use of image schemas. All this 
shows that the structural capacities required to understand syntax, object recognition, body 
awareness, and sensorimotor capacities form a single functional unit in the brain.  
     A second body of substrate-related evidence coming from artificial intelligence does not 
produce any direct proofs for the hypothesis, but it suggests a future course of research, 
building on present results. Recent modeling efforts in AI by Terry Regier (1995), David 
Bailey (1997), and Srini Narayanan (1997) support the assumption that language recognition 
operates on the basis of embodied image schemas in the case of verbs of movement and 
spatial prepositions, even when used in abstract. It does not seem exactly clear that research 
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remaining on this basic level of individual semantic units of speech has a strong bearing on 
the spatialization of form hypothesis in its strongest sense. However, if a similar kind of 
modeling could be implemented for high-level formal aspects of language, that is 
grammatical structures, this would come as a strong additional argument for the hypothesis. I 
will give a very brief outline of the existing research, so as to show what sort of experimental 
approach in AI could corroborate the postulate of Cognitive Semantics that grammar is 
processed by general-purpose mechanisms of spatial cognition.  
    Regier’s, Bailey’s, and Narayanan’s research results, stemming from a joint project at 
Berkeley with the ambitious name ‘Neural Theory of Language’, are summarized by Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999: 573-581). Regier’s accomplishment is that he succeeds in showing that 
conceptual categories which different languages apply to spatial relations can be created by 
the same neural mechanisms responsible for spatial perception itself. In this model the visual 
and the conceptual system are one. However, this is the result of an artificial connectionist 
network, albeit one built as simplified model of several actual neural structures, so what we 
have here is an existence proof for such a multi-functional structure rather than a proof that 
the brain actually operates in this way. Note however that these results nicely dovetail with 
Deane’s neurological data showing that a single brain region is responsible for grammar, the 
body schema, and spatial movement all at the same time.  
    Another modeling approach by Bailey tries to simulate how movement and motor control 
enter into the definition of concepts. His approach lends credibility to Langacker’s (1987a: 
112) postulate of motor schemas, which are neural events equivalent to events that actually 
elicit a motor response, only that they actually fail to do so, such as in dreaming of motion. 
Bailey constructed a model of a neural network that was able to learn the verbs used for 
hand motion in an arbitrary language. Working with a computerized model of the human 
body with all the indicated muscles and joints, the model should be able to name a given 
hand action correctly and perform the right action given the word. The deeper theoretical 
significance of the connectionist system is that it matches words directly with motor schemas. 
Or, as Lakoff and Johnson say, “the fundamental conceptual roles for making the right 
linguistic distinctions among the verbs are played by features of the motor system” (p. 578). 
To anybody trained in the tradition of faculty psychology this will sound like a category 
mistake, since the physical and the conceptual should be different on a principled basis.  
    The work of Srini Narayanan applies Bailey’s results to abstract reasoning. He 
demonstrates this on the basis of expression used in news stories about international 
economics, containing metaphors such as “the market plummeted”. His model is suggestive 
because it fits with the prediction that conceptual metaphors preserve the spatial logic of 
percepts. His research demonstrates in a simulated learning task that not only verbs for 
spatial motion, but also abstract reasoning can be learned according to the topological 
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properties of the schemas, their ‘spatial logic’. Again, these results do not prove that abstract 
inferences about economics are actually carried out by the system of motor control. They 
constitute another existence proof that the same neural circuitry can be used to move the 
body and to reason with. 
   We can see that the overall thrust in these three cases dovetails with Deane’s argument: 
First, several cognitive functions are shown to be (actually or possibly) co-occurring within a 
single integrated region of the cognitive substrate. Then the multi-purpose general 
mechanism that processes image schemas predicted by Cognitive Semantics is located in 
this network region of the brain or of the connectionist model. From this it is, finally, possible 
to conclude that certain linguistic functions are a result of the human ability to reason 
spatially. Regier, Bailey, and Narayanan show how spatial prepositions, concrete movement 
verbs and the corresponding physical movements as well as abstract movement verbs can 
result from a single structure of spatialized cognition. In a future step it remains to be shown 
from the AI perspective that high-level conceptual functions such as grammar can be also 
covered by this integrated image schema processor. 
 
(3) ARGUMENTS BASED ON THE CONTINUITY OF SCHEMATIC FAMILIES: MARRIAGE AND EMOTIONS 
The spatialization of form view allows a coherent account of how low-schematicity schemas 
cohere in generic ‘families’ at higher schematic levels. In other words, the assumption 
explains how accumulated individual findings on metaphors hang together in imagistic 
landscapes and how they form metaphor hierarchies, metaphor clusters, and master 
metaphor systems. It is probably undisputed that concrete models can be embedded in more 
skeletal framework models. What the spatialization of form view highlights, is that this can go 
up to an utmost level of schematicity. A strong theoretical reason for spatialized tools is that 
we have a unified model of the high and low levels of generality in cognition. The common 
cognitive format elucidates how cultural knowledge can be continuous, combinable, 
regroupable, transferable, holistic, and integrated. 
    One piece of evidence comes from people’s discourse on complex domains and from 
switches between metaphors of a larger scenario. The aforementioned study by Naomi 
Quinn (1991) on American marriage indicates that people readily make comparisons and 
execute transformations between different metaphorical instantiations of a more generic 
schema.100 For example different stages of a relationship are being talked about in different 
versions of the PROCESS schema. The schemas MERGING, CONTACT, LINK, and SPLITTING are 
all specific level subtypes of a process with a shared topology (cf. Cienki 1997: 11). This 
implies at least a two level hierarchy: 
                                                 
100 Quinn’s data provides at least partial evidence that such a mechanism exists, although she does 
not interpret her data as pointing to generic imagery in major ways (see chapter 3). 
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An even more valuable kind of evidence for the existence of generic level models comes 
from the study of master metaphors, i.e. the cumulative analysis of metaphors across 
domains and how they form higher-level systems. The research by Kövecses (2000) on 
emotion concepts that was mentioned in chapters 1 and 3 presents solid evidence for highly 
schematic master models.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In English different metaphors for emotion of all kinds (love, hate, anger, fear, sadness, etc.) 
feature the FORCE schema in some way. In addition the generic emotion schema goes into a 
yet more encompassing model with the schema for rationality. In fact, the two are each 
other’s image-schematic counterparts. Being rational means resisting an outward force 
through one’s own strength, while a strong emotion causes one to surrender to it. One is the 
Top level 
image schema:    PROCESS 
Specific level  
image schemas:   MERGING CONTACT LINK SPLITTING 
Middle level 
image schemas:   EMOTIONS   REASON 
reason  
sub-
schemas? 
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Relational  
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‘agonist’ in a coupled force schema, while the other is the ‘antagonist’. This yields a hierarchy 
of schematically embedded metaphor: 
 
(4) THE ARGUMENT OF FOLK-THEORIES AS IMAGISTICALLY REDUCED PROTOTYPES OF FOLK-
MODELS 
Finally, I would like to suggest a conjectural argument for further discussion: The relation of 
folk-models and folk-theories (or folk-theories of lesser and greater sophistication) can 
sometimes – just as the above embedding hierarchies – be explained as one of reduction 
and skeletalization. That folk-theories, as presented in discourse, and folk-models, as 
inferred by the cognitive analyst, rarely coincide has been long acknowledged 
(Holland/Quinn 1987). What people of a culture say about the way their minds work is one 
thing; what indirect clues about the cognitive unconscious tell us may be another. Conscious 
theories are rarely faithful reflections of operative models in the cognitive subconscious, so 
that hypotheses on operative models cannot be established by simply interviewing 
informants about their views on ideas typical of their culture. Cultural theories reflect 
complexity reductions and simplifications as of ideological discourse. It is characteristic of 
ideology that some aspects of the operative processes of cognition remain unacknowledged, 
some are distorted, and others emphasized in popular consciousness. And no doubt, the two 
models sometimes even clash in terms of social action, either as disagreement between 
different parties or as cognitive dissonance of one individual. Even though people reason by 
graded membership categories in most actual instances, as soon as they are asked about 
how they reason or to make a general judgement they will probably fall back on their cultural 
theory governed by an ideological belief system. For example, the Western folk-theory of 
categorization imposes an ideology of binary relations (either-or). The school system, in 
particular mathematics and philosophy, have inculcated the belief in a logic-like view of 
categorization in which necessary and sufficient conditions for membership obtain, whereas 
graded membership or complex chains play no role. For the most part this does not describe 
the cognitive reality of everyday thought, as the studies by Rosch (1978) and others indicate. 
Instead, categories are structured around prototypes or in complex chains. 
    Although we are barred from any direct access to operative mental models, a 
comprehensive system of indirect clues and ‘convergent evidence’ has been suggested by 
cognitive linguists (Lakoff/Johnson 1999). Given that we put trust in this apparatus of linked 
indirect methods, we are in a position to compare what people say about the way they think 
with their non-conscious performance. This raises the question what the relation between 
reflexive models and operative models is. On the basis of such a comparison it may be 
reasonable to believe that folk-theories have the same image-schematic structure as the 
corresponding operative models. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 20) give some thought to this. 
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They distinguish ‘essence prototypes’ that people think they think with (i.e. the folk-model of 
cognition) from the graded categories that can be linguistically inferred in a more 
differentiated observer’s view. Lakoff and Johnson suggest that the prototypical core 
members of operative categories are used in conscious theories to represent the category as 
such. Container-logic is applied to both, but in the operative model more complex structures 
are added, such as radial structures and graded membership. Following Lakoff and Johnson, 
we may assume that many folk-theories are prototype models of operative space-tools.  
    If this is correct, the folk-category of metaphor should roughly correspond to the operative 
mental tool used in metaphor comprehension, with the latter adding details and allowing 
variants. As a case study, let us compare a common model of metaphor, which is 
presumably based on a folk-theory current among educated people, and a more refined 
model based on recent analytic efforts by cognitive scientists. Many past theorists have held 
a simplified and fairly general theory of metaphor as ‘mapping’ between domains. What is 
more, this also emerges in some everyday expressions like the German “im übertragenen 
Sinne” (= “figurative meaning”; literally “in the carried over sense”). This view of metaphor is 
understood through an image of a projection between two containers linked by a conduit. 
This fits into Reddy’s findings on the Western communication metaphor called – in shorthand 
– CONDUIT for the medium through which a series of connectors passes. Presumably the 
theory of metaphor is therefore based on a general CONDUIT folk-model shared by academics 
and non-academics alike. I propose that the earlier theory of metaphor is motivated by 
recursive, but incomplete understandings of operative cognition. The folk-model may be a 
simplified prototype version of the operative model working on CONDUIT logic. If this is 
correct, the operative mind activates a general spatialized tool representation for 
metaphorical structures every time a metaphor is processed and treats metaphoric cognition 
as an interaction between two spatially fairly separate spaces, even though these two spaces 
have a complex internal substructure and are not strictly bounded. The analysis of metaphor 
within the mental spaces model can be read as an illustration of this (Fauconnier 1997: 168), 
if we assume that it can also be understood as a subconscious space-tool used in real 
cognition. Fauconnier does not explicitly state that mental space theory is more than an 
observer’s model, and thus speaks of operative models. However, a theory of how people 
process ontological differences is implicit in Fauconnier’s model since it posits that 
contrastive ontological spaces are involved in complex utterances and thoughts, e.g. a base 
space for the speaker’s perspective and a hypothetical space for what somebody thinks. If 
the mental spaces model is taken to be an operative cognitive model, it can be compared to 
the CONDUIT model. Evidently, the mental spaces model is more elaborate than the CONDUIT 
image. Most importantly, it includes at least four, instead of two, spaces that are involved in 
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metaphorical mappings.101 It therefore adds elements to Reddy’s two-space model. If we 
assume that the four-space model comes close to an operative model, the two-space 
CONDUIT folk-model has some features of a simplified prototype. The source and target 
spaces in the blend resemble the basic conduit schema. As regards the simplifications, the 
mental spaces model adds detail features, such as selective links and two more spaces. 
Another difference is that not the whole content is transferred through the conduit. Instead, 
particular objects or attributes are connected to other particular aspects in other spaces on a 
one-on-one basis. It is only for this reason that a separate blended space needs to be 
hypothesized. The consequence of this is crucial. The central inference in Reddy’s model for 
communication (presumably similar to the folk-model of metaphor based on the idea of 
‘mapping’) then no longer holds, namely that a coherent and uniform content is sent as a 
whole and without any mental effort to another container. Selecting information, building 
analogies, and creating specific pairings is essential in the theory of mental spaces. There 
must be emergent structure in the new blend as well as unused elements in the source and 
target spaces. Overall, when we compare the simplified and the more complex model it 
appears that the basic imagery that is used is partly similar, but the actual inferential 
understandings of a function differ considerably. 
    We started from the assumption that the blending model used for metaphor resembles the 
operative Gestalt tool (a kind of co-functional imagery) used in metaphor processing. 
Although the operative tool is evidently more elaborate in imagistic structure than the folk-
model, I have proposed that theories in scientific and everyday discourse may hold clues 
about operative cognitive tools. The clues they offer are more about the general nature and 
the use of spatial logic of the tool than about its specific structure. In other words, they share 
the space logic of difference, but how this logic is applied diverges between graded 
membership models and essentialist theories. Minimally they fit with two general ideas, 
namely that (1) there are multi-purpose mechanisms at the folk-theory level, and (2) these 
mechanisms are similar, but not identical in imagistic structure to the operative tools inferred 
                                                 
101 The suggestion of four major spaces is a highly original and stringent innovation. I agree with 
Turner (1996: 87) that this furnishes a superior general model that accommodates all sorts of different 
mental structures and provides insights into their subtle, yet important differences. However, I would 
caution against taking spaces either as permanent givens or just as simple and non-overlapping 
mental locations in which everything coheres in a nice and unambiguous way. (By consequence, even 
more than four spaces might be imaginable, depending on our viewpoint.) For our purposes this is a 
side-issue. Regardless of how spaces are carved up and positioned, mutatis mutandis my crucial 
argument remains intact that they are instantiated through spatial cognition and partake of the logic of 
spatial linkage, coincidence, and apartness. 
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by linguistic methods. Though operative models may form the basis for the folk-theory level, 
theories often differ considerably from the operative models in the inferences they generate. 
 
PREVIEW 
The entire remainder of this work is devoted to the extension and elaboration of Lakoff’s 
spatialization of form hypothesis and tries to demonstrate how image-schematic tools are 
brought to bear on the understanding of worldviews and ontologies. Among other things, I 
will attempt to show how basic ontological kinds, categorization, and essence building can be 
explained through image-schematic tools, especially such that are used as organizing co-
signatures of more specific processes. Another emphasis will be the analysis of how dynamic 
transformations of ontologies and holistic effects are created through dedicated co-
signatures. 
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Chapter 9:                                                                                                          
The Foundations of Cultural Ontology – An Imagistic Theory 
 
The following chapter constitutes the heart of this work and deals with spatial logic in the 
study of cultural folk-theories and of folk-models that constitute ontology. After giving a 
general cognitive definition of ontology, the chapter presents Ronald Langacker’s framework 
for the analysis of dynamic Gestalt imagery and with this as a tool examines a series of 
ethnographic and philosophical examples. In a nutshell my fundamental claims are these: (1) 
Ontologizing is a cognitive process by which the generic categories of being in a cultural 
thoughtscape are defined and distributed differentially across thought domains; (2) these 
ontological categories are imagistic categories of utmost schematicity; membership is 
defined by conforming to their generic topological features.  
    In other words, I will propose a theory of ontological distinctions based on imagery types. 
This is clearly prefigured in the ‘ontological metaphors’ defined by Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980), who treat a small number of very basic but extremely widespread examples such as 
OBJECT, FORCE, or CONTAINER. I attempt an analysis along the same lines, but also extend 
the notion of ontology to more complex configurations. Thus, the ontological categories can 
be either defined through simple imagery categories or also through complex co-signatures, 
such as CAUSAL EVENT, or ENABLEMENT FROM ABOVE (see chapter 8). Co-signatures function 
as a kind of ontological category, because they characterize the basic status of a 
representation alongside the more specific cognitive processing of it and allow placing it in 
the right generic expectational pattern.  
    My framework is inspired by the theory of cognitive grammar formulated by Ronald 
Langacker since the early 1980s. However, my own ideas are neither only about linguistic 
cognition nor, as far as language is concerned, only about thought at the word or utterance 
level. At the cost of being more speculative, I choose a large scope on purpose here. My aim 
is to find out what the imagery approach can do for a systematization of long-standing 
questions within cultural anthropology. I will systematize the aspects of Langacker’s theory of 
mental imagery that are relevant to ontology. I will examine two broad classes of ontologies, 
namely substance and process ontologies. The framework is applied to issues such as 
essentialist thought, the relation between metaphor and metonymy, or the function of ritual. 
 
1. Defining ontology as imagistic formats 
Ontology (or the verb ‘ontologizing’) is often used in not very sharply delineated ways, so that 
it is apposite to work out some basic definition. Cursorily, in a cognitive approach 
ontologizing designates (1) a mental process (2) that attributes a specific reality status to 
representations either consciously or unconsciously, and (3) in doing so assigns the 
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representation to a category shared with other equal-status representations. Moreover, (4) 
the process is one we constantly and necessarily perform in one way or the other, spanning 
folk-models, folk-theories, and expert-theories alike. Ontologizing (5) subsumes evaluative, 
emotional, and connotative dimensions and thus makes for ‘reality colorations’.102 I will stress 
the first three of these general points here: 
   First, ontology is about what goes into the same category with what. Categorization means 
attributing general traits to a mental entity or, put the other way around, identify the entity as 
belonging to a category circumscribed by the traits. For example, in many folk-theories a 
mental content is either being identified as a process or as a substance and sorted 
accordingly. Through identification with a category the mind bestows a particular kind of 
basic nature on a representation (from a choice of several possible ones). Thus, processes 
are inherently different from substances in the way we think about them. 
    Second, ontology frequently involves the act of attributing a specific reality status to a 
representation or belief, defined in relation to a cultural system of knowledge and values. 
Belonging to a category includes this status of ‘realness’, while the emotional and evaluative 
dimension emerges from this sense of ‘realness’. Ontology as an incessant process is 
organized in cultural ontology systems. Such a system, often as reflected in language, 
influences which dimensions of perception, feeling, and imagination are particularly ‘real’, i.e. 
culturally or individually relevant, as opposed to others. For example, in some worldviews 
only substances are thought of as real, in the sense of being the deeper nature that underlies 
what superficially appears to be a process. Ontology as status ascriptions to pieces of 
information is often reflected in grammar. Interestingly, some languages use evidential 
markers as ontologizing devices, such as the Papago language of Arizona, which makes it 
obligatory for speakers to use the little word s whenever describing something not seen 
firsthand. In the nearby Hualapai language a speaker can, the other way round, use the verb 
suffix –o to specify that she has actually seen what she is reporting. The most sophisticated 
evidential system is that of the Wintun, who 
 
“use the verbal suffix –ke for hearsay information and the narration of myths, the suffixes -da,-besken, 
or -be, (first, second, third person) for visual or unquestioned evidence, the suffixes -ntide, -nterestken, 
                                                 
102 However, this chapter will deal more with the imagistic aspects of general types of representations 
than with their phenomenological character (e.g. emotional imagery and the qualitative ‘feel’ that goes 
with a particular concept). Also, emphasis will lie on culturally dominant ontologies, meaning such 
ones that are normatively espoused in many social lifeworlds of a culture. A systematic distinction of 
the alternative ontological or experiential modes in a culture, perhaps in the way Schütz (1962) 
purports to provide it, will not be given. 
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and -nte for nonvisual sensory evidence, and the suffix -re for information based on inference (...).” 
(Palmer 1996: 199) 
 
In other words, languages such as Hualapai require the speaker to identify the epistemic 
status of her report and tend to split the world of knowledge into the grammatically marked 
categories. While this may seem exotic, it is not. The English tense system requires 
speakers to distinguish actions that have started earlier and are still going on from completed 
actions. A quasi universal split is that between nouns and verbs. While language may not 
strictly determine ontological categories and is probably not the only source of ontology, its 
effects in highlighting certain ways of carving up the world are powerful (cf. 
Gumperz/Levinson 1996). 
    Third, the cognitive operation of ontologizing is one that is inevitably and permanently 
applied to representations. There is no concept or belief without ontology of some kind, 
because every concept is somehow situated in a cultural space of similar and different 
concepts. For example, following a suggestion by Sperber (1975), even ‘half understood’ 
notions, or belief accepted on faith or authority, are part of a typical ontological category in its 
own right that could be called ‘beliefs about representations’. Experts’ knowledge such as the 
theory of relativity one accepts as true without a full grasp of it, simply because our scientific 
experts lay an accepted claim to it.103 Ontological categories are inevitable because they are 
vital for orientation in our cognitive system. The consequences of a particular way of 
ontologizing are not to be taken lightly. It matters to our treatment of animals, for example, 
whether we consign them to the category of humans or more to the category of soulless 
things. Equally, it matters to theology or psychoanalysis whether we consign the memory of a 
religious experience to the category of external powers impinging on us like a material force 
                                                 
103 This must, obviously enough, include scientific theories about ontology. Yet, it seems crucial to me 
to pinpoint a distinction of what the task of a cognitive approach is and what it is not. In short, cognitive 
theories worth the name should try for the barest possible ontological commitments. These may 
include the use of causal explanations, the belief in the psychological realities of others, or taking a 
degree of ‘experiential realism’ for granted. Other than that, I believe that ontology in cognitive theory 
should always relate to second-order descriptions about how other people think in real-life. The 
experienced ‘reality’ of everyday actors needs to be only depicted, not judged on its merits. In a 
responsible cognitive theory the task is to describe (and explain) the spectrum of human alternatives in 
ontologizing, while the folk-models are committed to one specific way of ontologizing to the strict 
exclusion of others. In other words, more traditional societies typically have very little consciousness 
about alternative ontological construals of something, being embedded in a specific worldview and 
upbringing. Other worldviews are either unknown or rejected as ‘false’. The recent emergence of 
‘postmodernism’ in the West has a great deal to do with a growing awareness that there are different 
basic ontologies to choose from, with the effect of relativizing or even ousting traditional truths. 
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or to the category of internal psychological states. It matters a lot whether we think of dreams 
as something fundamentally different from being awake and thus also perhaps less ‘real’ – 
for example whether or not the actions committed by us or others in dreams have some 
bearing on everyday reality. It also matters if we consider wishes as actions with real 
consequences or as fundamentally different from them, etc.  
    The origin of ontological distinctions is diverse. Many categories are given to us very early 
in life, perhaps as innate predispositions, such as the predisposition to identify species and 
ascribe essences to them (Sperber 1996, Hirschfeld/Gelman 1994). They may also be 
triggered by culture-specific or universal archetypes of experience (Alverson 1994, Grady 
1997a). Even later in life, when new experiences are undergone, such as in meditative 
practice or scientific endeavor, new ontological categories are continually created to fit these 
experiences. Although the precise nature of ontological categories is strongly dependent on 
cultural and individual experience, the propensity to ontologize is a universal feature of the 
human cognitive system. At least from the perspective of the paradigmatic Martian visitor, 
there are amazing similarities between ways of ontologizing all over the world.  
    Which mental faculties create ontological distinctions is less clear. I submit here that 
generic imagery can explain major ontological categories. In other words, ontologizing can 
mean identifying a concept as shaped by and belonging to a particular class of image 
schemas or image schema transformations. Image-schematic cognition includes generic 
multi-purpose tools that bestow a basic character on concepts. At the same time each 
general type includes an infinity of different elaborations and combinatorial structures. The 
section to follow will introduce a general theory of dynamic mental imagery. This may serve 
as a basis and a descriptive language for the subsequent sections, which try to give an 
account of substance ontologizing and later contrast process-based ways of ontologizing. 
 
2. A Gestalt theory of linguistic imagery – Introducing cognitive grammar 
In his two-volume treatise The Foundations of Cognitive Grammar Ronald Langacker 
(1987a, 1991) formulates a theory of spatialized cognition with respect to language use, a 
theory he also refers to as  ‘space grammar’ in his early work. Central portions of his theory 
of cognitive grammar can be adapted here to gain some basic insight into ontological types. 
Langacker shows how spatialized thought can go a long way in explaining, both, the 
understanding of individual word meanings and of grammatical relations. The basic idea, 
also present in the notion of ‘perceptual symbol systems’ expounded by Barsalou et al. 
(1999) (see ch.8), is that our mind deals with concepts in a way analogous to perceptual 
input. Language elicits imagistically conceived scenes in the mind that are similar to 
perceptual images. This pertains to visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, kinesthetic, 
and emotional/proprioceptive images alike, but is best explained with reference to vision. 
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One way in which utterances are similar to perceptual scenes is that the mental scenes they 
evoke involve a vantage point, which is often defined in contrast to characterizations of the 
scene from other vantages (e.g. a subjective ‘inside’ view and an objective ‘outside’ view). 
The fact that mental images are intrinsically construed intentionally excludes any unitary or 
universal perspective. In what follows I will give an introductory sketch of the analytical 
apparatus that Langacker developed in order to describe how subjects construe scenes of 
mental imagery. The analytical concepts to be considered here are:  
(1) the figure/ground distinction,  
(2) the related notion of picking out a profile from a base,  
(3) the notion of specificity,  
(4) the notion of schematicity or resolution, and  
(5) the notion of perspective or viewing arrangement.  
 
Let me start with an expository metaphor of how dynamic cognition works. When words or 
other symbols mentally evoke a situation, this is comparable to staging a play (cf. 
Ungerer/Schmid 1996: 182). The scene has a stage and a backdrop, including a perimeter 
(figure and ground). On the stage there are highly active main actors, less active actors in 
minor parts, and immobile props (profile and base). There are spotlights drawing exclusive 
attention to parts of the scene or the main actors (specificity). The audience can zoom in on 
any of the details of the play through a theater-binocular, for example when interested in the 
costumes or the mimics (higher resolution, lower schematicity). When walking through the 
theater, a person can change her perspective and possibly even switch perspectives if she 
dares to climb onstage (viewing arrangement). Finally, there is a dynamical dramaturgy by 
which all these elements are coordinated. 
    (1) A basic distinction going back to the early days of Gestalt psychology is that between 
figure and ground. Figure and ground are not only perceptual phenomena, but are a 
ubiquitous cognitive operation performed in conceptualizing a notion or a scene. An image of 
a situation generally involves the identification of a relatively comprehensive and stable 
setting as point of reference and participant agents which are (a) smaller, (b) more compact, 
(c) more clearly defined, (d) more vivid, and (e) more likely to be in motion. The ground or 
setting contains all the available knowledge of the subject on a matter. In speech the ground 
refers to the culturally defined tacit presuppositions speaker and hearer must bring to bear on 
the explicit expression in order to understand each other. This setting is determined by the 
subject’s cultural, social, age, and gender background as well as her situational vantage 
point and her intentions. 
    (2) Almost interchangeably, Langacker also refers to figure and ground as the profile and 
base of an image. When an utterance or thought is shaped, certain elements of a concept 
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network are selected as appropriate, whereby they become the figure of the scene taking 
shape before the mind’s eye. Other possible elements are relegated to a secondary role in 
the background or excluded for the moment, maybe to be called up later.104 Langacker calls 
this operation of highlighting parts of a conceptual domain profiling. Profiling creates a 
specific figure-ground distribution. It means picking out one or several special components 
and giving them a special prominence in relation to the rest of a complex, the base.105 
(Although elsewhere Langacker speaks of several other applications of the figure-ground 
distinction than profiling, for our purposes they are effectively coterminous.) Every concept is 
defined relative to a base.106 The base for a linguistic predication is the entire tacit cognitive 
structure it presupposes. To give a simple and concrete example, the concept of ‘knuckle’ 
needs the concept of ‘finger’ as base domain, which in turn requires the domains ‘hand’, 
‘arm’, and ‘body’ (Langacker 1987a: 148). Likewise the notions of ‘arc’ or ‘radius’ can only be 
defined relative to the base domain ‘circle’, which it presupposes (ibid.: p. 184). Figure and 
ground relations are characteristic of cognition in general, even when we move from quasi-
visual scenes to other more complex kinds of thought. A concept’s base of predication often 
is a complex cultural model. Thus the notion of ‘bachelor’ presupposes a cultural model 
according to which most people (with some exception such as clerics) are expected to marry 
at a certain age (Lakoff 1987). Likewise, the notion of ‘lying’ is relative to a complex cultural 
model of communication and dialog, including expectations like one’s interlocutor being 
helpful, relevant, truthful, etc. (Sweetser 1987).  
    Since a given base always contains more components than any single utterance or 
thought can pick out, several alternative profiles of a given domain are possible.  
“Expressions often invoke the same domain, but contrast semantically by choosing alternate 
profiles within this common base” (Langacker 1987b: 56). For example, two alternate 
predications can profile either the knuckle or the fingernail within the common base of 
‘finger’. When the base is a complex model such as a prototypical scenario (say, the anger 
                                                 
104 As I see it, the uneasy semi-distinction between the profile/base and figure/ground pairs relates to 
Langacker’s wish to highlight slightly different things. Grounds are present in the image, albeit not in 
the same focussed way as their respective figures. By contrast, bases can refer to all sorts of 
associated knowledge, even though it might be so much in the background that it does not enter the 
scene to any substantial degree itself. 
105 This reflects the concept of Prägnanz in Gestalt psychology, defined through the ‘law of the good 
Gestalt’. It means that human perception, among all the possible ways of connecting the parts of a 
whole, will give preference to those connections which result in the most simple and distinct Gestalt. 
Which part is connected to which is governed by the four principles of proximity, similarity, closure, 
and good continuation. 
106 The basically same idea appears in Lakoff’s terminology as idealized cognitive models (ICMs), and 
in Fillmore’s work as frames, as Clausner and Croft (1999) point out. 
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scenario in American English) and one speaks of a phase in it (like the injury, anger arising, 
the attempt to control the anger, and the final explosion and retributive act), it is obvious that 
each individual utterance highlights only a part at a time within a whole, relative to which any 
single utterance is understood. Alternative options of grammar can also be understood as 
alternative profiles. An example are the active and passive voice versions of a sentence: The 
active voice designates the subject as profiles figure and the object as ground, whereas the 
passive voice makes the former object the subject and induces a figure-ground switch. 
Langacker gives many more examples in which otherwise identical sentences may be 
construed in slightly different images through the use of grammar. 
    The figure-ground or base-profile continuum is a measure of the relative distribution of 
attention between mental concepts. The profiled figure, which occupies center stage, is given 
the maximum attention; other concepts are more like stage props; still others are hidden 
outside the scene, maybe to appear later. The relative proximity of a piece of background 
knowledge to the figure may vary. It depends on the complexity of the task and as well as on 
the existence of automatized schemas. For fairly automatized tasks large proportions of the 
required knowledge can recede so far into the attentional background that almost no 
attention needs to be given to them. In Charles Fillmore’s (1975, 1976) terminology, the mind 
has acquired a schematized frame. A frame comprises default assumptions about 
situationally relevant factors and screens out others. It means that for simple requirements of 
many everyday situations people know what kind of knowledge counts and can afford to 
forget about other factors. A frame profiles all necessary cognitive entities for well-known 
situations, so that the rest of our brain functions can recede far into the background for 
maximum means-end efficiency. Only when the default frame fails, like when an interlocutor 
acts in a weird and unexpected way, a wider background is drawn upon and more conscious 
and less ‘ready-made’ problem solving strategies are invoked. 
    (3) Langacker also introduces the parameter of specificity with regard to profiling. High 
specificity means the highly localized profiling of a region within a more extended 
background. A visual analogy may help here: It is like zooming in on the details of a picture 
and thereby disregarding the surrounding parts which shift out of focus. Note that specificity 
is related to the scope of an image. Palmer (1996: 100) puts this cogently: 
 
“Language can never designate all details of meaning. Words and other predications either may name 
the whole of an image, leaving the components implicit, or may evoked some component or 
components, leaving unspoken the fact that components belong to a larger image.” 
 
Whether local profiling automatically results in high specificity of the profile, probably 
depends. Theoretically it is possible to have highly localized profiles within a very broad 
scope. This would depend on the capacity of an individual’s mind to hold a great amount of 
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rather distant information in the background of attention while focusing on something in great 
detail. The rare cases of people who can count dozens of small objects at one sight provide 
an example. 
    (4) Another basic dimension of imagery, which has been already dealt with at length in 
earlier chapters, is its schematicity. Langacker also refers to this in a photography metaphor 
as ‘resolution’ or ‘grain’, although all non-visual imagery is included as well. A schema 
describes an image of lower resolution (coarser grain) than any of its specific instantiations. 
The category term ‘tree’ is more schematic relative to its instance ‘eucalyptus’, which evokes 
an image of higher resolution. Higher resolution thus means that more detail is added to the 
schematic image of a tree. The same is true of metaphorical predications, as in the earlier 
discussed example IDEAS ARE THINGS / IDEAS ARE FOOD. As I see it, resolution is linked to the 
parameter of specificity, insofar as the side effect of zooming out frequently is that, apart 
from broadening the scope, resolution also becomes lower. However, changes of resolution 
can occur without the scope changing by a zooming operation. For example, between ‘tree’ 
and ‘eucalyptus’ the scope remains the same, while raising specificity, as opposed to ‘tree’ 
and ‘leaf’ which involves a process of zooming in on a narrower scope while remaining on 
the same level of schematicity. 
     (5) A final basic property of thought, which is akin to vision and hearing, is choosing a 
perspective or viewing arrangement on a mental scene. For example, Langacker (1990b) 
shows how sentences can elicit either a construal from the objective or from the subjective 
point of view, depending on whether the observer imagines herself as participant in the 
conceptualized scene or outside it. The viewing arrangement, then, is a basic imaginative 
device allowing to switch between viewpoints of a scene – a switching operation that is akin 
to positional changes in perceiving a real event. It is again transmodal, contrary to what 
Langacker’s terminology couched in a visual metaphor might imply. Two basic parameters of 
the viewing arrangement are its scope and its viewpoint. While the viewpoint chooses a 
subjective position, the scope either includes or excludes the surrounding features of the 
focus to variable degrees. Combining these two parameters, a viewing arrangement can thus 
include the speaker and the object, it can include only the object, or it can view the speaker 
from outside as if she were an object.107 In a nutshell, the cognitive grammar approach to 
                                                 
107 It is an essential feature of humans as social beings to see one’s self from the others’ point of view. 
Among other things, objectivizing viewpoints are cultural resources for dealing with incoming outsiders 
and for orientating oneself in new places. When coming to a new place the person has to switch to the 
role she usually attributes to outsiders when at home and assumes that the locals will have similar 
expectations from her as she has from other outsiders when at home. Thus, communities generally 
define conventional models of an outsider role, as Bradd Shore (1996: 266) argues. In response to 
Bourdieu’s (1977: 2) critique of “the anthropologist’s lamentable penchant for experience-distant 
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imagery can be summarized as resting on the assumption of (a) an imaginative 
apprehension of word or thought meaning,  (b) as analogic Gestalt, (c) on a mental ‘stage’, 
and (d) by a situated and intentional ‘viewer’. It thus contrasts both with structuralist views of 
meaning and symbol-manipulation views of meaning in the cognitive sciences.  
 
WORD TYPES AS RELATIONAL AND NOMINAL PROFILES 
According to Langacker’s cognitive grammar, different word categories have different spatial 
profiles. In presenting his ideas relating to this, I will follow Ungerer and Schmid’s (1996: 191-
194) excellent summary. Langacker’s cognitive theory of grammar is suitable for our 
purposes, because it sets out from a description of cognitive mechanisms that are pre-
linguistic. This entails that, at least in principle, a mental concept does not determine the kind 
of linguistic expression that will be used to render it. In some cases this form of ‘Mentalese’ is 
word-type neutral, so that one identical cognitive base can underlie a noun, a verb, an 
adjective, or an adverb. Consider the following example of three individual entities that 
somehow belong together. In a diagram they can be depicted as small circles with the 
connectors representing togetherness relations: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a                     b                    c 
 
Figure (a) is the basic conceptual unit which can be turned into a category or word type in 
two different ways, represented by (b) and (c). Which word type is actually activated depends 
on profiling, i.e. what is highlighted in the conceptual unit. In our example either the relation 
between the three entities can be profiled or the entirety of the unit. The mental image in 
which the relations are profiled has linguistic manifestations, such as the adverb ‘together’, 
the verb ‘share’, or the adjective ‘common’ (the relation of togetherness can be rendered by 
either a verb, an adjective, an adverb, or even a preposition). If, on the other hand, the 
cognitive region is profiled, this means highlighting the unit qua whole. In this second 
imagistic construal the three entities and their relations are still present, but not 
                                                                                                                                                        
representations of human experience”, he rightly emphasizes that objectivist models, which appear to 
lack a concrete point of view, are actually a part of the common stock of knowledge of any competent 
native. It is therefore misleading to think that all knowledge is exclusively conceived in an egocentric 
orientation.  
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foregrounded. Linguistically the unit profiled as a whole can be rendered as a noun, for 
example as the word ‘group’.  
    It should be emphasized that differences in profiling are inherently gradual. That is why 
this theory circumvents criticisms of reclaiming universals from what are in fact word 
categories specific to some languages only. On the contrary, Langacker’s theory 
parsimoniously explains languages like Chinese, which do not have a context-independent 
noun/verb/adjective distinction. In cognitive grammar the type of a word is also not a 
principled distinction. Different word types can stem from the same imagistic unit that is 
contextually construed in different ways. Whether something is understood as noun, 
adjective, or verb can then depend on the profiling of different aspects. On the other hand, 
not every conceived situation allows the whole range of options for profiling. Normally, 
situations are either suited for either a nominal profile (nouns) or a relational profile (verbs, 
adjectives, prepositions). These are the two large classes of construal types. 
 
SCANNING TYPES OF RELATIONAL PROFILES 
Let us now turn to a sub-class of the relational profile type. For example, the same directional 
specification can be rendered as ‘enter’ or ‘into’, which have related meaning but are different 
word types. By and large, motion verbs and directional prepositions both denote the same 
thing, namely a relationship between a stationary landmark and a moving trajector. Nuances 
between these word types apparently do exist, however. What makes them different is a type 
of mental scanning procedure that is applied to them. What is mental scanning? It can be 
seen as analogous to visual or tactile scanning. Going through the alphabet, looking at the 
different parts of a painting, tracing the trajectory of an airplane, or reading Braille are all 
good instances of scanning. The interesting thing is that all these can be performed as the 
result of sensory perception or in the absence of perceptual input, only in the imagination. 
Among other things, the mental ability to perform scannings is a prerequisite for the 
understanding of word types. 
     To differentiate word-classes Langacker distinguishes between two types of scanning 
operations he calls ‘summary scannings’ and ‘sequential scannings’ (1987a: 144-146). In a 
summary scanning the facets of the situation are examined one after the other, the data are 
added up and then accessed as a single Gestalt once the scanning is completed. This 
means that in the final Gestalt all the scanned facets are co-present. A summary scanning 
can be likened to multiple exposure photograph. In a sequential scanning data is also 
successively collected, but it is only added up for a particular stage of the event. As soon as 
a phase passes, new data is collected for the next phase of the event, and so on. A 
sequential scanning can be likened to the consecutive frames in a movie clip. It is obvious 
that sequential scannings are only possible for processes, not for unchanging states. One 
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apparent consequence of this distinction is that different image schemas correspond to one 
or the other of these different scanning operations. For instance, the PATH schema is 
actualized in a sequential scanning, i.e. as a dynamic relation. The UP-DOWN schema, on the 
other hand, is a relation that is usually scanned in a summary fashion, i.e. as a static relation. 
    Langacker introduces a further important sub-distinction for the class of summary 
scannings. In summary scanning the trajector in the image can either be in motion or stative. 
This means that even a moving trajector can be construed in a summary fashion as a 
multiple exposure, which is different from construing it sequentially as a movie clip. To clarify 
this threefold distinction consider the following three diagrams. They depict the images 
underlying the words ‘enter’ (sequential scanning), ‘into’ (summary scanning with moving 
trajector), and ‘in’ (sequential scanning with stative trajector). 
 
       a. “enter” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 b. “into”  c. “in” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of the verb ‘enter’ each stage of the scanning is characterized by a relative 
position between the moving trajector and the stationary landmark, which differs slightly from 
the neighboring pictures. By virtue of this, the time element is profiled, thus making it a 
sequential rather than a summary scanning. ‘In’ and ‘into’, on the other hand, prompt the 
subject to perform a summary scanning. While ‘into’ is in some respect like the verb ‘enter’, 
time 
static 
landmark 
static 
trajector 
mobile  
trajector 
 394 
the difference to the sequential scanning is that the preposition ‘into’ puts more emphasis on 
the result of the action than a verb would. This means that the final location is profiled. It also 
causes the temporal aspect of the movement to be backgrounded, thus prompting a 
scanning of the phases in a summary fashion. The other preposition ‘in’ designates a stable 
state. It may be asked why we here speak of a summary scanning of states at all, since there 
is no visible movement. Although this cannot easily be deduced from the diagram, the 
scanning is of summary (i.e. additive) nature for the following reason: If something remains 
inside a boundary, rather than moving out of it, this constancy can only be ascertained 
through repeated scannings. These are then activated as a summary Gestalt. Thus both ‘in’ 
and ‘into’ need an assembly of repeated scannings. This is more apparent in the case of 
adjectives. If two lines are parallel or if an object is of one particular hue of red can only be 
ascertained through scannings that check if the quality remains stable. 
 
NOMINAL PROFILES AND REGIONS 
More needs to be said about nominal profiles. One pedestrian but consequential observation 
is that nouns do not only designate physical objects. Although physical objects are most 
prototypical for nouns, all sorts of abstract notions are also amenable to nominalization (i.e. 
conceptual reification). Thus, what defines nouns as such must be more abstract than 
physical ‘thingness’. Langacker’s theory of imagery proposes an interesting answer to this: 
The defining property of a nominal profile is that it designates what he calls a ‘region’. What a 
region is required to have is, in the most abstract terms, a set of interconnected entities. This 
means that a region can either contain interconnected things or relations. We have already 
seen a case of interconnected things in the example of ‘group’. An example for 
interconnected relations would be a verb like ‘enter’. Such a verb can be nominalized to 
become the ‘(act of) entering’ by profiling the region of the entire sequential scanning. Now 
the entire scanning qua being a unit is highlighted, although the processual nature remains 
present as a feature that sits a bit more in the background. 
 
“enter” 
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It should also be said that a region is not necessarily identical with a container having 
boundaries (1987a: 201). It is sufficient that a region either stands in contrast with its 
surroundings (like the noun ‘spot’) or that it is salient by virtue of its configuration (like the 
noun ‘constellation’). 
     How can abstract word categories, then, be explained? After all, the internal relations of 
abstract words may be of several kinds: With some abstract nouns such ‘alphabet’ a sense 
of an actual spatial region is still present (like our teacher writing the alphabet on the 
chalkboard), although our knowledge of their proper sequencing is an abstract element. With 
other concepts such as ‘constellation’ there need not be a spatially contiguous cluster. 
Instead the mind picks out and interconnects the parts as schematic image. Still with other 
words like ‘staff’, ‘set’, ‘league’, etc. the parts are not usually spatially related in one specific 
way, although we may have a prototypical way of imagining the staff in a situation where they 
appear together, like when posing for a photograph. Instead the interrelation is of a more 
abstract kind; it is functional with respect to a common task. It is only the attribution of 
functional interconnections in abstract nouns that establishes the common property. The 
noun-defining region is established as a constructive act in the mind. As Langacker clarifies, 
the very act of enumerating the set-members serves to interconnect them (1987a: 199). But 
not even that is required in the strict sense. Not every single member needs to be 
enumerated in specific detail; a schematic representation of a functionally interconnected 
cluster is sufficient. 
    The theory proposes that functional interconnection is image-schematically represented as 
spatial interconnection and spatial proximity. Therefore, the cognitive status of being a region 
and the interconnections within the region are mutually defining. By virtue of interconnections 
imagined as spatial links, any kind of functionally related entity can be conceived. It follows 
that virtually all sorts of mental entities can potentially be construed as a region. This is a 
central insight for our further discussion of ontology. Any higher-order cognitive event 
consisting of abstract non-basic domains can be mentally treated just as physical objects are 
in physical space. Abstract entities, events, and even qualities – as shall be argued below – 
can be construed as region. Following Langacker’s claim at least in spirit (cf. 1987b: 55), 
many of my later ethnographic re-analyses rest on the contention that the construal as a 
region can also apply to units that are not linguistically designated in an explicit fashion. In 
other words, such a construal is independent of language and applies to other symbolic 
phenomena as well. 
 
QUALITY SPACES 
As a final major ingredient of imagistic cognition, Langacker posits that the mind constructs 
so-called ‘quality spaces’ (1987a: 206). A quality space is defined “by ranges of alternative 
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properties that an entity or substance might possess, with respect to which comparisons can 
be made.” They are organized in terms of specific qualitative parameters (solidity, color, 
taste, discreteness/continuity, texture, etc.) Any kind of substance is characterized as having 
a restricted range of possible values along a specific parameter in a quality space. 
Designating the nature of a specific substance is done by profiling (bounding) a 
corresponding sub-region in that quality space, such as designating an object as being either 
in the hot, middle, or cold region of the temperature space (cf. also Gärdenfors 2000: 6). 
    Possible basic domains in which such a profiling operation can occur extend beyond 
physical space to include any other sensory or abstract quality as if it were a region in 
physical space. For example, Langacker proposes that certain nouns are bounded in terms 
of quality space, rather than physical space. Two of his examples are “We need a strong 
glue to fix the cabinet” and “Most beers have too much malt”. The glue and beer in question 
are not conceived as being part of one common physical space. Instead, they are being 
categorized in terms of belonging to a certain quality type, i.e. strong glue and malty beer. 
Many abstract semantic categories such as ‘furniture’ are similar to this, since appertaining to 
the category is partly understood as falling into a series of specific quality spaces, e.g. size 
range, being permanent artifacts in dwelling, being potentially movable, and having certain 
general functions. It is important to keep in mind that complex concepts are necessarily 
defined with respect to a large number of quality spaces. On the other hand, a specific 
construal never exploits all possible quality spaces of an entity to a significant degree. 
Instead, each construal imposes a selection that contrast with the selections of other 
construals. 
    If it is true that qualities are conceived like this then a general quality type such as COLOR 
HUE is represented by a spatialized continuum, in which a profiled sub-region such as RED 
corresponds to a specific quality. Different hues of red in turn correspond to different regions 
in the graded quality space RED. A profiled region naturally does not in itself say anything 
about what specific quality it represents (the qualia), it only assigns a relative position and 
scope to it within the whole space. For imagining the specific quality of a space, e.g. red, 
loud, or heavy, knowledge must be projected into this. This added knowledge labels it as 
‘red’, ’loud’, or ’heavy’, and, at least in the case of sensory qualities, links it to an embodied 
pole of percepts. I believe that there must be some irreducible and primary experiential 
notion of quality. Otherwise differences, say between different hues of red, could not be 
attributed. Presumably the experience of color has to play a role in some way.  
    Nevertheless, the claim made here in spatial cognition is extremely far-reaching. Although 
Langacker emphasizes that only a limited number of quality spaces have physical space as 
their basic domain, the way I read him, qualities are clearly conceived as regions to which 
real spatial cognition applies. Specifically, spatial placing is used to conceive quality relations 
 397 
within a given kind of quality (e.g. hue, size, tone). Langacker states that it is intuitively 
obvious to conceive all kinds of entities as regions (1987b: 59), even in cases of abstract 
concepts that share no continuous extensionality in space or have any shape that could be 
imagined in a rich image. We can parenthetically note that Lakoff’s (1987) ‘spatialization of 
form hypothesis’ in part rests on the same reading of Langacker’s work.  
    I have just argued that on its own imagistic representation of a spatial continuum only 
captures the general relational format of quality, i.e. its characteristics as one kind of quality 
among many similar kinds, one kind of red relative to other hues. Spatialized thought is 
typically imbued with experiential knowledge of qualia. However, I now want to raise a central 
claim that goes beyond Langacker’s immediate concerns and contradicts this insight. My 
interest is, as stated earlier, in abstract imagistic co-signatures that lead a life of their own in 
the mind. In this sense I propose here that it is cognitively essential that quality can also be 
represented as the abstract idea of QUALITATIVENESS without any specific idea about its 
nature. That is, a quality can be represented as a slot to be filled out, when sufficient qualia 
are absent. I will demonstrate that it is pivotal for certain cognitive operations to conceive of 
qualitativeness without the specific quality or where a quality remains incomplete or vague. 
 
3. Imagistic spaces as realms and essences – The making of substance ontologies 
From this point on I would like to add a specific kind of terminology to Langacker’s. For 
expository convenience I propose to introduce the notion of a ‘realm’ in speaking of a 
particular type of imagistic region. In my view, this is the core notion for understanding how 
any kind of substance ontology works, because it allows ‘sameness’ to be conceptualized in 
purely abstract terms, regardless of specific qualities. What is a realm? A realm is a bounded 
territory that can be represented by a CONTAINER, and thus an imagistic region. It has an 
additional distinctive feature, though: Within a realm there is a specific effective 
characteristic, something we may gloss as a specific ‘rule’. That means that a realm is 
different from other CONTAINER schemas in that it contains something of uniform structure or 
kind. It is defined as internally homogeneous in terms of quality.108 It is easy to see that a 
realm, in Langacker’s terminology, would be called a region (of the bounded variety) 
internally construed as a mass. Graphically it can be depicted as follows: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
108 The metaphor of realms is a very frequent means of doing ontology, e.g. when Descartes 
postulates a radical split between the two realms of reality res cogitans and res extensa in the world, 
each of which has a specific quality. 
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In our mental imagery, a realm’s interior is either an actual mass, i.e. something 
distinguished by constancy in color, pitch, smell, muscle-tonus, etc., or it is something 
uniformly structured (as would be a line pattern, a rhythm, or a repeated movement), which 
can be construed as a mass rather than an agglomeration of individual parts. A couple of 
more specific examples will be helpful here. Two suitable analogies, albeit with slightly 
different implications, would be the scanning of the cross-section of a log of wood or 
wallpaper with a repeated pattern. In the case of a log the internal homogeneity is directly 
visible. Within the Gestalt outline of the log everything within is of the same wooden 
substance, as opposed to, say, a hollow wooden hoop. In the case of the wallpaper pattern 
the internal homogeneity is more complicated to explain. It is not continuous, but rather one 
of repetitive configurations. Within its Gestalt limits the various sub-sections have the same 
structure as we scan from one local sub-profile to the next. (This structure contrasts with a 
wall with windows in it, in the middle of which a different pattern occurs.) The important 
criterion for scannings of repeated structures to qualify as a realm is that we effectively 
construe them as mass. The global homogeneity of the region must be profiled, not the 
pattern differences on the small scale. This is quite easy to conceive visually by imagining 
that, as you zoom away from the wallpaper, the internal patterns will dissolve into a blurred 
mass. For example, red and white dots will yield a homogeneous pink blur. If this is done 
mentally and with abstract structures this amounts to an image schema transformation 
usually called multiplex-to-mass (Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987). The logical consequence of a 
construal as mass is a profiling of the region’s boundary, because things of a different 
essence start there. 
    Note again that both types of construal as realm are by no means limited to visual or 
tactile scanning operations. We can just as well imagine an auditory sequence with either a 
sustained tone of unchanging pitch marked by a beginning or an end and repetitive (i.e. 
rhythmic) structure within. Or, we can imagine a sequence of motor action where we either 
sense a sustained muscle-tonus or repeat the same basic movements over and over again. 
Therefore, what follows from these examples is that a uniform structure within boundaries is 
a frequent experiential reality of all sequential sensory modes (seeing, hearing, touching, and 
moving are saliently sequential to most people, whereas olfactory and gustatory percepts 
seldom are). 
homogeneous
interior 
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FROM CONCRETE SUCHNESS TO ABSTRACT SAMENESS 
What has the notion of realm got to do with substance ontology? I propose that there is a 
generic image-schematic metaphor that I will call SAMENESS IS CONSUBSTANTIALITY, which 
can be further specified in terms of condensed qualities, but also exists in pure abstraction. 
To see this, let us distinguish three levels of how categories are discerned. Take an example 
such as furniture, for which quality spaces were used to explain the ascription of various 
conceptual aspects. At a primary level furniture refers to a number of primary quality spaces, 
of size, color, texture, shape type, or use, which are more or less applied across domains. 
On a more complex cognitive level I propose that, as we draw on the constituent quality 
spaces for a category, the category of furniture acquires its own domain-specific quality 
space resulting from the overlap of size, color, discreteness, etc. of the more primary 
qualities. That is, we ascribe an abstract quality space that represents the overall category in 
a blend of its features. This leads us to the third and most abstract level. I propose that for 
understanding that something belongs to a complex category such as furniture, we 
sometimes even invoke representations of sameness that are completely independent of 
qualia. Sometimes we are not concerned with the particular knowledge that furniture is of a 
certain size, often made from wood, mobile, and mainly used for sitting, eating, or storing 
things. Rather we ask what makes the ‘furnitureness’ of furniture, what makes it conceivable 
as an abstract category. How can sameness be abstractly represented in the mind? As a 
solution to this query I propose the notion of an abstract quality space on the very highest 
level of schematicity. This space has the properties of a very abstract realm, because the 
only thing represented in the image is internal homogeneity, though in no specific way.  
    At its most simple, my general hypothesis is this: A substance ontology of one kind is 
metaphorically understood as material identity of the inner portion of an object. Thus, 
different instances of a category are part of the same imagistic realm and therefore part of 
one homogeneous mass. This homogeneity represents shared substance, or 
consubstantiality. Through SAMENESS IS CONSUBSTANTIALITY we understand abstract ontology 
in terms of concrete experience. For example, what makes wood into wood is its material 
structure that is consubstantial. In other words, what makes things eligible for ontologization 
is an understanding of them as container that can hold some sort of substance. By 
consequence, a specific ontology is defined by the inner substance of a kind. Two things 
belong to the same category because they consist of the same substance internally. I will 
discuss two important entailments of this in due course: 
(1) The relation of category and its individual members is conceived as an image-
schema transformation from multiplex to mass. In other words, in conceiving a 
category as such we focus away from the individual members and their differing 
particularities until their individual profiles dissolve in a mass. When we profile a 
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category qua category, i.e. when we give it a nominal profile, the category members 
tend to be construed as a homogeneous mass. Certainly this does not necessarily 
imply that the inner structure of the category or properties of the individual category 
members are cognitively absent. They do, however, recede into the background as 
soon as the boundary and homogenous internal mass are profiled. What the nominal 
profile does is this: It tends to impose a boundary on non-classical categories and to 
background fuzziness, so that this may explain how the folk-theory of Aristotelian 
categories comes into being. 
(2) Furthermore, SAMENESS IS CONSUBSTANTIALITY can explain that being part of the 
same mass can stand for a shared essence. The folk-theory of essences, i.e. things 
are things of a kind because they share an essence, can be represented in a purely 
image-schematic fashion. To the extent that we ascribe essences to categories, these 
are understood as regions with specific content, with each region differing from the 
neighboring one. No distinct attributes are required to conceive a particular essence. 
Instead an abstract image schema of CONSUBSTANTIALITY is invoked. (I will discuss 
this in more detail below.) Note that an essentialist construal is defined as one where 
people draw inferences from observed traits and behaviors to inherent properties and 
inversely believe that the hidden properties are causally responsible for observed 
aspects (Hirschfeld/Gelman 1994). This inferential nature can be understood as the 
relation between ‘realm’ and ‘rule’, since a specific rule is a quality that produces 
certain effects in its region. 
 
The applicability of realms as images of abstract qualitative sameness is very broad. I submit 
as a hypothesis that we continuously construe experiences as realms in situations that are 
perceived or evoked from memory as bounded and coherent phenomena. For instance, idea 
spaces pertaining to logical thought types (e.g. hypothetical, fictive, planning) can be so 
construed. The suggestion is implicit in Fauconnier’s (1985) ‘mental spaces’, which are 
constructed in linguistic clause recognition. Mental spaces may be interpreted as imagistic 
micro-ontologies with specific qualities. After all, it means a fundamental ontological 
difference whether a logically separate clause segment is attributed with being hypothetical, 
with representing another person’s belief, or with representing actual states of affairs. In my 
theory we can read this as the space standing for the relevant clause segment being 
interpreted as distinctive region with a homogeneous ‘rule’, e.g. the quality of being 
hypothetical. Quite possibly the phenomena modeled by Fauconnier as mental spaces 
involve real space logic, i.e. aspects of relative contiguity, uniformity, and boundedness (cf. 
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Lakoff 1987: 282).109 By virtue of spatial logic the idea that certain logical segments of a 
clause are inherently different in reality status can be represented.110 But not only 
Fauconnier’s approach seems to fit with the notion of a realm. Different emotional tones or 
social requirements of various lifeworlds can also be construed as realms, and thus invested 
with homogeneity to represent their experiential suchness. This may be equally true for 
differential forms of discourse (private, discussion, ritual, leisure, work) or different 
subcultures. Such a broad application of the realm concept is justified, because all 
mentioned phenomena share one aspect, namely that people frequently understand them as 
having necessary distinctive attributes. 
    Notably two controversial issues lend themselves to an explanation by realms and abstract 
quality spaces: (1) the relation of metonymy and metaphor as a continuum of construals 
between a shared profile and distinct individual profiles; and (2) essentialist thought without 
attributes as maximally abstract quality spaces. I will consider these points in sections 4 and 
6. 
 
4. Space logic in anthropology (1): Realms, superordinate categories, and polytropes 
The sensitivity for complex tropic relations has grown in the recent years (cf. chapter 3), 
including the idea that metaphor and metonymy may form part of a single process. 
Anthropologists have documented intermeshing tropes that add up to a polytrope (Turner 
1991, Wagner 1986). In complex ethnographic settings such as ritual not one trope alone 
applies throughout a sequence, but rather several, either in consecution or simultaneously, 
so that they become mutually interdependent. Ohnuki-Tierney (1991: 162) speaks of an 
                                                 
109 There is proximity in the sense that related space contents are immediately available and 
automatically fall into focus. A space qua attentional focus behaves like a visual focus, because the 
mind concentrates on the related information in the foregrounded space. There is boundedness in the 
sense that mental spaces are distinguished by the mind from other spaces. There is uniformity in that 
mental spaces avoid contradictions of kind within a space. That is, a space is dedicated to a particular 
kind of task, even if it contains different objects. The mind’s movement through several subtasks 
follows a spatial logic. Foregrounded elements are preserved in the mind to become backgrounds if 
further spaces are introduced and foregrounded. Can we plausibly argue for the cognitive reality of 
spatial inclusion logic here?  The highly general claim that spatial processing is involved in linguistic 
production and recognition is supported by Deane’s (1992, 1996) research cited above. Yet, evidence 
for the more specific claim that discourse constituents are held apart by virtue of a quasi-spatial 
separation still needs to be found. 
110 Again, understanding the kind of difference between the spaces is left open by space logic. For 
knowing the kind of space involved the speaker has to attend to the specific ‘space building’ words, 
and in order to understand the spaces propositional content she has to draw on conventional 
knowledge about word meaning. 
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almost complete interpenetration of analogy and contiguity. This goes further than an 
‘additive view’, since the same trope can be subject to dynamic transformations. While any 
attempt to cover even a fraction of the important issues raised by ‘polytropes’ would be 
preposterous, I will apply the present framework to a frequent pattern in tropic constructions, 
namely the dynamic metaphor-metonymy relation, and thus be able to give an image-
schematic account of it in terms of specificity and schematicity. I argue that transitions 
between metaphor and metonymy occur so easily and swiftly due to the two being alternative 
construals in single cognitive process. This also explains why it is so often impossible to hold 
metaphor and metonymy tidily apart as descriptive concepts. I believe that the often a bit 
wayward or arbitrary use of terminology reflects the underlying nature of the phenomenon 
itself. Notably, repeatedly similarity seems to produce contiguity, if not in a real-world sense, 
then in a conceptual sense, in the way we perceive the ‘distance’ of our mental categories. 
When put into an imagistic perspective the terminological separation of metaphor and 
metonymy makes only heuristic sense. 
    The difference between metaphor and metonymy was traditionally understood as that 
between association by analogy and association by contiguity. As metonymy we can 
understand any contiguity, notably of objects associated with their locations, producers 
associated with products, causes associated with effects, or parts associated with wholes as 
well as wholes associated with parts. Radden and Kövecses (1999: 21) define metonymy as 
follows: 
 
“Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access 
to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model.” 
 
Thus the basic definitional units or reference points for metonymies are ICMs (idealized 
cognitive models). A metonymy can occur in two specific configurations. (1) It can relate a 
whole ICM to one of its parts; or (2) it can relate conceptual entities that form parts with 
respect to an ICM, with the entire ICM itself being only present in the background. Metonymy 
is, then, an intra-ICM phenomenon. By contrast, metaphors can be roughly defined as 
operating between two or more ICMs, instead of within a single one. This goes to show that 
classifying metaphors and metonymies requires presuppositions about major cleavages and 
clusters in the cognitive landscape, because they constitute the reference points for the 
determination of a tropical type. 
    My argument now hinges on the acceptance of the following key point already advanced in 
chapter 1: What constitutes a cultural model, an ICM, or a domain is subject to perspective, 
since cognitive relations are always dynamically construed. Domains, categories, and 
cognitive models of all kinds are only situationally delimited in the exact way they are. 
Construals are always dependent on situationally and pragmatically defined vantages 
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(MacLaury 1995). Although there exist prototypical construals, cognitive groupings that occur 
more frequently, and such that never occur, there is always an interpretational margin. An 
important consequence of situationally dependent construals is that many mental construal 
relations of metaphor or metonymy remain ad hoc, while only a few are permanently stored 
and become part of the cultural stock. 
 
METAPHORS AS SUPERORDINATE CATEGORIES 
For understanding the relation between metaphor and metonymy, views of metaphor as an 
inclusion into a superordinate category are a good starting point. This view has enjoyed 
some popularity in cultural anthropology for a long time and was perhaps first inspired by the 
description of metaphor by the art theorist Herbert Read (1952) as creating a ‘commanding 
image’. Sam Glucksberg and Boaz Keysar (1993) argue for conceptualizing metaphor as the 
creation of a common superordinate category that includes source and target. In case of their 
pet metaphor ‘My job is a jail’ they argue that it is necessary to create the superordinate 
category of the two entities in order to understand it. This superordinate category would be 
‘confining entities’ and would encompass jobs and jails.  
    What are the merits of this position in an imagistic analysis? I shall argue that a more 
fitting formulation for most cases of metaphor is that a common quality space is temporarily 
created, with respect to which source and target are made seem alike.111 I will use 
Langacker’s terminology to distinguish two types of processes: 
(1) Temporary superordinate categories are ad hoc and assist a momentary cognitive 
task only. Imagistically, they can be conceived in terms of a quality space that is 
projected ad hoc (a description as reified realm would imply too much permanence). 
(2) Permanent superordinate categories become reified and entrenched as 
acknowledged cultural categories. Here a quality space is not only put together and 
projected, but also reified to create a metonymical category relation out of the original 
metaphor.  
 
Both types involve superordinate categories in some sense, but only in the latter case they 
become permanently profiled and thus give rise to a common cognitive category. I want to 
stress that the term ‘superordinate category’ should be reserved for cases of conceptual 
reification into permanent cultural entities. Metaphors may – but need not – give rise to these 
                                                 
111 If Langacker is correct, multi-dimensional feature clusters designated by abstract attributes may be 
construed as regions in a similar way that objects, processes, or simple attributes are. Thus the sense 
in which a nominal profile extends beyond a complex quality space is the relative permanence of the 
construal and perhaps the fact that a permanent semantic label is assigned to it, while both share the 
basic process of clustering elementary features. 
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and only do so by passing through two stages. In other words, a permanent reification as 
superordinate category is a secondary process, which builds on the primary process of 
assigning a shared quality space. As core hypothesis I will presuppose that permanent 
reification is achieved through the ascription of a nominal profile to a region that perhaps 
emerged as an ad hoc blend of qualities.  
    First however let us take a look at step one, namely the creation of non-permanent quality 
spaces through unconventional metaphors. 
 
AD HOC CATEGORIES: ‘WISE WORDS OF THE WESTERN APACHE’ 
My purpose now is to highlight the implications of ontological realms and quality spaces for 
the study of metaphor. Let us look at a classic anthropological example from the pen of Keith 
Basso (1976) about a distinctive metaphorical speech genre found among the Western 
Apache called ‘wise words’. The genre is associated with men and women of advanced age 
with a reputation for balanced thinking, critical acumen, and extensive cultural knowledge 
who devote their time to commenting on life outside the bustle of everyday affairs. The ‘wise 
words’ invariably have a particular form that equates animated (mostly animal) agents with a 
type of human beings. Examples include ‘lightning is a boy’, ‘ravens are widows’, and ‘carrion 
beetles are white men’: Lightning is a boy because it darts around, is unpredictable, and acts 
without aim. Ravens are like widows because they sometimes wait for people to give them 
food, something poor widows are also forced to do. Carrion beetles remind the Apache of 
white men because of their tendency to waste food. The young beetles, before they start 
eating meat, eat a small hole in a leaf and then move on to the next one, leaving plenty of 
good food behind. They are also like white men in another respect, namely that they always 
want to stay in the cool in the summertime and only come out early and late in the day. For 
the Apache, what makes a well-formed ‘wise word’ is defined by two clear constraints. First, 
in order to be appropriate it must evoke behavioral attributes which source and targets have 
in common; while other types of attributes, such as size, color, shape, habitat, and the like 
are not considered appropriate. Second, the attributes must be indicative of an undesirable 
quality. 
    The metaphorical concept created is always more inclusive than either of the categories 
used as source and target. The features of connotative meaning, which direct the 
understanding of the metaphors, can only be adduced at the level of the next inclusive 
conceptual category.112 Basso takes this as evidence that metaphor is grounded in the ability 
                                                 
112 Concerning mapping and selection restrictions Basso already anticipates the Invariance Principle of 
Lakoff and Turner (1989). Basso (p. 252) says that “any connotative feature adduced to establish a 
similarity between carrion beetles and white men must be compatible with features that define ‘carrion 
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to form novel conceptual categories, such as ‘beings that are wasteful’. Metaphors fill 
accidental lexical gaps, i.e. heretofore non-existent concepts that are not prohibited by 
selection restrictions, and simply do not happen to have a word for them. Thus, metaphor 
serves to counter the “designative inadequacy of lexical systems”. Simply put, 
conventionalized linguistic categories do not allow conceptualizing all qualities we might wish 
to consider together, and this is where metaphorical ‘wise words’ step into the gap. Basso 
asserts that metaphor is a form of exceptionally wide classification, which conforms to the 
normal linguistic selection restrictions.113 
    There is something to the claim of a novel superordinate category, but the formulation can 
be misleading for at least three reasons. The first two reasons have to do with the notion of 
‘category’, the third with the term ‘superordinate’. First, it seems that here the metaphorically 
created categories remain to a substantial degree ad hoc (cf. Barsalou 1983). Even if a ‘wise 
word’ may become a conventional wisdom, it does not as a rule become so permanently 
entrenched as to create a cultural category that includes or assimilates further members. In 
the words of Clausner and Croft (1997), the ‘wise words’ remain metaphors of a limited 
productivity. Secondly, the superordinate categories do not have the character of multi-
feature domains. Instead they only single out and highlight a few attributes, so that no 
complex category is created. Among the possible associations that one can have with a 
carrion beetle, a raven, a bolt of lightning, or a dog the metaphor only creates a sharp focus 
on a single quality important to the context. Thirdly, the term ‘superordinate’ may obfuscate 
the issue because the novel categories crosscut the everyday ways of categorizing and do 
not constitute permanent higher-level categories that encompass lower level kinds. The 
metaphor is in a sense more inclusive than either of the categories by creating a new 
common category. At the same time, it is less inclusive since the new category never 
includes all qualities of the constituent domains. The metaphors involve a crosscutting focus 
that highlights some common qualities while backgrounding all the non-shared ones of either 
domain. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
beetle’ and ‘white man’ as living earth dwellers” and that “[a]ny connotative feature that fails to meet 
this requirement (e.g. ‘never die’, ‘cause snowstorms, ‘make good cooking pots’) will be prohibited.”  
113 The second point need not concern us here, since it is a particular result of this very example. 
Since the Apache do not, in their metaphors, create paradoxical and counter-realistic effects, they 
indeed conform to the cultural selection restrictions: They create normal categories that are simply not 
lexicalized. However, this is clearly not the case for all kinds of metaphor. The fact that purely situative 
metaphors are very frequent is, for example, highlighted in the work of Fauconnier and Turner (1995) 
on so-called ‘counterfactual blends’. 
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NOVEL METAPHORS AS TEMPORARY QUALITY FOCUS 
I now propose to rephrase the whole issue thus: The selection of attributes can be more 
successfully described as a Langackerian quality space. A profiling operation on a common 
quality such as wastefulness occurs, while other qualities, such as the color, size, shape, or 
habitat of beetles recede into the cognitive background. Two dissimilars are assigned to an 
ad hoc quality space, which they share while the metaphor is in effect. Thus, in overcoming 
the ‘designative inadequacies of lexical systems’ metaphors create a non-ordinary quality-
focus. The carrion beetle metaphor juxtaposes source and target with respect to a quality 
space of the verb-attribute ‘behaving wastefully’. This space is created for a specific and 
limited purpose. Hence, metaphor comprehension is a process of imagistic foregrounding. A 
shared quality space like ‘behaving wastefully’ serves as an integrative background against 
which two domains are perceived for the given moment.  
    At first, when we have heard an expression but not yet discovered its meaning, the source 
and target domains are foregrounded as token images with no specific qualities, a process 
that imposes on the mental scene what I have called a ‘region’. This is much like the rim of a 
magnifying glass we look through before we have found the right focus. As long as the mind 
searches for a yet unknown analogy, e.g. between white men and carrion beetles, many 
possible associative meanings swirl in the background as potential, but none has been 
chosen yet as a meaningful common quality space. As soon as the meaning is grasped, a 
second layer arises behind the tokens: the shared quality space. The semantic tokens are 
spatially embedded in it and thus go from a state of spatial disconnection into a state of 
spatial coincidence. This quality space signifies relative foregrounding of selected attributes, 
which now ‘imbue’ the tokens with their quality. Behind this situative focus the deliberately 
backgrounded other qualities of both domains are mentally present. However, they do not 
inform the metaphor’s quality space, and remain consequently non-salient for the moment. 
Thus, any ad hoc metaphor evokes a specifically layered figure-ground structure in which a 
shared quality space is the figure. The graph shows how an ad hoc metaphor ascribes a 
shared quality space: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
source target 
common quality blend 
(ad hoc) 
backgrounded non-
shared features 
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Summing up, the point made here is this: Rather than using the notion of superordinate 
category indiscriminately, it is often more fitting to say that a certain common quality space is 
created in respect to which source and target become alike. However, my criticism is one of 
degree and aims at a terminological refinement, intending to specify gradual differences in 
cognitive usage. In other cases the term ‘novel category’ is more fitting, e.g. where the 
quality space is reified, like by being lexicalized as a noun.  
    This has theoretical ramifications for the current debate about metaphor. The ‘class-
inclusion’ view held by Glucksberg and Keysar (1993) clashes with the mapping approach, 
as indicated by Gibbs (1992), Lakoff (1993), and Clausner/Croft (1997). Lakoff would tend to 
see metaphor as a permanently stored relation between two semantic domains, while in 
Glucksberg’s view conceptual coherence is accomplished by the construction of an ad hoc 
superordinate category in the process of discourse. I contend that taking exclusive either-or 
stances on this question amounts to a rather unfruitful quibble, as the question of permanent 
cognitive entrenchment is a matter of degree that varies with different instances. 
 
NOMINAL PROFILES IMPOSED ON COMPLEX RELATIONS: NUER TWINS AND BIRDS 
As argued above, metaphoric reification is a secondary process that has a shared quality 
space as a prerequisite. When a novel and unconventional expression is used with 
frequency it at some point acquires permanent ‘thingness’ in the cultural stock. Hence, a 
novel quality space can become permanent and be given the status of an imagistic realm 
instead of remaining an ad hoc blend of qualities. 
    Cognitive models of higher complexity can also be invested with the ontological status of a 
realm, independently of their rich internal structure. This can be shown with regard to a 
classic discussion of the metaphorical Nuer assertion that ‘twins are birds’ (Evans-Pritchard 
1956). The example has subsequently been reanalyzed by Lévi-Strauss (1963) and more 
recently by Terence Turner (1991: 141ff), whose insightful reassessment forms the basis of 
my following analysis. The Nuer claim that twins and ground-dwelling birds have one 
substantial identity and are parts of the same order possessing a common substance that 
can be glossed as ‘Spirit’. The way this common substance is cognitively defined is highly 
interesting for my argument. The common substance does not result from a simple ascription 
of a common quality or primary attribute. 
    Instead, the metaphorical ascription builds on complex similarities in cognitive sub-models 
and on an abstract CATEGORIAL AMBIGUITY or MEDIATOR schema as follows: All entities 
imbued with ‘Spirit’ hold the same kind of relative position in a complex categorization 
system. Both twins and ground-dwelling birds are highly non-prototypical members of their 
species. The ambiguous way in which both of them combine difference and sameness vis-à-
vis their species is indexical for the encompassing and mediating power of ‘Spirit’. 
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Specifically, the Nuer link ‘Spirit’ to the interpenetration between celestial and terrestrial 
domains, i.e. an ABOVE-BELOW dimension. Twins are likened to dappled ground-dwelling 
birds, such as francolins or pied crows, in that they occupy an intermediate position in the 
hierarchy of being. High-flying birds with bright and pure colors are less ambiguous and 
belong to the celestial realm associated with the nonhuman plane of being. By contrast, the 
dappled ground dwellers combine the colors of the earth and the sky. They are birds, but not 
unambiguously so, because they are not of the sky and thus ‘other’. Twins partake of this 
intermediate level because they are ambiguous with respect to Nuer categories of 
personhood and identity. In one sense they are separate individuals, while in another they 
appear to share a common essence. This double nature entails yet another one for the Nuer: 
Twins are both ordinary humans and sacred beings who have the power to encompass and 
control the disparate domains. Just as the speckled birds in the avian realm, they are 
emblems of mediation that synthesize and unite oppositions.  
    Turner’s writing is quite clear about the fact that the relational feature of categorial 
ambiguity in an ABOVE-BELOW schema is reified in Nuer discourse. According to him, it is 
assigned a substantial continuum of which all similar relations are part. Thus, by assigning 
the common category of ‘Spirit’ to structures of fused oppositions and transcendence a 
‘meta-totality’ is constructed (1991: 145).  
    For the sake of a precise cognitive description three steps in the overall process should be 
held apart. First, the structure of the relational schemas for twins and birds is established 
separately, which adds up to a double anomaly: In addition to their markedly peripheral 
position within their genus category, both twins and birds elude clear positioning in the 
ABOVE-BELOW schema. On the basis of this, a similarity between the twin anomaly and the 
ground-dwelling bird anomaly can be posited. Finally, this similarity of anomalies is reified 
and nominalized as ‘Spirit’. Let us take a closer look at each step: 
    (1) Twins and dappled birds occupy an atypical spatial position in two separate ways each. 
To make the semantic ambiguity more tangible the Nuer choose a spatial image of the above 
and below. Twins and birds fail to fit into the cosmological schema, which classifies beings 
as either of the above or the below. If semantic categories are, as Lakoff (1987) claims, 
radial structures with a center and a periphery, twins and dappled ground-dwellers are 
situated at the periphery because of attributes incongruent with the category prototypes.  
     (2) This yields two relational mappings that share a twofold commonalty each, namely an 
ambiguous middle-position both in radial categories and in the ABOVE-BELOW schema of Nuer 
cosmology. I would argue that these two ambiguities are effortlessly perceived as a single 
integrated Gestalt. In other words, the peripheral position in terms of the relevant 
conventional category of everyday thought and the intermediate position in the cosmological 
schema can be imagistically superimposed. Twins and birds thus share a generic 
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INTERMEDIARITY schema. The doubly present aspect of intermediarity enters into a mapping 
that compares the relative spatial position of twins to that of birds on a meta-level.114 
    (3) On the basis of the previous steps the two INTERMEDIARITY schemas derived from the 
relational mappings, are given a nominal profile by the inclusion into the novel category 
‘Spirit’. The nominal profile put on the overall schema reifies it, while the linguistic label 
contributes to this process. A substantial continuity of twins and birds is explicitly posited by 
ascribing both to a quality space of intermediarity. If Langacker is correct that any mental 
entity on every level of complexity may be construed as a nominal profile, then this holds for 
any blend of qualities or a systems mapping such as the one considered here. It seems 
secondary whether we speak of ‘Spirit’ as a substance or as a common quality (a point on 
which Turner remains rather uncommitted). The quality space coincides with a nominal 
profile attached to the semantic concept of ‘Spirit’. Given that we assume linguistic 
nominalization to entail reification, the quality space may be considered reified. The quality 
space with the feature of intermediarity is a unique mental predication on and therefore the 
differentia specifica of the category of ‘Spirit’. Importantly, all this does not imply that the 
Nuer generally think of twins as birds and fail to appreciate the difference between humans 
and animals. Langacker’s (1987b: 65) explanation how such a double-appreciation of 
complex detail structure and a simple totality is possible fits the example perfectly: 
 
“Speakers aware of the internal diversity of a substance are nevertheless capable of construing it as 
homogeneous; and the resulting image can be conventionalized as the semantic value of a 
predication.” 
 
This case study underwrites the methodological utility of a Langackerian perspective for 
analyzing complex beliefs in general. If Turner’s ethnographic interpretation is to be trusted, it 
corroborates the general claim that relational structures at any level of complexity can be 
                                                 
114 Meta-mappings are ‘systems mappings’, as described by Holyoak and Thagard (1995). Systems 
mappings mean that, instead of comparing attributes, a mapping establishes secondary similarity 
relations between other more primary relations (either of similarity or dissimilarity) on a superordinate 
level. A systems mapping means comparing whether A : B = C : D. Whenever A matches B and C 
matches D there is a relation of meta-similarity of the two sub-relations. Likewise, if A does not match 
B and C does not match D, again, a meta-similarity of two non-similar pairs is generated. Systems 
mappings are routinely employed in complex everyday inferences. In our case there are relations on a 
graded scale. Here, if U resembles both V and W to some extent (given that V and W are mutually 
exclusive categories), and an analogous relation holds between the set X, Y, and Z, then the central 
items in either set (U and X) are located in a similar relative position between their points of reference: 
Intermediarity needs two reference points and measures the distance to each on a graded spatial 
scale. 
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rendered as a nominal profile. If any kind of relational structure at any level of aggregation 
can be nominalized, Langacker’s linguistics and anthropological interests have convergent 
goals. Ontological substances need not be elementary mental units for simple everyday 
notions. At the level of cosmological key concepts no doubt many other kinds of complex 
mental mappings can be understood in a substance focus. Imagistic structures of any 
complexity can become embedded in a homogenous realm that relegates the structural 
detail features to the background and creates a common substance. Entire epistemologies 
can be condensed as a single profile and assigned a single word. While the complex 
relations are hidden by a single semantic label and are mentally backgrounded, they can be 
mentally treated as a single, continuous, and discrete ‘thing’. 
    The case study also allows the general conclusion that treating complex relations as 
Gestalt wholes, which can be construed as unitary substances, is not spatial logic run wild 
but a cognitive reality. What is the cognitive utility of the reification into a nominal profile? 
First of all, the easy recall of a complex relation as relatively simple Gestalt is promoted, 
which in turn can create a high cultural salience. Second, the reification is linguistically 
reflected by a semantic label, a fact that itself creates a certain cultural salience. Ideas for 
which we have words often come to mind more easily and more easily assume a central role 
in cultural theories. Finally, through a word like ‘Spirit’ thematic associations or polysemies 
become relevant by going beyond similarities in the ritual context of origin. 
 
UNIFIED METAPHTONYMY: THE GENERAL HYPOTHESIS 
I will now spell out some general implications implicit in the foregoing analysis. How do we 
imagistically grasp the generic structure of metaphors and metonymies, i.e. their co-
signature? I submit that the source and the target of a metaphor are conceived as residing in 
separate domains. Each domain is conceived spatially as a region of integrated knowledge. 
Now, the most simple image-schematic understanding of a metaphor is that of two 
containers between which links are established. They are linked in at least two ways. First, 
they are linked by ‘mappings’, that is one-on-one linkages between attributes. On top of that 
they are also related by being foregrounded as parts of the same mental setting. 
Metonymies, on the other hand, presuppose that two spatially or causally contiguous things 
get placed in a common container of some kind. Belonging to this common region makes 
them, in a sense, things of a kind. This was meant by saying that metonymies render things 
consubstantial. 
    Based on these assumptions, imagistic profiling offers an equally elegant and cognitively 
plausible solution to the old query about the relation of metaphor to metonymy. I propose the 
following general hypothesis: Any context bringing together two disparate cognitive units, 
such as the target and the source of a metaphor, can be construed as a metonymy by 
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profiling them as a unitary region with a homogenous content. In other words, all situations 
offer a potential for thinking of them as metonymical. They are metonymical ad hoc through a 
common quality space or metonymical permanent if a uniting ICM structure is built around 
them, which functionalizes them vis-à-vis the same task or domain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Returning to our Nuer transformation of humans into avian cognates for a moment, where 
the polytropic setting shifts from highlighting one trope to highlighting another, we can say 
that what happens is this: When the metaphor turns into a metonymy (i.e. when birds and 
humans are said to partake of ‘Spirit’), the metaphoric schema is backgrounded and in its 
place a consubstantial realm is laid over the schema which now covers both metaphoric 
domains. Since this superimposed realm is ipso facto made of only one common substance, 
this substance is imparted to both of the previously separate source and target domains. In 
this way things from separate domains are assigned to a newly created domain in which they 
become unified. 
    How is the dynamic transformation between metaphor and metonymy achieved? I propose 
that (1) metaphor and a metonymy are simply alternative image-schematic construals of the 
same total cognitive unit that (2) depend on the capacity to mentally zoom in and out 
between a unifying and a differentiating perspective. Imagistically, the transformation from 
metaphor to metonymy corresponds to the transformation from a multiplex (usually meaning 
duplex) construal of a region to a mass construal. In the multiplex construal the apartness of 
  
target 
 
source
Metaphor profiles domain separation 
Metonymy profiles domain unity 
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source and target domain and internal relational vectors between them are profiled, whereas 
in the mass construal the fact of belonging to a single region is profiled. Metonymies 
construe regions as ontologically homogeneous realms that merge their constituents into one 
whole of the same kind. As mentioned, such a construal may imply a new super-ordinate 
category but can remain an ad hoc quality space. 
    Metaphors can establish metonymies. They can evoke a substantial continuum by placing 
two disconnected things in a hypothetical mental container through contextual juxtaposition. 
Put differently, the newly constructed mental container stands for the common context itself. 
It also stands for the psychological power of contexts to make the unrelated seem related, 
which is no less than a basic principle of inductive reasoning: Things that co-occur are 
typically assumed to be related as a working hypothesis, even if the underlying causal links 
may remain elusive for the moment. 
    By superimposing a realm on the containers standing for the source and target domains 
respectively these containers are backgrounded or gradually disappear. We might call this 
image-schema transformation DISSOLUTION OF STRUCTURE. It has a rich experiential 
motivation. Mentally images fade after the visual exposure, as do sounds. We know how 
things dissolve in water. More importantly still, we know how food dissolves in the body. We 
know how people assimilate in a new environment and their idiosyncratic essence dissolves 
in the present essence, or is impregnated with it, as it were. We might even argue that the 
experience of pain going away is similar. A sharp pain turns into a mere tingling sensation 
before it completely goes away. The pain fades into the background and our attention is free 
for new things to emerge in the foreground. All these instances share a similar image 
schema structure. There is a fundamental similarity between the fading of sensations from 
our attention and the imagined dissolution of things. If all this is correct, we may conclude 
that metaphor and metonymy are understood as parts of a natural image schema 
transformation.  
    In this perspective, every metaphor in principle holds the potential to be construed as a 
metonymy. Different contexts require different profiling choices. When we choose to consider 
two metaphorically linked entities still as parts of separate domains, we do not profile (or – 
which is the same thing – superimpose) a consubstantial realm. When we choose to 
consider them metonymically, we profile the encompassing realm standing for a common 
quality. 
    It was noted above that this hypothesis is restricted to a particular kind of metaphor. But is 
this really the case? The crucial question appears to be whether two discontinuous terms can 
be always freely reified. Clearly this is not the case with many everyday metaphors. A 
substantial proportion of metaphors are made for purposes of creating a surprising ad hoc 
convergence without substantially merging the two categories. Yet, it is not accidental that I 
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developed my theory on the basis of ritual and cosmological narrative. In these humans 
intentionally modify what the categories of mundane reality dictate. In ritual and cosmological 
narrative there are regroupings of everyday categories with the intention of pointing to a 
deeper, if more elusive, plane of reality. By contrast, a large proportion of everyday 
metaphors do not override the conventional ways of categorizing from one day to the next.  
    However, in a historical perspective my hypothesis becomes highly suggestive as a 
general claim, because ontologies shift, expand, or contract. What was once a metaphorical 
relation between two domains may come to be gradually felt to be more of a metonymy. A 
good example is the relation between humans and machines that is currently undergoing 
changes. Traditionally, Western culture has defined humans as privileged creatures of 
creation made in a divine image and standing apart from the rest of nature. The rise of 
materialist and mechanistic philosophy from the 18th century on made some first substantial 
inroads on this traditional ground. Humans were then first understood through the metaphor 
of the machine. A recent precipitate of the same thought style can be found in the ever-more 
successful metaphor that conceptualizes mechanical computation in terms of human thinking 
or vice versa. Very recently, not only science fiction literature about part-human, part-
machine creatures, so-called cyborgs, testifies to a blurring of boundaries between the two 
categories. Technological and medical advances foreshadow new kinds of beings for which 
the old ontological separation has no reality any more. The scientific debate around the issue 
whether there can be artificial life and artificial consciousness makes the boundary between 
humans and machines seem increasingly permeable. Although humans and machines are at 
present not nearly two things of the same kind in the mind of most people, there are 
prevalent thought currents that are preparing the ground for such a newly supervening 
metonymical view, i.e. a common ontology. Thus the analogy seems justified: Just as ritual 
and narrative enforces a rapprochement of domains for unveiling deeper cosmological truths, 
so does historical process dissolve and regroup conventional domains of thought. What was 
conventionally a metaphor yesterday may become a metonymy today, and vice versa. 
  
5. Space logic in anthropology (2): The cultural power of profiling topical regions in 
the mind 
The issues raised here are manifold and would allow to be extended in several ways. One 
important issue, that of realms as essences I will treat a bit later. Now I will develop a 
framework theory of mental profiling and what it accounts for in terms of learning, organizing, 
and applying cultural knowledge. 
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ACQUIRING CULTURE AS DISTINGUISHING TROPIC FIGURES FROM THE EXPERIENTIAL GROUND 
For children the society they are born into forms an unstructured background, from which 
culturally significant relations must be distilled. The idea of mental foregrounding can shed 
light on the developmental acquisition of knowledge about tropes. Christina Toren (1993a) 
argues that learning culture is about learning to distinguish relevant tropes from a ground of 
social settings. More precisely, learning the meaning of many events requires foregrounding 
specific aspects and interpreting them as a trope, i.e. understanding that they stand for 
something other than themselves. The child has to come to terms with the 
multidimensionality of social reality, in which events have symbolic significance. Toren 
illustrates her point through her Fiji fieldwork on children’s understanding of the significance 
of the kava drinking ritual. She describes how the understanding of the ritual changes as the 
children grow older. For adult Fijians the ritual is, to a very significant degree, an expression 
of social status. For adults the spatial location of the drinkers either further up or further down 
from the ground metaphorically refers to status (POWER IS UP). For small children talk about 
above and below in kava drinking is not about the status-attributes of persons. They 
understand it as purely related to a person’s spatial location. Drinking kava, then, is only 
about drinking kava. Only later and gradually do children become aware of the metaphorical 
significance of above and below. Toren suggests that with the youngest group of children 
there is still a fusion of what later becomes a figure relative to a ground. The metaphoric 
figure first has to become salient through learning. Later a progressively differentiated double 
view on kava drinking is introduced, duplicating its significance into both something related to 
drinking itself and a social power code. A similar idea has been expressed by Christopher 
Johnson (1997), who studied the conflation of metaphor source and target in early childhood. 
For example, the English ‘to see’ in the perceptual sense and in the epistemic sense of ‘I can 
see what you mean’ are treated as yet undifferentiated. 
    Toren’s terminology is perfectly compatible with our imagistic framework. I would 
speculate that the specification of tropic relations from an undifferentiated background of 
possible linkages requires the following steps. First, in learning to be Fijian the young 
children have to acquire a basic idea of social power relations, which motivates the formation 
of a domain of social power in their minds. Perhaps this is done on the basis of their 
acquaintance with physical power, which they come to relate to social power. Second, they 
have to learn that this domain is somehow related to the kava drinking ritual and their 
observations made in this context. Finally, they have to learn which aspects of the ritual 
encode power. Presumably, the UP-DOWN dimension is again motivated through experience 
with physical power in fighting. What is the rationale for speaking of a preexisting ground? I 
claim that it is only the sum-total of social experience from which tropes are progressively 
acquired and against which they are set off as salient symbolism. Especially the domain of 
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power has to be first constituted as a coherent domain and thus as the cognitive base for the 
emergent profile, as defined by Langacker. 
    Even if these stages may be not clearly sequenced altogether or occur in the inverse 
order, to speak of a progressively emerging figure makes sense. This captures the fact that 
the cognitive focus becomes ever more precise and the actual linkages more highlighted, 
while other options under consideration recede into the background. If we understand figure 
and ground as an actual cognitive description in terms of our theory of imagistic thought, this 
implies a two step process of (1) the differentiation of a new theme by foregrounding, and (2) 
the metaphorization of this theme by linkage: First the target domain of power has to be 
foregrounded, so as to give the children an idea that social stratification exists. An image-
schematic model of the metaphorical relation between the two domains can be adduced 
once the target domain of social power has been broadly formed. When this is done the 
target domain has to be connected with the source domain of spatial positioning in the Fiji 
house. Overall, a complex novel image is created which is acknowledged as a relevant new 
Gestalt of social drinking. A permanent link between the preexisting domain of drinking and 
the newly formed domain of social power is created, and this is accomplished by drawing on 
yet another domain as a symbolic mediator, namely that of physical power. Through this link 
two mental loci become one, and they become a single object of attention: a figure set in 
high relief.  
    Admittedly, to say that a trope is a profiled figure does not yet say anything about its 
specific meaning. This depends on the kind of trope. However, the general cognitive idea 
presumably intended by Toren is that a given nexus (a relational profile set off from the 
unrelated rest), such as that between kava drinking and status, is learned as a culturally 
significant Gestalt – the ritual is memorized as an event of inherently social significance – 
and that the whole configuration of meaning is henceforth evoked as salient characteristic of 
the setting. Making a figure salient as a trope means noticing other implications than those 
immediately at hand. This is done through imposing a relational profile (in this case between 
source and target domains of a metaphor) set off from the ground of understood domains as 
a whole Gestalt. A trope may thus be defined by the fact that it not simply stands for itself; it 
introduces a relational profile as a new more complex Gestalt that either juxtaposes or fuses 
previously divergent domains. 
 
FIGURE-GROUND INVERSIONS AND PROGRESSIVE CULTURAL EMBEDDING 
It has been suggested that cultural models are structured as complex imagistic arrays that 
allow for different vantages and for choosing different profiles. A cultural model may be 
defined as the sum of possible perspectives organized as an integrated whole (Palmer 1996: 
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59): “Perspective does not disappear from a model; rather a model potentially subsumes all 
of the perspectives provided by its contributing images.” 
    This includes the potentiality of figure-ground inversions. A case of figure-ground inversion 
between two sub-models of the same domain is described by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) for 
so-called linguistic duals. For example, in English metaphors of time, either time is moving 
(“time is passing”) with our viewpoint being conceived as static, or we move relative to a 
static time-medium (”we are coming on Christmas”). These two imagistic construals are 
clearly related. They can be understood as changes in viewing arrangement of a broader 
time model with two relational entities, each of which can become the trajector. In other 
words, whether time or the observer becomes the trajector depends on an act of profiling and 
choosing a fixed vantage. Recall that profiles tend to be in motion, while grounds tend to be 
static. 
    An implication of the figure-ground model is that profiling varies with the exigencies of 
divergent social situations. A specific situational focus decides what is cognitively 
foregrounded, against which other knowledge items the foreground is relatively defined, and 
which are of lesser interest for the moment. Tropes of different situations linked into a larger 
cultural model can be interpreted as figure-ground inversion. Ritual systems may gear 
different rituals to one another, so that the figure of one functions as the other’s ground. 
Toren (1993a: 161) captures the gist of Roy Wagner’s (1986) ‘obviation model of trope 
expansion’: 
 
“(...) here ‘core symbols’ are made, synchronically in a ritual process or over time in a historical 
process, to play against one another. So, for example, a ritual sequence may take its meaning against 
the ground provided by kinship, exchange relations, marriage; when it is kinship that is in focus, the 
relation is reversed and the ritual sequence becomes the ground and kinship the figure whose 
‘meaning’ is posited in ritual terms. This type of ‘figure-ground reversal’ is central to Wagner’s 
‘obviations’, the process by which a core symbol comes to be at once proposition and resolution, to 
‘stand for itself’.” 
 
Therefore, all tropic constructs can be potentially embedded into others. These then become 
the background of the embedded trope in a figure-ground relation. Often such relations of 
embedding between tropic contexts are effectively employed to give tropes their meaning 
with relation to a complex set of cultural background understandings. It is important to see 
that this potentially means a mutual embedding, since what is the ground at a given moment 
can be the figure in the next. 
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‘CULTURAL THEMES’ AS FREQUENTLY FOREGROUNDED FIGURES IN THE COGNITIVE LANDSCAPE 
The profiling of figures in a figure-ground relation has further implications for the 
conceptualization of cultural concepts. Before we go on, I will wrap up the ideas expounded 
above in a general model centering on the idea of the mind as a space. We may consider it a 
nice expository metaphor to view cognition as a landscape in which cultural ideas are 
suspended object-like and between which one wanders. However, by dint of the 
‘spatialization of form’ approach the mind as landscape can be understood more literally as a 
thoughtscape. If abstract ideas are indeed ordered by spatial logic, we may think of them as 
imagistic mental objects in a space with a focal standpoint, centers of attention, a certain 
number of linkages, and a horizon. (This also has the virtue of being suggestively analogous 
to models of the material cognitive substrate in the connectionist approach. If we blend the 
representational with the neural perspective, any ad hoc representational landscape mirrors 
the sum of strongly activated neural links which reflect the concept that is processed.) From 
a representational perspective the activated core-nodes are much like a person in a 
landscape surrounded by many nearby objects. Some things can be perceived in the 
proximity of the subject’s location. Others recede towards the horizon where they become 
blurred and more difficult to make out. Still other concepts remain behind the momentary 
horizon and can be noticed only by moving to another location.115 
    Of course, the nodes become fleeting as our attention wanders, so that many mini-
landscapes pass before the mind’s eye in actual mental performance. Recall the Nuer and 
Bororo examples, which illustrated the possibility to see two domains as alike in one context 
and dissimilar in another. However, cognition always works in such a way that parts of the 
actors, objects, and ideas remain constant throughout the rituals, while settings and symbolic 
emphases change (cf. Hutchins 1987). There must be a level at which people know about 
general conceptual relations along the way, even if these are not activated. Let us go beyond 
the moment’s performance in which either the metaphor or the metonymy construal reigns 
supreme and look at the non-activated but potential structures. This non-activated potential 
mind, a mental storehouse called competence by linguists, then resembles a landscape of 
many dimensions. This can mean entrenched knowledge or a future potentiality that the 
repertory of a culture holds in store but which is yet to be learned by an individual. Assuming 
that competence is a cognitive reality capturing the general relations of many performative 
                                                 
115 Interestingly, the idea of cognition as navigation through three-dimensional space is used in 
cyberspace literature, such as William Gibson’s Neuromancer. Yet, the metaphor of the mind as a 
visual landscape is simplistic, since even single concepts in their entirety are often much too complex 
for three-dimensional logic. Integrating all of the relevant mental objects involved in a complex 
representation makes the three-dimensional approach utterly wanting. This would require matching 
groups of objects on disjunctive planes or thinking of the landscape as n-dimensional, respectively. 
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landscapes, it co-articulates several non-simultaneous settings simultaneously. The model in 
a nutshell is this: In performance many constrained mini-landscapes come and go, while 
competence means a multi-dimensional mega-landscape relating them. 
    Gilles Fauconnier’s (1985) terminology of ‘generic spaces’ and ‘blended spaces’ can be 
invoked to see what is going on at the competence level. Generic spaces represent the 
background knowledge of what two domains share in conceptual content, independently of 
any momentarily activated mapping. Generic spaces are permanent background structures. I 
propose that we may speak of permanent generic spaces to express the partial merging of 
shared structures or tools common to many actual performances. Blended spaces, on the 
other hand, are generally used in the sense of what is evoked in an ongoing mapping 
between spaces. In spite of the performative focus of the latter, I suggest that we can 
introduce the notion of a ‘non-actualized blended space’ to represent potential relations 
between concepts that might meaningfully be united in a single domain of experience. 
Compared with generic spaces there is less shared background content here, but the 
potentiality of a foregrounded blend is conventionally known to some degree. Together with 
generic spaces (= basic conceptual similarities) non-actualized blends (= the sensed 
potential of additional domain interactions) constitute cultural competence. 
    How is competence relevant to ontology? At this level we can hypothesize what cultural 
themes are in terms of imagistic overlaps. When numerous landscapes of performance 
intersect at the competence plane, core themes are constituted. This echoes Ardener’s 
(1982: 8) concept of ‘semantic density’ of a linguistic category, denoting the frequency of 
association and interaction, which is perhaps expanded to a more inclusive level. (On the 
substrate level, core-functions would, likewise, be those with the most frequent and thus 
permanent links to other far-off regions of the brain.) A cultural core theme can, then, be 
defined as a mental location that is central in many different situational (‘performance’) 
landscapes of the mind, representing many different contexts (see the diagram below of the 
mini-landscapes and their region of intersection). In each performative instance this mental 
location is dynamically generated, but the configurations that are instantiated display 
significant overlaps and draw on roughly the same memory structures.116 Because other 
notions densely cluster around their location, core themes also permit the greatest 
productivity in terms of new inferences. Many other landscapes can be accessed, since they 
are nodes in a multi-dimensional network. Multivocal symbols, such as are discussed by 
                                                 
116 The IMPORTANCE IS STRUCTURAL CENTRALITY metaphor is part of this, since foregrounding and 
centrality are nearly identical. The central placement of the node is an automatic result of a concept 
that occurs as important characteristic of numerous situations. The learner knows that such a complex 
trans-domain concept will require a great number of contributing links. And the greater the number of 
links pointing to a concept (presumably as opposed to pointing from it) is, the more central it becomes. 
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many anthropologists, would be a prime example of such a junction or node. So much for the 
general pattern; now for some ideas about what happens locally in specific cognitive 
domains.117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOPICAL STRUCTURES AS PROFILED REGIONS 
One of the central ways the human mind bestows ontology is by profiling within 
representational arrays. Even though landscapes and horizons are fleeting as people engage 
in thought, I contend that major ontological categories are fairly permanent profiles 
(representing attached qualities), which are shared by many mental domains. As such they 
are set off as figures from their various locales. Such ubiquitous categories are ‘topical’ in 
cultural discourse, in that they tend to be chosen as relevant explanatory concepts across 
cognitive tasks.  
    I would like to develop the argument more carefully and begin with the notion of topicality 
in everyday language. Topicality, i.e. the marking of a discourse theme, is a linguistic 
universal. Probably all kinds of natural languages employ markers of one sort or the other 
that let speakers construe a mental entity as topical. Topical markers direct our mental 
attention toward a particular cognitive locus. (Incidentally, topic markers are quite similar to 
                                                 
117 The question here is whether a highly multifaceted model is ever consciously evoked as a single 
image. I will answer affirmatively in chapter 12: Although there are limits to memorization, imagistic 
condensations of complex knowledge structures are possible. A model may simultaneously 
conceptualize the different phases of, say, a scenario-model through a schematic image of its overall 
plot. 
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the linguistic devices Fauconnier and Turner call ‘space builders’, which indicate if the 
expression to follow is ontologically real, hypothetical, believed, etc. The images that space 
builders elicit, namely ‘mental spaces’, are also compatible with what follows.) I will argue 
that topical loci are spatial loci in the mental landscape. Following Langacker (1987a), I 
assume that spatialized imagistic devices are used in creating topicality and that it is the 
CONTAINER schema (= the schematic image of a profiled region) that figures prominently 
here.  
    A particularly clear example of topical marking is found in Japanese, as a paper by Haruko 
Minegishi Cook (1993) shows. Japanese has two sentence markers, wa and ga, which are 
used for different purposes. Cook (p. 371ff) gives an example to illustrate the difference 
between the two: 
 
1. John wa     gakusei     des. 
           student     COPULA 
“As for John, he is a student.” 
 
2. John ga     gakusei     des. 
 
“John (and only he among those under consideration) is a student.” 
 
The wa states what the sentence is about; it is thematic and circumscribes a particular 
cognitive focus. The ga singles out an individual, John, from others. It is used for exhaustive 
listing from a given set. This means that for ga the focus from which the individual entity is 
picked is either tacitly presupposed by the speakers or explicitly designated by a preceding 
wa particle. When wa and ga occur in a single sentence, the relation between them is 
understood as a PART-WHOLE relation, as Cook maintains. Consider the following example: 
 
3. John wa     hana ga     hikui. 
           nose    low 
“As for John, his nose is flat.” 
 
The notion of container is well illustrated by the metaphor of taking a photograph here. It is 
comparable to a camera lens that limits our field of vision. Analogous to this visual image the 
particle wa marks a conceptual container that demarcates a certain portion of the mental 
scene from the rest. It defines the conceptual focus and scope (see Langacker 1987). Ga 
then singles out and marks an entity within this set scene. This can be seen, for example, in 
answering a ‘who’ question. The question itself sets off a portion of the scene with regard to 
which the question is to be understood, i.e. the scope of the question, and therefore uses wa. 
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For the answer the use of ga is obligatory, since it picks out a member from the proposed 
set. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not only spatial settings (such as John’s exterior of which his nose forms a part) can be 
defined by wa, it can also be used in various metaphorical ways. The “As for John,...”-phrase 
can be used for a locus of possession, of cognition, of involuntary perception, of desire, and 
of ability: “John has money”, “John understands the sentence”, “John (involuntarily) hears the 
song”, “John wants to read the book”, and “John is good at Japanese”. All of these cases can 
be seen as instantiations of an abstract schema of a container and a singled out participant. 
The wa-ga schema, then, is used to express a series of conceptually similar relations such 
as part-whole, member-set, participant-physical setting, and participant-experiencer setting. 
The schema is also used when a predicate involves an action, as Cook contends (p. 384), 
because the actor is construed as participant in some time and space setting. This would 
also explain all cases where ga is used without a thematic wa, apparently as a neutral 
description. Rather than marking a set-member here the ga particle marks a participant 
moving about in some presupposed time and space, which is often the immediate context of 
the locution, but may also be the world in general, which is taken as a necessary 
presupposition for any action to occur. The thematic focus is therefore given, and on this 
basis understanding an element can be again singled out by ga. 
    Furthermore, the wa container can also be construed as a particular attribute of which an 
entity partakes (p. 385). This is what was described earlier as ‘quality space’. However, no 
participant is singled out here, instead the entity defined by the thematic container and its 
attribute are understood as spatially co-extensive. Attributes can be construed in this way, 
since they are independent of any specific space-time profile that a ga particle would imply. 
Therefore the entity itself may be construed as the wa-container itself. Note that any 
generalized action may be understood as attribute, since it conforms to the same logic. This 
is shown by the following example: 
 
4. Ame wa     sora   kara    furimasu. 
    rain          sky     from   fall 
“Speaking of the rain (in general), it falls from the sky.” 
wa 
ga 
set: As for John,.... 
singled out member: his nose is... 
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Here rain is characterized by the attribute/generalized action ‘falling from the sky’. Since no 
possible contrast is conceivable within the defined thematic scope the wa-defined subject of 
rain is identical with the predicated attribute that it falls from the sky. As an attribute it 
constitutes a transcontextual defining feature: Since rain never falls from the ground, from 
ceilings, from walls, etc. the designated aspect is not an option besides others. If ga is 
superfluous for attributes, this is because all other attributes do not belong to same domain 
within which they might be juxtaposed as participants. They do not belong to the very same 
thematic container designated by any single instance of wa, but simply to an altogether 
different theme. For example ‘falling from the sky’, ‘being made of water’, ‘sometimes 
resulting in rainbows’, ’being caught in wells by people’, and all sorts of other conceivable 
attributes of rain do not belong to the same logical domain. By contrast ‘John’s nose’, ‘John’s 
eyes’, ‘John’s neck’, etc. do belong to a single logical domain, that of external features. They 
take ga because they are identified within the same domain-container. 
    Wa can place an outer limit on (situative) discourse, just as it can mark off certain facets of 
a scene. As Cook (p. 388) points out, the demarcation function of the container, which sets 
off a certain portion of the scene from the rest and makes it thematic, implies a contrast. And 
indeed, wa is frequently used in explicitly contrastive sentences. However, we may assume 
that all wa particles are implicitly contrastive to a certain degree, because they designate a 
theme and excludes all others. Furthermore, a participant in a container can be marked as a 
container itself, for example when the speaker wishes to contrast it with another participant in 
the same container (p. 392). This underscores the contrastive function of wa, while 
explaining why the inclusive function of ga is overridden.  
    Recent studies by other researchers  indicate that the use of wa and ga is not restricted to 
the sentence level. Similar uses can be found on the discourse level. These authors 
discovered that in written discourse wa marks a discourse topic. In spoken narratives of 
cartoons, films, etc. it marks the locally contrastive elements in discourse (p. 393). This use 
of the wa particle seems of particular interest for our considerations here. Thematic choice is 
understood as conforming to a spatial logic of demarcation and profiling. It should be fairly 
obvious by now that Cook’s approach closely parallels what was said about figure and 
ground in making cultural tropes thematic. The wa container is nothing else but a profiled 
image-schematic figure set off from a ground of possible entities.  
    Of course there are other ways in which CONTAINER logic can be used to represent mental 
entities and their relation. Mettinger (n.d.) recently carried out a related study of thematic 
profiling. His study deals with what he calls linguistic contrastivity in English, such as is 
expressed in propositional syllables as ‘anti-‘, ‘un-‘, ‘in-‘, ‘de-‘, ‘contra-‘ and all sorts of 
concepts perceived in pairs or on scales such as ‘old’ and ‘young’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘comedy’ 
and ‘tragedy’, etc. Mettinger proposes that the inside-outside dimensions of the CONTAINER 
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schema may be used to encode contrastivity as image schema. Alternatively, two containers 
may be opposed within a common background. Mettinger calls these the IN-OUT and the IN-IN 
schema. These two relations are depicted in the following figures that both designate one 
pole as plus and one as minus: 
 
 
 
 
 
IN-OUT         IN-IN 
 
Following the lecture of Bourdieu (1977: 168) who speaks of the ‘universe of discourse’, one 
wonders if he does not have an actual folk-model based on space logic in mind. Bourdieu 
describes a field of argument defined by the two poles of heterodoxy and orthodoxy set 
against one another. This might be an actual spatial representation. If this is the case, it must 
be like Mettinger’s IN-IN schema, perhaps with the notion of antagonism highlighted between 
the poles. More in general we might ask if models of the cultural Other are not imagined 
through one of the two models, depending on whether any sort of common background is 
acknowledged. 
    Note that, apart from the plus-minus axiology that remains absent from the Japanese 
example, the thematic wa is an instance of the IN-OUT relation. The difference to Mettinger’s 
contrastive concepts is mainly due to the ensuing addition of the ga particle, which implies 
that the inside is further differentiated. This being said, what is the main difference between 
the two alternatives defined by Mettinger? The answer is that in the IN-OUT case the cognitive 
background is left unspecified, whereas in the IN-IN case it is accentuated, thereby making 
the OUT-dimension an embedded second IN-dimension. In order to gain common ground I 
would argue that both are versions of a yet more basic DIFFERENT LOCUS schema, which is 
instantiated in slightly diverging ways. The schema DIFFERENT LOCUS means the very basic 
recognition that two mental entities do not occupy the same mental space. This basic 
recognition can be supplemented by further characteristics in one of several ways. 
    The difference between IN-OUT and IN-IN is, then, one of degree. Perhaps the background 
container of the IN-IN schema, which includes the two participant containers, becomes 
increasingly profiled as we become aware that the contrastive pair depends on a generic 
parameter from which it emerges. Thus, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ would be construed with a profiled 
common background as soon as the generic parameter of ‘quality’ is processed in any 
noticeable way (compare ‘size’ for ‘big/small’, ‘strength’ for ‘strong/weak’, ‘loudness’ for 
‘loud/low’). If my conjecture is correct, it follows that, in the case of contrastivity, every IN-OUT 
 
      + 
+ _ 
_ 
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schema is an IN-IN schema in at least an implicit way. It may be hypothesized that the 
surrounding container of the IN-IN schema is the token image for the generic parameter of a 
binary dimension. Also note that a third possible image schema that may be superimposed 
on the IN-IN image is that of SCALE, in order to allow for grading between the two container-
like poles. Therefore, the container may also be placed around a bipolar scale and represent 
its generic parameter in the same way as for two discrete regions. 
    Just as in the PART-WHOLE case described by Cook, cognitive locus is defined as 
contrastive in the IN-OUT case, but this time in an exclusive rather than inclusive way. 
According to spatial logic the participant designated by Japanese ga must fill the same 
logical space that surrounds it and was defined by wa. By virtue of the same logic, the 
binary/scalar opposites designated by ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘old/young’ etc., can never fill the 
same logical space at the same time. Something cannot be good and bad in the same 
respect at the same time. In the IN-IN case a more complex and embedded contrast is 
employed, which combines PART-WHOLE and IN-OUT.  
    Cook and Mettinger both use similar notions of profiling within the container images. In 
Japanese the profiling of a topical theme with relation to the cognitive background is 
signalized whenever wa is used. Then one or more specific participants are picked out from 
this thematic setting in a second, more specific act of profiling. In Mettinger’s English 
examples the used member of a contrastive pair is profiled against the other. When ‘good’ is 
used ‘bad’ is present, but only in the background. Of course, figure and ground may be 
inverted any time. In the somewhat more complex IN-IN schema both are profiled against the 
background of what I called their generic parameter. 
   While this, once again, suggests common imagistic tools across cultures, the approach 
can, with a slight twist, be taken as explaining cultural variation as well. A major difference 
relates to the different manners in which profiled regions may be set up, most notably as a 
clear-cut region or as a continuum with blurred fringes. This is illustrated by another recent 
linguistic comparison by Ikegami (1993), which is by chance again between Japanese and 
English. It suggests intriguingly divergent cultural tendencies in performing the profiling 
operation. Ikegami’s study analyzes the much-noted Japanese vagueness in defining speech 
topics. Japanese tend to blur the extension of the speech topic in various ways: They are 
reluctant to impose a singular/plural distinction, which is grammatically optional through the 
addition of personal pronouns, while verbs leave it unspecified. There is a homology of this to 
a great many Japanese verbs which leave it unspecified whether the intended action is 
achieved or not, while their English counterparts imply achievement. The inverse case of an 
unspecified English verb whose counterpart in Japanese is specified apparently does not 
exist. The English disposition may be interpreted as the imagistic bounding of the final state 
in SOURCE-PATH-GOAL scanning, while the Japanese counterparts do not impose a localized 
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end-state on the image, or leave this region blurred and much broader. Furthermore, 
expressions in Japanese tend to neutralize the contrast between proximateness (“this”) and 
remoteness (“that”), by using expression like “such”. These imply that there may be possible 
similar entities that are just as relevant as the entity in question. Not only quantitative 
contrasts between singular and plural, but also qualitative contrasts such as male/female or 
animate/inanimate are neutralized. It may be a characteristic of Japanese culture to leave the 
opposition between individual and group or man and nature relatively unarticulated or avoid a 
sharp contrast. Ikegami argues for an image schema of CONTINUUM underlying all these 
examples. This is quite convincing if we assume that all of these quantitative and qualitative 
polarities are conceptualized as scales that require the imposition of a clear-cut local profile 
at either end. 
    The general conclusion Ikegami draws here is quite consequential: Cultures differ in their 
tendency to impose clear-cut local profiles as an unambiguous figure (p. 811). In all of the 
mentioned cases the Japanese language prefers a relative blurred profile to a clear-cut one 
when compared with English. In fact, this may be a case where an overarching cultural 
template in thought is defined by a simple image-schematic penchant for one or the other 
type of profiling operation. The reader may wonder whether this conclusion is at odds with 
Cook’s above-mentioned findings, where profiles are imposed without any mention of blurred 
extension. Upon closer reflection, there is no reason why the two findings should clash: Cook 
described how a relative PART-WHOLE relation was defined by two particles, without actually 
specifying whether the entities designated by wa and ga were conceptualized as clear-cut or 
blurred profiles. The important fact about them was that they substantially differed in scope 
and stood in a relation of inclusion of ga in wa. (Note also that neither of them does relate to 
any bipolar scale.) Although the examples relate to different functions of language, it might 
well be that the topical markers described by Cook are also construed as relatively blurred 
continua, as long as the PART-WHOLE contrast remains present. 
    In sum, we may assume that there are many other ways in which topical profiling within 
mental arrays plays a role, be they scales, three-dimensional scenes, or others. All of these 
linguistic results are suggestive for cultural anthropology. My aim here is to show that what 
holds for small-scale linguistic expressions is also true for the complex mental arrays that 
ethnographers struggle to comprehend as cultural key ideas. 
 
RELATIONS BETWEEN REGIONS CAN EXPRESS CAUSAL LINKAGE AND ONTOLOGICAL SEPARATION 
OR UNITY 
There are suggestive ethnographic examples, which illustrate that the relations between 
important regions are encoded by virtue of the spatial logic of separateness and distance (for 
an in-depth discussion of this logic see Gärdenfors 2000: ch.1). It matters a lot whether two 
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concepts are seen as wholly separate, contingently related, intrinsically related, or 
inseparable. In a discussion of Balinese concepts of emotion and empathy Unni Wikan 
(1992: footnote 5) reflects on the difficulty to translate “heart” as the locus of emotion into a 
Western understanding. For the Balinese, feeling and thought are inherently fused. This can 
also be seen from Wikan’s analysis of the Balinese schema of understanding between 
humans. Understanding according to the Balinese folk-model means emotional ‘resonance’, 
in the sense of empathy to what a person feels and intends in a situation. This high 
cultivation of a hermeneutic approach to meaning stands in striking contrast to a strong 
tendency of academic Westerners like herself to cling to the ‘objective’ meanings expressed 
in words. This becomes evident in judging if two worldviews are compatible, as Wikan’s 
reflection on a personal field experience shows. She relates as an example the unexpected 
and effortless ‘resonance’ between an orthodox Muslim woman and a Hindu healer. That this 
was possible in spite of deep ‘literal’ rifts in ideology between the two left Wikan dumbstruck. 
After grappling with the experience for a long while she developed an understanding of 
resonance. It means that emotional empathy is the crucial characteristic of understanding, 
and that literal understandings of religious dogma are of lesser worth if split from the context 
of a person’s deeper intentions. In this way, then, the heart is always implicated in 
understanding.  
    In an imagistic analysis all this could mean that the many experiential sub-concepts 
associated with ‘thought’ and ‘feeling’ by many Balinese belong to very much the same large 
region and entertain a multitude of links among them. They constitute a cognitively 
entrenched metonymy, so to speak. By contrast, to Westerners the two regions are 
sufficiently apart to consider them in isolation. An ontological fusion is not mandatory, mutual 
evocation more restricted, and therefore many people apply different rules to the two realms. 
To the Balinese, thought-feeling is essentially a single realm, an observation made in a 
number of other regional ethnographies as well. The main insight here can be generalized in 
the terms of our imagistic model: Where mental regions overlap or coincide there is a strong 
ontological unity of concepts. 
    It also matters in which superordinate region a concept is embedded. By spatial logic, 
being part of an encompassing region again means a causal-functional link: When a certain 
mental entity is conceived as part of another, it causally emanates from it. The following 
citation from the same paper by Wikan (p. 301) makes the point lucidly, this time with respect 
to the Balinese sub-theory concerning the question through which signs other people’s 
emotions can be interpreted: 
 
“In Bali, I had been puzzled to find that Balinese often seemed to express empathy even for people 
whose suffering they hardly knew. It was puzzling because other anthropologists had maintained that 
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Balinese were lacking empathy (Mead 1942: 23; Geertz 1973a [1966]), and also because I could not 
see how they could see beyond people’s faces when those were always ‘bright and clear’ (cedang). 
    After long pondering, I hit upon an answer. Balinese had another way of situating emotion from us. 
Rather than seeing it as a private response, arising in the individual, they perceived emotion as 
embedded in social situations, and thus it could be probed by the assessment of sheer social facts 
(Wikan 1991a: 161). When I came upon an article describing a Chinese theory of emotion similar to 
this (Kleinman and Kleinman 1991), I was intrigued.” 
 
A similar argument about the Ifaluk of Melanesia is made by Catherine Lutz (1988). 
According to her, the people of Ifaluk do not conceive of emotions as something located in an 
individual mind or heart, as Westerners do. Instead, they are a relation between several 
individuals, so that emotions exist independent of and outside the psyche of any one person. 
In Ifaluk thought the concept of emotion is thus not embedded in the concept of person. 
Instead it is assigned to another ontological substrate. By comparison, in Western thought 
emotions are firmly embedded in the concept of person, whereas a transpersonal substrate 
is difficult to think. The belief in person-independent existence of emotions at a level of its 
own is equally rare. On Bali and Ifaluk emotion causally belongs, whether by linkage or 
inclusion is of little importance, to the ontological region of public facts. They have “another 
way of situating” it. For Westerners it has no such direct link to observable events in the 
absence of facial expressions and other personal sings of the inner condition. On Bali and 
Ifaluk social and experiential aspects are ontologically fused and represented in a more 
integrated region than is the case for the Western ontology of emotions. 
    Note that embedded states and linkages between concepts of equal range are logically 
near-identical. Basically, any sub-concept entertains links to the region outside the mother-
concept. More than that, in a holographic and dynamic view of the imagistic mind there is 
rarely a permanent relation making one concept the genitor and the other the offspring. They 
subsist within each other in close mental proximity, and it may be a question of situational 
profiling which one becomes container and which contained (cf. figure-ground). 
 
IDEOLOGICAL THEMES AS PROFILING OF A BASIC CONTAINER 
One way in which profiling performs an ontological function we have already seen: 
Depending on preferences for continua or clear-cut profiles, mental entities are conceived as 
either categorically different in nature or different only by degree. I want to turn to a related 
ontologizing feature of profiling now. Profiling can create a preferred locus of explanation for 
a given domain across its performative settings. What follows is based on the assumption 
that task settings are conceived imagistically as mental scenes occupied either by rich 
imagery of things or by image-schematic co-signatures, such as EVENT, CAUSALITY, 
HIERARCHY, TAXONOMY, COMPLEX CATEGORY, METAPHOR, etc. Presumably the following 
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observations on the profiling operation may apply both to rich images of a scene and to 
abstract image-schematic tools to understand the scene. 
    How a social situation is ontologized by the participants depends on which mental regions 
are activated or which among the activated regions are highlighted for the setting at hand. A 
good example is cultural thought about social agency and social responsibility, i.e. to whom 
the quality of being an actor is attributed. For example, for a given religious setting a divine 
entity may be seen as a crucial acting agent, although not tangibly present as a sensory 
entity, and a child, non-initiate, foreigner, etc. may be seen as non-agent, although she has 
sensory presence. Likewise, in many traditional societies (and modern ideologies such as 
fascism or communism) people tend to think of collectives rather than individuals as prime 
agents. Maurice Bloch (1992: 74-75), among many others, has emphasized the ontologizing 
power of non-individualist ideology118 in creating a model of the locus of social agency. He 
illustrates this with reference to Ladakhi culture, in which the house is thought of as the prime 
social actor: 
 
“The point is that, for the Ladakhi and many people like them, ideology makes it appear, in a way that 
is at least partly convincing, that the active components of society are not people but houses. 
Imagining that agency can only be experienced as emanating from single people is a direct product of 
our ideology of individualism and is, as Dumont has again and again emphasized, totally misleading 
for the type of societies with which we have been concerned so far (Dumont 1977). (...) 
The sociological and legalistic talk of corporations which, until recently, characterised much of the 
classical discussions of descent groups in anthropology (Fortes 1953) did little to help make this point 
clear to non-anthropologists since it obscures the real, sometimes physical, way in which this 
belonging is experienced. For example, many African and Asian people say that members of a 
descent group share the same bones. To say this is not to use a metaphor for closeness; it means 
exactly what it says in that these people believe that the bones of their body are part of a greater 
undifferentiated totality. In cases such as these the body is not experienced as finally bounded by the 
air around it; it is also continuous with parts of the bodies of people who in modern western ideology 
would be seen as ‘others’.” 
                                                 
118Individualism takes the body boundary as constitutive. Presumably a slight biological bias inherent 
in the skin’s natural self-boundary exits, but none that is exclusive or cannot be partly overridden or 
extended by ideology. First of all, there is a possibility to proprioceptively experience transpersonal 
boundaries, either in religious experience or simply through a symbiotic integration in the family or 
tribe. Hence, ‘counterintuitive’ ideologies of setting the primary container trans-individually can be 
grounded in lived experience. Second, the proprioceptive ‘natural’ body imagery can be affected and 
partly transformed by ‘external-view’ objectified imagery of the self encoded in ideology. The two 
realities can exist on parallel levels, (1) as ideological tenet of the larger self and (2) as the skin as 
boundary. Such dissonant experiences can be stored in different parts of the mind (cf. Strauss/Quinn 
1997).  
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This example profiles imagistic entities that are mutually embedded rich images in an 
actually spatial setting: The individual is a part of the family, the family a part of the village, 
the village a part of society, etc.; all are objects in physical space. However, the same may 
be true of abstract mental settings with no rich images. At the transition from the European 
Middle Ages to the Renaissance it was debated whether theology should be philosophy’s 
handmaiden or the other way around. I claim that, even though both concepts are fairly 
abstract entities, they may be assigned priority by profiling their mental region. (An image of 
hierarchy may also contribute in metaphors that characterize philosophy as theology’s 
handmaiden, an image within a time schema defining which came first or gave the impetus 
for the other, and many more other images.) 
    The question of ontology, in terms of imagery, is at what level of spatial expansion or in 
which locus the basic container is situated, i.e. what makes up the basic unit of reality from 
which other units derive. In other words, ontologies differ with respect to which main figure is 
picked out for a given cognitive domain and contrasted to its ground. In the cognitive domain 
mentioned by Bloch – we could call it the interpretation of social action – there are different 
levels at which agency can be attributed. Much of contemporary psychological theory as well 
as the dominant folk-theories of the West would attribute agency only to individuals. But even 
individualist ideology does not think it abnormal to speak of ‘corporate identity’, ‘collective 
beliefs’, or ‘national spirit’. Therefore, profiling an entity as permanent region opens the 
possibility of essentializing it. Often, such ontologically primary regions are created by the 
mind on purpose, as can be seen for the greater undifferentiated totality that Bloch speaks of 
in the case of the bones. In imagistic ontology a higher degree of ‘actualness’ derives from 
belonging to a special container that stands for a privileged realm. A prime example is the 
Platonic realm of ideas, where reality is situated in general concepts rather than in individual 
percepts. 
    A significant characteristic of ontological core-concepts is that they figure prominently in 
cosmological and social explanations. Profiling a region as ontologically important, thus, 
entails its selection as an explanatory model. Within the theory of spatialized co-signatures 
we may hypothesize a dedicated structuring device model for explanatory relations. In broad 
terms this is probably a LINK schema and includes a directed FORCE. A mental entity 
becomes causal by entering into a relation with another, i.e. by being fused into a relational 
profile between explanans and explanandum. When a concept is ontologically profiled 
relative to competing concepts and is entrenched, it acquires permanent salience. As a 
consequence it is likely to be chosen as explanatory link (cf. Gärdenfors 2000: 205 on 
induction by linking). Various kinds of perceptual and conceptual realms may be highlighted 
as ontologically primary in selecting explanatory concepts. For example, some ideologies 
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emphasize the sensory level of material everyday things, and others highlight complex 
mental constructs as ontologically primary and as explanatorily preferable.  
    In sum, ontological principles are defined by ‘basic’ regions that are central in the cultural 
landscape of thought. The internal structure of a basic region may include image schemas, 
such as MODULARITY, CYCLE / ITERATION, PART-WHOLE RELATIONSHIP, EQUAL RELATIONSHIP, 
BINARY OPPOSITION, CAUSATION BY IMPETUS, COMPLEX INTERRELATEDNESS, HIERARCHY, 
PROCESS, SUBSTANCE, etc. Any complex image schema among these can be ontologically 
profiled and given a privileged role as a cultural explanatory concept. It can become a 
thematic schema with instances in a great number of domains. 
 
6. Space logic in anthropology (3): Hidden essences re-examined  
The framework suggested above, especially the notion of realm and abstract quality space, 
is highly conducive to explaining folk-theories of categorization. An interesting phenomenon 
here is the widespread assumption that category-defining attributes exist, even if people do 
not know what they are. In other words, people are prone to believe in underlying but hidden 
essences. I will now discuss the limitations of the presently most influential theory of 
essences in cognitive anthropology and suggest an alternative that is imagery-based. 
 
CONTAINERS OF UNSPECIFICITY 
Recently, the cognitive anthropologist Pascal Boyer (1990, 1993b, 1994a) has come up with 
a stimulating theory of essentialism. His theory focuses on the universal human faculty of 
believing in categories without knowing what they consist of in terms of defining attributes. 
Boyer calls this the hypothesis of pseudo-natural kinds. It is based on the apparently 
universal human tendency to attribute underlying essential traits to animal and plant kinds, 
whose essence remains largely independent of external appearance. In Boyer’s approach, 
co-developed by like-minded anthropological colleagues, such as Dan Sperber, Scott Atran, 
and Francisco Gil-White, there is a cognitive module shaped by evolution for recognizing 
living kinds. A module is defined as (1) innate disposition, (2) which evolved because of its 
adaptive value to our forebears, and (3) which is triggered by experiences of a certain – 
sometimes quite broad and situation-unspecific – kind. 
    In the case of the living-kinds module it is alleged that people see biological species as 
fundamentally distinct from other entities because they have ‘essences’. The term 
essentialism refers to the widespread belief that category membership depends on the 
possession of some hidden properties, of which the observable properties are but typical 
signs (cf. Boyer 1994a: 106). Even small children reason on the basis of this belief, at least 
when the given input encourages such a construal. Recent experimental findings on 
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‘psychological essentialism’ by the cognitive psychologists Frank Keil, Rochel Gelman, and 
Lawrence Hirschfeld support the idea that essentialism is a natural human propensity. 
    Boyer’s crucial argument is that essentialism is not only effective for biological species. 
The recognition module for natural kinds can be extended outside its proper domain and 
applied to social phenomena, making human groups quasi-natural kinds. A reason for this 
ready extension may be that they resemble natural kinds in that they have shared rules and 
endogamy (Gil-White 2000). It would be interesting to know whether the social domain 
simply satisfies the general input conditions of the module that evolution created in our 
ancestors or if it involves a genuinely creative metaphor. However, for the point I want to 
make here this is of little concern.119 
    In one of Boyer’s (1993b: 125ff) three examples, taken from his ethnographic fieldwork 
among the Fang people of Gabon, there is the category of beyem (‘people who see’), whose 
member one is by virtue of possessing an unobservable property called evur, sometimes 
described as an organ of the body. The link between certain activities as a healer or bard-
expert on ancestors and witchcraft and the membership of the category is not a direct one. 
For example, even though most bards in the mvet ritual called mbommvet (who are a kind of 
beyem) play a certain instrument and know the epic tales, what makes one member of the 
category is in fact the underlying property, the evur. Although no one really knows what this 
property consists of, it has to be there and is the defining feature of the category. Therefore, 
whether a particular person is, in fact, a beyem is subject to reasoned guesses and corrigible 
inferences. The intuitive group decision whether one person claiming to be a real beyem with 
the appropriate external skills actually is one or not arises in a complex hermeneutic process 
of past situations and rumors being evaluated in terms of an ongoing ritual and vice versa, 
which Boyer (1994a) explores at length. However, here we are solely concerned with the fact 
that there must be a generalized way of representing the property of having an evur, even 
though there is no experiential way to perceive it. 
    In Boyer’s opinion, the essentialist construal of categories comprises an ‘intuitive heuristic’ 
in cases where our understanding is underdetermined. (Boyer takes this kind of cognitive 
strategy to be of special importance in religious beliefs, which are supposedly usually vague.) 
                                                 
119 When children, against perceptual resemblance, are told that sharks are fish and dolphins 
mammals, i.e. that they belong to different natural kinds, they correctly infer that dolphins cannot 
breathe under water (Boyer 1993: 137). This works best for ‘inherent’ functional properties like 
breathing and feeding. With less typical aspects like size and speed it does not work as well. This 
indicates that aspects of a particular sort seem to characterize ‘natural kinds’. A principled difference 
between non-essentialist and essentialist categories does not, then, seem to hold, since both seem to 
include more core and more peripheral attribute features. Possibly any category or kind behaves like a 
natural kind in some respects. 
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Loosely speaking, essentialism, then, serves as a likely fallback strategy. It is likely because 
it is prefigured in a seemingly innate cognitive template to distinguish natural kinds from other 
categories on the basis of an ascribed essence that allows drawing correct ontological 
inferences about them. In that view, such ontological assumptions about natural kinds are 
automatically triggered once a kind of objects is construed as natural. 
    I am in full accord with Boyer on the significance of essentializing in human thought. 
Nevertheless, I want to raise some doubts about the full adequacy of his explanation for 
essentialism. Boyer attributes this faculty to a natural propensity to think in terms of ‘natural 
kinds’. However, for a comprehensive explanation of essentialist phenomena in various 
cultural settings this theory is too unspecific:  
(1) Most importantly, Boyer makes claims about the functional and evolutionary 
source of the essentializing faculty, but fails to specify its cognitive format. He neither 
speaks about images nor about propositions, but simply dodges the issue. Because 
cognitive formats are not in view, we cannot properly study if an essentialist belief is 
part of a broader master metaphor or embedded in a rich cultural schema.120 Boyer’s 
                                                 
120 Although Boyer is at pains to set his approach off from Lakoff’s, he clearly suggests a theory 
building on metaphor. Boyer’s (1993: 133-134) contention that conventional metaphor cannot, of itself, 
sufficiently account for essentialism is wanting. He sets out from too narrow a notion of metaphor and, 
in doing so, misrepresents the intents of cognitive metaphor theory. Boyer claims that essentialism is 
only insufficiently understood by a metaphorical mapping from the natural to the social. His attack on 
the adherents of such a view is two-pronged: First, he contends that even if the ontological entailments 
effective in the case of beyem are exactly those of natural kinds, there is no linguistic metaphorical 
reference, i.e. there is no conventional metaphor at all. In effect, this argument only calls into question 
an outdated and narrow understanding of metaphor: Clearly, conceptual metaphors may be effective 
even without linguistic counterparts. Lakoff (1993), Gibbs (1994), and Lakoff and Johnson (1999) cite 
plenty of evidence generated by non-linguistic methodologies, which create a broader view of 
metaphor. Boyer takes issue with yet another aspect of metaphor theory by analyzing a linguistic 
polysemy of ‘living species genus’ and ‘clan’ from his ethnographic data. In this case, he tells us, the 
actual ontological entailments from the source domain of genera do not warrant a full projection on the 
target domain of clans. For example, the fact that species cannot interbreed will not fit with the Fang 
cultural rule of clan exogamy. Conventional (linguistic) metaphor can therefore not be a sufficient 
condition for a transfer of ontologies. However, Boyer’s argument can be defused on the simple 
grounds that polysemies need not in every instance be active and potent metaphors. More generally 
he also fails to acknowledge the recognition of metaphor theory that source domains never project all 
properties to the target. Lakoff (1993) explicitly acknowledges that the selection of effective mappings 
is usually constrained by the ontology of the target domain (cf. chapter 1). Adding all this up, borrowing 
the notion of essence from the animal world without the problematic entailment of endogamy following 
along does after all fall within the purview of the cognitive theory of metaphor as we presently 
understand it. 
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perspective fails to explain the embedding of some essence beliefs in further 
cognitive schemas. I will mention Karma beliefs as an example for this below. The 
complexity of cultural cognition is reduced too much by Boyer’s bracketing out of 
imagery.  
(2) Boyer’s approach unduly restricts explanations to domains of cognition with similar 
traits as natural kinds, since his emphasis on pseudo-natural kinds has its foothold in 
the idea that we project inference patterns between real species and their cognates, 
‘social species’. But what about other essences? The crux is that essentialist beliefs 
are widely reported even with respect to very abstract notions, and for those 
inferential similarities are difficult to assert. Although the theory can claim some 
plausibility for essentialist traits mapped on social groups or persons, because these 
are perceived as basically similar to living kinds, for essentializing artifacts it has less 
intuitive appeal, and for highly abstract essences it fails altogether: Religious essence 
beliefs, such as the supreme reality of Hindu atman, would have to be explained by 
wholly different theories, since they seem to have little in common with essences 
ascribed to a species or social group. By the same token, it would seem that the 
essentialist conception of the ‘true self’ is left unexplained. It seems difficult to 
understand it in terms of a natural species, because it is not a separate entity to begin 
with but the innermost part of a person and because it is not really opposed to other 
species. The relation to natural kinds is spurious at best here.  
 
In sum, the deficiencies in scope of Boyer’s approach follow from the failure to deal with the 
representational format of essences and his exclusive focus on a very specific source 
domain of natural kinds. 
    For these reasons it should be appealing to formulate a theory of sufficient scope to 
account for all essentialist phenomena by the same mechanism. In what follows I will put 
forward such an explanation. I retain from Boyer the suggestion that there is a hidden or 
invisible underlying trait that is common to a group of persons or things and the idea that this 
makes for their causal attributes. Going beyond Boyer, I want to specify a general cognitive 
format for all essence representations, which explains their structure with reference to image 
schemas and realms. Such a refined theory seems fruitful because it covers all essence 
phenomena due to the abstractive nature of image schemas. 
    Specifically, I propose that the conceptualizing of essences emanates from the cognitive 
reality of container schemas with contents imagined in the most abstract way possible. The 
above introduction into the notion of ‘realm’ put stress on their inherent capacity to represent 
the status of having common properties in an abstract way. We can thus explain essences 
as homogeneous mass-construals of a region and their inherent quality space. In our 
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example, the class of beyem can be represented as a container in a folk-model. All individual 
beyem, summarily and abstractly conceived, are contained within this container. In order to 
cognitively represent that they share a substance it is necessary to construe the container 
region as realm. The region will appear as filled by a homogeneous quality space. It is 
superimposed on the set-members and ‘imbues’ them with their essence. Therefore, the 
homogeneous substance is an image-schematic representation of the hidden property 
shared by all set-members. This is the case because the image schema is the defining 
property for the otherwise elusive class of beyem. All other properties of the various beyem 
individuals that people may happen to observe need not be highlighted when representing 
this class qua class, because they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for class 
membership. Thus, the notion that mbommvet bards perform ritual songs in a specific way 
embedded in a specific setting, etc. need not be saliently evoked by the abstract 
representation as such. The only necessary and sufficient condition is the hidden quality of 
having evur and this, in turn, can only be represented in an abstract way. Therefore, the 
image schema of a realm constitutes the defining feature sine-qua-non of the representation. 
    The mental operation can also be explained from the following angle. Contents as general 
idea are constitutive of the concept of a container, and thus intrinsically included: Even in the 
case of an empty container the idea that it can be filled to hold and bound objects is present 
in nuce. This adds up to the following metaphor: Essentialist thinking is governed by the 
image-schematic understanding that ESSENCES ARE HIDDEN CONTAINER CONTENTS. The 
reader can try this out in a self-experiment. Imagine an abstract container from the outside 
whose content is invisible but imagined as present. We know it is there because we can 
imagine content as pure token, without any detail features. Visually conceived, the image-
schematic notion of content is most comparable to a gaseous substance that cannot be 
seen, evenly fills its available space, and is only defined by its boundaries. (We can revert to 
such propositional knowledge about typical hidden essences to evoke the image schema.)  
    A pure token image of content is made possible by a mass-construal, where the individual 
features of the items recede into the background. This operation is applicable to whatever we 
can construe as a container-like region, not only to people or groups of people. Typified 
content can be imagined even without any specific quality that typifies. This is the crucial 
cognitive capacity of essences: Even when we do not know or cannot imagine what makes 
things of a kind we can imagine that they are of one kind in some way. 
 
CROSS-STRENGTHENING BETWEEN ABSTRACT IMAGES AND CONCRETE CRITERIA 
Do imagistic essence models exist as such, or are they enriched by attribute-based 
cognition? If my analysis is correct, essentialism is hard to conceive without image schemas. 
However, regarding inference in cultural context a proviso is in place, lest exaggerated 
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conclusions be drawn. The contribution of attribute-based thought to essentialism should not 
be dismissed too easily. No doubt, Fang beyem involve a folk-theoretical, i.e. a deliberate 
and discursively shared, category definition. On this level the ABSTRACT (= HIDDEN) CONTENT 
image schema can define the representation. However, the actual inferences about category 
membership, i.e. a specific person being a beyem or not, are a different story. They are not 
generated by an abstract image. Instead, they are produced by situationally strengthened 
assumptions that are based on each individual’s previous experience or on gossip, as Boyer 
shows elsewhere (1994a: ch.8). (This was discussed earlier as the mechanism of ‘elective 
affinity’ or, in Boyer’s terminology, ‘ad hoc abductive inference’.) Thus, in addition to the 
general definition of a linguistically marked and discursive category, people develop 
subconscious models from observations about individuals judged to be real beyem in the 
past. According to Boyer, these intuitions typically influence the judgment of a given new 
case.  
     If subconscious inferences spill over into the understanding of the abstract concept, as 
they surely will, essence beliefs are no longer devoid of criteria. This comes to the fore when 
we look at an individual’s inferences. From the perspective of the individual, essence 
ascription is linked to quite personal experiences with beyem, even though these would 
clearly be inadequate without the theory of evur-bearers. Even though a general cultural 
theory of beyem would never emerge on individual experiences alone, the moral is a simple 
one: A pure and decontextualized notion of a hidden essence with no rich contextual 
knowledge intervening can exist only in theory, never in cultural practice. 
    Let us examine another case in point regarding the debate about essences and national 
identity. Daniel Linger (1994: 304f), in a thoughtful comment on Richard Handler’s (1988) 
work on the politics of culture in Québec, argues that claims about empty essences have to 
be dealt with cautiously. Handler’s work parallels Boyer’s because it indicates that average 
Franco-Canadians hold vague, unsystematic, and only partially shared notions about criterial 
attributes that define Québecois identity. Linger, however, points out that the conclusions 
about the underlying cognitive model have to be drawn cautiously. Even if there are no fixed, 
i.e. necessary and sufficient, criterial attributes for being Québecois, criteria might be 
represented in alternative formats. (Two possibilities I can think of are prototype-models with 
fuzzy boundaries and graded membership and ‘family resemblance’ models that form a unit 
only by a sequence of overlaps. In both cases criterial attributes are non-taxative.) Apart from 
that, Handler’s conclusion of empty essences is problematic, because it is deduced from the 
informants’ inability to produce a fully verbalized theory. However, the absence of an explicit 
theory does not necessarily mean they do not hold any criteria-based folk-model. Caution is 
called for because the culturally most fundamental beliefs are usually taken so much for 
granted that they remain implicit (Bloch 1998: 46f). 
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    The Québecois example hints at the relation between imagistic models and criteria that fill 
the ‘empty vessel’. Handler gives an account of the ideological creation of Québecois identity 
through populist discourse. This implies that people take recourse to an abstract idea of 
essence to reinforce and structure knowledge that might otherwise be too inconclusive. 
Essence beliefs fill gaps in actual knowledge. Basically it makes sense to assume a 
dynamical relation of cross-strengthening between abstract image-schematic representations 
of essence and observational data. If Handler is right, this relation is most often initiated by 
an essence belief. The essence model can provide a first foothold for elusive ideas. The 
reason for this is that nationalist discourse is described by Handler as first encouraging the 
idea of a unique collectivity (by asserting it verbally) and then trying to fill it with substance 
validating the belief. I suggest that many people, especially if they have only weak 
nationalistic commitments, predominantly rely on the abstract model of essence. Only if 
subjects become increasingly politicized about the issue a more complex model to fill out the 
abstract image can be triggered in a second stage. Assuming this is correct, how do people 
enrich the imagistic model with criterial attributes? 
(1) The political ideologists provide the average person with a score of ideas on 
national distinctiveness that can enrich their representations.  
(2) People who fear a cultural alienation by Anglo-Canadians may resort to an 
elective affinity mode of identity-construction, i.e. “they worry a lot about discovering 
signs of their distinctiveness” (Linger 1994: 305). And, no doubt, as they seek they 
will discover such.  
(3) Markers for distinctiveness can even be consciously or unconsciously constructed 
by the subjects themselves through changes in behavior. A fine example of the latter, 
from another context, is the gradual exaggeration of certain phonemic attributes that 
the people of the island Martha’s Vineyard developed once there began to be a flood 
of tourists from nearby New York that threatened the local identity. 
 
Essence beliefs are, then, ‘good to think with’, because they do not require a very deep 
understanding of a matter or even furnish a conceptual peg for half-baked ideas. On the 
other hand, essence beliefs provide a productive cognitive basis for constructing criteria-
based models. Where this is the case essence image schemas must in some way exist 
alongside rich knowledge structures. An interesting subject for further study is whether 
essence beliefs and criteria-based beliefs are stored as parts of the same model or not, and 
if they clash how people come to terms with this cognitive dissonance. 
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STRUCTURAL ESSENCE AS ABSTRACT NOTION OF PATTERN 
Let us return to the description of other essentialism schemas. While we have been dealing 
only with mass-construed realms up to now, we can extend the scope of the present analysis 
to multiplex (internally differentiated) construals of container-like regions. An interesting 
demonstration of the effects which stronger cognitive profiling of the internal relations of a 
region generate is provided by the Buddhist theory of Karma. 
    I submit that there can also be more sophisticated versions of the basic schema for 
essence. I shall argue that this additional complexity can be introduced by a specific way of 
construing the interior of a region. Instead of giving the interior a construal as homogeneous 
mass, we can also profile the interrelations of parts. The pivotal point to make here is that we 
can do this even without imagining a very specific array of parts and relations. 
    For example, the idea of Karma in Buddhism is represented as pure structural essence. 
The accumulated structure of one’s life – karma-laden structure – passes over to another 
existence in the endless chain of being. In contradistinction to Hindu ways of conceptualizing 
reincarnation, the special emphasis is laid on abstract structure being passed on:  
 
“Karma has been compared to a design made by a seal pressed upon wax. When the soul passes 
from the former life to the afterlife, only the abstract design which the wax obtained from the seal 
passes over. With respect to rebirth, Buddha taught that nothing substantial was retained and that the 
characteristics possessed by an individual were impressed on a new existence in another womb.” 
(Gerhart/Allen 1984: 123) 
 
The fact that ‘structure’ is of no specific kind is of crucial importance to Buddhism. The 
abstract design that is passed on can be understood in a large number of ways, and exactly 
this overarching reference is intended: All and everything that made up a life will leave its 
imprint one way or the other. Notice that there is some difference between the pure essence 
schema with its entirely undefined hidden content and the Karma schema. In the latter not 
only the basic identity and immutability of an unknowable content is asserted, attention is 
also directed towards the idea that the content has a sort of shape, a pattern, without being 
specific what pattern this is. To achieve this effect the container schema is further structurally 
elaborated by a generic image schema for INTERNAL STRUCTURE (or PATTERN). This may 
which may be conveyed through one of the following graphic depictions, which schematically 
capture different patterns of abstract internal structures:  
 
 
 
 
 
 438 
I chose the example to demonstrate a very significant point: It is absolutely indispensable to 
be able to represent the notion of structure in a generic way. How the recognition of pattern 
as an abstract schema is motivated psychologically, is best explained with reference to 
Gestalt principles. Perceptual salience is geared to the detection of ‘meaningful’ patterns as 
opposed to percepts without such a meaningful structure. Patterns are attributed significance 
on the basis of patterned features of various kinds, e.g. in that they internally repeat angle, 
distance, and shape, or are recognizable as a known perceptual Gestalt, like that of a table, 
a person, or a codified sitting arrangement. Thus, we have a general imagistic notion of what 
makes meaningful patterns. What I propose is this: As abstraction from the set of meaningful 
percepts, an image-schematic representation of PATTERN makes the notion as such 
conceivable as a generic conceptual schema.  
    Let me note a further aspect that will come into focus later: Karma is a cognitive hybrid 
between structure and essence. The sense of common essence is retained at the same time 
that pattern is highlighted. While the question from Boyer’s example is posed here, an 
additional aspect is added on top of it, namely how do essence beliefs dynamically interact 
with other beliefs. I would argue for the co-presence of two mental operations, the containers 
a homogeneous realm and as structured region. The two images are superimposed on one 
another to create a more complex Gestalt. This is a particularly good example of how image 
schema superimpositions make very sophisticated cognitive effects possible. An even more 
well-structured sub-case of the internal structure schema is the systems image schema, 
which I will treat later in much detail, and which is also an important conceptual schema in 
Buddhism. 
 
7. Space logic in anthropology (4): Cultural theories of knowledge as immutable 
essence vs. reality in continuous flux 
Although essentialist thought seems to play a prominent part in many and perhaps in all acts 
of cultural construction (cf. Fuss 1989), there are examples of cultures that display a rather 
marked tendency to see social reality in ever-changing flux. Maurice Bloch’s comparison of 
ethnographies by two of his students, Gabriele vom Bruck and Fenella Cannell, serves to 
illustrate this differences between a culture that tends to think in terms of essences and one 
that does not. The basis of the following comparison is a range of cultural beliefs relating 
primarily to the nexus between essence, power, and identity and the reaction to change and 
external pressures. (The reader should remain alert to this restriction in order not to 
overextend the claim, which are very broad anyhow.) 
    Bloch (1998: 71-76) compares two folk-theories of memory and “what amounts to much 
the same, folk-theories of the sources of knowledge and freedom”, drawing on two 
ethnographies from Yemen and the Philippines. They represent a contrast of differing views 
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of person, history, cosmos, and morality that could hardly be more striking. (As Bloch points 
out, there is little difficulty in seeing the parallels to the theories of mind and memory of Plato 
and Aristotle, respectively.) 
    The Sadah of Yemen, descendants of the Prophet Mohammed and until 1962 the spiritual 
and political leaders of the Yemeni Imamate, manifest a view of history and truth that is 
rather typical of similar groups in the Arab world. The Sadah are thought to be privileged 
vessels of divine and legal knowledge. Their descent is believed to give them an inherited 
predisposition to acquire holiness and wisdom. Even if no automatism is invoked here, a 
biological potential is assumed that can unfold, given the proper conditions. The Sadah were 
able to maintain their position of influence in a Yemen that remained in isolation well into the 
middle of the 20th century. After the revolution that overthrew the Imamate they were 
persecuted. Forced to adapt to a certain extent, they have done their best to maintain 
themselves unchanged, notably through the practice of endogamy and emigration. At the 
same time they believe that behind the transient and worldly realm of changing governments, 
political ideologies, and intellectual fashions the ultimate truth remains unchanged, and that it 
is their mission to uphold it. 
    The reaction of the Sadah community to the changes of the recent decades can be 
understood in the light of an Islamic theory of truth that is fundamentally a-historical. As with 
Plato, there is an absolute transcendent truth. Nothing essential can ever be learned anew; 
instead it is given in the word of God and eternally present. In the swirl of circumstances 
around the community, the proper attitude to be cultivated is to protect true knowledge from 
the injuries of a passing and lesser reality. The foremost duty is to preserve the divine 
message fixed in the Quran. Moreover, this Islamic conception of truth is reflected in a theory 
of learning that operates by rote, strict discipline, and a lack of explanation. A particular logic 
underlies this:   
 
“The mind of the pupils is infinitely inferior to the mind that created the Quran because of the 
immeasurable distance that exists between God and humans. It is therefore important to place the 
holy message in these inferior minds, not so that the pupils will ‘make it their own’, as our 
educationalists would say, but so that the text will make the mind of the pupils its own: and thereby 
make the pupils people of Islam. The learning has to conquer the recalcitrant self, not the other way 
round. This also explains the importance of memorizing the text and not merely reading it.” (p. 73) 
 
In this view, there is no true growth of knowledge. Memory is a vessel into which knowledge 
that pre-exists enters from outside. Ultimate truth lies in the text of the Quran itself, and not in 
understanding it. Writing is not a mnemonic device that could be a substitute for 
internalization; instead the unchanged scripture needs to be passed on. It would be 
sacrilegious and preposterous at the same time to believe that any imperfect human being 
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could ever wholly grasp this truth. At the same time this theory of truth as passively received 
eternal form also explains how the Sadah acquired their privileged social position. According 
to the Islamic theory of Quranic truth some minds are, by virtue of descent, shaped in a way 
that predisposes them more for divine knowledge. This means that for the Sadah learning is 
less of a struggle. Holy knowledge is acquired by them in a fashion conceived as natural. 
    Bloch contrasts this example from Yemen with the poor peasants and urban dwellers of 
Bicol in the central Philippines, studied by Fenella Cannell (1992, 1999). Not unrealistically, 
the people of Bicol see themselves essentially at the mercy of more powerful others: 
landowners, government officials, and the colonial powers Spain and America. This self-
image is also mirrored in their view of the supernatural world, which is inhabited by saints 
and spirits whom they have to reconcile and whom they have to accommodate. Their attitude 
toward history and change could not be more different from the Sadah mentioned before. In 
reaction to the impinging outward events the people of Bicol allow these events to continually 
mold them. Not being interested in some irreducible essence of their selves, they “represent 
their role in history as having been willing to let powerful outsiders transform them to the core 
and in the process having also somewhat modified those who thought they were merely 
conquerors.” (Bloch 1998: 75) In the same way they adopted Catholicism from the Spanish in 
the colonial era, they take up the Western models and trends seen on television today. 
Notably, they create their own beauty contests, which give them the opportunity to appear for 
a short moment like the foreign and powerful models. In a humble and perhaps somewhat 
ironic negotiation they seek a more equitable modus vivendi. 
 
“The actor starts in a position of inferiority and oppression but with time and patience he/she engages 
the superior in a negotiation, which becomes a relationship of exchange, if always unequal exchange. 
One transforms oneself to accommodate the superior in oneself but as this occurs one engages their 
pity and so one gradually builds oneself up through the accumulation of accepted experiences. As a 
result the negotiation from weakness becomes the basis for becoming a subject in one’s own right 
through creative adaptive transformation” (Bloch 1999: 75) 
 
Thus, social reality is continually negotiated. Although there is no unified and explicit theory 
of personhood in Bicol regarding the cultivation of power, encounters with other people are, 
on a less conscious and intentional level, often represented as the mutual testing of power 
and influence. In every contact between two persons at least one of them is liable to be 
transformed by the encounter. Neither views of self-legitimating hierarchy nor radically 
egalitarian views of society, in which hierarchic principles are resisted and inverted, seem to 
apply here. What Cannell stresses above all else about the Bicol people is their great 
preoccupation with transformations from states of greater hierarchy, distance, and 
asymmetry to states of greater balance, intimacy, and harmony. In the identity-power-
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essence nexus such an emphasis on the transformative qualities of social process is 
possible, because social status is precisely not conceived in the way the Sadah of Yemen 
do. In Bicol superior wealth and power are not regarded as the sign of an internal essence of 
any physical or spiritual kind. Nor are powerful and wealthy persons icons of a 
transcendental order projected into the social realm. Although the possession of power is not 
thought of as a purely material matter, the sources of supernatural power remain plural and 
the boundaries between them fluid. Fate, luck, human and supernatural patronage, hard 
work, the mechanisms of economic exploitation and debt, and God’s mysterious will all 
contribute to the Bicol view of social inequalities. 
    A crucial difference, from my point of view, between the Sadah and Bicol examples is that 
in the Sadah case a cognitive mechanism is operative which the Bicol people do not employ 
to any important extent. The Sadah have an explicit representation on the level often 
described as ‘folk-theory’ in cognitive literature, whereas the Bicolanos represent their 
identity, if the concept of identity can be applied to them at all, only as an implicit ‘folk model’. 
Cannell herself (1999: 247) suggests an opposition between concepts of identity that 
highlight ‘being’ (as in ‘being Merina’ which Bloch’s Malagasy ethnography describes as 
inherited essence) to such that are a matter of ‘doing’. The people of Bicol are very little 
disposed toward making formal statements about ‘who they are’. Although Cannell does not 
use that term, it is tempting to call this an embodied and enacted form of identity rather than 
a discursively constructed one. The Bicolanos insist very little on the possession of a ‘culture’ 
in the sense of unchanging laws and customs, and much which is continuous in local 
practice goes unarticulated. As nothing is fixed forever, new events will put ever-new imprints 
on the mind. At least in the theory that the Bicolanos hold about themselves the human mind 
can be likened to a wax slate. Many of the automatic reactions of Bicol life are not 
discursively laid out or even admitted to exist (p. 251).  
    Moreover, this lack of explicit theory is reflected in the lack of ritual closure. In contrast to 
societies where there is emphasis on a single, unchanging, and dominant supernatural 
authority and where ritual provides a monolithic reading of ‘truth’ to its participants, in 
societies 
 
“where (as in Bicol) there are may overlapping variations on ritual directed at a collection of 
supernaturals whose exact powers and relationships to each other are subject to speculation (and 
have been over several centuries without apparently reaching a final solution), the problems of reading 
the meaning of participation in ritual must necessarily differ. While religious understanding in Bicol is 
by no means unstructured – everyone believes in the Catholic God; everyone understands the general 
character of the invisible people – much of its detail is thought of as only known provisionally.” (p. 252) 
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By understanding many claims only as provisional the Bicolanos apparently accord many of 
their beliefs only relatively weak ontological status. This follows directly from their strong 
(meta-)concept that underlies the principle of continuing negotiation of social reality. There 
are two sides to this coin. While the central cultural difficulty for the Bicolanos is to reconcile 
the demands of the different powers in a context where no solution is felt to be permanent, 
this also gives considerable amplitude to innovative effort and play in ritual. In this sense 
Cannell (1999: 228) emphasizes that to most Bicolanos “the construction of a seamless and 
tightly joineried cultural product is an activity of little interest”. Her conclusion about the 
Bicolanos’ process-oriented conception of identity negotiation deserves to be quoted at 
length: 
 
“Bicol is a place which sits oddly in anthropological discussions because its identity seems guaranteed 
neither by its own claims to the possession of unchanging authenticity, nor by its involvement in 
political and cultural ‘resistance’, nor by its deliberate withdrawal to the position of ‘marginality’. 
Bicolano people do not have a triumphalist view of their own culture, nor do they in everyday life reach 
complete resolutions to the problems of power and power relations. This should suggest to us, 
perhaps, that ambiguity, irony, and irresolution are also kinds of social fact, not to be explained away 
simply as a way-station en route to a higher degree of cultural certainty, any more than they are to be 
portrayed as the ‘post-modernist’ fragmentation of some former cultural coherence. It is in these areas 
of irresolution and complex meaning that much that is important in Bicol life takes place; the point of 
Bicolano conversations is not just the conclusion they might reach, but the course of the conversation 
itself.” (p. 254) 
 
The Bicol example is a rather good one for the purpose of illustrating a processual ontology. 
Bicolano models of cultural identity, of personality and memory, and of power are all 
determined in relation to the social practice of continually negotiating status. Hence, there is 
a culturally recurring cognitive format that effects and abstention from thinking in essences. 
Even if this must remain open, one can speculate whether the power-identity-essence nexus 
seen here is universal. 
    In conclusion we can say this: Essences in experience are devalued in Bicol, because 
many important domains of cultural thought (about self, identity, power, etc.) do not seem to 
be conceptualized as essence.121 A most pertinent question for cognitive anthropologists in 
                                                 
121 Another basis of argument that is trickier is the study of grammar. Some authors have proposed 
that languages lacking a strong tendency to construe entities from qualities and processes have 
relatively underdeveloped mental schemas for such ‘entification’. The argument goes as follows: Some 
languages are better equipped to represent reified entities, especially such with a strong tendency to 
nominalize, such as Sanskrit, Latin, or German. (Even within Europe it may have been no accident 
that German culture and its noun-dominated language has favored idealistic philosophies, while 
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this and similar cases is to what extent a recurring process schema informs and permeates 
the various micro-domains of everyday life. Do concepts of negotiable identity and power 
contribute to an embodied consciousness of flow in everyday work, talk, play, etc.? Is there a 
foundational model of ontology in which most non-material concepts, and even many 
material phenomena, are conceptualized as being in flux? This question is important 
because the above explanation of processual worldviews merely through a mechanism’s 
absence (namely the absence of essentializing) may be insufficient. Theoretically, there may 
exist a cognitive mechanism in its own right for a general processual schema. If Cannell is 
right about negotiation as an actually omnipresent quality of communication, my guesstimate 
for the Bicol case would be yes. The data point to an entrenched high-level expectation that 
cognitive concepts continuously undergo shifts.  
     Implicit in all this is the question whether we must assume a superimposed cognitive layer 
of processualist ideology. Any powerful ideology implies a schematic template leaving 
imprints on all sorts of everyday actions, i.e. a foundational model. Here, this would indicate 
a template of ‘processually tinted glasses’ shaping the perception of contexts. This 
ideological template could, for example, function as a second-order belief about other 
representations (cf. Sperber 1975, 1982, 1985, 1996). A recursive device such as this 
amounts to a filter in the mind that ontologically de-emphasizes one’s non-processual 
concepts, screens them out, or lets other more suitable ones be sought in their stead. This 
would let people believe less in the permanence of seemingly fixed states. Conversely, 
without the ideological filter concepts would be conceived merely in their own terms as either 
more static or more in flux. No principles of construal would hold universal sway and no 
tinted glasses would exist.122 The findings of the Bicol example do not seem to permit a final 
                                                                                                                                                        
English culture with its more verb-dominated language gave rise to more experientially oriented 
thinking.) On the other hand, supposedly processualist leanings in Chinese thought are reflected in a 
linguistic structure in which words have shifting applications as noun-verb-adjectives. By this logic 
Chinese language does not essentialize in a very pronounced way, because it does not distinguish 
types of referents independent of situational context. If Chinese language categories indeed mirror 
Chinese thought, the world is cognized as a flux rather than a rigid structure that has been carved-up 
once and for all. The general problem with that line of reasoning is that thought is not wholly 
determined by language, even though it may be partially constrained. The other problem is more 
technical, namely that more subtle grammatical devices can easily be overlooked, especially by 
analysts with an incomplete command of the language (a noteworthy demonstration to this effect is 
Malotki’s [1983] refutation of Whorf’s [1956] language-based claims about circularity in Hopi time). A 
very interesting, if not wholly conclusive debate about the claim that the Chinese have a tendency to 
avoid entification (and to avoid thinking counterfactually) is presented by Palmer (1996: 164-169). 
122 As I see it, a similar (and equally heuristic) definition of ideology underlies the two-parameter grid 
suggested by Gellner’s (1988: 77) attempt to typologize worldviews. Gellner distinguishes between 
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judgment about an ideological template of flux. However, the possibility cannot be 
discounted, even in spite of the Bicolano reluctance to state general beliefs. Cannell reminds 
us that the subjects need not state this model formally or even be very conscious of it. A 
high-level foundational model does not necessarily entail a general theory. As a general 
conclusion it seems safe to assume that neither complete cognitive discreteness of everyday 
cognition nor complete systematization by ideology is the case and that cultures are 
therefore invariably situated somewhere between the extremes. Probably few, if any, 
societies will have a generalized folk-theory of essences encompassing all non-material 
concepts. On the other hand, recent research – especially Hirschfeld’s (1994) hypothesis on 
innate dispositions (not representations!) to essentialize racial attributes – provides very 
strong evidence that at least some degree of essentializing is universal. In light of this a real 
foundational model of processual reality seems rather unlikely. 
    Let us briefly look at some other data. It has been observed by many ethnographers that 
cultures vary greatly in attributing dynamism to natural phenomena (Palmer 1996: 148). For 
example, the American Indian cultures nearly universally regarded plants, rocks, and 
mountains as beings animated by indwelling spirits. Other cosmologies postulate that the 
universe is animated by abstract and impersonal powers. The Chinese doctrines of yin and 
yang and the belief in qi (see below) testify to this. This type of thought employs a concept of 
dynamism that is, I suggest, an image-schematic-structure mentally projected on static 
entities. Reality – as that which is ontologically prior – is perceived through this expectational 
pattern. 
    Some quite strong evidence for a model of reality in flux comes from linguistic 
anthropology. Palmer (ibid.) made the tentative observation that speakers of the Uto-Aztecan 
language Yaqui tend to attribute dynamic qualities to scenes which Anglo-Americans 
typically would feel inclined to describe as static: 
 
“I drew a crude picture of a stick figure and a house, which I would normally describe as ‘a man 
standing by a house’, but the figure was described by Yaqui speakers, in Yaqui as ‘a boy walking by a 
house’. Other pictures of animate subjects appearing in what seemed to me static poses received the 
same treatment.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
multistranded and singlestranded worldviews on the one hand and, orthogonally, between referential 
and non-referential worldviews on the other. Referential worldviews are such that are largely 
determined by everyday sensory experience relatively unmediated by complex mental models, 
whereas in non-referential worldviews the super-structural level of ideology is relatively isolated and 
operates unconstrained by sensory experience. 
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Although the elicitation experiment in itself was too cursory, Palmer suggest from his 
experience that to Yaqui speakers animate images have greater salience than static images. 
Firmer evidence comes from the neighboring, but linguistically unrelated Navajo, where 
several generations of researchers have come to similar conclusions. One ethnographer 
attributed to the Navajo a dominant conception of the universe in motion. Accordingly, 
Navajo language includes exceptionally detailed differentiations of movement types, 
depending on the number of bodies, their shapes, and their distribution in space. Even more 
conclusive is the fact that substantive concepts are framed in terms of some characteristic 
action or movement. The expression for ‘full moon’ translates literally ‘a hoop-like object has 
rolled out’, the expression for letter is ‘a fabric-like object is moved about’, and ‘wagon’ is 
rendered as ‘wood rolls about hoop-like’. Even completely inanimate objects are described 
as dynamic. For example, it is said that ‘the rock is in the process of being in place’, so that 
Palmer comes to the conclusion that “[t]he Navajo world is a place in which all things have 
already been set in motion” (p. 150). 
    For exploring the cognitive structure of processual models of reality we are on the safest 
ground with the study of explicit discourse. Attending to cultural theories rather than models 
affords major advantages. However, we also need to be aware of the relative cost of such a 
strategy compared to ethnographic accounts of everyday cognition such as Cannell’s. 
Elaborate cosmological theories are often limited to experts’ discourse and may either not be 
distributed across the general population, or the belief-systems of laymen may diverge from 
the experts’ beliefs. This notwithstanding, I would like to take a look at several South and 
East Asian religious systems and their process ontologies.  
 
8. Space logic in anthropology (5): Theories of processual ontology in Asian religious 
systems 
The central discussion of the following section is about process ontologies. Yet, it should be 
made clear from the outset that these cannot be tidily separated from other conceptual 
elements such as PATTERN. Therefore this section will be concerned with the interaction of 
patterns and processes in complex representations that map both aspects. It is best to start 
with an exemplification of a basic conceptual schema that I will call CONTINUOUS PROCESSUAL 
FLOW. The ideas of Buddhism provide a good example here, which will be treated in two 
portions. One will be dealt with right away and the other will ensue after an excursus on 
another more complex schema of which flow forms a part. 
 
BUDDHIST IMAGERY (1): BRINGING THE FLOW TO REST 
Steven Collins (1982), in his work on the Theravâda Buddhism of Southeast Asia, analyzes 
in some detail the imagery employed to express its basic philosophical tenets. As so often, 
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rich images are used to evoke the relevant image schemas. Arguably, the most important 
and most widely exploited rich image is that of water. Such metaphors occur in a contrastive 
set of water in motion on the one hand and water at rest on the other. Water as stream or 
current of uncontrollable force is used as an image for the process of samsara, which 
signifies the round of rebirth characterized by the unending recurrence of ‘suffering’. 
(Incidentally, in another conceptualization of continuous movement samsara is frequently 
associated with the image of a wheel that turns, hence the phrase “round of rebirth”.) The 
flow stands for the basic existential state which the unenlightened Buddhist seeks to 
overcome through the cessation of craving and an insight into the illusion of ‘self’. In this 
negative use of the stream metaphor the world of the senses is an uncontrollable force in 
which one is drowned or carried along helplessly into the round of rebirth. The attachment to 
the sensual world is likened to ‘greed, swollen with the river of craving’, whereas the 
enlightened monks have cut off this stream of desire (in other images they cross it safely 
without drowning or getting carried away). To go with the stream is to succumb to desire and 
the suffering issuing from it. The followers of the Buddha strive to go against it. Thus, the 
mindfulness of the monks is conceptualized as a dam within the image of this stream. It is 
acknowledged that monks in their training cannot cut off the stream immediately, but it can 
be guided like water in viaducts (Collins 1982: 249ff). 
    Water as still, clear, cool, deep, and peaceful expanse, on the other hand, is used as an 
image for nibbana, the cessation of self and suffering. (In the literal meaning of the word, 
which means ‘blowing-out’ of craving, the motion of the still ocean is opposed to the flickering 
and spreading motion of the flame. While the substances of fire and water are rather 
opposite, the current of a stream and the movement of a flame nonetheless belong to the 
same pole of imagery, which is opposed to that of states without motion.) The image of the 
ocean is explicitly used in texts with the following connotations: it is calm and cannot be 
disturbed by the rivers that flow into it, just as the enlightened man is not disturbed by the 
minor inconveniences of life. It is immeasurable and cannot be ‘filled up’ by the number of 
people who reach it; it is the ultimate destination of rivers flowing towards it, just as nibbana 
is for the Buddhist religious life. Like the ocean, the goal of nibbana is calm peacefulness. 
The ocean falls away from land gradually, just as the attainment of nibbana is gradual. The 
ocean makes all the affluent rivers into one, just as the social classes become one in 
nibbana, etc. (p. 260). In sum, Buddhist imagery opposes the image of unceasing 
CONTINUOUS FLOW, which forms the general principle of the world and entangles the self in it 
through transmigration of patterns, to an image of COMING TO REST in something that is 
without bounds. 
    Note the embodied metaphors employed here. Desire and craving is a FORCE, just as the 
suffering that is inextricably involved is – at least in its physical variant – FORCE inflicted on 
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us. Note also that in the image of mindfulness as a dam explicit reference is made to the 
related schema of BLOCKAGE (cf. Johnson 1987: 46 and Talmy 1988). Finally, two further 
basic aspects of force imagery are also present in the irrigation and viaduct imagery. The 
force can be guided into a channel or CONDUIT. And it can be deflected or split into smaller 
forces. I would argue that all these metaphoric images correspond to embodied experiences 
made in the course of meditative practice. The propelling force of the process of reality is 
explicitly identified with another, more specifically psychological and embodied kind of force, 
that of desire. Just as there is an embodied sense of desire welling up – and this seems to 
be the case in Indian culture just as much as in the Western representations of desire – there 
is an embodied sense of gaining control over these forces, either by warding them off or 
channeling them. The phenomenal reality of the human condition as craving and frustration 
is fundamentally identified with the experience of self, the implication being that when self 
ceases to exist as a psychological state, the basic frustrating condition does likewise. This 
Buddhist model is another fine example of the homology relation between objectified imagery 
(i.e. the flow of reality model) and proprioceptive body awareness (i.e. the embodied model 
of desire as directed force). Desire as embodied reality is identified with the agent force in 
the objectified general model of processual reality, so that an embodied and a cosmological 
concept are integrated. In Buddhism a phenomenological theory is embedded in a 
metaphysical belief adapted from the Brahman tradition, that of karmic reconfiguration.  
 
THE PROCESS IMAGE SCHEMA 
The image schema of CONTINUOUS FLOW is a specific sub-variety of what I would like to call 
the PROCESS schema. (Alternatively, coining the term CHANGE schema would be just as 
justified.) This is a more basic description of the imagery of the EVENT structure metaphor, as 
described by Lakoff, Turner, and others, and of the relevant co-signature I discussed in 
chapter 8. 
    Just as we can imagine structure in the most abstract way we can also conceive 
schematically of process, i.e. without having any specific process in mind. In other words, 
there is such a thing as a PROCESS image schema, or rather an image-schematic scanning 
operation, which comprises the common underlying basis of all processual concepts. The 
idea may be illustrated through Langacker’s (1987a) notion of processual profiles, which 
constitute the defining characteristic of verbs. Recall that verbs are understood as such by a 
sequential scanning operation which all of them have in common. (Sequential scannings 
contrast with summary scannings in that phase changes of a process are imagined in quasi-
real time and like a movie clip.) The grammatical recognition of a verb qua verb elicits a 
sequential scanning operation. In Langacker’s analyses of words and clauses sequential 
scanning is usually of a particular kind, e.g. we scan the process of a trajector object 
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approaching or entering a landmark, the falling or climbing, moving around or parallel to a 
landmark, and so on.  
    In the case of canonical verbs the skeletal schema is what Langacker (1987a) calls an 
elaboration site (E-site). An E-site is defined as the analogous locus of a highly schematic 
image on which further imagistic details have to be superimposed through steps of gradual 
specification, which shapes a detailed image defining a particular scene. In a typical 
sentence each word adds a further imagistic aspect to the mental picture until it is as specific 
as intended by the speaker. An analogy is an artist who starts with a broad sketch, then 
works out the contours, and finally adds the more fine-grained details, all on the same 
sketchpad. For word types this simply means that the semantic features of the word add 
detail structure within the basic type of scanning. Depending on a given verb’s semantic 
meaning, a particular kind of movement or landmark-trajector relation is evoked. 
    The Buddhist metaphors reported by Collins employ rich images such as water as a 
vehicle. On the other hand image schemas can also occur in pure abstraction, i.e. not as 
elaboration sites.123 We can schematically abstract the scanning operation from any 
particular instance. For example, the verb schema can occur without elaborating it in detail. 
Langacker mentions highly schematized images in the case of auxiliary verbs like be and 
have and do. If total abstraction is performed we get the most generic image schema for 
PROCESS, a maximally schematized frame devoid of particulars. What is the cognitive 
rationale for abstracting away from all particular processes? The answer is simple: For 
expressing all possible processes through a single generic image, i.e. the principle of 
process, this maximally schematic representation is needed. As cosmological idea the 
feature of processuality must, of necessity, subsume all possible processes in a single 
image. The following diagram represents the abstract schema of process or change. The 
wavy arrow stands for constant alteration of circumstances through the phases. 
 
                                                 
123 E-sites shed light on my previous distinction of thought styles based on concretized and such 
based on purely schematic thought (ch.5, 7). Do people think of the skeletal structures of a generic 
schema such as PROCESS as E-sites needing additional detail or don’t they recognize this as 
necessity? This notwithstanding, a certain difference between ontological abstraction and 
mathematical abstraction should be clear. In the mathematical abstraction of conceptualizing a set no 
noticeable rich image content is present. To mathematicians it is a primary virtue not to think in terms 
of apples and oranges but in purely formal terms of x and y. Ontological abstraction, on the other 
hand, may preserve the phenomenal reality of everyday perception and its wealth of detail. However, 
such abstraction claims that this reality is to a certain degree illusionary or secondary compared to a 
more schematic image of reality behind it. For instance, in speaking of Being as such, the generic 
structure of process can be assigned a value as the actual reality behind the superficial concretion. 
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It may be noted in a short aside that more elaborate versions of this schema are in wide 
circulation, such as SELF-INITIATED MOTION. This schema is for example characteristic of 
animism. It includes the image of a volitional agent, and thus a FORCE schema of some sort 
that is superimposed on the PROCESS schema. Conceptual models of the self being either 
agent or patient (or both) of this general process are very common, because cultures 
invariably conceptualize the human role in the general process of reality. 
    We have now seen how reality may be conceptualized as fundamentally processual in an 
image-schematic way. The further analysis will pursue the question of how the PROCESS 
schema forms a part of complex schemas. A prerequisite is the characterization of two other 
fundamental schemas that may frequently form a compound with process: PATTERN and 
SYSTEM. 
 
THE STRUCTURE IMAGE SCHEMA 
The STRUCTURE image schema, which I alternatively also designate as PATTERN, has already 
been introduced in the above treatment of Karma in this chapter. I characterized Karma as a 
cognitive model of the preservation of essence imbued with structure. The schema arises 
from the recognition that different types of patterns have something in common, namely that 
they are structured. Structure is nothing concrete, but a certain schematic kind of 
arrangement of elements. The structure image schema can be made to fit a wide variety of 
specific examples with the general traits of discreteness and a repetition of distance, angle, 
surface, rhythm, pitch, etc. It can either characterize a region with a diffuse extension (a) or 
have a more clear-cut boundary (b):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    a     b 
time 
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THE SYSTEMS IMAGE SCHEMA 
Another spatialized schema is a more complex extension of the basic concept that 
something has a structure: the image-schematic notion of a system (cf. the complex systems 
schema suggested by Kövecses 2000: 206). Before I enter into a description of it, note that 
this schema need not be static in any way, since the notion of FLOW may be easily 
superimposed on it. In a systematical overview, the concept of system includes the following 
aspects: 
(1) There is a complex configuration, represented by a STRUCTURE image schema. As 
noted before, the structure is not of any specific kind, but the generic property of 
structure. 
(2) This structure may or may not be bounded by a CONTAINER. In other words, the 
structure may be imagined as stretching infinitely or being only the property of a profiled 
local region that is embedded in a backdrop of other cognitive imagery. We might note 
that if the schema is a local profile that contrasts with a background of different 
properties, the effect is much the same as imagining a rigid container boundary. The 
difference may be that the profiling operation is given stronger emphasis in the latter 
case.  
(3) The structure has PARTS. It is worth emphasizing that in the abstract system schema 
the parts need not have concrete shape or number. The parts themselves may again be 
seen as possessing further internal structure (CONTAINER) or be amorphous. 
(4) In a full-scale systems image the parts interact with each another, again in an 
unspecified fashion. This is best represented by LINK schemas or, more specifically, by 
CONDUIT schemas. Substance, information, energy, or whatever else is imagined to be 
exchanged passes through the conduits. 
(5) The systematic linkage of parts constitutes a whole, a system, which has an overall 
condition. This condition may be one of homeostasis (conceptualized by the BALANCE 
schema) or relationships of output/input (CONDUIT exchanges between this and other 
CONTAINER systems). Finally, the system may also be embedded in a figure-ground 
relationship (FORCES, PARTS, etc. crossing the CONTAINER boundary to the outside) and in 
this way entertain ecological relations.  
 
Here are two graphic images of a systems schema. The first of the two graphs emphasizes 
complexity and the second being more schematic one the exchanges along the conduits: 
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Systemic and processual images have a strong mutual affinity. I argue that the two crucial 
aspects of non-substantialistic ontologies are flow and interrelation. Many examples show 
how the systems schema of interrelation is dynamized and lends itself to the 
conceptualization of processual ontologies.  
    The following examples highlight the generic similarities between a number of thought 
systems, which have a processualist and systemic view of reality as common denominator. 
The outstanding work of Linda Olds (1989, 1991, 1992a) pursues this agenda with 
determination.124 She strives to describe the processual common ground between different 
world-views of Eastern and (modern) Western origin. In order to elaborate the above 
assertions about the systems schema and its function, Olds’ (1991) work on Chinese 
metaphors of interrelatedness may serve as an example. She examines some important 
points of convergence in the philosophy of Daoism, (Neo-)Confucianism, and a strand of 
Buddhist thought called Hua-Yen. Though offering a wealth of different views, these 
philosophies can be seen as related to one another, especially when contrasted to any kind 
of transcendental metaphysics building on a hierarchical view of reality, and in particular the 
‘Great Chain of Being’, as it has been called by proponents of perennial philosophy in 
Platonic, Neo-Platonic, Christian, Hindu, and Sufi philosophy. At least for purposes of large-
scale comparison between cultures and religions it seems permissible to contrast thought 
styles grounded in some variety of the systems schema with such that rest on concepts of a 
distant Godhead or Ultimate Source from which everything else on the lower levels of being 
emanates. In marked contradistinction to the latter, the systems view of reality offers a 
powerful immanental ontology. As such it avoids the disparagement of the material world as 
distant from the sacred. Hereby a model of the secular as sacred and universally immanent 
                                                 
124 Similarly, Pepper (1942) subsumed this type of world-principle under what he called the root 
metaphor of ‘Organicism’ in Western philosophy. 
two versions of the systems schema 
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transcendence is created. For example, a general characteristic of Chinese world-view 
metaphors is that they stress polarity as a fundamental ontological dynamic. By viewing all 
opposites as complementary and interrelated, any kind of mutually exclusive dualism of 
either/or, so characteristic of ‘Great Chain of Being’ philosophies, is avoided. The practical 
cultural implications of this are wide-ranging. The neglect or denigration of the material, 
bodily, natural, and, by association, the feminine is absent or at least less pronounced.  
    The metaphors central to Chinese cosmology refer to organic patterns and processes 
representing an ontology of events, not of substances. In particular Daoism places a strong 
emphasis on living in ‘harmonious change’ in a universe that is a single life process. Again, 
this is captured in frequent linguistic metaphors of flux and process, such as the transforming 
qualities of water. Even where the most widely used translations might suggest substance to 
Western thinking the terms in question are best pictured as dynamic processes. This is the 
case for the so-called Five Elements or Five Phases of Chinese cosmology. To take an 
example, Hsu (1999) argues that the element called Wood is best understood as a multivocal 
image schema that we might refer to as FLEXIBLE BENDING. The central association of Wood 
in traditional Chinese philosophy and medicine is that of a process, not that of wood as a 
substance. 
    Similar observations are necessary concerning other terms. The notions Tien (‘Heaven’) 
and Dao (‘Path’) are best understood as immanental and all-pervasive causal matrix or as 
holographic field. When Chinese philosophers talk of the body they tend to describe it not as 
an individuated container but as a holistically embedded process. Similarly, the mind is a 
more conscious level of the refined sensitivity inherent in the entire universe. The mind is, 
then, a natural process emerging ‘with a sufficiently high degree of pattern’ (Incidentally, a 
similar view has emerged in recent cognitive science. See for example Varela et al. [1991] on 
the ‘emergence view’ of consciousness in cognitive science.) Finally, the individual and 
society are not dichotomized, for the individual is nothing but a creative focus of excellence 
(te) or an individuating disposition within the social-cum-natural Dao of the whole (Olds 
1991). 
    Likewise, the Neo-Confucian core-concepts of li (‘pattern’) and qi (‘matter-energy’) should 
not be misread to promote a substantialistic view. Li and qi are inextricably intertwined and 
mutually presuppose one another. They emanate from one noumenon as its two principles of 
expression. As a more detailed analysis in chapter 10 will show, they elicit a stereoscopic 
superimposition of two images, in which the manifest and the dynamic aspects of reality are 
both represented in one. 
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BUDDHIST IMAGERY (2): CO-DEPENDENT ARISING 
Radical processualism is perhaps best exemplified by the doctrine of co-dependent arising in 
Buddhism, which centers on the notion of sunyata (‘emptiness’). This is the central 
ontological tenet of the school of Madhyamika, the Buddhist middle way, exemplified by the 
Indian scholar Nagarjuna of the second century A.D. According to this philosophical school 
and the meditative techniques espouses by it, all entities that we perceive as bounded and 
stable in everyday consciousness are, on deeper examination, empty of independent 
existence. All existing things are causally interconnected. Hence, the separation of subject 
and object in perception and thought is but an illusion, as our sense of self must 
consequently be.125 
    We may call this theory a process ontology, since the sovereignty of substantial entities is 
categorically denied, or rather exposed as an illusion. No deeper reality can be attributed 
outside the ever-changing flux. This reminds of a Western cousin of mystical processualism, 
Heraclitus, who is famous for saying that one never steps into the same river twice. 
Buddhism is even more radical here: I, who steps into the river, am never the same twice; 
indeed the entity of ‘I’ has no actual existence at all, except from a superficial and exterior 
viewpoint. The object- and subjectless flux is the primary reality, and only by virtue of a bad, 
but deeply ingrained habit the illusion of subject-object and of stable identities arises. Only by 
‘grasping’, which is the habitual response to suffering so typical of the inescapably deficient 
and woeful human condition, the objectifying consciousness gives rise to the illusion of 
identities. The cure for this state of affairs is awareness in everyday life and in meditative 
practice.  
    Note that here the flow schema is employed to slightly different ends than in our first 
example from Theravâda Buddhist imagery, although the two are compatible. There the main 
emphasis of the imagery was to mark flow as the unceasing principle of reality and suffering 
as the motor of this flow. Here the emphasis is on the denial of the ultimate existence of 
independent subjects and objects, because everything perceived at a given moment is 
represented as connected. There the cognitive operation was a sequential (diachronic) 
scanning to represent the cyclic or unceasing fundamental motion. Here the focus tends to 
be on the states of affairs in the word at a given moment in time and on the interrelatedness 
of everything at that moment. Eventually, however, the two aspects collapse into one with the 
                                                 
125 In order to do justice to Buddhism, especially the more radical schools of Mahayana, of which Chan 
(Japanese: Zen) may be said to be the most extreme, their philosophy attempts no positive description of ultimate 
reality in the ordinary sense. This is a characterizing trait of all brands of mystical practices. If they pursue their 
goals by imparting representations to their pupils, they ultimately aim at breaking the cognitive processes of 
everyday life. Hence, the representations in question here are part of a ‘negative theology’, only stating which of 
our ordinary expectations are at fault and perhaps offering some theoretical ladders for purposes of illustration, 
which can be safely cast away after climbing. 
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awareness of time as an illusion: The causal chain linking yesterday, today, and tomorrow is 
the same causal relation obtaining between you, me, and all other living and inanimate 
entities. 
    We are now interested in the question of how such a processual view can be conceptually 
represented. A first observation is that no in any way concrete view of process is adequate 
for understanding the central ontological tenet of Madhyamika Buddhism. We need a 
concept of process per se, where everything is linked with everything else, a purely 
schematic concept without any concrete content. Such a concept was described above and 
called the PROCESS image schema. 
    The notion of co-dependent arising articulates the belief that all things and beings are 
empty of self-existence. In that all things co-dependently arise, nothing is separate of 
anything else; nothing has a separate identity that would in any sense be unchanging or 
permanent. Instead, there is continuous flow of a fundamentally interconnected world. This 
ontological key-axiom of Buddhism rests on an abstract image schematic representation 
making use both of the systems and of the causality schema, with the causal FORCE schema 
superimposed on the LINK schemas within the system. It is emphasized in this notion that 
everything is connected to everything else in a systemic fashion and that universal causal 
relationships obtain. Another aspect of the idea of co-dependent arising is the schema of 
CONTINUOUS FLOW. The causal force process described above is one of continuous intensity 
in time. Thus the highly complex Buddhist notion of co-dependent arising combines the 
SYSTEMS image schema and the CONTINUOUS FLOW schema. 
    Why can it make sense to talk of emptiness? This takes us back to the above distinction 
between purely schematic structures and schematic structures understood as elaboration 
sites that need additional detail. We can say that this conceptual distinction is quite 
straightforwardly reflected in the opposition between the everyday style of thought and an 
enlightened style of thought in Buddhist theory. If we adopt Langacker’s cognitive 
terminology for describing Buddhist thought it seems clear that the objective is to imagine the 
PROCESS schema in itself without making it into an elaboration site. Or rather, while we are 
aware that everyday cognition does in fact elaborate the details in every concrete act we 
perform, we are told to emphasize the processual nature of the act and not its ‘suchness’ as 
a specific act. 
    Let us see how we might come to capture the universe, or at least its fundamental 
principle, in a single image. This fundament is a principle of causality. The difficulty is that 
whenever we try to imagine a concrete causal connection in a rich image it will be between a 
limited number of objects. Here however we are invited to think of reality as the universal 
causal interrelation of all that exists and to surpass the rich image level. The universe as a 
whole and all its parts at various levels of macroscopy can only be imagined abstractly. As so 
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often, people may resort to two imagistic strategies to imagine this. They may start out with a 
rich image of some sort, such as the globe, and move in a mental journey, either way, into 
the micro level of continents, countries, cities, people, etc., or into the macro level of the 
stars, extending into never-ending reaches. In doing so, the mind can imagine how all these 
levels are connected, as well as how all the objects on a single level are connected. In order 
to arrive at such a representation, schemas of CAUSAL LINKS have to be superimposed on the 
rich images at each level, indeed a whole network of them. The second, more sophisticated 
strategy adds much the same causal structure, but in a purely abstract fashion, i.e. without 
rich images as starting point.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIAGRAM A: co-dependent arising as momentary one-shot picture of a co-dependent functional system 
(SYSTEMS schema) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIAGRAM B: co-dependent arising as a transition between phases of such functional systems 
 
9. Space logic in anthropology (6): Key concepts, experiential blends, and ritual 
In this final section I am concerned with how cultural key concepts are learned through 
discourse, everyday experience, and ritual. All of the issues include creative blends that 
shape new concepts by virtue of contiguity. However, I will not present the argument in terms 
of blending theory. Instead I will propose a family of co-signatures assisting the creation of 
novel concepts in the heads of novices (which, however, are complementary to blending). 
time 
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The presented co-signatures are similar to a large measure, because they all pertain to the 
context-guided creation of novel metonymies. They relate to three different fields of 
cognition, namely discourse (conceptual metonymy), sensory experience (experiential or 
perceptual metonymy), and ritual as a combination of the previous two. Let me give you a 
short flavor of the ideas presented in more detail below: 
(1) Cultural key concepts are spatialized images of central nodes that link up 
surrounding concepts. There may be a general nodal co-signature of this for learning 
not fully understood but recognized key concepts. This is a conceptual metonymy, i.e. 
conceptual data put together through linkage in discourse. 
(2) Experiential metonymies, i.e. sensory data experienced together, may constitute a 
concept defining setting, in a way that a concept’s meaning is given through an 
archetypal setting. Cultural concepts are shaped through the sense impressions 
brought together in these settings. I propose that experiential settings may elicit 
mental co-signatures that assist the linkage of features into a culturally typical feature 
bundle. 
(3) A theory of ritual co-signatures is proposed as an extension of this: In a first step 
contiguous experiential features are united in a novel blend (this is an experiential 
metonymy again). Then they are reified and thus given conceptual permanence. In a 
further step the blend radiates outwards to their domains of origin and create a sense 
of holism by making the entire domains appear more contiguous. 
 
It should be noted that all of the following ideas are, by and large, an extension of a 
hypothesis suggested in passing by Lakoff (1987: 286). For what Lakoff calls ‘feature 
bundles’ he hypothesizes a generic schema: 
 
“A feature bundle is a collection of properties. The elements in the ontology are properties. 
Structurally, the bundle is characterized by a CONTAINER schema, where the properties are inside the 
container. Classical categories can be represented by feature bundles.” 
 
Lakoff’s use of the word ‘bundle’ suggest that he was also thinking of features being linked 
apart from being included in one space, although he does not mention the LINK schema.  
    I will propose a co-signature here, which can function as a generic schema for feature 
bundles and which adds further elements. In a nutshell, the idea is that (1) LINKS within the 
container region can form a hub-like structures that promotes some parts to the status of 
governing concepts, (2) the CENTER-PERIPHERY schema comes in to suggest the importance 
of key concepts, and (3) FORCE vectors to the center arise when the key term recruits 
information from surrounding concepts. 
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KEY CONCEPTS AS NODAL STRUCTURES  
It is a commonplace assumption among culture theorists that many cultures have key 
concepts, which organize a substantial portion of the conceptual world shared by a 
community. In what follows I propose that a node-like co-signature helps people understand 
what key concepts are. This is by and large a restatement of Deane’s (1996) theory of head 
structures in grammar. It will be remembered from chapter 8 that Deane analyzed conceptual 
structures at the sentence level through the LINK and CENTER-PERIPHERY schemas. According 
to this, grammatical heads are like the hubs of an airport that link all other parts, so that the 
parts at the spokes can only be co-activated by passing through the center. Here I propose 
to extend this idea to whole conceptual systems, which may have corresponding head 
structures for any cultural key concept and an expectational co-signature that assists 
acquiring new key concepts. I will also propose that nodal images create abstract ideas of 
holism and underlie philosophical theory-concepts such as “interrelatedness”. 
    It is puzzling that key concepts are a recognized fundament of thought systems and can at 
the same time be often remarkably evanescent and esoteric as to their exact referent. How is 
this possible? Cua (1982: 256) presents an interesting analysis from Chinese philosophy that 
is a good point of entry for my argument. Cua analyzes a set of philosophical quasi-identity 
expressions around an abstract notion and exemplifies these by an example from Neo-
Confucian philosophy. The Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yang-ming used the notion of 
Dao as unifying perspective, as node of a series of quasi-identity statements such as “Dao is 
jen” (humanity), “Dao is li” (reason), and “Dao is tien” (Heaven). Taking all the statements 
together, it is notable that multiple equivalences are constructed here, while the central point 
of intersection, namely Dao, remains undefined in itself. At the same time that it remains a 
multivocal and perhaps vague notion, Dao is made an integrative key concept. Of course, we 
get clues about what there is to Dao by blending the attributes of humanity, reason, and 
Heaven, although this may involve difficulties and even paradoxes. Bear in mind, however, 
that I want to draw attention not to the content of this blend but to the structural idea that 
such multiple equivalences create. My emphasis here is less on how the equivalences 
specify the substance of the central concept through the specific ‘load’ of converging multiple 
vectors. The basic message of connectedness is relatively independent of the concrete 
meaning of the terms. Even if we had only a faint idea what concepts like humanity, reason, 
and Heaven actually mean, the set of concentric pointers to a core notion would stir up a feel 
of overarching unity. I will therefore leave the conceptual content aside and look at the 
spatialized tool, the abstract co-signature, responsible for this effect. 
    My hypothesis is that key concepts are guided by a nodal co-signature, which is built from 
the LINK and the CENTER-PERIPHERY image schemas, perhaps with a directional FORCE image 
thrown in. A nodal co-signature is evoked through predications of equivalence as in the Dao 
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example. I propose that the nodal structure is constitutive of the understanding that these 
swirling and vaguely linked ideas and emotions are (1) systematically related, (2) have a 
governing core notion, (3) and belong to a whole. Interestingly, an imagistically highly explicit 
version of this can be found in Plotinus’ theology, who claims that God, in his elusive 
uniqueness, is related to the multiplicity of intelligible ideas as a center that draws together 
the radii as one. The world soul holds the same center position as an attractor in relation to 
the individual souls, and the individual soul to the various activities in the body (cf. Arnheim 
1969: 287). It is notable that the same image is employed for three different referents here 
(God, world soul, individual soul), so that this is an obvious case of a generic schema, 
(although I would not speak of a real co-signature outside folk-models). A mental image 
based on LINK, CENTER-PERIPHERY, and directed FORCE vectors might look like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incidentally, we have here an inversion of the notion of radial concepts in categorization 
prototypes as proposed by Lakoff (1987). (The radial concept is, of course, one of the most 
frequent co-signatures of all, since it is involved in the comprehension of all non-classical 
categories.) Lakoff proposes that the prototypes are at the center of a category and less 
typical members are at the periphery. Let us briefly compare my idea to Lakoff’s notion: The 
difference is that in radial concepts there is a well-known center of the model with a 
prototypical value, from which strands emerge into peripheral space, whereas in nodal 
structures the center is abstract and immaterial at first. What radial and nodal categories 
have in common is that the physiologically preformed understanding – omnipresent in human 
experience with systems – of IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL. A possible corollary is that spatially 
central is also ontologically central, i.e. of a particularly high reality status, of a best or most 
important concept. A second and related consequence is that nodal connectives are 
epistemologically central by reducing complexity and providing a Gestalt-like access to a 
multifaceted reality, which is otherwise hard to grasp as one. 
    In this the nodal schema is strikingly similar to the notion of ‘summarizing’ symbol, which 
Sherry Ortner introduces in her article On Key Symbols (1973) in contrast to ‘elaborating’ 
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symbols. For our purposes it will suffice to recapitulate Ortner’s characterization of the 
former:  
 
“Summarizing symbols, first, are those symbols which are seen as summing up, expressing, 
representing for the participants in an emotionally powerful and relatively undifferentiated way, what 
the system means to them. This category is essentially the category of sacred symbols in the broadest 
sense, and include all those items which are objects of reverence and/or catalysts of emotion – the 
flag, the cross, the churinga, the forked stick, the motorcycle [the film Easy Rider had just been 
released when the article was published, M.K.], etc.” (p. 1339/40) 
 
It seems that summarizing symbols can be arbitrary symbols standing for a conglomerate of 
ideas and feelings. They can even be devoid of any ‘meaning’ in themselves. Their meaning 
emerges through the relation to a surrounding mass of ideas that it ties together. In other 
words, they are a symbol standing for the system as a whole, and their purpose is to convey 
wholeness. As was the case in the example taken from Confucianist social ethics, Ortner 
stresses that such a summarizing symbol creates a unifying perspective. What could the 
image of togetherness look like? I propose that it highlights the fact of the surrounding ideas 
belonging to a shared space (a group) and thus to a unique entity: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I believe that Ortner had much the same thing in mind that I am trying to explain here in 
terms of imagery. Most importantly, in both Ortner’s summarizing symbols and my nodal co-
signatures the core of the node can remain conceptually vague or allow multiple 
associations. What is typical for a nodal co-signature is that the node is conceptually less 
specific than the surrounding concepts. These are more experientially or conceptually 
familiar. The notion of Dao is thus a high-level notion that cannot be easily made sense of 
independently, i.e. without a background of linked ideas. Some knowledge of the surrounding 
concepts is a precondition for understanding the center. If this is correct, there is some 
directionality in the LINK schemas (I depicted them as pointers above). Conversely, the node 
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is something like a FORCE ATTRACTOR. It constitutes a center of informational gravitation, i.e. 
something that needs to be explained by other concepts.126 Conversely, the adding of 
information into a node may be imagined as directed FORCE vectors. By virtue of all this, 
nodals may function as learning guides, so that the nodal position only start as an empty 
token, which is then fleshed out by degrees with qualia from the surrounding concepts. The 
structural idea is there right away, and the content comes later. 
   A few further words about the cultural importance of nodal co-signatures should be said. 
An important function may be to intimate the notion of wholeness.127 People are faced with 
the problem that the experiences within their culture stand, at best, in a loose family 
relationship. Everything is linked to many other things in many relevant respects. The 
problem is that nothing is experientially linked to everything, which increases the peril of 
worldview-fragmentation. If everything is to be related to everything else, people may be 
aided by a schema that abstractly represents the belief in interconnectedness. The nodal co-
signature lends itself to such an abstract representation, with the key concepts at the node 
becoming exemplars of the idea of culture as an integrated whole. Thus the general co-
signature linked up with an exemplar such as Dao makes it easier to think that the cultural 
landscape of thought possesses a common ground. 
    Why this should be so can be explained through the Gestalt properties of the co-signature, 
which allows conceptualizing several notions in a global, simultaneous, and quick way. In the 
Dao example, the form of linguistic presentation is the superimposition of several highly 
complex terms, rich in associative power, perhaps with a ring of wholeness to each one itself. 
The co-signature, evoked through equivalence statements, then guides the coupling of the 
content into an overall structure. In other words, a cluster of propositional meaning-realms, 
each represented by a container-like region is compacted into a novel Gestalt whole 
rendering the parts accessible simultaneously. I submit that a memorization of the nodal 
Gestalt is in great part responsible for the feeling of holism. At the same time a whole 
semantic field of other governing notions comes to mind, since the node acts as a common 
                                                 
126 That the basic message lies in the mode of presentation of the ideas is not to deny that the 
subsequent decoding of the content does in its turn yield a vast array of information. Depending on our 
strategic interest we can account for Cua’s example in two ways: either as a blend of conceptual 
content from better-known surrounding concepts or as an entity defined by its structural position in a 
network, such as a nodal connective. However, most often content and co-signature work together. 
Thus a nodal co-signature guides what Fauconnier and Turner (1995) call a conceptual blend. 
127 As would be the case with any kind of complex network image, the cluster around the node itself 
evokes wholeness. Our example merges another feature with this: The complex notion gives rise to 
the idea of a focal point at the same time. The nodes and their linguistic token, such as Dao, are the 
point where a multitude of strands central to a worldview meet. 
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hub. Even though few utterances outside philosophy invoke obvious equivalences like the 
Dao example, I will show below that experiential contiguity along similar lines plays a great 
role in rituals of all kinds. 
 
THREE USES OF THE NODAL CO-SIGNATURE 
Let us now broaden the scope of our inquiry beyond obvious equivalence predications in 
discourse, such as the Dao example. I submit that the nodal co-signature altogether 
encompasses at least three important applications: (1) They are attached to not fully 
understood concepts, whose importance and centrality, however, is already recognized by 
learners. (2) Nodal co-signatures structure so-called ‘floating signifiers’, i.e. words and 
concepts whose salience, again, is recognized, but whose content is context-dependent. (3) 
The nodal schema can constitute the image schema linked to abstract words such as 
“wholeness”, in which case it is less a co-signature guiding another process than an 
autonomous concept. 
    First, in learning new abstract key-concepts, nodal co-signatures can provide some initial 
understanding before the concept becomes fully fleshed out by experience. We may surmise 
that it generally plays an important role in learning new concepts. Some developmental 
literature shows that we should not dismiss the role of linguistic labels in conceptual 
unification out of hand (cf. Bowerman 1973). Claudia Strauss and Naomi Quinn (1997: 78) 
apply roughly the same idea to cultural key concepts: 
 
“Another form of cultural learning – an extremely important one – proceeds by naming an abstract 
entity, e.g. honor or love, that learners can then learn to identify and acquire a fuller knowledge of 
experientially.”  
 
According to this view, children start from a vague, not yet understood linguistic label infused 
with the appreciation that it designates something of high importance. A concept such as 
honor is actually represented as culturally integrative before it is experienced in all facets. 
While Strauss and Quinn remain vague with regard to the representations this involves, my 
theory of co-signatures clarifies this. If a wide-spread learning default for new and complex 
notions that are culturally endowed with an aura does indeed exist, the nodal co-signature is 
a plausible way of representing this half-knowledge by virtue of IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL. Here 
learners have to gradually comb their cultural experience for the appropriate radially placed 
concepts that are then understood as pointing to the node’s meaning. That is, the specific 
details are gradually fit into the co-signature, which is thus enriched with content.128 The 
                                                 
128 All this makes sense granted that there is more to concept learning than experiential configurations 
formed through motor schemas, so that children only have to be told the appropriate name for their 
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nodal default can provide guidelines for integrating information whenever people fail to 
memorize the original setting with all the aspects present, but retain an abstract 
representation that the features somehow belong together. In this way the idea of 
relatedness can remain even where the experiential images that gave rise to the idea have 
been forgotten. If all this is correct, the experiential input fills out the slots specified by a 
nodal structure. That need not necessarily mean that ready-made radial containers are 
somewhere out there in the conceptual landscape waiting to be filled out for a specific 
domain. What it might mean is that there is a general predisposition to construct nodals and 
thus key concepts, once triggers are present that give a concept the aura of importance. 
   An interesting hypothesis related to the nodal co-signature is this: A single word applied 
across many contexts may promote blending these into a single concept that is more than an 
ad hoc metaphor but less than total identity. In making diverse experiences, such as 
children’s play and social games or sports and war into a social category of one kind, a 
partial integration can be accomplished by assigning a shared term to different experiences. 
(In the spatial co-signature this word is the central region of the nodal schema.) For example, 
describing sports in terms of war may not be strictly a metaphor, in which a sense of domain 
separation is strong. It can be more of a conceptual conflation through a shared key-word 
such as ‘fighting’, despite the understanding that they are not exactly identical. The nodal co-
signature explains both aspects: The semi-permanence of the conceptual blend lies in the 
awareness that a common node such as the word ‘fighting’ exists between radially placed 
concepts such as war and sports. The understanding of non-identity lies in the potential 
insight that the radially placed concepts hold separate spaces and are mediated into unity by 
a third concept only. 
    Furthermore, what has been called ‘floating signifiers’ by Lévi-Strauss (1966) can be 
accurately explained by co-signatures. As defined in chapter 2, floating signifiers are rough-
hewn basic ideas which do not have one single fixed meaning or context, but whose 
relevance and salience is accepted. In effect, this is a meta-representation (cf. Sperber 1996: 
72f) that a concept is multiply important, although its meaning is subject to shifts from one 
situation to another. I propose that this meta-representation is in fact contained in imagery 
based on the CENTER-PERIPHERY schema and in the fact that high schematicity is involved. In 
the nodal co-signature people associate the multiply signifying word with the node. If I am 
correct, this evokes two pieces of information: (1) IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL, and (2) that there 
                                                                                                                                                        
well-formed model one fine day. Rather, the search of the concept for a matching experience and the 
search of several experiences for a uniting concept can be convergent learning procedures. Perhaps 
they are combined in a dialectical process of incremental specification. Which principle is stronger, 
words seeking out experiential matches, or the other way around, is the subject matter of good 
ethnography and detailed developmental psychology. 
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are multiple instantiations of this centrality, because the image is fleshed out only ad hoc but 
is not associated with a permanent rich image. 
    A final argument is that nodals can also function in isolation, in a way that no content is 
inserted into what otherwise is an imagistic co-signature for subtasks. Such a reified image 
can represent the concept of INTERRELATEDNESS. Dao may be a good example, provided the 
word is taken as an abstract term and treated more independently of surrounding concepts. 
Again, the difference between a co-signature relating contents and a purely abstract notion 
independent of content is gradual. 
    At least two considerations give credit to my suggestion of a nodal co-signature. First, this 
approach gives more depth to theories of mystery such as Blumenberg’s (1996) or Sperber’s 
(1996). They explain conceptual opacity, especially in domains such as religion, in terms of 
polysemous and bendable structures. My theory explains what these multi-purpose frames 
look like cognitively. In my view, the high schematicity (i.e. the lack of imagistic detail) 
inherent in the co-signature may endow a representation with mystery, because concrete 
detail is lacking. Opacity issues from high schematicity, while resolving opacity means 
fleshing out new imagistic details.  
    Second, the nodal co-signature explains the extremely widespread folk-theories of word 
essence (cf. Lakoff and Turner 1989: 108, Radden and Kövecses 1999: 23f). Theories of 
word essence are most often an entailment of the metaphor WORDS ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS 
(Reddy 1979). Word essence refers to the folk-belief (also shared by many scientists) that a 
word stands for an object-like and permanent thing, even if we are not yet in a position to 
fully specify its meaning. Thus discussants are often seen quarreling about a concept’s true 
meaning, although they admit that they fail to understand it sufficiently, and thus act on the 
assumption that meaning is a fixed given in a Nietzschean ‘Hinterwelt’. Words are assumed 
to have an essence, which is there for discovering and must preexist in a God’s eye view. 
This would also nicely explain floating signifiers, which presumably involve a folk-
representation of the signifier’s essence. I assume it does so when the concept behind the 
recurrent word is identified as being one and the same. This has the advantage that a folk-
theory of polysemy is not needed.129 
                                                 
129 We can merge my earlier ideas on essence with the nodal model here: Recall that I claimed that 
the cognitive understanding of the essence (i.e. abstract SAMENESS) is based on the idea of a 
physically homogeneous substance. However, this idea is image-schematically abstracted. Through 
abstraction we get a mental region construed as homogeneous and thus yielding – in my terminology 
– a ‘realm’. This realm now quite simply sits at the center of a nodal structure. (The link-like pointers 
converging on the node stand for the idea that the yet unknown essence can be discovered through 
blending qualia at the node.) My point here is that both the essence and the nodal model can be 
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    The possibilities inherent in the nodal schema are not exhausted yet. I propose that it can 
also assist in incorporating various atoms of sensory impressions into a single unique 
concept. Therefore, instead of discourse-based blends, we now have an experiential blend. 
Impressions brought together in a context make for the effectiveness of ritual in creating new 
and powerful concepts. Let us return to an example from Bradd Shore’s (1989, 1991) work 
detailed in chapter 4. Recall his argument that much cultural knowledge comes to children in 
a highly organized experiential fashion long before a conceptual theory, a word, or even a 
tacit concept is acquired, such as the Polynesian concept of mana and the related concept of 
rank that are learned through body postures. In addition, Shore (1991: 19) speaks of 
culturally shaped ‘sensory metonymies’. High rank in Samoa is equated with a series of 
physical referents, namely shiny skin, light complexion, large size, resting posture, and 
spatial centrality. My suggestion is that nodals may form the co-functional imagery scaffold of 
these and other sensory inputs, making them an integrated concept. Of course, sensory 
metonymies on their own require no co-signatures to be understood as linked. What makes a 
co-signature likely in our example is the fact that a core concept, namely rank, is linked up 
with the experiential metonymy. As was also proposed in chapter 4, the conceptual field 
including mana and tapu also flows into the junction of all these sensory referents. 
    What all this boils down to is this: The nodal co-signature is the mental schema for 
concept defining settings of all kinds. The schematic structure may be used whenever 
different sensory stimuli are orchestrated together to conventionalize a concept through their 
co-presence. The setting that defines a concept’s meaning can either be a perceived real 
world situation (as in the presence of a powerful chief), or a mental scene in which 
conceptual images of stimuli are imagined together. 
    I maintain that the nodal co-signature may apply wherever a concept is shaped through 
experiential or conceptual metonymy that is blended through a cultural setting. This may be 
as true for more mundane concepts as it is for cultural key concepts. Possibly, the nodal co-
signature is an inherent part of how metonymies of all kinds are being processed. 
 
RITUAL SETTINGS AS ENACTED EXPERIENTIAL BLENDS THAT RADIATE OUTWARDS 
Imagery theory offers fascinating possibilities of understanding the integrative and creative 
nature of ritual, and indeed of social cognition in general. Mark Turner (1999) draws attention 
to several recent publications on the role of blending for making humans what they are. 
Bridging domain gaps is important in art and science, in fact in any creative activity. Culture 
as a cognitive phenomenon, i.e. cultural creativity in reshaping both things and mental 
representations, arises from conceptual reconfigurations of things that do not occur together 
                                                                                                                                                        
explained through abstract co-signatures. This explains how these two can be put together – in the 
imagery model they simply form a new Gestalt. 
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in immediate perception. In other words, culture itself is only possible because the human 
mind performs blends. While this fact is indicative of human cognition in general, it is most 
conspicuous in ritual. I will therefore base the following sketch of how new cross-domain 
relations are forged on a discussion of ritual. However, I will not focus on the selectivity of 
mappings that blending theorists so ingenuously demonstrate, but on a general and quite 
simple fact they seldom emphasize, namely that blends are, especially in the case of 
cosmological and religious rituals, meant to rebound and carry the blend into the various 
larger domains symbolically merged in them. 
    Our hypothesis that mental regions are perceived as analogous to spatial regions has 
significant consequences for the understanding of ritual. I propose that a very significant 
function of many or even most rituals is to forge cross-domain relations in the mind that do 
not exist outside the ritual. Specifically, the argument goes that an experiential metonymy of 
artifacts and actors can lead to a conceptual metonymy of their entire domains and give rise 
to holistic images through this. Cross-domain relations are forged by enacting a social setting 
(a real space), which is at the same time a mental blend (a novel conceptual space). In what 
follows, I will suggest a co-signature to be responsible for such blends. 
    What is ritual, what its cognitive function? Rituals are creative socio-cognitive 
orchestrations that shape a shared reality through the evocation of images. Two major 
aspects of ritual are (1) contiguity in a physical space and (2) a mental blend of conceptual 
content from the tokens united in physical space. As to contiguity relations, all of the 
following elements enumerated in Blank’s (1996) work on metonymy are present in ritual 
arrangements. They are based either on co-present or on successive relations.  
 
“Co-present relations rely on the synchronism of their elements, successive relations rely on a spatial, 
temporal or logical sequence. Co-present relations exist between the ACTORS (people, animals, 
institutions), interacting in a frame, their ACTIVITY, INSTRUMENTS, TOOLS, affected OBJECTS, the PLACE 
where an activity is held, and the TIME at which this activity usually is performed. Co-present are also 
typically essential or implicated ATTRIBUTES and ASPECTS of persons, objects and activities, 
distinguishable PARTS of activities (cf. ‘part-whole’ and ‘whole-part’ relations) and INDIVIDUAL 
REPRESENTATIONS of a COLLECTIVE BODY . Finally, the FRAME as a whole is always co-present. 
Successive relations exist between a STATE, ACTIVITY, or a PROCESS and their PURPOSE and AIM, their 
CAUSE or PRECONDITIONS and their RESULTS, their PREVIOUS and CONSECUTIVE STATES. Other 
successive relations exist between PERIODS, different PLACES, and, last but not least, related FRAMES. 
Ideally, any metonymy can be reduced to one of these types of conceptual contiguity.” 
 
It is my claim that mental and social spaces coincide in ritual. With contiguity in real space a 
conceptual or experiential metonymy is created. In a second step, what is brought together in 
the setting is supposed to reflect relations of things at large. The generic metaphor 
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underlying rituals of all kinds is that THE LARGER WORLD IS THE ENACTED CONTEXT. Clifford 
Geertz (1973: 112) writes: 
 
“In a ritual the world as lived and the world as imagined, fused under the agency of a single set of 
symbolic forms, turn out to be the same world, producing thus [an] idiosyncratic transformation in 
one’s sense of reality (...)” 
 
Thus, a novel mental world is created through an enacted social episode in which the 
imaginary becomes the real. I now want to elaborate on this with regard to mental regions. 
Ritual contexts are real-life settings that shape imagistic mental settings (i.e. containers with 
elements), where previously unrelated entities can be grouped together and arranged into a 
relational profile that highlights their coherence. Rituals are enacted social spaces for 
blending mental spaces. The real-life blending space with the objects, people, and actions it 
encompasses is duplicated in the mind as a profiled region in which images meet. 
    The cognitive purpose of ritual that I want to stress here is especially visible in religious 
ritual. The aim is overcoming cognitive boundaries, such as between man and nature or 
between social classes. Domains understood as separate in everyday thought are brought 
together. In ritual an enacted context stands for the world. This transposition presumably 
works through spillovers of specific metaphoric mappings to their larger domains (cf. chapter 
2). These spillovers explain how holism arises in a folk-model. Ritually enacting a functional 
and spatial interdependence among actors and objects may create a nexus between the 
entire domains of origin of these actors or objects. For example, actors in the garb of animals 
create a totemic nexus on top of folk-theoretical intuitions on the separation of species. 
Elements from different domains, such as human speech and a bear’s skin, bring together 
the disparate domains of the hunter and the hunted, for example. The enactment, i.e. the 
experiential metonymy including causal-functional and spatial links, spills over to the 
domains at large, so that a holistic effect follows. When actual metaphors and their larger 
domains are blended into one, rituals create a common frame for things apart. Things 
spatially coincident in ritual suggest a larger nexus; things functionally used together in ritual 
suggest a general functional unity; token artifacts from various domains used together 
represent the merging of the domains as such.  
    Now for a more detailed imagistic analysis. I submit that rituals of various sorts first evoke 
an image of an integrated whole through the contiguous setting (a spatio-temporal region), 
which then evokes a novel mental region or blended space with the participants. The 
responsible co-signature may be represented like this: 
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The explanation for the graphs is as follows: In step 1 people, objects, actions and 
background features of the ritual are brought together in the ritual space for as long as the 
act lasts. We may call them the ‘ritual tokens’, because for our purposes their meaning 
content is less important than the fact of their co-presence. In step 2 the non-permanent 
tokens establish a permanent symbolic relation, which may be enhanced through repetition 
of the ritual. A lasting blend is forged in memory by making a chance conglomerate into a 
recognized functional unit of the tokens and their symbolic referents. Mere spatial contiguity 
becomes a functional unity.130 That the exact nature of the functional unity is of course 
suggested by the meaning of the symbols is, again, irrelevant for the co-signature, which can 
be assumed to be invariant. We may ask what happens in terms of mental imagery in this 
process then. I propose that the tokens are reified through repetition and functional unity. 
This means that the actors, props, actions, and background of the ritual are assigned the 
status of a permanent and stable imagistic region, rather than an ad hoc assembly of mental 
images. As described before, reification means acquiring permanence as a cultural entity in 
memory and introducing new conceptual qualities as a fixed point of reference. What is non-
permanently united in the ritual now belongs together in a deeper way. The consubstantial 
region (‘realm’) co-signature is the generic metaphor for COMMON QUALITY OR FUNCTIONAL 
UNITY IN A SINGLE CONTEXT of things that were apart. (Although any well-learned co-signature 
is independent of qualia, the blended qualia and their emergent properties can fill the slots in 
any actual instance.) As a result of all this in step 3 a spillover from the ritual to the world is 
achieved. It transports the specific image of contiguity of tokens and qualia into their various 
                                                 
130 Through repetition or conventionalization experiential metonymies can become what was defined 
as a ‘nodal key domain’ in chapter 2. A single integrative image, such as the house, is then the 
primary locus where symbolic material is metonymically fused. 
step 1: links into a 
enacted spatio-
temporal region 
step 2: the resulting 
integrative mental 
region 
step 3: the integrated tokens radiate 
outwards to their domains of origin 
and act as a node for  them 
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source domains of origin. Ideally, ritual forges some temporarily contiguous tokens into a 
permanent contiguity between their domains of origin. We get the added metaphor of 
PERMANENT CONCEPTUAL CONTIGUITY IS TEMPORARILY ENACTED CONTIGUITY.  
   Of course the rhetorical and symbolic details of a ritual could be explored in more detail 
than our present focus warrants. A common region does not just simply emerge, but is made 
plausible through many intricate steps. A very salient ritual context, psychological states such 
as fear or ecstasy, and multiple metaphorical links between different attributes, symbols, etc. 
may be important background conditions (I will convey an idea of how this works a bit later).  
    This section can be summed up through the following three related hypotheses: 
(1) Through repeated exposure to all sorts of rituals or other creative activities people 
acquire a general mental tool for spillovers from symbolic material forming part of a 
blend to the symbols’ larger domains. This tool is imagistic and thus a co-signature.  
(2) Through repeated exposure to a specific ritual, e.g. one relating two domains such 
as animals and humans, the participants acquire an image of the two domains with 
their specific qualities being blended. The image consists of the general co-signature 
but has added domain-related qualia filled into the slots. 
(3) We may speculate that the general co-signature for ritual can also serve as a 
mental image of the abstract idea of holism. Conceivably, many acts of domain 
blending are added up (made possible because they share a general co-signature) 
and then become the image of wholeness. This image is suitable as a folk-theoretical 
representation that there is an intricate weave of social, natural, and religious 
interrelatedness in manifold ways (cf. Olds 1992a).  
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Chapter 10:                                                                                            
Dynamic Ontologies 
 
A problem not discussed thoroughly enough up to this point is that cultural ontologies 
generally require a dynamic understanding. Modeling dynamic features is not a principal 
strength of cognitive metaphor theory. Most often a static form of presentation of the kind ‘X 
is Y’ is sought and this falls short of explaining complex changes and switches between 
images. However, as anthropologists are more wont to recognize metaphorical predications 
are very often complex cognitive transformations that span several stages or evoke several 
images in parallel. In the attempt to cognitively model these transformations, Langacker’s 
explanatory framework does significantly better because it specifies dynamic elements in 
imagery, such as different types of scannings or viewing arrangements.  
    Dynamic schemata are very frequently invoked for the representation of complex cultural 
phenomena on the level of ideology. Scripts and scenarios, i.e. cognitive models which 
define conventionalized expectations about sequences, have been extensively described 
elsewhere (e.g. Schank and Abelson 1977, Holland / Quinn 1987, Lakoff 1987). Here I want 
to further develop what we know about sequential cognition by looking at image schema 
transformations not previously considered and to propose an understanding in terms of 
imagery. Equipped with Langacker’s apparatus, I will make partly tentative, but new 
observations on dynamic imagery of different kinds: 
(1) There is meaning in the basic nature of dynamic scanning transformations, 
especially with respect to duration and effort. 
(2) Theories may invoke dynamic images through invitations to consider paradoxes, 
because these obviate any stable image. An important class of image schema 
transformations is constituted by what I will call ‘Gestalt switches’. They are akin to 
superimpositions and figure-ground inversions. But unlike them, they do not create a 
stable final image, but require constant shifts between imagistic models. 
(3) Imagistic multi-vantage models can encode seemingly paradoxical philosophies 
that integrate, both, substantialistic and processualist ontologies in a unified 
framework. 
(4) Transitions between different ontologies can be created through rhetoric, which 
include cues to transform default images into more counter-intuitive holism images. 
 
I will now develop these hypotheses through a series of examples: 
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1. Meaning encoded as basic features of dynamic image schema transformations 
Image schemas may be used as carriers of meaning in a very basic way. My hypothesis is 
that the structural characteristics of the image schema transformations performed before the 
mind’s eye may elicit significant effects by using the very operational nature of a mental 
manipulation as a vehicle. In other words, the mere act of instantiating a particular 
transformation may become the carrier of information. The fact that we can move image-
schemas before the inner eye can in itself become a metaphorical source domain. That is, 
performing it may be evocative of certain metaphorically connected knowledge. Hence, I 
extend the notion of schema to a structural-temporal characteristic of the scanning process 
itself. Scanning processes of a given kind feature a generic temporal-topological structure. In 
other words, various instances of, say, a sequential scanning share a common topology that 
can become a carrier of meaning itself. 
    Several ways may be listed in which the basic nature of image schema transformations 
can be used to convey meaning: 
(1) The temporal element makes the fact of change and process representable. 
Indeed, it provides a natural format for it. By metonymical implication distance may 
also be representable, since it requires time to cover distances. 
(2) Scanning procedures make topographical properties such as layeredness 
representable. By implication effort and strain through mental zooming may be 
evoked. 
 
ICONIC TIME SCHEMAS 
It is not without consequences that we are able to manipulate image-schemas before the 
inner eye in the same way we manipulate physical objects. This process takes a certain time 
to be performed, as experiments indicate (cf. Johnson 1987). Complex image-schematic 
transformations quite noticeably extend through phenomenological time, e.g. when we are 
asked to rotate an object mentally. And, unlike static image schemas, they give a palpable 
sense of change taking place. Something interesting happens here: By taking time to 
perform these transformations, they establish an additional topological identity with 
experience in general. If, for example, the text of a book requires slow and careful reading 
this can be an iconic reference to an effortful and gradual process in the text’s content. 
Likewise, the voluminous nature of a book can be a reference to the length of the story told 
(the correspondence between a narratives duration and the duration of the plot is a quite 
natural and frequent one.) If scanning the external form of a poem requires us to zigzag 
between lines this may evoke an image of constant change, again often with reference to the 
content level. In some styles of music, such as in the case of the Japanese shakuhachi flute, 
fleeting tunes that continuously meander without interruption are used to suggest an 
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ceaseless processual flow in existence. Further examples of iconic phenomena such as 
these will be discussed in a later chapter. 
 
DIFFERENTIATION SCHEMAS: ZOOMING AS STRAIN AND EFFORT 
The refinement, subtlety, and focus of ideas can be metaphorically expressed through what I 
will call a DIFFERENTIATION schema in the operation of zooming (for greater specificity or 
schematicity). This is a transformational schema arising when we screen a static image 
schema array for a particular feature not easily perceived. The structural characteristics of 
the multiplex to mass transformation discussed above intimate certain considerations. 
Wandering before the mind’s eye from an undifferentiated mass into the individual details of 
an image is an act of focusing. In vision, focus implies strain of the eye muscles, when we 
look at a detail carefully or try to make out something in screening a scenario. Similarly, 
performing mental imagery takes time and concentration (the term ‘imagery’ itself being a 
metaphor from the visual source). Thereby, we end up with the metaphorical entailment that 
the refined layers imply effort to perceive them. This is a prime example of an embodied 
metaphor. 
    Let me flesh this out by discussing a culturally situated example. The layered CENTER-
PERIPHERY model of the self, as manifested in “at core man is good”, “deep down in his soul”, 
can be combined with a differentiation image-schema that visualizes a temporal movement 
through layers or magnitudes of perception. An example of such a notion can be found in 
Hindu thought, as the following statement of Bharati (1985: 193) cogently summarizes: 
 
“It is very important to realize that all Hindu notions of the mind, the ego, the entire psychological 
apparatus are material conceptions in philosophical terms (...) From the canonical manifestations of 
mind (buddhi, ‘intellect’) via manas, ‘the thinking organ’, conative energizer, to the body of flesh, all 
these are conceived as matter, albeit of different degrees of subtlety and density – the body is the 
crudest, thickest of these material entities, buddhi the subtlest. These are visualized as layers 
superimposed on one another, literally called ‘sheaths’ (kosa) in Hindu philosophical thinking. In the 
canonical Upanisads, the self is successively defined as the gross body, then the senses, the mind, 
intellection, and finally the atman which equals brahman, the ubiquitous absolute which has no form 
and no matter.”  
 
Bharati makes it clear that these quasi-psychological categories are visualized as reified 
material entities and that they are conceived as layers standing for ontological realms. In 
other words, they use CONTAINER schemas in one of the following two ways: Either the 
containers are combined by the NESTING relation, with intellect being the innermost layer and 
therefore difficult to see or grasp from the outside. Or intellect inheres in the bodily container 
sphere as a most subtle layer in a SUPERIMPOSITION relation on the body, which produces a 
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single blended space not unlike a multiple exposure photograph. Both views have a roughly 
similar entailment: As one scans the whole cultural theory with all its successive levels, there 
is either (1) a zooming movement from outer to inner, or (2) a zooming movement from crude 
outlines to details (these two options conform to two related imagistic principles, which 
Langacker calls ‘specificity’ and ‘schematicity’). The phases of the movement are 
metaphorically mapped on degrees of crudeness and subtlety. The scanning procedure 
produces an image schema of graded refinement as one proceeds to uncover the subtle 
layers inside or ‘within’ the crude layers. The subtle realms are so fine-grained that we have 
to visually move towards them to recognize them. The more subtle layers are valued 
positively, so that soul and intellect are more relevant than body. 
    I submit that the imagistic operations have the following metaphorical entailment: The 
difficulty and strain of differentiating implies that the subtle layers are something not easily 
accessible, but require a concentrated effort and self-cultivation. The linguistic term ‘subtle’ 
implies the same, since subtle things will be lost on crude people who do not cultivate their 
senses or their capacity to discern. Also, an implicit value statement is expressed through the 
strain of going into subtle realms. What requires effort must be of greater worth, a quite 
common belief, in keeping with much everyday experience in all kinds of domains. The value 
statement is at the same time an ontological statement. 
   Bharati also demonstrates convincingly that the image is more than an experts’ theory in 
Indian culture. It is amplified by social practice. As he states, well-to-do Indians may wander 
among starving people without feeling any pangs of guilt or any impetus to help them, 
because they are supported by the cultural ideology that the bodily and transient existence of 
those who suffer is not what counts. It should be plain that in the discussed model the bodily 
is what is easily perceived without focus, and is therefore devalued. Summing up, the 
crudeness and subtlety metaphor is used to illustrate the relative unimportance of the 
everyday, easy-to-grasp experience and to posit the value of other knowledge instead.  
 
2. Dynamized image schemas: Bursting finiteness through horizon concepts 
In chapter 6 the HORIZON schema was introduced as a dynamic image schema, in which the 
viewer imagines moving in space in relation to a receding vanishing point. I discussed the 
schema to explain theories of the nature of political ideals and of Utopia. Schemas similar to 
the HORIZON schema can be used to intimate infinity and boundlessness in philosophizing 
about transcendental concepts. Transcendental concepts suggest that we should not 
represent God as an entity akin to everyday objects. In the work of the late medieval 
theologian and mystic Nicolas Cusanus we find a geometrical metaphor for imagining the 
transcendental nature of God. Cusanus conceives of God through the simile of a circle with 
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infinite radius. In effect, this makes the curve converge with a perfect line (Blumenberg 1996 
[1979]: 445). How do we make sense of this image and what exactly is conveyed by it? 
    So far as we know from experience we recognize the curve of a large circle when we 
increase our distance to it. In this case we have an apparent line of which we are told that it 
actually belongs to a circle. What our inner eye is told to do is to perform an imagistic 
operation of moving away from a line until the curve becomes visible. Whenever we think 
that the curve should be visible we are told that it cannot be so and correct it by 
superimposing the image of a line to make it conform to the paradox’ second invitation. Thus 
we move even further away from the point of origin, ad infinitum. Of course the mental 
process will not take more than a few seconds, but at any rate its effect will be to suggest 
infinite distance. The corrective Gestalt-switch from curve to line and its futile repetition – 
futile because of the paradoxical imperative – take us on an infinite imagistic journey before 
the inner eye. We move toward a horizon never reached. 
    Another complementary effect of this is to suggest God as the most encompassing 
possible phenomenon. If God is conceived of as an entity or as realm of power we may see 
him as a container. (Hence the idea of God as a circle.) For two-dimensional containers to be 
such they have to change angle at at least three points, although the typical container is 
pictured as a circle. Yet, here we are invited to imagine a container of such tremendous size 
that we could run along its boundary forever without noticing even the slightest bend. 
Alternatively, we might imagine moving towards a thing in the distance that eludes us, 
whenever we advance, as described in the original horizon schema. 
    A related interpretation of Cusanus’ simile places emphasis on the aspect that in the 
image of God as an infinite sphere the center is placed everywhere and its circumference 
nowhere. Rudolf Arnheim (1969: 278) argues that Cusanus, by imagining God as an infinite 
sphere with no fixed center, laid the groundwork for 20th century relativism. According to 
Arnheim, relativism as an imagistic procedure calls for the coordination of two mutually 
exclusive images. One the one hand we imagine a center, as a sphere surely must have, 
and on the other hand we acknowledge the possibility of transferring the center to any other 
place. Relativism, then, is the capability to alternate between different locations of the center, 
i.e. to imagine a given point as the center, and at the same time relativize this central position 
by superimposing any number of other decentered spheres. This faculty for relativist thought 
can be described in terms of figure-ground reversals. While we focus on a given center this is 
the figure, but once our attention wanders on, it becomes the background for a new center to 
emerge as figure. Vantage points are inherently defined as relative and temporary. 
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3. Image-schematic Gestalt switches 
As mentioned earlier, conceptual models with more than one canonical vantage point are 
beginning to be studied by cognitive anthropologists and linguists (MacLaury 1995, 
Hill/MacLaury 1995). This model builds on the idea of memorization frames of conceptual 
elements that hang together and in which only partial configurations are profiled at any given 
time. At a later point the profile shifts to another element of the same frame, while the old 
ones recede into the background. 
    Here I want to introduce an idea that goes a step further. There are some cultural theories 
that require the subject to continuously switch between two incompatible vantages. Although 
they belong together, these vantage points are not necessarily similar in topology and may 
even be completely incompatible. Despite this clash of imagery I suggest that incompatible 
construals may be linked in a larger imagistic model. The fundamental image schema 
transformation responsible for this is called ‘Gestalt switch’. 
    One important dynamic operation of mental imagery has gone largely unnoticed, perhaps 
because it presents itself predominantly in connection with very complex ideological models 
such as dialectical thought. I am inspired by Jürgen Ritsert’s (1990: 175) work on ideology in 
which he claims Gestalt switches to be a basic pattern of ideological models. In his turn, 
Ritsert builds on ideas first expressed by Richard Rorty in the book Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity (1989: 78) where Rorty conducts an analysis of the mental operation underlying 
dialectical thought. With reference to Hegel, Rorty holds dialectics to be “a skill at producing 
surprising gestalt switches by making smooth rapid transitions from one terminology to 
another”, an ability to pass back and forth between two antithetical views. I join with this view 
and will in the following try to make the case for its imagistic nature through an example. 
    Gestalt switches are a kind of transformational imagery that enables complex schemas in 
ideology. In the way I define the term, the capacity to produce Gestalt switches emanates 
from the more primary ability to perform superimposition in imagery. Recall that we described 
superimposition as the capacity to project two more elementary image schemas into a single 
more complex one, making it into a new and integrated Gestalt. An example we have seen 
earlier was imparting internal structure to a container schema by a system or network 
schema. Gestalt switches are both similar to superimpositions and to figure-ground 
inversions in different respects:  
(1) They are like superimpositions in the respect that two imagistic parts are invoked 
together. Unlike superimpositions, however, the two parts do not become a static 
whole that does not change anymore after the operation is completed. Instead, 
Gestalt switches are alternating and fluctuating. The mind’s eye passes back and 
forth between two wholes that will not easily merge. One scans the sub-image, and 
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then the other, but not in full simultaneity, but only in such manner that one image 
always leaves a memory trace in the background of the other. 
(2) The process is also near identical with figure-ground inversions, in the sense that 
different parts of a frame are profiled in alternation. The difference is that I spoke of 
figure-ground inversions with topologically (and thus logically) integrated images, 
while Gestalt switches can operate between fairly incompatible images that are 
blended only for a particular purpose. 
 
Thus, without yielding a static new Gestalt, the two images enter into a close relationship by 
being actualized near-simultaneously. This opens powerful cognitive potentialities. Without 
being a Gestalt in the usual, static sense the resulting process can be assumed to have the 
major Gestalt-like property of being memorized as a package. To what extent constituent 
parts remain more basic than the whole in a ‘Gestalt switch’ array is open to debate: It is 
clear however that, while both images are separately accessible in principle, they only 
produce their specific cultural meaning together. 
    It has been observed by many philosopher-critics that dialectics is an art of the 
contradictory and illogic. This is true when the primary value is granted to the atomist axiom 
that each cognitive act and each mental image should be intrinsically separate. However, a 
Gestaltist perspective is truer to life since it cannot be denied that the human mind operates 
by creatively combining images and that it produces culturally relevant models in doing so. 
 
FOLK-THEORIES AND EXPERTS’ THEORIES OF DIALECTIC 
In what follows I intend to demonstrate that dialectics in philosophy is but a prominent 
example of a frequent Gestalt switch between a set of two cognitive foils: These I will call the 
image schemas of SUPERIMPOSITION / IDENTITY and of NESTING / INCLUSION. Each of these 
image-schematic relations only makes sense separately and usually does not allow overlaps, 
yet the idea in the following example is to tie them together. Let us see how the two foils of 
identity and inclusion can occur together by considering some examples. Here we can return 
to Terence Turner’s (1991) definition of ‘synecdochal’ structure mentioned earlier, which 
refers to a PART-WHOLE configuration in which the whole iconically replicates the structure of 
its parts. The memorable example given by him is the frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes’ 
Leviathan, which depicts the sovereign as giant body made up of endless numbers of 
miniature subjects that share the same shape with the sovereign. Another good example are 
the graphs of Mandelbrot-function in mathematics. Mandelbrot-figures result from depicting 
so-called fractal functions as visual patterns or curves that, when enlarged, replicate ad 
infinitum the very same patterns on any ever so small microscopic level of their structure. 
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What Turner states for poetic and ritual forms equally applies to the formal structures of 
these mathematical functions: 
 
“In this play of transformations, what is whole at one level becomes part at the next higher level, on the 
condition that this higher level is itself created by the uniform replication of the same holistic form by 
the lower level units. The higher-level whole thus becomes defined as the invariant form of its 
constituent parts and implicitly charged, as such, with the demiurgic powers of self-creation.” (Turner 
1991: 154-55) 
 
With regard to the same kind of similarity relation between part and whole Louis Dumont 
(1970: 242) speaks about the possibility of simultaneous identity and contradiction 
engendered by the parallelism of two perspectives. Dumont takes the semantic double sense 
of ‘man’ as an example. Man is at the inferior level defined as opposite to woman. He is not a 
conceptual whole but part of a dichotomy that forms the whole, the human race. On a 
superior level he stands for the original human and thus for the race as a whole. This 
differentiation of levels is recounted as a part of the biblical creation narrative. Eve was 
created from Adam’s rib, thus God differentiated the two sexes. Through this act Adam is 
now both, the representative of the species and the prototype of the male individuals of the 
species.  
    Looking at the formation of complex concepts in the course of history, this emerges as a 
widespread pattern. With reference to Sweetser (1987) Keller/Lehmann (1993: 78) note that 
in linguistic polysemies a term is in the course of time extended in reference, so that it is 
“taken to mean basically the abstract structural relation that motivated the extension to start 
with”. Both, then, become instances of the same more schematic structure, even though it is 
also frequently the case that the more concrete application of the original pair continues to be 
the default or prototype one (and we may add, the linguistically unmarked element). 
Sweetser studied the relation between the root sense of modal verbs in English and the so-
called epistemic sense. While the root sense of “You must do that” implies physical 
compulsion, there is a metaphoric extension into the epistemic realm, as in “He must be 
sick”, which is to be read as ‘everything forces me to the conclusion that’.131  
                                                 
131 It is crucial to see that these examples are simply a case of high-level schematization. They create 
a generic category schema that includes the original category. Recall that generic and specific levels 
subsist in one another in the new model, rather than the more schematic sense of ‘must’ replacing its 
earlier concrete sense. The two senses are not opposed, they are parts of the same model, only at 
different levels of schematicity. From the specific-level term ‘man’ the term ‘mankind’ is derived by 
making the category more schematic to include woman. ‘Man’ becomes the unmarked category 
member, its prototype, while ‘woman’ remains marked. In making it more schematic a more general 
substance (i.e. ‘belonging to mankind’) is created, which both share.  
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    Dumont himself regards the encompassing of opposites as characteristic of the 
complexification of thought categories. He suggests that every time a notion gains 
importance, it acquires the capacity to encompass its opposite. This way of encompassment 
can be found in the theoretical apparatuses of modern ideology, e.g. goods encompass 
services in classical political economy, work encompasses exchange for Adam Smith, 
production encompasses consumption for Marx, “all in the very sense that Adam 
encompasses Eve” (p. 245) All these more encompassing structures of thought share a 
general shape. There are two levels of thought in one image that stands in what Dumont 
terms a hierarchical relation: 
 
“The hierarchical relation is, very generally, that between a whole (or a set) and an element of this 
whole (or set): the element belongs to the set and is in this case consubstantial or identical with it; at 
the same time the element is distinct from the set or stands in opposition to it.” (p. 240) 
 
And further: 
 
“At the superior level there is unity, at the inferior level there is distinction, there is, as in the first case, 
complementariness or contradiction. Hierarchy consists in the combination of these two propositions 
concerning different levels. In hierarchy thus defined, complementariness or contradiction is contained 
in a unity of superior order. But as soon as we intermingle the levels, we have logical scandal…” (p. 
242) 
 
The mental recognition of synecdochal structure is, I believe, what unites the different uses 
of the philosophical term dialectic: In substance, this is an overall system with different levels 
or different temporal states. These are related in such a way that they replicate an image at 
different levels of inclusiveness, i.e. at different magnitudes in the NESTING schema. Take as 
an example the Marxist claim that, as history goes on, class antagonisms are, after a phase 
of conflict, perennially resolved in the synthesis of the prevailing class, which realizes an 
inescapable forward step of socio-historical progress, only to run into a new, but initially 
impalpable antagonism on a higher level. Similarly, in epistemology dialectics reside in the 
awareness of a rule of repetition, of a structural constant, as we advance from more primary 
to more inclusive levels of understanding. Dumont (1970: 243) puts this in the succinct 
statement that in a hierarchical schema the parts that nest one inside the other may increase 
in number without changing the law, i.e. the generative relation. The Gestalt switch, then, 
consists in the fact that we should take the inferior level, to which we have concrete access, 
as real and at the same time acknowledge the structural principle by which this concrete 
knowledge is relativized on a more encompassing level. Of this encompassing level we know 
only the structure (i.e. that one particular class-conflict is bound to become obsolete by its 
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resolution into a historical synthesis of the antagonism) but no details. Thus, we are invited to 
simultaneously instantiate a concrete piece of information and a general image-schematic 
structural template, and take both seriously, even though they stand in contradiction. 
    The general idea here, as before, is that image-schematic Gestalts can provide relatively 
easy and swift access to what is a tremendously complex concept to be expounded in a 
theoretical fashion. I believe that lay people understand practical dialectic with ease, while to 
explain dialectic in a theoretical fashion typically remains restricted to philosophers and other 
theoretically inclined people. By pointing this out, the idea may seem less far-fetched that the 
complexity of dialectics is relevant to everyday understanding. I will admit that this proposal 
is rather speculative in nature and remains to be further corroborated or disproved. What I 
remain adamant about is the fact that some sort of cognitive conceptualization of dialectic for 
everyday purposes is indispensable, since what happens is understood and is probably not 
so far removed from what theoretical expositions of the same cultural principles in religion 
and philosophy express. 
 
DIALECTIC AS DYNAMIZED IMAGERY 
Dynamized imagery has already been treated in regard to the yin-yang emblem (chapter 6). 
A dynamized image may at first blush seem static, but has features that suggest imagistic 
force vectors and movements to the mind. In the yin-yang emblem the dynamism was 
suggested by a single image. Here now we are dealing with two superimposed images that 
create a similar effect. Dialectic involves a diachronic dynamization of imagery in the 
cognitive act.  
    The imagery of Chinese Buddhism provides good examples where synecdochic similes 
have been frequently employed. According to Linda Olds (1991: 18), the sage philosopher 
Fa-Tsang (A.D. 643-712) used the following teaching image to illustrate the synecdochic 
notion of infinite progression:  
 
“(...) Fa-Tsang’s example of the Golden Lion, each of whose hairs contains another golden lion, such 
that all lions and all the hairs together enter into each other in infinite progression. (Chan 1963, 412): 
‘In each of the lion’s eyes, ears, limbs, joints, and in each and every hair, there is the golden lion. All 
the lions embraced by all the single hairs simultaneously and instantaneously enter a single hair. Thus 
in each and every hair there are infinite numbers of lions, and in addition all the single hairs, together 
with their infinite number of lions, in turn enter into a single hair.’ Other teaching images include the 
metaphors of the interpenetrating of many rays of light from different lamps (136) and the Ocean 
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Mirror which reflects in its depths all things in the universe including the farthest stars and Galaxies. 
(G. Chang 125)” 132 
 
In this image there is infinite inclusion and identity at the same time. It is quite fascinating to 
see that Fa-Tsang obviously anticipated the fractal structures of the mathematician Benoît 
Mandelbrot, which similarly repeat their structure on successive magnitudes and scales of 
reduction ad infinitum. This image not only contains a one-step synecdoche, in the sense 
that one superior level structurally replicates one inferior level. The image is also dynamized 
in much the same way that we saw in Nicolas Cusanus’ circle metaphor of God above. That 
is to say that we have to repeat scanning procedures without coming to a satisfactory end. 
We saw that this is, as a rule, the result of the paradoxical instructions the figure presents. In 
this case the dynamics emerges through the instruction that what has been figure on one 
level be ground on the next in unending progression. 
    The dynamized schema we may call one of interlocking or nested levels. The image may 
be aided by the CONTAINER images of different magnitudes, nested within one another much 
like the figurines of a Russian matrjoshka. The NESTING schema may be used to imagine the 
resulting structure of the whole Gestalt, parallel to the mind’s-eye wandering through the rich 
images of a lion, magnifying a hair, superimposing yet another lion image on it, etc. 
 
A. interlocking levels (NESTING) B. lion image (with the balloons depicting 
the yet unfilled elaboration sites)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
132 Chan, Wing-Tsit, trans.: A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton 1963; Chang, Garma 
C.C.: The Buddhist Teaching of Totality. The Philosophy of Hwa Yen Buddhism, University Park, PA, 
1971 
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We perform a Gestalt switch as soon as we focus on the isomorphism between the different 
imagined levels. The levels become interchangeable because they can be topologically 
matched and congruently superimposed. Their STRUCTURAL IDENTITY is evident. As a result 
there ceases to be an uppermost level, because we can start anywhere in the progression 
and have an infinite succession of lions above and an infinite succession of lions below the 
level that we attend to just now. 
 
C. isomorphism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This precisely is Fa-Tsang’s main goal: He wants to intimate the idea of unending mutual 
inclusion. We can start out everywhere, on every conceivable level of reality and all other 
levels will always be contained within it. This conveys a radically non-hierarchic view of 
reality. Simultaneously with inclusion there is structural replication, a kind of micro-macro 
iconicity between PARTS and WHOLES (= synecdoche in Terence Turner’s terms).  
    Hence, we can see how Fa-Tsang’s simile successfully conveys a two-fold ontological 
statement. Of course, both aspects taken together are paradoxical in our everyday 
experience. According to our knowledge of middle-sized objects, something can either 
include something else or be identical to it, never both at once. The paradoxical is realized 
here through a Gestalt switch between the tow images. For the desired effect the 
STRUCTURAL IDENTITY schema and the INCLUSION schema are implemented at the same time. 
In complex thought this paradoxical procedure is not unique to Buddhism. To give but one 
example, the idea of the set of all sets in mathematics makes use of the very same Gestalt 
switch. 
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THE CONCEPT OF ‘QI’ IN CHINESE COSMOLOGY AND MEDICINE 
Let us now go into another example from the same cultural sphere, which illustrates how the 
switch between two vantages can accommodate seemingly contradictory tenets that make 
up a part of the same theoretical model. An analysis somewhat similar to the one just 
undertaken can be conducted for a key concept of Chinese cosmology, that of qi (which, 
incidentally, has a number of similarities to the Buddhist SYSTEMS schema described in 
chapter 9). While qi, of which there are diverse conceptual models and applications both in 
expert and everyday discourse, is broadly similar to the Buddhist ontology, it offers a slightly 
different, and perhaps more explicit, answer to the question of how reality can be ultimately 
in flow and appear substantialistic at the same time. Reality as it appears phenomenally is 
not claimed to be an illusion but part of a dualistic principle that acknowledges appearances 
without ultimately reifying them. The following detailed discussion of qi as a concept will 
ultimately lead to the recognition of yet another basic cognitive operation – that of 
stereoscopic vision or superimposition of dialectical opposites. 
    The idea that processes in macrocosm and microcosm are analogous in nature became 
predominant in Chinese philosophy as early as the third century BC. The concept of qi 
gained in importance as an important expression of this idea. In addition to suggesting that 
the human and the natural world are determined by shared functional principles, qi also 
came to denote a common medium through which the human and the natural world act upon 
one another. By stipulating an overarching causal interdependence at work in the universe, 
qi became the focus of articulation for a dialectic of nature and culture. In this view qi 
permeates macro- and microcosm and consequently encompassed innumerable facets 
through which it can surface in the phenomenal world. While being a unifying concept on the 
one hand, on the other hand it lends itself to the expression of diversity, because the 
qualities embodied by qi vary with location and context. The qualities of qi reflect the 
speaker’s perspective and must always be understood relative to them. Hsu (1999: 81f) 
underscores that qi as ‘shared substrate’ changes its perceived qualities depending on which 
time-space rubric it is positioned in. This view makes it possible for Chinese medicine to split 
qi into many qis, which have to be in balance in the larger picture of flow (these are for 
example associated with different body organs or different phases of the seasonal cycle). Qi 
is not a quality of anything particular. The traditional view of Chinese medicine is that when a 
healer transfers qi to the patient he is but a vessel for it. The healer as vessel or conduit 
partakes of a primordial force that is neither intrinsic to anything nor possessed by anyone.  
    When speaking of a pervasive ‘shared substrate’, two aspects deserve separate mention. 
First, there is the basic conceptual foil of a constant flow inherent in all events of the world. 
This aspect can be pictured as a river that is in everlasting motion: the world as a whole is 
like such a river. Second, and more specifically, this implies that there is a constant change 
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of substance. Going beyond the river image, this means that reality is subject to a constant 
transformation of substance. One material pattern changes into the next, and so forth. In 
Neo-Confucian philosophy these two aspects were expressed in a terminological dual of qi 
on the one, and li (‘substance-identity’ or ’pattern’) on the other hand. This dialectic pair is a 
good starting point for our analysis, although the term li is conceptually present even where it 
does not appear, because qi was already understood to include the other part of the dual 
anyway in various other Chinese traditions. In other words, li and qi are notionally 
inseparable principles of expression of a single ‘noumenon’ (Olds 1991: 18). The substance 
and the process aspects of reality must always be considered in tandem. All seemingly 
permanent substances are but temporal manifestations in an encompassing process of 
substance-configuration and reconfiguration. To see the body as part of its energetical 
environment is part-and-parcel of this view. Just as the boundaries between body and 
environment can solidify to some degree, they also can become blurred again. Where qi 
becomes dense material life comes into being and when it disperses again death occurs. 
The flow and substance identity of qi can be disrupted in several ways. Positive qi can be 
blocked by counterflowing qi; there can obstructions and accumulations of qi. Importantly, the 
accumulation of qi, presumably conceived from its substance aspect, obstructs the process 
aspect and thus the whole principle of qi, because an unhealthy stagnation ensues. 
Accumulation is seen as a rather unspecific principle. What is of foremost importance is the 
process of accumulation, whereas the consideration which stuff is accumulated plays a 
lesser role. Presumably, the representation involved here is of a skeletal and general kind, 
i.e. an image schema. Thus in traditional Chinese medicine gallstones, tumors, and muscle 
thickenings can all be referred to by a common term, since they share the common 
underlying process of gradual growth. A qigong healer will use the same imaginative act of is 
body-mind to invert the directionality of all these different kinds of growth by concentrating his 
inner qi on the reversing process of shrinking. The symptom they have in common is defined 
relative to a specific (partially) mental act of imaginatively directing a force. The aspects 
highlighted for diagnosis and the embodied cognitive operations involved in treatment are 
therefore mutually defining. The same kind of imaginative process is involved in both. 
 
COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF ‘QI’ 
Cognitively, qi is a complex concept and includes several facets that may seem 
contradictory. In an attempt to come to grips with this complexity, some scholars have 
approached qi as a pervasive ‘configurative energy’ or as a substrate in which things happen 
and which makes things happen. It can also be likened to the notion of ‘field’, which is both 
all-pervasive and causally unifying. Here, I will attempt a ‘componential’ analysis of the 
images that produce the representation. Qi may be said to incorporate all of the following 
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cognitive parameters: flow, force and change, pattern, part-whole relations in balance, and 
pattern totality across time. These elements taken together suggest a multi-vantage model 
encompassing a one-shot momentary construal and a processual total construal. Let us 
consider the elements in turn and how the figure in the overall model: 
    (1) Qi is MULTI-DIRECTIONAL FLOW. Flow pervades all being things and binds them into one 
all-encompassing process. In a general flow there is no stagnation in any subpart of the 
whole, all parts move in accordance with one another. One might imagine this condition as 
circulation of objects. In such a case the whole universe would presumably be imagined as a 
container with all kinds of objects, large and small, circulating within. However, the principle 
of the micro- and macrocosmic equivalence entails that a profiled segment of any size is 
always part of a larger whole and therefore the circulation cannot be perceived in toto. The 
alternative is to abstract away from concrete circulation. This can be achieved by 
superimposing several foils of flow directions on top of each other, so that a multi-directional 
image is evoked. This is something that is not normally possible in visual perception, unless 
many film sequences are blended. In the imaginary it is possible to conceive of all of these 
movements simultaneously. The diagram below depicts such a superimposition of foils in 
MULTI-DIRECTIONAL FLOW: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The superimposition of various foils with flow from different directions into one multi-directional image. 
 
    (2) A major experiential implication of flow is FORCE, and force in turn brings about change. 
In isolation this image schema would imply that nothing of any permanence exists. Yet, 
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because this contradicts manifest reality, which includes more or less lasting patterns, other 
elements are needed. For this reason the relation of force and form is understood in an 
image of CONDENSATION. Where qi becomes dense it becomes pattern. Presumably, this is 
motivated by the knowledge about liquid and solid states. As qi condenses into pattern it 
metaphorically changes from a liquid to a solid state. Inherent in this is the idea that the 
general flow is pervasive but not equally distributed everywhere. The flow can be disrupted 
or accumulate in some loci. 
    (3) Qi is also seen as instrumental in bestowing a temporary PATTERN on reality. Its 
causality is represented in the FORCE dynamics of the flow image schema. When a force acts 
on an object it may either displace it or transform its shape. Therefore, the force of the flow 
schema may be understood in either of the following two ways. The first possibility is that 
pattern is brought along by the current flow, further flow will carry it away and bring new 
pattern. Pattern is here conceived as an image-schematic token with a pattern A that is 
carried into the focused location, to be followed by pattern B, etc., like moving objects 
running in front of a film camera or objects floating past on a stream of water. Force then 
moves several objects past an observer’s location. Another conceivable possibility of how 
force works is that it reshapes the pattern of a single object in focus by acts on it from all 
sides. 
    (4) Qi fundamentally expresses a BALANCED DISTRIBUTION in the PART-WHOLE relations of a 
SYSTEM. If the world in general is suffused with qi, it can also be allocated to individual 
material objects (such as the human body) and even subparts of objects or bodies. 
Ordinarily, parts replicate the whole, in that qi flows through them. Traditional Chinese 
medicine explains and diagnoses ailments by virtue of the fact that some part no longer 
conforms to the generalized flow as it should. Afflicted body organs can oppose the universal 
principle of flow in the whole body by blocking or accumulating qi. This can also be 
interpreted as an aspect of experiential force dynamics. An accumulation occurs when the 
flow meets a counter-flow that blocks it or meets an obstruction. Thus one can also speak of 
an ideal of BALANCE in intensity between the various subparts of the flow. It is also interesting 
to note that obstructions arise from qi that has condensated into substance which blocks qi 
that is still a process. 
    (5) Qi is the sum of patterns seen across time, i.e. a PATTERN TOTALITY. It implies a general 
schema of reality in which a constant agency is at work that stretches across past, present, 
and future. Therefore we might expect a temporal representation of it in which there is a 
sequential scanning across time-phases. If this is correct, we can conclude that two crucially 
different views of qi can be juxtaposed. The view of qi as causing agent of material patterns 
would presumably employ a summary scanning (i.e. it preserves the cognitive images of the 
preceding cognitive phases until a whole image is cumulatively present) which maps the 
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causal build-up of the present pattern in a one-shot picture. The end-result of this summary 
scanning is a pattern that is arrested before the mind’s eye and appears stable. Such a view 
is of limited scope in the temporal domain and does not anticipate further changes or go far 
back into the past. The aspectual view of qi as the underlying principle of a process ontology, 
on the other hand, employs a diachronic view of maximal temporal scope. Presumably it 
uses a sequential scanning which does not preserve the foregoing phases but highlights the 
constant change of phases instead. I will argue that the former aspect of qi is represented by 
the term li, which is used as its dual in some Neo-Confucian conceptualizations and attempt 
an imagistic analysis of how the two faces of the dual relate. The terms qi and li are used to 
express the relation of material manifestations to the principle of flow. The mind and the 
material body are both aggregations of qi interrelated with li. Where qi becomes dense it 
aggregates into pattern. 
 
A STEREOSCOPIC VIEW OF PROCESSUAL FLOW AND MATERIAL PATTERN 
I would now like to formulate the hypothesis that the representation of qi and li builds on an 
imagistic mechanism of ‘stereoscopic vision’ in which schematic flow and substance-identity 
aspects merge into one. Although I will concentrate on this one example, a similar 
conceptualization can be expected for other kinds of polar concepts. I am indebted to Olds’ 
(1991: 19) lucid characterization of the notion of polarity, which she advances with the very 
same Chinese context of qi-notions in mind: 
 
“In a sense each pole represents a different type of focus by which to view one process, and the poles 
are not to be understood substantively but as reciprocal processes constituting one whole, e.g. as in 
motion and rest both representing the t’ai-chi (…).” 
 
The formulation that each pole is a different focus of a single process could indeed originate 
from Ronald Langacker’s pen. Clearly, what Olds means by polarity is a switch between two 
types of profiling of a unified double-Gestalt. This Gestalt switch is a stable superimposition 
of two foils called the PROCESSUAL FLOW schema and the PATTERN schema. The three 
diagrams below depict several aspects of the stereoscopic model: 
    Diagram A is an attempt to schematize the componential structure of flow and pattern. 
Two foils are projected onto the central elaboration site region, which has no attributes apart 
from being associated with the idea of mapping a cosmological essence. By virtue of that 
knowledge (i.e. that the model is one of cosmological essence) the region is presumably 
conceptualized as an imagistic realm (see ch.9) to capture the idea that there is something 
inherent about it. Two constituents that are part of a double Gestalt converge on the E-site 
and fill it with a more detailed image. Because the realm has as a matter of definition an 
essence, the two constituent images must have permanent and intrinsic qualities. One 
 486 
permanent quality of the realm is qi-flux mapped in a FLOW-schema. The other permanent 
quality of the realm is li-pattern. This must be the most schematic image of pattern possible, 
since it cannot be any particular pattern. No particular pattern is permanent in this 
cosmology, while the fact that patterns arise again and again is. Thus the model of li it must 
condense all possible kinds of pattern into one generic image, i.e. it maps a process 
engendering different sorts of patterns over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIAGRAM A: The two constituent schemas of FLOW and PATTERN are superimposed within an E-site that 
is at the same time a substance realm standing for an essence. 
 
However, the two constituent schemas may also be envisaged as one. Diagram B depicts 
this process as a sequential scanning of changing patterns. Again pattern can be abstracted 
away from specific patterns by using the generic PATTERN schema. For purposes of 
illustration I have used several different kinds of abstract patterns in the diagram. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIAGRAM B: The resulting stereoscopic superimposition: a diachronic synthesis of flow as continuous 
change of pattern 
 
time 
 essence-
realm 
(E-site) 
time
FLOW PATTERN 
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In this stereoscopic view either aspect may be profiled. It may be said that different related 
cosmological concepts governed by the framework correspond to different profiles of the 
stereoscopic Gestalt. A profiling of the backdrop of process takes place whenever one 
focuses on the general features of the cosmology, which are those of continuous change. 
The cognitive power of the model lies in the fact that it does not only map a generic view of 
ontology, it also allows an understanding of specific occurrences of everyday experience. A 
case of profiling pattern is apparent in thinking about ‘personality’ or ‘self’. By virtue of the 
people’s feeling, some permanence in their characters and in their innermost identities, some 
degree of relatively stable pattern must be acknowledged.  
    Diagram C shows personality/mind as a foregrounding process within the stereoscopic 
Gestalt. There is a permanent background quality of the region, which is qi-flux. The 
temporary and concrete quality of the region, li-pattern (= mind), is in the foregrounded 
profile. The person in the box in boldface represents it. Note that the foregrounded pattern is 
considerably more concrete and detailed than the PATTERN schema representations above, 
which map pattern-ness as such and thus all conceivable kinds of pattern at once. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIAGRAM C: The stable mind/identity of a person as foregrounded profile of a particular pattern 
 
Picking out the foreground can be understood as an operation of zooming into a particular 
region of the whole representation and making it the object of attention. The sequential 
scanning is brought to a halt and arrested on an image in a way that is perhaps best 
understood through the analogy of arresting a particular sequence of a film before the mind’s 
eye for some more thought while the show is going on but the person’s attention veers off to 
or rest with an image that is no longer present.  
    It is noteworthy that the foregrounded pattern of mind/identity is not maximally schematic, 
as was the case in diagram B. Instead, it is associated with specific images and propositions. 
Image-schematically the difference is implicative of the switch between multiplex and mass 
construals of a region. Recall that in a mass construal a large scope of an image is visible to 
the mind’s eye, but at the cost of blurring the details. In a multiplex construal the scope 
narrows. This has the advantage of making the particulars visible.  
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    I would like to propose that a multiplex-mass operation takes place with the 
conceptualization of stable persons before the background of an ever-changing process in 
the case of a qi- based cosmology. The person-related construal focuses on a single phase 
of the sequential process of being, with the purpose of bringing its particular details to the 
fore. At the same time the process of which any personal existence is ultimately part is de-
emphasized from this vantage. However, reification is not a necessary consequence of 
construing the scene as stable pattern (by foregrounding the present within the unceasing 
flux in a ‘snapshot’). Emergent pattern can be taken for what it is, namely a temporary 
manifestation intrinsically embedded in a process. One is still encouraged not to lose the 
background out of view while attending to the figure. The whole of the general Dao principle 
must remain present. This knowledge background makes the individual the emergent part of 
a larger whole. While the foregrounded individual life has more concrete structure and is 
perhaps accorded pragmatic precedence, the cosmological background has higher 
ontological priority. The individual personality is only conceivable against the background of 
ultimate reality, whose nature is flux, not stability.  
 
COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY 
Our image-schematic perspective warrants an important conclusion, which should be of 
interest to philosophers: Deriding Chinese worldviews and similar perspectives as ‘dialectical 
nonsense’, as some analytic philosophers are inclined to do, means denying a 
psychologically real aspect of the imagistic mind. Like everybody else qi believers perceive 
everyday reality as partly stable, but with a background recognition of flux. The perception of 
the material world is suffused with an ontological image. Clearly enough, this is a case of 
Wittgensteinian ‘seeing as’, i.e. perception intentionally laden with a complex concept. The 
foregrounded individuals are not perceived as individuals pure and simple. They are 
perceived as parts of a more basic image of never-ceasing change.  
    This admits of an intriguing comparative conclusion: Any dichotomous thought style is a 
result of choosing between two or more construals and according one of them the primary 
status. The encouragement of a simultaneous perception of foreground and background 
perhaps explains the difference between the predominant East Asian and Western modes of 
thought. In Western philosophy two incompatible images tend to be only construed as 
alternate foci, never two at the same time. The typical strategy of managing imagistic models 
in Western thought is to treat them as one-shot construals. Because they are atomized, they 
must be logically opposed as alternatives to choose from. In Chinese philosophy dichotomies 
between substance and process are avoided. It refuses to split foreground from background 
for any more than a temporary duration. Complementarity is made possible by processing 
imagery stereoscopically.  
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    In sum, stereoscopic construals allow for a cognitive explanation of what seems 
paradoxical in holism: The paradox of a seemingly stable reality and its simultaneous denial. 
The switch (or ‘zooming-in and zooming-out’) between multiplex and mass acknowledges the 
individual patterns as temporary, but changing and eventually transient figures before a 
larger ground. 
 
4. Dynamized ontologies: Moving between non-holistic defaults and holistic overlays 
The worldview of a cultural community always exhibits different ontologies and lifeworlds 
(Schütz 1962), with perhaps the most incisive rift running between the sacred and the 
profane. The notion of ‘split ontologies’ was also developed in recent Possible Worlds 
Theory, most notably in Thomas Pavel’s Fictional Worlds (1986: 136ff), Marie-Laure Ryan’s 
Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence and Narrative Theory (1991: 40), and in Paul Werth’s 
Text Worlds (1999), who undertakes a synthesis of the cognitive linguistic approach and the 
possible worlds approach. The idea of split ontologies as used by text theory stresses that 
readers move between different kinds of ontological ascriptions. Either they are explicitly 
cued to do so or they infer the transition from their background knowledge. What goes for 
texts equally holds for other cognitive phenomena in culture, such as ritual. 
    The ontological realms of an epoch or culture may be more or less unified, as Pavel (1986: 
140) expresses: 
 
“Models that occupy the central area of the [cultural] landscape may vary between two extremes: 
complete fusions versus flat literal universes. A complete fusion is a salient structure in which every 
element at one level plays a role at each other level as well (...). A flat or literal universe is a single 
level construction, assumed to contain without residue all and only what there is.”  
 
Most often neither a complete saturation of the profane with the sacred nor a situation of total 
intransmutability between them obtains. While the major religions contain “projects of 
complete ontological fusion” (p. 138), most social organizations limit the expansion of the 
sacred. The contact points are restricted to a set of well-defined elements, such as sacred 
spaces, ritual objects, ceremonial periods, etc. 
    Does the division of ontologies presuppose a division of cognitive principles? Horton 
(1982) suggests that any cultural world is divided into a strongly sensate everyday world, 
which is quite similar between cultures (after all, people in few cultures have trouble with 
driving a car and understanding its physics), and an ideological and religious realm that could 
not be more different. This could mean that cognizing physical reality is constrained by other 
cognitive functions than metaphysics. However, where can we seek the common cognitive 
ground that has to be assumed for gradual transformations of ontologies? What is the basic 
format both kinds of ontology operate in? 
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    I propose that sacred ontologies operate on the same basic mechanisms as everyday 
ones do and widely use imagistic thought, but put them to use in highly specific, and often 
counter-intuitive ways. I also maintain that transitions from the everyday to the sacred world 
not ‘just happen’. They are usually assisted by complexly scripted techniques and social 
procedures, implemented both as body techniques and as mental techniques. A close 
attention to the cognitive particulars of these cultural techniques is called for. While the field 
of religious techniques is broad, I will focus on the crafting of imagery through rhetoric for the 
purpose of transforming one ontology into another, specifically between the everyday and the 
sacred. In other words, I will try to describe how an initial imagistic understanding is gradually 
transformed into another more holistic one that fuses the world. I will also skirt the rhetoric 
micro-mechanisms evoking the change, although my focus lies on the transformation of the 
evoked imagery itself. In a bird’s-eye view, modeling ontology changes in terms of 
dynamized imagery draws together the following assumptions: 
(1) A basic assumption is that everyday cognition features default imagery at a level 
of generic co-signatures (see ch.9). These image-schematic co-signatures underlying 
extended events in the profane life-world include LINEAR EVENT STRUCTURE, 
SITUATIONAL UNITY, or CAUSALITY and may be fairly universal. I will not discuss the 
occurrence or variability of these specific co-signatures in detail, my aim being a more 
theoretical one. I intend to demonstrate that, whatever defaults there are, they offer 
possibilities for being culturally transformed and harnessed to non-everyday 
purposes. 
(2) On the basis of these defaults there are manipulations of meaning and with it 
transformations of the imagery. Ritual or narrative is crafted by cultural actors to 
deconstruct defaults and put new more counterintuitive understandings in place. A 
major goal of these manipulations is to create holistic effects. This means promoting 
the idea that different contexts cohere, that thematic structures stretch through 
various cultural sub-worlds, and that seeming linearity of everyday life hides intricately 
entwined webs of meaning. Central rituals do this, in the respect that the meaning 
atoms brought together and unified in them are taken to radiate out into the world as 
a whole, since such a ritual stands for the social at large. 
(3) Since there is evidence that the above defaults are image-schematic, it seems 
plausible to assume that their replacements after deconstruction also are. Therefore, I 
will inquire how an image-schematic default is gradually transformed into another less 
natural understanding with a particular ideological function such as the promotion of 
holism. 
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NON-FOCAL CLUSTERS AND THE IMAGERY OF HOLISM 
We already examined several co-signatures involving focal clusters, i.e. conceptual spaces 
in with a central symbolic unit on which the others converge (ch.9). Now we will look at 
clusters without a single dominant center, but where, nonetheless, an extensive set of 
meaning-laden features is brought together in an experiential or symbolic metonymy in order 
to promote the social vision of togetherness, interrelatedness, or wholeness. This image-
schematic co-signature I will call a non-focal cluster. 
    Here is my basic theoretical claim: A sense of wholeness may arise through extended 
concept-networks that first integrate various unconnected facets of experience into a focal 
cluster and, on this basis, eventually assign a common ontology to them by transforming the 
cluster image into a single unified pattern. This can best be illustrated through an exemplary 
analysis taken from James Fernandez’ fertile work on religious revitalization movements in 
Western Africa. Following his description of the sermons in a religious revitalization cult 
among the Fang of Gabon called Bwiti, Fernandez (1986: 181-82) advances the following 
interpretation: 
 
“These sermons are what Vygotsky (1962) has called ‘thinking in complex’. The sequence of images – 
the body images, the forest images, the vital liquid images, the suspended things images, the food 
images – put forth are not dominated by any overall conceived and stated purpose or by any dominant 
image. The materials presented cluster around a complex – a sequence of organizing images. New 
materials from various domains of Fang experience are introduced on the basis of association by 
similarity or contiguity, contrast or complementarity with this sequence. But then again, abruptly, new 
elements with all their alternatives are allowed to enter the thought process and raise new thematic 
preoccupations – and to suggest new possible nuclei of attention. By any standard of administered 
intellectuality, such sermons seem diffuse and spontaneous in the extreme. And yet, as the 
sermonizer promises, they ‘tie together’ what brotherly enmity and witchcraft has torn asunder. By a 
sequence of ‘likenesses’ he shows that the world, fallen into devilish particularities, is really one thing. 
(...) The sequences are riddles, puzzles, that force the membership to answers that suggest an 
overarching order and a relatedness to the diversity of the cosmos. (...) they both condense and 
integrate that knowledge as they revitalize it. And the sequence of images link together various 
domains and levels of cultural experience. A cosmological integrity is suggested if not made explicit.” 
 
My reinterpretation of Fernandez’ work will not render in detail the various rhetorical devices 
employed in the sermon (for a full account see Fernandez 1982: ch.20). Since the sermons 
are highly complex polytropes comprising a host of dimensions, a brief summary of the 
diverse ways of tying things into a cosmological integrity must suffice here (1982: 563): First, 
there are thematic preoccupations, i.e. recurrent images that appear throughout different 
domains of representation. Images are sought that resonate on various levels: physical, 
family, socio-political, subsistence, and ritual. These multivocal symbols are compacted in a 
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variety of associations condensed as symbols. Second, essential opposites, like male and 
female, are reconciled through metaphorical equation with a mediating term that becomes 
their super-category. Third, through a choice of a set of sacred trees, each standing for a 
particular quality, a multidimensional ‘quality space’ of emotions is established with the 
purpose of moving the participants through the moods of dominance, subordinance, external 
or internal preoccupation, and corporeal or spiritual orientation. The image of the forest (i.e. 
the sum of the different trees) comes to stand for the spatial range of emotional qualities that 
humans can experience. In sum, the performance focuses the participants’ attention on a 
sequence of primary associations that are connected to society, self, creation, theology, and 
eschatology. The sermonizer moves from one subordinate performance to the next by 
associative chaining, sometimes by contiguity, sometimes by analogy. Fernandez speaks of 
a movement between sets of tropes and, elsewhere, between series of ‘micro-cosmogonies’ 
(1982: 561, 559). Hence, each metaphor or metonym picks out a part of experience and 
explores its associated affective dimension. But each only succeeds in exploring a part, but 
never the whole. There is “a constant search to ‘return to the whole’ out of dissatisfaction 
with the ‘partness’ of any of the devices of representation” (p. 562). Consequently the 
solution must lie in transforming all of these into a single whole. The following cognitive 
interpretation will focus on how partness can be overcome in an overall structural 
representation of the sermon as event. In a condensed version my argument is this: 
    A crucial point for understanding the sermon is the lack of a focal point or node. This 
implies an ever-shifting focus and puts different concepts and tropes on an equal footing. No 
single key-concept sticks out, so as to govern the rest. The tropes are roughly equal in 
momentary salience, a fact which also puts them on a par in ontological importance. 
Everything is valuable because everything dissolves into a larger identity. The imagistic 
operation which these intermeshing concepts give rise to in an image-schematic analysis is 
an enormous super-container in which all the different things contained are effectively 
consubstantial, since they are so intimately intertwined (see ch.9: SAMENESS OF ONTOLOGY IS 
SAMENESS OF CONTENT-SUBSTANCE OF A CONTAINER). In such a metaphoric conception of 
unity, the world is one single container of but one substance, which makes it of one founding. 
Assuming that the common container substance creates an image of a unified realm, it 
remains to be explained how this image is created in the mind. I shall argue that the 
emergence of this unified realm is facilitated by the sermon’s nature of ”seemingly random 
walks through a thicket of images” (op. cit.) that violates everyday expectations about 
causally meaningful events. 
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A. Shifting nuclei of attention within a frame. B. The particularities dissolve, while the 
common container substance (= common 
ontology) remains. 
 
After this provisional characterization a more detailed cognitive account of the two phases is 
in order. As can be seen in the figure above, I specifically propose that the sequence of 
images evoked in the sermon makes the participants conduct a quasi-scanning before their 
mind’s eye, like the ones they are used to do in trying to comprehend a more coherent 
everyday setting. In this scanning they move from one sub-sequence to the next, thereby 
shifting their nuclei of attention. As the encircling boundary in the diagram indicates, those 
who participate conceive the whole setting of the sermon as a bounded region.133 I will 
assume social interactions to involve the default expectation that one bounded sequence is 
about one sort of coherent thing, which makes for the basic essentials of a purposeful event. 
In other words, it is an implicit background expectation that the region is a realm, i.e. of one 
ontological kind. Thus, while an event-scanning usually takes place within a single cognitive 
domain, the sermon does not refer to any single well-formed domain. Instead, it refers to a 
whole cluster of them, the links appearing tenuous at best. In an attempt to make sense of 
the sermon, the audience tries to construct a domain common to all of the sub-sequences. 
This attempt is bound to fail, as long as the believers focus on the specific content of the sub-
sequences. In order to make sense of the event image-schematic thought is required on their 
part. They have to bring to bear the general notion of a meaningful network. Such a notion 
may consist of a PART-WHOLE schema with LINKS plus – conceivably – CONTAINER spaces 
with realm-like features, i.e. with each of them representing a specific ontology. The 
                                                 
133 This is motivated by the basic metaphor EVENTS ARE CONTAINERS, which follows the same logic as 
CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS. Things that belong together usually occur in spatial proximity. Likewise, 
actions that belong together can be metaphorically understood as spatially close to each other. 
Moreover, actions may have a temporal center and temporal boundaries creating in and out 
dimensions with regard to an event, just as containers do in the spatial domain. 
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difference among the individual ontologies designates the ‘devilish particularities’ pointed out 
by the sermonizer. 
    The crucial idea is that, in a second step that follows after actualizing the usual network 
structure of a complex event through PART-WHOLE and LINK, the usual event ontology breaks 
down. But how is this achieved? As we have seen, the breaking of the ‘devilish particularities’ 
is partly accomplished through riddles and puzzles that suggest an overarching order.134 This 
alone can hardly be the whole story, though. A factor at least as important relates to the 
sermon’s strangely erratic structure. A proposal by Ronald Langacker (1990c) on the nature 
of the dominant prototype (i.e. default expectation) for events, which has been already 
described in chapter 8, can be applied here. Langacker’s analysis of clauses describing 
actions rests on the basic image schema for FORCE transmission in action chains. According 
to this view, action chains can be imagined like one billiard ball transmitting its impetus to 
another one, and so on, until the energy is finally absorbed and the event ends. Events are 
like the transmission of force in that one part is causally related to the following much in the 
way that one moving object transmits its impetus to the next In Langacker’s view, which is 
based on Leonard Talmy’s work on FORCE relations, a situation can be cognitively described 
in terms of an interactive network of parts representing the constituents of a situation and 
their selective chaining into a particular causal sequence, depending on the thought that is to 
be expressed. In the sermon a coherent chain is not established, instead there is a constant 
shift between nuclei of attention. In Langacker’s terms we have a consecutive local profiling 
of network constituents, but one that does not produce any reasonable summary scanning. 
In a series of unrelated local profiles it is impossible to make out an event of one kind, so that 
the ontological default expectation cannot kick in. On the assumption that Langacker’s 
billiard-ball logic of events can be extended from single clause patterns to more complex 
thought sequences – and there is no apparent reason why it should not – we get a plausible 
explanation for the breakdown of the initial default event-ontology. The default event ontology 
includes the expectation that it should be causally sequenced, meaning that one has to be 
                                                 
134
 How exactly this happens is no central concern here. It suffices to know that, aside from the erratic 
event-structure, the content of the sermon matters considerably in providing guidelines. I emphasize 
this to ensure that dyed-in-the-wool structuralists do no get the wrong idea here: Clearly, the evoked 
event-structure is only a background phenomenon emerging from the primary understanding of the 
tropical sub-sequences or even individual sentences. In listening to speech sequences we always 
activate both levels to a certain degree. While our attention is focused on the ongoing speech we 
crosscheck it with our structural background assumptions about the speech-event as a whole. Often 
our attention wanders back and forth between parts and whole, as we try to make sense of tricky 
passages. (Note that this has been described as a major characteristic of the hermeneutical circle of 
knowledge growth.) 
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able to make out a force structure linking the parts of the sequence. I conclude that, in the 
Bwiti example, a central factor contributing to the particularized ontologies’ breakdown is that 
an underlying force structure remains elusive to the audience of the sermon. Following Boyer 
(1994a) and Sperber (1996), this might be interpreted as a variety of cognitive ‘counter-
intuitiveness’, which heightens the impact of the sequence and makes it more memorable.135 
    At the point where the expected event ontology has been thoroughly deconstructed by 
puzzling the audience a new one needs to be found under the guidance of the sermonizer. 
Fernandez’ description of the second phase shows how a different sort of ontology can 
become effective. The nature of this new ontology follows directly from the religious purpose 
of the sermon. The sermon is clearly designed to make an integrative statement on the world 
as a whole. Whereas we usually experience a certain fragmentation of ontologies, the 
sermon as a religious act lays its finger on the fundamental human problem of integration in 
a world split between mundane and spiritual, social and personal, joy and grief, etc. It tries to 
resolve the problem of how to achieve a cosmological unity between these states. 
    I submit that the process can again be understood as an image-schematic operation. What 
happens in the mind when the particularities dissolve? By saying that their disparate sub-
regions dissolve into an overarching unity I propose that this quite literally happens in the 
participants’ imagistic conceptualization. The sub-regions, which represent the various parts 
of the sermon, dissolve as their local container boundaries become permeable. Eventually 
they fade away. Expressed in the slightly different terms of Gestalt psychology, the 
awareness of the differing ontologies recedes into the background, while a new aspect is 
foregrounded. As attention is drawn away from the sub-regions, this encompassing level of 
unity is imagistically profiled.136 
    This encompassing level arises by way of profiling a supra-container, which 
conceptualizes the event and, by implication, the disparities of the world as a whole. (It is 
worth emphasizing that the container is not an unmotivated image that is projected onto the 
experience of the sermon, but that it arises from the primary conceptualization of the 
situation as container itself.) The holistic construal means that the participants envisage the 
                                                 
135 We can hypothesize that an event’s salience is highest in exactly the kind of event presented here, 
which is on the one hand erratic, but on the other hand can hardly be dismissed as wholly 
meaningless, because recurrent thematic preoccupations and symbols stick out. Boyer (1994: 121) 
considers as optimal such representations that strike a balance between being imaginative and 
attention-demanding as well as having inferential potential and being learnable. 
136 With respect to the recurring symbols we can speculate that they contribute to a ‘diluting’ of local 
ontologies by appearing in different contexts. But, if I read Fernandez correctly, this happens without 
any of them assuming the status of a governing key-concept: rather anything can be a key concept, 
and many symbols can be one at the same time. 
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supra-container as a region filled with contents of one kind. More specifically, the image-
schematic transformation between multiplex and mass seems to be relevant here. We may 
assume that initially the audience construed the parts of the sermon as a multiplex, i.e. 
logically and therefore spatially distinct. Then, because the causal sequence ontology was 
not easy to apply to the experience and because of the speaker’s hints at intricate 
intermeshed links, a new construal emerges. Langacker (1987a: 259) describes this as a 
construction that 
 
“superimposes its own profile on this base and structures it in a manner that highlights those respects 
in which the profiled states of the process are constant; the component states are viewed at a level of 
abstraction sufficient to neutralize their difference and are thus construed as a kind of mass. The 
individual elements of this mass (…) lose their separate identity and are considered effectively 
equivalent owing to their shared participants and their common status as facets of the same base 
process.” [italics mine]137 
 
Applied to the audience’s representation of the sermon, this means that the new construal 
views the event region of the sermon as a mass, rather than a multiplex of individual entities. 
The hallmark of the mass construal is that effective homogeneity is attributed to the realm 
throughout its spatial expanse. Thus, the final effect is that the whole sermon setting is 
conceived of one consubstantial ontological realm. It is crucial to realize that this does not 
only apply to the sermon as event but also to the view of its contents. Not only the event of 
the sermon itself is being consubstantialized, it is everything the sermon made reference to, 
namely the entire world (see ch.9). Thus, wholeness is established by metonymical 
implication. 
 
CONCLUSION 
I tried to show in this chapter that folk-models of ontology require dynamic transformations of 
imagery and, more generally, that ontology as a dynamic phenomenon dovetails with the 
imagery approach in interesting respects. I tried to give a first flavor of how dynamic 
ontologies work by extending the notion of image schema transformation to include more 
complex effects than are usually discussed. The examples analyzed here are by no means 
representative of the variety or complexity that is possible in ontologies. They cannot be but 
                                                 
137Langacker’s characterization originally refers to the construal of grammatical constructions, 
specifically to the operation of highlighting the constant aspects of a process in English progressive 
constructions. Irrespective of this, his words fit into our context perfectly, seemingly because the mass 
construal is a quite general cognitive faculty with a broad range of uses. 
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a first step suggesting directions for further research. However, we may draw some general 
theoretical and methodological conclusions: 
(1) In complex mental models of mixed ontologies such as qi we find multi-
perspective blends or superimpositions of images. By virtue of this fact allegedly 
incompatible conceptual elements, e.g. substance and process, can be imagined 
simultaneously, usually in a figure-ground arrangement. Depending on which aspect 
of the model is highlighted the profiled image in the foreground changes. 
(2) A similar phenomenon can be seen in Gestalt switches, which differ only slightly. 
Here the incompatible elements are not integrated into a logical model that can be 
conceived statically. Such a model is not necessarily intuitively clear and without 
possible contradictions. The juxtaposition of elements is employed for the purpose of 
irritating and gives rise to alternating imagery. A general cognitive feature reflected in 
these phenomena is that people have to keep several images in mind simultaneously 
and imagine both partial congruence and partial incongruence between them, such as 
the parallelism between INCLUSION and IDENTITY schemas. The fact that complex 
cosmological models encompass many elements points to the necessity of 
reconstructing how people switch between partial images. 
(3) As a general conclusion it appears that the cognitive study of cultural phenomena 
analysis often requires a dynamical analysis, most obviously in the case of ritual and 
religious narrative. In the Bwiti case study I presented the theoretical hypothesis that 
image-schematic defaults (= co-signatures) are transformed into more holistic – and 
perhaps less intuitive – co-signatures through narrative, rhetoric, and ritual. Hence, 
deconstructions of everyday event co-signatures and subsequent novel images 
reshape ontologies for the creation of existential meaning. The methodological upshot 
is that we have to think about methods by which we can find clues for ontological 
imagery in ritual and narrative. Going beyond the sketch produced here, future 
approaches should also account for the mechanisms by which symbolic cues produce 
imagery transformations at the grand scale. This requires that anthropologists take 
image schema theory into the field and devise methods of analyzing ethnography by 
attending to visual, conceptual, and embodied metaphors in their overall symbolic 
interaction. Together with interpretive accounts of symbolism, cognitive anthropology 
should use what we know about general schemas that shape expectational patterns 
about whole events. More about the relationship between individual symbols and 
overall event meanings, albeit not in every case cognitive standard defaults, will be 
said in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 11:                                                                                              
Image Schemas of Action Sequences – A Typology  
 
Surprisingly little has been written about metaphors and images evoked by entire texts or 
other large-scale episodic units. What exits mostly concerns explicit parables (e.g. Turner 
1996), but not more implicit meanings. In response to this lack the following chapters bring 
together insights from cognitive linguistics on the role of schematic imagery in metaphor 
comprehension and the characteristic concern of cultural anthropology with large-scale 
meanings. I would like to inquire how image schemas contribute to the comprehension of 
complex action sequences, e.g. in music, dance, ritual, or narrative. This raises a cluster of 
questions, which I set out to answer in this and the next chapter with the help of our imagery-
based framework: 
(1) How does imagery determine the structural topology of sequences? 
(2) How can large-scale meaning content be condensed into simpler images?  
(3) As a corollary of the previous two, how are formal sequence structures and the 
meaning content of sequences related (iconicity)? 
(4) And, speaking of the meaning level only, how do large- and small-scale meaning 
structures of sequences interact with one another (overall interpretations and local 
symbols)? 
 
By way of introduction I will reiterate some basic points concerning the alternative formats 
that mental representations can assume. Next, it is important to understand that imagery is 
used for various different mechanisms in episode comprehension. I will adapt the distinction 
between structural co-signatures and predominantly semantic schemas made in chapter 8 to 
sequential cognition. My typology of image schemas usage in episodes broadly divides 
between image schemas of sequence structure (i.e. the symbolic medium) and such dealing 
with sequence content (i.e. the evoked mental representation). In further consequence, it is 
the image-schematic nature of both types that makes so-called ‘iconic’ mappings between 
structure and content possible. Finally, I will argue that we may understand and recall 
narratives, movies, plays, books, rituals, and the like by selecting and condensing essential 
features into a imagistic key metaphor or ‘plot-gene’. 
 
1. Representational formats revisited 
In the literature on representational formats there is a general agreement that all kinds of 
complex information, including percepts, memories, imagination, words and symbols – and 
some would even include emotions here (Palmer 1996) – are represented in the mind either 
as imagery or as propositional knowledge. The former term characterizes mental pictures of 
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a visual, auditory, haptic, proprioceptive, kinesthetic, olfactory, or gustatory kind that are 
memorized and retrieved as analog Gestalts. The latter implies that complex knowledge is 
stored in language-like chains. As such they form a digital code of discrete units linked by 
syntactic organizing principles. Both imagery and propositions are relevant ways of 
explaining knowledge and typically occur in a closely interwoven fashion, as Paivio and 
Walsh (1993) argue. The impassioned arguments of the 1980s imagery debate turning on 
the question whether either one of these formats can be reduced to the other can be set 
aside here. Among others, Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) have made a convincing case 
contra the cognitive psychologist Pylyshyn that imagery is an irreducible level of meaning in 
its own right rather than an epiphenomenon of a deeper level of cognition that is supposedly 
more ‘real’.138 For a review of empirical studies which bolster this line of argument see Gibbs 
(1994). The converse question is more interesting but has not been entirely settled: Whether 
propositions are simply a kind of imagery of extreme abstraction and condensation, as 
Langacker (1987a) seems to imply, or an irreducible level in its own right, is a question that 
lacks clear terms so far. Uncontroversial definitions of propositional thought are hard to find, 
especially since most definitions have a strong flavor of defaults, meaning anything that is 
not imagistic in the simple sense but failing to explain what propositions are in terms of 
mental phenomena (apart from the fact that they are algorithms to the brain substrate). 
However, for our purposes this debate is more technical than substantial. Both terms, 
imagery and propositions, make sense in a broad way of speaking. The heuristic value of the 
distinction remains, even if it should turn out that propositions have to do with the imagistic 
faculties of the mind in a way not exactly recognized to date. Some concepts will seem more 
given to an imagistic description with analog Gestalt features, others to a classification as a 
proposition due to their degree of abstraction or structural complexity that defies a simple 
image. With complex concepts not so easily described our preferred characterization will 
often simply depend on which aspect we choose to highlight. Belonging to one of these 
formats is usually not a strict matter of either/or. I shall try to convey an idea of how they 
interact as we go through a short description of their basic differences. 
    Let us start with the category of mental imagery. It spans a continuum ranging from very 
concrete to highly schematic. The pole of detailed imagery is commonly referred to as ‘rich 
images’ (or ‘mental pictures) and the pole of schematic or skeletal imagery as ‘image 
                                                 
138 Any account of meaning that excludes imagery runs into insurmountable difficulties. Johnson’s 
(1987) argument is pertinent here that the developmental origin of meaning relates to spatial images 
embodied as preconceptual knowledge. More importantly, even adults primarily experience words and 
thoughts as meaningful because they evoke analog images in the mind. Meaning as a subjective 
phenomenon lies in the representations arising before the mind’s eye and can never be completely 
explained on the basis of lower level functions of the brain substrate. 
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schemas’. Whenever a rich image is progressively schematized and its detail features are 
eliminated in the mind one gets an image schema. While rich images may almost be like 
sensory percepts in their wealth of details, image schemas usually result from picking out 
certain structural features and discarding the rest. For example, if we have a mental image of 
a basket of apples and extract its structure we will get a schematic container. This abstract 
container image is a generic image which underlies the basket and a multitude of other rich 
images alike. A room, a human body, a courtyard, the space defined by the drawn borders in 
a map, an imaginary space such as Heaven, or a mathematical set all partake of this basic 
container topology. By its very definition the container schema then is, like any other image 
schema, the representation of a transcontextual mental entity. Even though every particular 
instance is extracted from a specific image, there is an awareness that identical skeletal 
features underlie many other instances. At the level of basal elements of cognition such as 
FORCE, BALANCE, CYCLE, PATH, PART-WHOLE, CONTAINER, CENTER-PERIPHERY, UP-DOWN, 
FRONT-BACK, etc. the form is transcontextual by virtue of bestowing a similar basic topology 
on all of these superficially distinct mental images. However, to avoid misunderstanding it is 
important to see that rich images and images schemas are not necessarily different images, 
but two co-present levels of a single image between which we can let our attention wander or 
switch mental focus at will. Depending on our intentions our attention might either attach to 
the details, like an apple stem or a worm, or to the structure of the whole basket as a 
container. However, we can also find cases when one level is present in the mind first and 
the other is subsequently evoked: In one kind of instances image-schematic meaning 
emerges from a prior rich image memory. This is the case when we notice previously 
unconsidered analogies between two rich images by picking out meaningful structures that 
let us see the higher-level similarity between things considerably different in their details. An 
example would be the creation of a metaphor like “the body politic”, in which we either notice 
that human bodies and the borderline on a map are schematically analogous containers with 
elements inside or perhaps even by noticing that the functional relations of a body and those 
of a society are analog (presumably in an image of links, conduits and acting forces). 
Conversely, in other cases our memory stores highly schematized images as such. This is 
the case when we learn the notion of mathematical set, which we can either use in pure 
abstraction, as variables like X, Y and Z, or fill with all kinds of specific images like apples, 
oranges, houses, and people, or rules, ideas, reasons, conditions, and other abstract 
entities. 
    The meaning of these two poles of imagistic thought is additionally enriched by associative 
inferences of propositional knowledge. For example, in our image of the apple basket the 
recognition is easily called up that baskets are made of wicker and may be used for 
harvesting or ballooning, that apples taste sweet, and even very culturally specific knowledge 
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like that cider may be brewed from them, that Wilhelm Tell had to shoot one off his son’s 
head, that Snow-white was poisoned by one, and that New York is referred to as ‘Big Apple’, 
or that there is brand of personal computers carrying that name. None of these surrounding 
knowledge bits are represented as a part of the core imagery of the basket. Instead a vast 
array of extra knowledge, such as other tales by the Grimm brothers, the historical 
background of medieval Hapsburg Switzerland, or recent fashion trends from New York, can 
become the focus of attention if chosen. 
    Many analysts of the past credit propositional knowledge with the greatest power in 
creating complex conceptual models. Such a propositional view rests on the underlying 
metaphor THE SHAPE OF THOUGHT IS LANGUAGE LIKE. To its proponents this seems to be the 
most intuitive way of conceiving how cognitive operations of fairly elevated complexity work. 
Although recent publications on cognitive models make reference to, both, imagery and 
propositions, the debate has got somewhat stuck. Several authors tend toward one or the 
other pole but leave the terms of their preference largely implicit, reflecting the insufficient 
clarity as to how the two formats involved are related and what they mean. While authors 
such as Quinn (1991) are wont to conceive the predominant way that complex cultural 
models are structured as propositional, the works of Palmer (1996) and Werth (1999) have 
gained some ground in demonstrating the significance of complex imagery. In line with these 
two authors, I want to accord center stage to imagery here. My aim is to demonstrate that 
imagery is not restricted to concepts that are static, isolated, or low in complexity and that 
imagery constitutes a viable alternative for the explanation of the complex characteristics of 
dynamized sequences.  
    The basic idea is simple. When we think or speak of complex action scenarios and other 
temporal scenes we imagine detailed images not unlike comic-strip panels or mini-movies, 
from which we can extract skeletal features. This process results in the same kind of image 
schemas that stem from extractions from static mental pictures, only now they are 
dynamized or merge features from different phases into one. The major advantage afforded 
by this view is that through images complex sequences can be understood as integrated 
wholes, i.e. conceptual Gestalts. As I will try to show, this is important because as Gestalt 
images they can again be recognized as similar to more familiar cultural schemas that are 
also Gestalt-like. Of course, the whole of an extended narrative can never go into a single 
Gestalt. However, that which we would describe as its ‘plot’, i.e. its main scaffold of meaning, 
can. In the heuristic terms proposed above it may make sense to say that the imagistic 
aspect is precisely that one pertaining to an overall image of the main plot of a narrative, 
while the complexities are understood through propositions attached at various points. 
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2. Kinds of image schemas used in sequence cognition 
Next, we can identify two essentially different manners of how image schemas are deployed 
in episode comprehension. A major hypothesis of chapter 8 was that imagery encompasses 
a more semantic pole and a more structural pole of co-signatures. This is now applied to 
sequences: The first such function relates to the understanding of the structure of the event 
on a global scale. The second function relates to the content evoked by a story or any other 
symbolic sequence and to the way it may be condensed into a summary image. Language 
has a double nature. It has important formal properties, yet it also evokes imagery that has 
nothing to do with the form per se. A commonplace example is the utterance “there is a tree 
over there”. On the one hand we might notice structural features such as the number of 
words (six), the symmetric reappearance of the word “there” on both ends, or the word order 
that signals an affirmation rather than a question. However such structural features differ 
from the Gestalt image of a tree that appears before our mind’s eye the very moment the 
sentence’s meaning is grasped. Although the separation of structural and semantic image 
schemas represents a graded distinction within a continuous imagistic faculty, I advocate 
adopting it here. It is a strong heuristic that guards against conflating issues. In sum, we get 
two basic modes of image schema usage and one more complex level that combines the two 
primary modes: Structure-related image schemas of event-topologies and content-related 
(semantic) image schemas can be mapped onto one another by so-called iconic mappings. 
Here is a brief characterization of each level: 
    (1) We have reason to believe that the formal features of a sequence are understood 
through image schemas evoked by its temporal topology. If Lakoff (1987) is correct that all 
sorts of cognitive tools acquire meaning through their image schema structure (i.e. what I call 
co-signatures), this applies to sequential schemas too. Skeletal grids of a spatialized kind aid 
the understanding of the global topology of events. I propose that the temporal schemas 
characterized in the cognitive literature as ‘scripts’ (Schank and Abelson 1977), ‘event-
schemas’ (Mandler 1984), or ‘scenarios’ (D’Andrade 1995, Holland/Quinn 1987, Lakoff & 
Kövecses 1987) contain image-schematic structure: They are WHOLES (events) with PARTS 
(phases) connected by LINKS on a PATH. A specific characteristic of scripts, which are 
schematically defined prototypes of well-understood social situations, is that they line up and 
specify slots for filling in missing information. These slots are quite possibly understood as 
located spatially within the sequence by a PATH-INTERVAL schema. 
    These assumptions are not unfounded: Research on event structure, surveyed in Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999), as well as the ‘billiard ball’ model of causality by Langacker (1990c) 
indicates basic features of events (cf. chapter 8). Events are mentally interpreted as bounded 
structures (CONTAINERS) distinct from the event before and after, the time dimension of an 
event is considered as PATH that is followed, and we often expect events to reveal a causal 
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structure to our mind, like in the image of billiard balls transmitting their FORCE IMPETUS in a 
chain. Thus it might be said that, to begin with, it is the recognition of image-schematic 
structure that makes us define events as such. Although temporal events do not have an 
intrinsic form, we conventionally conceive of them as being spatially extended objects having 
shape and including continuity, discreteness, completion, open-endedness, circularity, part-
whole relations, etc. (cf. Turner 1993: 297). I propose that in more complex cases events 
may display additional structures, notably dimensions of NESTING (i.e. embedded figures), 
BALANCE (or other forms of density and relative distribution, such as CLIMAX or FADING), CYCLE 
(or other forms of rhythm and relative tempo), and ANTAGONISM (a kind of contrastive force 
dynamically marking a point of maximum friction).  
    (2) From all this we need to distinguish the case where image schemas are elicited by the 
semantic content of an event. That the parts of stories, plays, rituals, or songs evoke different 
mental images phrase-by-phrase follows directly from Langacker’s theory of language 
comprehension. I want to add a series of far-reaching claims about the supra-phrase level to 
this. My core hypothesis is that an event’s content can become available to the mind as an 
overall representation, not unlike recalling the plot of a movie from memory. Hinging on this 
central assumption I want to advance four related claims:  
(a) The rich images of a whole event can be condensed into a summary image that is 
accessed simultaneously, i.e. in a ‘one-shot’ fashion. 
(b) Such a condensed version can be described as a metaphoric core-theme – an 
equally apt term from literary theory is ‘plot-gene’ (Lotman 1990).  
(c) A plot-gene is often image-schematic, or at least partially so.  
(d) In some cases an adequate understanding of an event’s meaning unfolds to a 
significant extent through a schematic summary image. In other words, what has 
been called a ‘megametaphor’ evoked by gradual innuendo (Werth 1999) can have 
image-schematic structure like any other metaphor. 
 
That meaningful image schemas occur when we extract structural features from a 
condensed image of an event will be shown in chapter 12 through Joseph Conrad’s novel 
The Heart of Darkness. The novel’s plot lets our mind follow a riverboat journey into the 
unfathomed African rainforest. At the level of content our mind builds up a summary image of 
a gradual transgression from a well-known region to a far-off realm. I will argue that the 
image of this journey is connected to the Western model of the self by virtue of a common 
image schema structure and so takes on a strong metaphorical meaning. In effect, the novel 
metaphorically depicts the riverboat journey as an act of penetration from the realm of the 
relatively secure self to the realm of the unknown ‘Other’. Thus, an important key to the 
cultural response to the story lies in the image schema of transgression. Next, I will argue 
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that the novel’s megametaphor ultimately only makes sense on the basis of the Victorian 
cultural model of the self. The journey into the unknown thus plays on other cultural schemas 
of the Victorian age to do with the ‘Other’ in one’s own soul. I will show that the spatial and 
imagistic structure of the self model is responsible for the required metaphor comprehension, 
and that Conrad ingeniously crafted his novel into a spatialized metaphor which gears into 
this basic self-model. 
    (3) Not infrequently the two prior mechanisms of structural and semantic image schemas 
are combined. This is possible if the imagery evoked by an event format (i.e. musical or 
linguistic images of rhythm, phases, fading, build-up of tension, etc.) and the semantic 
imagery share image schema structure. The external format and the evoked content of an 
event can then be mapped onto each other. A mapping between sequence content and form 
is possible, because both the form of a sentence and the image it evokes can be scanned 
alike. Take reading as a temporal event and the temporal event that is described in the story 
itself. Strikingly, both can be scanned as temporal images and both scanning operations 
employ the same image schema format, so that a metaphoric relationship can obtain 
between them (Lakoff/Turner 1989). Such an image-schematic mapping between the 
structure and the content dimension is termed iconic relationship. A major function of iconic 
similarity is the effect of mutual reinforcement. 
    Resting on this general definition of iconicity, I will later argue that a series of other kinds 
of image schemas are eligible for iconic mappings and may enter into a veritable iconic web 
of relationships. This opens fascinating possibilities for analysis because it points to a theory 
of multimedia cognition. There are major examples in literature and ethnography where a 
particular image recurs throughout a sequence in various contexts and forms to invoke a 
core-theme. We will explore a marriage-ritual from Ladakh where the object of an arrow, the 
act of penetrating a house, and possibly the body feelings of the bride are part of the same 
meaning complex. Overall, phonological forms, semantic imagery, mental scenario features, 
action-structures, objects and emblems, and body feelings can evoke topologically similar 
images. The crucial point is that these differing surface media operate on the same imagistic 
principles. When image-schematic analogies between them are perceived the effect is two-
fold. On the one hand, ideas can be given salience by repeating them across different 
contexts or phases of a sequence. On the other hand, a recurrent core-theme contributes to 
the integration of the parts of the sequence, since the parts are perceived to have a single 
underlying idea.  
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3. Structural forms as images 
In a first step we need to give substance to the basic idea that sequential forms are 
perceived and experienced as meaningful through intentionally construed spatialized 
imagery. 
 
MUSICAL FORMS AND ‘PERCEIVING AS’ 
A suitable starting point for the analysis of sequential forms is the experience of music as 
meaningful pattern. Nicholas Cook’s (1990) work on structural imagery in musical experience 
offers suggestive evidence for three interesting findings: 
(1) Perceptual form is perceived only through a constructive mental act, rather than 
having a preexisting shape. 
(2) Expectational patterns about genres (i.e. typified cultural background schemas) 
shape the perception of what is heard and how it is heard (‘hearing as’). 
(3) Large-scale forms are understood through the attribution of structural image 
schemas, although experts are more proficient in constructing these than laymen. 
 
Let us consider the points in turn. What we experience in listening to music we experience as 
the form we impose. Even at the lowest level of cognition, experimental evidence indicates 
that the sensation of tone extended in time is itself an imposed form. Tone is experienced in 
contrast and in patterns, and that is why a single auditory stimulus in itself has little 
meaning.139 The perception of a continuing tone of a pitch is itself a psychological construct. 
For one thing, it is subject to the basic perceptual principle of closure posited by Gestalt 
psychology and now documented in a rich literature of experimental demonstrations. This 
means that an alternation of tones and gaps can be heard as continuous, if the gaps are not 
too long – the missing noise is filled in by the cognitive – auditory system. The same principle 
also operates in the perceptual synthesis of successive tones that create the experience of a 
musical line, as a number of laboratory experiments show. This act of mental synthesis can 
be experimentally demonstrated. When the similar tones of two different musical lines are 
presented in a scrambled way instead of separately to the right and the left ear, the hearer 
will regroup the stimulus, so that she will actually hear one meaningful line in one headphone 
                                                 
139 For linguistic utterances, however, such an exclusively structuralist view of meaning residing only in 
contrastive relations is misguided. The main reason is that – if we follow Langacker’s Gestalt theory of 
language – even the most primary word-units evoke complex relational patterns or sequences on a 
mental scene. (This contrasts with the traditional theory of semantics, which tends to see words as 
symbols without much inner structure, much as mathematical variables, and therefore perceives them 
as cognitive primitives. As such they are defined through their relations to other primitives rather than 
through their own intrinsic structure appearing in the evoked imagery.) 
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and the second in the other, even though both headphones only produce erratic jumps of 
frequency (p. 23f).  
    Another pertinent result issuing from musicological research is that musical lines are not 
heard as a series of individuals but as a single moving line. Music is perceived as a 
movement only through a spatialized image, i.e. a metaphor. This results from an auditory 
scanning procedure. As our perceptual focus passes from one topological location to another 
it creates the image of a movement in space. The line is perceived as a continuous journey 
through the sound medium, rather than incoherent individual sounds. In this way the time 
structure of an auditory event is spatialized. 
    There is another important consideration worth developing. How we perceive music is 
shaped by acquired contextual expectations for an event genre. Cook’s work supports the 
thesis that preconceived ideas about a kind of musical event shape how a given part is 
heard. People interpret ”the sound of the music as a token of something that in some sense 
exists independently of the sound” (p. 35). Music is heard as music of a specific genre, 
whereby a specific intentionality is bestowed upon the perceptual act. In other words, in the 
imagination the processed music segment is inserted in an expectational frame, in relation to 
which the segment is interpreted. This frame is defined by the musical genre and may be 
described as a musical ‘script’ in the sense of Schank and Abelson (1977). There is an 
experience of hearing a composition through the sound, rather than hearing the sound as 
such. Of course, this applies especially to musically trained people. If all this is correct, at 
least people familiar with the genre undergo an experience that, paraphrasing Wittgenstein, 
we can call ‘hearing as’. Cook gives as an example the genre of the fugue. In hearing a 
fugue as a fugue one hears the opening bar and then the entry of the first voice as already 
pregnant with the subsequent entries. Parts of different bars will be heard as extensions of 
one another, rather than unrelated elements (p. 31). Thus, background expectations cued by 
the context lead us to hear a piece of music as a specific genre. While one is not forced to 
hear the fugue as such, the sense of four continuous lines and an interaction between them 
creating a configuration are lost otherwise.  
    We have just seen the function of unifying images in the case of tone constancy, musical 
lines, etc. The reverse phenomenon of an internally differentiating projection on an 
unstructured whole can also make events meaningful. For example, the ‘inner-ear’ of a 
composer using a piano for composing a symphony can hear the discordant tones he 
produces with meaning in them because he interprets them as played by different 
instruments (p. 187). The bewildered people overhearing his work interpret them as a 
meaningless blotch of sounds. In the composer’s mind what is perceptually a single 
undifferentiated event cognitively turns into several parallel events, which create a balanced 
and harmonic relationship.  
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    Without doubt this mechanism of ‘hearing as’, ‘seeing as’, etc., is a very common feature 
of many cultural contexts. It is of particular importance for rituals, which could frequently not 
be understood otherwise. To take an example from religious ritual, if the Christian Advent 
rituals were not pregnant with the expectation of Christmas, a resonance of the Old 
Testament prophesies, and its significance for the Christian religion in general, it would not 
be experienced the way it does. A segment is interpreted as part of a more extensive 
scenario model, be it of a musical sequence or of a broader ritual context. Hence, much of 
cultural meaning resides in a particular mode of ‘perceiving as’ pregnant with culturally 
salient expectations. In sum, context-appropriate expectations (as defined by cultural or 
social scripts) influence the act of perception itself. 
    Let us now turn to the particular claim that large-scale formal structures are interpreted as 
image schemas. Cook suggests that musicians who are used to reading scores experience a 
spatial, even visual, awareness of the overall form of a piece of music when they hear it. The 
most conclusive sort of evidence for this comes from experimental studies with laymen. 
Before we turn to this let us start with an outline of music theory and its strong claims about 
spatial imagery (Cook 1990:51ff). The evidence is instructive although it involves both a 
cultural and an expert bias. The prevailing tenets of Western musical analysis generally 
include seeing musical structures as a tropical PART-WHOLE relation. The underlying premise 
is that what happens between individual notes in terms of counterpoint can also occur on a 
higher level. The modulation of key areas contrasts them in an analogous way to individual 
notes, thus raising tension or dissonance to the level of total structure. This is characteristic 
of the sonata genre. Stressing the part-whole trope entails that the piece is meaningful only 
as entirety. In sonatas the contrasts are resolved and overall BALANCE is established only 
when the thematic material of a piece is perceived in total.  
    Not wholly unrelated to this, the school of analysis harking back to Schenker interprets 
musical forms as arising from a ground in a kind of figure-ground relation. A symphony may 
have a ‘home key’ as ground, in the sense that all other keys through which the music 
passes are to be understood in relation to this overall tonic. If this is correct, a piece has only 
one tonality landmark, while every other segment represents only trajectors appreciated 
relative to the basis. In other words, there are deviations from and subsequent 
reapproximations to a marked base. Schönberg, for one, expounded this view explicitly and 
related the way a given key is experienced to the distance and relationship to the overall 
tonic. According to adherents of this view, the closed tonal plan of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century composition represents an arch-shaped tensional contour in which the movement 
away from and subsequent return to the ‘home key’ creates a sense of finality (see 
Hofstadter’s Gödel, Escher, Bach 1979: 129f). 
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    Clearly, this movement in tonal space can be interpreted as image-schematic. We can 
assume that tension is a multi-modal concept in the sense that we cannot only experience it 
kinesthetically but acoustically and visually as well. Hence, the phases of the music piece are 
evaluated in a spatial and metaphoric way that perceives divergence from the ‘home key’ as 
spatial distance and as kinesthetic tension. The phases scanned summarily give rise to an 
arc stretching through the temporal dimension. The arc shape is created by the rising and 
falling degree of tension relative to the home key. The attributed large-scale form is activated 
as an image schema. We can generalize as follows: The meaning of a large-scale form 
resides in the topological features of this schema, just as the esthetic meaning of a musical 
form resides in imagistic, the building up of tension, and its resolution. 
 
TESTING FOR THE COGNITIVE REALITY OF THE LARGE SCALE 
The question of cognitive reality has to be examined carefully lest we overstretch our claims. 
Many findings may apply to musical experts, but not to average listeners. Most notably, there 
is the problematic issue of short-term memory constraints. For example, there is 
experimental evidence to show that tonal closure has psychological reality for the listener 
only if the time-scale involved is very small: Despite the fundamental importance that 
musicians usually attach to it, there is no clear experimental confirmation that the untrained 
listener actually notices when a piece of music, after variations and intermezzi of several 
minutes, returns to the basic tone (p. 54ff). Therefore, there can be discrepancies between 
the experience of the listener and the structure of the score on a higher level that is only 
accessible to the music analyst. 
    A general caveat, which applies not only to musical structure, follows from this: For large-
scale formal units the psychological reality for the subject cannot be simply taken for granted. 
We must concede that a high degree of expertise is needed to hear the music as a formal 
structure. Such expertise makes it possible to ‘see’ musical events temporally remote from 
each other as an objective structure and not least due to the expert’s familiarity with visual 
devices such as musical scores. Thus, mental or material mediating devices may 
significantly increase the performance in grasping large-scale forms.140 However, in a survey 
of experimental studies Cook finds that the constraint of experts’ mediating devices does not 
identically apply to musical forms of all magnitudes. Three levels of time-scale may be 
distinguished:  
                                                 
140 This problem by no means only exists in the area of music. Several recent authors, such as the 
anthropologist McCallum (1996), leveled very similar points of criticism against Lévi -Strauss’ often too 
sweeping claims about the systematical structural codes he artfully extracted from myth, ritual, and 
everyday action. 
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(1) At the lowest level of musical organization – hearing a tone or hearing a scale – 
perceptual grouping is involuntary to a high degree.  
(2) At the intermediary level – hearing a couple of bars – listeners can decide to some 
degree what they want to hear. At this level music can be heard as grouped in one 
way or the other, depending on what the listener knows or is told about the music (p. 
41). Here cultural and contextual expectations, moods, and associations of individuals 
give rise to what we called ‘hearing as’.  
(3) It is only at the highest level, that of large-scale forms, that average listeners may 
not succeed at all at hearing the music as form, unless they have been trained to use 
mediating devices such as the sort of spatialized overlay that a score provides. 
 
Therefore, untrained persons perceive spatialized forms in music more readily when they 
occur on the intermediary scale. An example for such intermediary-scale forms that are 
cognitively highly effective with laymen are classically used music endings that evoke 
schemas of dynamic movement (p. 43). Regarding the use of pitch another frequent middle-
level schema employs the movement towards a vanishing point, as in the stock nineteenth 
century close on the tonic. Occasionally an alternative schema is used that builds up a 
dynamic climax and then breaks off.  
    Furthermore, how strongly forms are constrained by short-term memory depends on the 
kind of musical cues. This becomes evident when we compare the form of fugue and the 
form of tonal closure in a piece of whatever genre. The multi-tonal structure of the fugue may 
be called a large-scale structure, but it is nonetheless constantly present. A constant hint of 
multivocality reverberates throughout a fugue, so that the synchronic contrast between keys 
reminds us of the diachronic contrasts. By comparison, a normal tonal arc involves a basic 
key that is not held present in the modulated keys. Hence, here the tension of the tonal arc is 
only felt when the preceding stages of the piece are retained in memory and contrasted with 
the ongoing deviations from the base key.  
    As a general methodological conclusion, we have to put claims about large-scale formal 
structures under careful scrutiny and test for their cognitive reality. This major conclusion 
does not only hold for music, but also for non-musical examples of action sequences (see 
the examples below). We should not jump to too hasty conclusions though, because various 
sorts of non-expert mediating devices enable people in everyday situations to notice 
structural codes. First of all, a reflective awareness of the large-scale form is not prerequisite 
for producing an aesthetic or evocative effect. Consequently, unduly restrictive test methods 
that lay their focus on the conscious recognition of formal structures could result in too 
narrow claims. Moreover, I propose that we must test for a number of additional cognitive 
mechanisms that help overcome the constraints of short-term memory in grasping extended 
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formal structures. (1) Image schemas that are represented through various symbolic media 
can counter the constraints of short-term memory. Thus pictorial representations of an arc 
may reinforce a musical arc. If many short-term structures of the same kind recur within an 
event, it may be easier to perceive that the whole sequence is structured in the same way. 
By the same token, iconic structures afford a mechanism in which parts within the same 
medium, e.g. sound, replicate the structure of the whole. When an image schema 
characteristic of a large-scale structure turns up within the same unit on the micro-level, this 
may help keeping the large scale present. (2) Another way that large-scale forms may be 
recalled is through words. Many rituals explicitly comment on what the whole action 
sequence is about, something that is not the case with non-vocal classical music. 
 
METAPHORICAL EVENT STRUCTURE 
A received wisdom of anthropology has it that most cultural orchestrations are not simply 
about themselves, but let other themes resonate through them. The form of events can also 
enter into more complex meanings when used metaphorically. In other words, the structural 
features of a sequence function as a metaphor of a particular theme. When this happens 
form does not stand for itself or its esthetic effect, but evokes a complex theme of social or 
cosmological nature. This fact is most obvious in all kinds of ritual, but may also apply to 
aesthetic pleasures such as music. The Javanese musical system of gamelan is a 
particularly good example for exploring the cosmological metaphors expressed through an 
aesthetic style (Becker 1979, Becker/Becker 1981). Gamelan music is performed mainly on 
bronze xylophones and bronze gongs by an ensemble of between five and twenty-five 
instruments. The fundamental governing principle of gamelan music is the cyclic recurrence 
of a melodic/temporal unit. According to the Beckers, gamelan is a musical manifestation of 
how the passage of time in Java is ordered. At least as far as the calendar system is 
concerned, time is represented as cyclical in Java. When seen only as time-measurement, 
the Javanese system is not unlike the European. Yet, this cyclical conception goes beyond a 
simple calendar in that it also reflects cosmological assumptions to a significant extent. 
Instead of the European idea of ever progressing change in Java we find a fundamental idea 
of recurrence. In this perspective, the really interesting thing about Javanese time, as 
reflected in the calendar system, is that it is not represented as a single recurrent cycle, but 
as several concurrent cycles running simultaneously. Two overlapping systems of week-
cycles are of particular importance, a five-day one based on the indigenous market day 
system, and a seven-day one based on the Islamic week. The overlaps of these two cycles 
alone produce a larger unit of 35 (5x7) days, since the week-beginnings only coincide again 
after that time has elapsed and thus define the beginning of a larger cycle. As if this were not 
complex enough, there are two separate systems of reckoning months, one based on the 
 511 
lunar month and one on a 30-day month together with a year cycle. For the Javanese it is an 
acknowledged and culturally highly valued expertise, similar to astrology, to know the 
coincidings of the various calendrical cycles and their meanings in the life of an individual. 
There are almanacs published each year and experts are consulted to aid people with 
charting in order to avoid hazardous coincidings and to take advantage of beneficial ones, for 
example for setting the date of a marriage. Now, all this concern with the coinciding of 
overlapping cycles is reflected in gamelan music. How is gamelan structured? The basic unit 
of gamelan is a cycle marked off by a gong. Other musical instruments subdivide this cycle 
into halves, quarters, eighths, etc. on successive levels of greater density and speed. In 
some pieces there are three subdivisions, so that the whole set of instruments coincides 
once in a whole cycle, many of them coincide at its first subdivision, and some at the third 
subdivision. Also, different cycles are turning within one system, some of them are not 
turning at the same rate, and even if they are they do not have the same length. 
    Coincidence is a central source of meaning and power in Javanese culture. Just as 
pitches coincide at important structural points in gamelan music, so certain days coincide to 
mark important moments in the life of a person. As calendrical cycles ultimately relate to the 
realm of nature (days and seasons), gamelan music draws its power from sharing with them 
the same basic structure of cycles and overlaps. By virtue of these gamelan is understood to 
replicate the cyclic motion of the universe. 
    Overall, we may say that Javanese culture sensitizes people for noticing coincidences in 
cycles. Overlapping cycles are a cultural feature present in various types of medium; they 
form a foundational schema orchestrated in different symbolic guises. This schema 
sensitizes the Javanese for a particular kind of event structure, an event structure whose 
occurrence has a high significance in explaining social power. The cognitive salience of 
points of coincidence in gamelan music is mirrored in an analogous salience and importance 
of powerful days and occasions. Gamelan is a prime example for a metaphoric linkage 
between everyday domains: An idea about society and cosmos that points beyond the 
esthetic realm itself is made audible.  
 
4. Iconic replication of content in structure 
So far I have been solely concerned with formal structure I am are now going to extend our 
horizon to include its thematic content, such as the semantic imagery evoked by words or 
other conventional symbols. As the imagery of thematic content as such is the main topic of 
Langacker’s life work and needs no further introduction, I want to focus on a more complex 
phenomenon in which both form and content interact. 
    Not infrequently, the structure of a text (in the broad, semiotic sense) replicates its content. 
This is what Haskell (1987a,c,d) dubs ‘structural metaphor’ and what Lakoff and Turner 
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(1989) – in accordance with the linguistic mainstream terminology – call the ‘iconicity of 
language’. As iconicity is the more mainstream term I will stick to it. The structure of an event 
can enhance or reinforce its content, or at least provide hints about it. An example for this 
was already briefly touched upon in the case of the endings in thematic pieces of music that 
move towards a vanishing point and thus signal the end of the piece. In this case an 
imagistic horizon schema was evoked by the fading music. Now for a detailed discussion of 
an example from poetry. 
 
THE TOPOLOGY OF SCANNING 
A convincing case study of an iconic sequence can be found in Lakoff and Turner’s (1989: 
140-41) detailed treatment of the complex structure of William Carlos Williams’ poem To 
Solitary Disciple. It is a poem that is given not only to a reading through its content, but also 
to a reading through its iconic structure that replicates and reinforces the central parts of the 
content. I will not treat all the metaphors in the poem here, but focus on Lakoff’s and Turner’s 
account of the poem’s image-schematic structure as a whole sequence and its relation to the 
mental pictures evoked by its content. 
    The poem describes a church steeple with the tilted moon above the pinnacle. Direct your 
attention to the central part of the poem in the third and fourth stanza: 
 
“Rather notice, mon cher, 
that the moon  
is tilted above 
the point of the steeple 
than that its color 
is shell-pink. 
 
Rather observe  
that it is early morning 
than that the sky  
is smooth 
as a turquoise. 
 
Rather grasp 
how the dark 
converging lines  
of the steeple 
meet at the pinnacle –  
perceive how its little ornament 
tries to stop them –  
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See how it fails! 
See how the converging lines 
of the hexagonal spire 
escape upward –  
receding, dividing! 
-sepals 
that guard and contain 
the flower. 
 
Observe how motionless 
the eaten moon 
lies in the protecting lines. 
It is true: 
in the light colors of morning 
brown-stone and slate 
shine orange and dark blue. 
 
But observe  
the oppressive weight  
of the squat edifice! 
Observe the jasmine lightness 
of the moon.” 
 
Let us bypass the two opening stanzas of Carlos Williams’ poem, which are commonplace 
rather-than clauses in form and are mainly intended to set our expectations for what will 
follow. The third stanza, however, encourages us to imagine a mental movement along the 
steeple’s profile and beyond it. It is this mental movement that takes on metaphoric 
significance. To get there we have to consider first the basic cultural understanding of 
HEAVEN IS UP, which is reflected in Christian architecture and invests the steeple with 
symbolic significance. The steeple points upwards beyond the edifice itself and toward the 
divine. Now consider the imagery evoked by the third and fourth stanzas of the poem. Linear 
forces converge on the steepletop ornament, which fails to hold them back. These forces pull 
beyond “the oppressive weight of the squat edifice”, as the final stanza of the poem says.  
    Adding all this up, Lakoff and Turner propose that the target domain of the poem, taken as 
a whole, is the essence of religion. In its metaphoric reading the imagistic passage just 
referred to suggests that the divine is above and more essential than the institution. The 
steeple points to something more essential than the edifice it is part of. The irregular and 
imperfect, but animate and natural form of the moon is considered more essential than the 
manmade edifice, which metonymically stands for the church as institution. Likening the 
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moon to a flower and the converging lines to sepals reinforces this animate image. Religion 
is seen to be not about the abstract, perfect, lifeless doctrine of the institution, but rather 
about real, imperfect, living beings. So much for a condensed version of the poem’s content 
in a metaphorical reading. 
    What is of particular interest now for our purposes is the structure of the central poem 
sequence. Lakoff and Turner demonstrate how the form of a sentence and the form of a 
steeple are metaphorically understood as motions of the same overall kind. Even if the 
external form of sentences and geometrical objects usually have little in common, both 
require us to follow their structure with the mind’s eye in a similar way. Importantly, the lines 
of the steeple are seen as moving; they escape upwards.141 They arise from a similar mental 
scanning as when we follow the imagined course of an image. Likewise, when we read a 
stanza we also understand its form as movement from a point of origin to an endpoint. 
Therefore, the way we scan our mental image of the converging lines and the way we scan 
the structure of the printed stanza are similar. It is this property that makes an image-
mapping between the sentence’s global structure and the rich image it conveys possible: 
 
“[T]he linear form of the ‘rather’ clause’ maps onto the linear form of the steeple lines; the metaphorical 
linear motion of the clause maps onto the linear motion of the steeple lines; the expected metaphorical 
stoppage of the ‘rather’ clause at the ‘than’ clause maps onto the expected metaphorical stoppage of 
the steeple lines at the ornament where they meet; the metaphorical opposing force of the meaning of 
the ‘than’ clause maps onto the metaphorical opposing force of the ornament; and the continued 
motion of the ‘rather’ clause past its expected stopping point maps onto the continued motion of the 
steeple lines past their expected stopping point.” (Lakoff/Turner 1989: 156) 
 
The implications of this phenomenon are rather profound: In this way the structure of the 
content meaning (i.e. the imagined mental scene) is understood in terms of the structure of 
the form of the language presenting that meaning. By virtue of a created analogy between 
two separate levels of linguistic meaning, an intriguing type of mapping becomes possible 
that lends an extra layer of metaphorical structure to the poem. Linguists commonly refer to 
this analogy between the evoked imagery and the formal features of language as ‘iconicity’ 
or ‘iconic relation’. 
    This suggests the general hypothesis that we understand the form of language through 
image schemas: 
 
                                                 
141 Another effect of the scanning movement is this: The escaping lines imply action and applied force. 
The wandering mind’s eye, in combination with the blocking ornament, lends itself to suggesting a 
pulling force away from the oppressive weight of the building, and therefore lightness. 
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“Thus, for example, one aspect of the sentence structure is given in terms of parts and wholes, that is 
the parts of speech and the higher-level constituents containing them. Other aspects of a sentence’s 
structure are given in terms of balance, proximity, subordination, sequence, and so on. The schematic 
images that allow us to understand such syntactic notions are also used in our conceptual structure. It 
is for this reason that image-schematic correspondences between form and meaning are possible.” 
(Lakoff/Turner 1989: 157) 
 
Consequently, iconicity is a strong indicator that Lakoff’s ‘spatialization of form’ hypothesis is 
applicable to formal features of language (although diverging by degrees from my previous 
description of spatialized tools of thought). As a more general phenomenon such iconic 
structure is not restricted to language in the narrower sense. It can enrich poems, narratives, 
rituals, or other forms of symbolism, and perhaps thematic music and dance as well. In all 
these instances iconic structure may serve to reinforce or clarify the contents, or to suggest 
unity of form and content as a general integrative principle. 
 
ICONICITY AS CUE FOR GENRE EFFECTS 
As another example of iconicity, Haskell (1987a: 78) mentions Giambattista Vico’s book New 
Science, which was the first modern (18th century) work on the conceptual importance of 
metaphor. Vico’s opus does not only treat metaphor as a topic, at the same time it also 
exemplifies the power of metaphor in its style. Quite similarly, many texts of Jacques Lacan 
‘embody’ their main thesis, namely that the subconscious is structured like a language, by 
appealing to that subconscious by puns, metonymic associations, and metaphors in a 
systematic fashion and thereby evoking in the reader the topic of the text rather than 
describing it (1987c,d). The same thing has been noted for Hegel’s style of presentation in 
reiterative loops as a mirror-image of his concept of dialectic. In all three cases, what has 
been criticized as unclear style of exposition is in fact a deliberate stylistic effect. In all these 
cases authors transfer their intended content to the structure of the communicative act. The 
understanding of iconicity resides in the human capacity to notice inter-level isomorphisms. 
In order to decode it, some sort of partial representation of the text’s structure must be 
involved. Usually we do not consciously construct it, rather we subliminally extract it.142 In 
short, we metaphorically understand the structure of the meaning in terms of the structure of 
the form by extracting an image schema common to both. 
                                                 
142 We can surmise that there is a preconscious semi-awareness of the homology long before the 
‘click’ of recognition occurs. Haskell (1989) produces evidence that bears out this claim. He shows that 
participants in group discussions actively produce homologies to the group situation in their choice of 
discussion topics, apparently without being aware of this. 
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    Iconicity can attain considerable complexity and subtlety. A fascinating example can be 
found in the work of the philosopher Jean Gebser (1947), who produced a speculative theory 
of the development of Western consciousness with strongly mystic leanings. His is an 
evolutionary theory of the dialectic encompassing of successive states of consciousness. 
One key point I want to focus on here is Gebser’s projected next level in the evolution of the 
mind ahead of us, which leads to a quasi-mystic mode of consciousness. The central idea is 
that this higher mode of reality (a mode Gebser calls ‘diaphanous’) can only be accessed 
through a leap. Interestingly, when I read the book it was the structure of presentation of this 
remarkable opus which gradually provided clues as to how such a leap might be effected in 
the mind. The structure of the book is highly repetitive, and at a certain point one is bound to 
start wondering why he chose that style of exposition. Gebser’s objectives are, by logical 
standards, rather opaque. In fact, he asserts the reality of something that he is addressing, 
while at the same time acknowledging that language is rather incapable of describing it 
adequately. Interestingly, at some point in my reading it became obvious to me that Gebser’s 
style is intended, whether consciously or not, as an iconic hint to the effect that grounding 
genuine understanding in everyday experiences will not yield any results. The argumentative 
dramaturgy reflects this: After a certain point argument modules are, by and large, simply 
repeated in changing configurations, rather than a great number of really new arguments 
being added. Each module in itself does not seem easily accessible, but surreptitiously and 
gradually a network is woven between these modules. Hence, they begin to mutually define 
each other as the text progresses. Involuntarily, although not effortlessly, I constructed a map 
of the text as a whole, which seemed to be a circular system. On the other hand, the content 
of the text also aims at presenting a consciousness that is inherently circular in an external 
view, a structure that cannot be accessed from the common ground of everyday discourse 
without a leap. At the same time this is exactly what Gebser asserts through the text’s 
structure. The book’s core theme is, then, the structure of incommensurable world-views and 
how we can still plunge into what radically eludes us. How we can do this is intimated by the 
book’s structure. In short, the form of presentation points the same way as the content, 
because both posit the necessity of a leap. 
    All in all, this goes to show that entire texts can produce systematic genre effects through 
their structure taken as a whole and through iconic features embedded therein. By virtue of 
the repeated cueing of a specific pattern an iconic effect is, therefore, also possible at a fairly 
large scale. Even though, in the case of entire texts, a very detailed cognitive account of the 
hermeneutic interaction process between content and form is difficult for methodological 
reasons, it is apparent that authors intentionally (and sometimes subconsciously) use such 
effects and that at least a part of the readers will recognize them. 
 517 
Chapter 12:                                                                                              
Large-scale Summary Images, Plot-genes, and Image Schemas 
 
Up to this point we have explored image schemas as a means of understanding the formal 
structures of a meaning-carrying medium, such as language form or musical rhythm, and 
iconic mappings between form schemas and content schemas (i.e. form-semantics pairings). 
We will now focus more closely on the purely semantic aspect, and treat an interesting novel 
aspect of it not discussed explicitly before anywhere in the imagery literature. Thus we will be 
dealing with images evoked when language is understood semantically (i.e. in a poem’s, 
narrative’s, or novel’s content) and more specifically with what I would like to call summary 
images of representational content.  
    The relevance of images schemas in construing semantic phrase-meaning is one of the 
most fundamental assumptions of Langacker’s cognitive theory of language. In the present 
chapter I will give this approach a new twist through the claim that quasi-semantic imagery 
can operate at the supra-phrase level and that it can assist the cognitive interpretation of 
episodes as wholes. The present case study based inquiry presents a novel yielding a level 
of metaphorical insight based on the overall plot. However, my claim is highly complex and 
requires that a series of preliminary arguments are developed step by step: 
(1) I intend to show how the human mind makes sense of metaphorical cues 
scattered throughout a sequence, as outlined by Paul Werth (1999), and that this 
requires the gradual build-up of an overall image. 
(2) Going a step further than Werth’s analysis, I argue that in some instances 
narratives or the like even give rise to overall images of the whole extended episode. 
These are a specific sub-type of what Yuri Lotman (1990) has called a ‘plot-gene’, i.e. 
a mnemonic scaffold underlying an extended theme. 
(3) Next, I will specify a cognitive precondition for a theme being condensed into a 
summary representation. The sequence must give rise to a ‘summary scanning’ in the 
sense of Langacker (1987a) in order for an imagistic plot-gene to emerge. This rests 
on the capability of the human imagination to synthesize into a single awareness 
contents that, in the real world, cannot be perceived simultaneously. I maintain that, 
with respect to large-scale structures, summary images require a selection and 
condensation process of imagistic knowledge.  
(4) Finally, I will try to illustrate through Joseph Conrad’s novel The Heart of Darkness 
that the resultant plot-gene can metaphorically resonate and play on a conventional 
cultural model, in this case the Victorian folk-model of the self. In other words, the 
outcome of a summary representation can be imagistically mapped on other 
topologically similar models, including conventional image schema metaphors. 
 518 
To put it in a nutshell: episodes as a whole can become meaningful through condensed 
summary representations; and these summary images can in turn be explained through the 
their image-schematic structure. 
 
1. Orchestrating dispersed cues: Werth’s notion of ‘megametaphor’ 
I will begin with treating the question of how complex meanings are constructed on the basis 
of scattered cues and sustained innuendo. More often than not the meaning structures with a 
deep impact are dispersed over a sequence and cannot be precisely located.143 In an 
admirable effort the late Paul Werth (1999: ch.11) unfolds a theory of metaphors that occur 
as sustained undercurrents in a text. Werth speaks of ‘sustained metaphors’ and 
‘megametaphors’ (p. 317 and 323), which are employed by authors to achieve very subtle 
meanings without being explicit. These metaphoric elements are not expressed in any single 
location – they are cumulative.144 We might note that other tropes, in particular irony, are 
often only accessible as the outcome of a sustained process of the same kind. As an 
example, Werth analyzes a megametaphor employed in the introductory chapter of E.M. 
Forster’s A Passage To India, which then produces an ironical effect. The metaphor is based 
on a description of the city of Chandrapore, in particular of the natives’ dwellings and the 
quarters of the English ruling class, through which wide-ranging statements on power and 
vitality are conveyed. A first effect comes from the repeated use of negatives in the 
description of the native quarters lying low near the river: 
 
“The text is replete with negatives of all sorts and also with concessives: 
-straight negatives: nothing extraordinary, no bathing – steps, not holy, no river front, never large or 
beautiful, nor was it ever democratic, no painting; 
- negative modification: scarcely distinguishable, scarcely any carving, the very wood; 
- words with negative meaning: trails, rubbish, shut out, mean, inefficient, hidden away, filth, deters, 
stopped, mud, abased, monotonous, excrescence, fall, drowned, left, rotting, persists, low; 
-concessives: except for the Marabar caves, and THEY are twenty miles off, edged rather than washed, 
happens not to be holy, indeed, though a few fine houses exist, houses DO fall, people ARE drowned.  
                                                 
143 A shortcoming of metaphor theory is the overly optimistic view it might leave with the reader about 
the relatively simple nature of the analyst’s task in getting at deep meanings. Although many wonderful 
examples of small-scale metaphors can be found in the work of Lakoff, Turner, Johnson, and others, 
the central dimensions of meaning in long sequences are not typically tangible in the way localized 
and well-defined micro-structures on the word or sentence level are. 
144 A comparable effort can be found in Kövecses’ (1994) article on metaphors in Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s grand oeuvre Democracy in America. The cumulative metaphorical theme that his 
analysis reveals is DEMOCRACY IS A (PASSIONATE) PERSON. 
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The metaphors underlying this list never quite surface into explicit form: they are something like THE 
CITY IS A PILE OF RUBBISH, THE PEOPLE ARE A LOW FORM OF LIFE.  The image this gives me is something 
like a rubbish-dump inhabited by rats, or perhaps a compost heap inhabited by woodlice.” (p. 320) 
 
However, this is only part of a much more complex metaphoric characterization. Another 
important sub-metaphor results from a mapping of the city’s topology on the power 
relationships: The colonialist English live at the top of the hill and the natives at the bottom, 
people with mixed race being in between. This is the very common metaphor of CONTROL IS 
UP (which the English presumably used on purpose when they chose their quarters). It fits 
into the tendency, described by Lakoff and Turner (1989) and Olds (1992a,b), to think in 
terms of a Great Chain of Being spanning between the supreme level of humanity, which is 
nearest to God, down to nature. Yet, the Great Chain of Being can lead to an evaluative 
inversion, an ironical turn which Forster exploits in the next paragraph. Although the native 
people of Chandrapore are characterized as moving mud, and the whole place like some low 
but indestructible form of life, at least they are alive. They are connected to the organic and 
vital. By contrast, the imagery describing the quarters of the English is predominantly 
geometrical and impersonal and gives rise to INORGANIC IS GEOMETRICAL, as Werth suggests. 
Both, natives and English, are heavily set in contrast against the vegetation, which is 
 
“almost violent in its mobility and vitality: the trees rise, burst out, they seek light and air, and are 
endowed with strength, they soar and greet and beckon and build, and they glorify the city. The most 
powerful movement that mankind can summon up, by contrast, is swelling and shrinking.” (p. 322)  
 
Werth also argues that Forster attributes metaphorical values to the color scale, which 
reflects the vitality scale. The sky, which is metaphorically described as a temple, a 
repository and agent of vital divinity, and as the origin of all life and power, is fully specified in 
terms of color. For the vegetation intense color is strongly implied. The natives, on the other 
hand, are presumably mud-colored, and the English without color at all. The local metaphor 
of VITALITY IS BEING COLORFUL emerges from this and connects with the previous implication 
that EARTHLY POWER IS LIFELESSNESS. Thus, metaphorically the natives, who are closer to the 
earth and even appear to be made of it, benefit from the divine vitality of the sky, while the 
English ruling class completely lacks vitality and movement. The sky, then, redefines the 
POWER IS UP metaphor in terms different from what the initial characterization of the living 
quarters would suggest. The English may wield worldly power, but they do not partake of the 
power of vitality. On their hill they are, in a sense, suspended in an inorganic, colorless, and 
lifeless state between earth and sky, which are linked in a direct nexus of vitality. 
    In order to arrive at these metaphorical implications, the text as a whole has to be taken 
into account. Like approaches to parable and allegory, Werth focuses on expressions that 
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are not explicitly recognizable as linguistic metaphors. More importantly, he adds to other 
approaches in that the metaphors’ effect is only achieved through cumulation in a densely 
interwoven context. Concerning method, Werth proposes to arrive at conceptual metaphors 
by inferring a common underlying conceptual frame from a set of divergent expressions, just 
as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) first proposed. However, Werth’s megametaphors are 
accessible only on the higher level of the text or discourse, whereas almost all metaphors 
studied by Lakoff and his associates are still recognizable on the level of the sentence. Also 
note that Lakoff’s conceptual metaphors, such as ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, are 
independently recognizable in each of their single linguistic occurrences, say in “He blew his 
stack”, and need no sustained context. Lakoffian conceptual metaphors can be grouped into 
clusters by the analyst, but they produce no sustained undercurrent within a single text. By 
contrast, Werth’s megametaphors are only accessible in a cumulative and heavily context-
dependent way. Again, this contextually sensitive approach dovetails nicely with the intent of 
anthropology not to abstract utterances away from their specific social context.  
    In line with the previous data, Werth’s study of megametaphors indicates that integrated 
meanings have to be inferred from extended sequences. Conceivably, the sustained 
metaphor effects in Forster’s novel, such as EARTHLY POWER IS LIFELESSNESS, do not produce 
a conscious effect in all readers. Yet, for the implicit recognition of the megametaphor and its 
ironical effect a condensation of sub-themes into a textual Gestalt is required. I would claim 
that the same summary build-up of a Gestalt is cognitively required for any other sustained 
trope to take effect. 
    In conclusion, let me underscore the high theoretical relevance of Werth’s approach for my 
claims about sequential cognition. What emerges here, at least implicitly, is the idea of 
‘summary images’. A metaphorical undercurrent stretching through a text would not be 
possible without the build-up of a summary image, because the topic of the metaphor itself is 
only constituted through the subtle repetition of a theme, such as vitality and power, which 
has to be understood as a whole. Different expressions and words have to be matched to a 
single image to the extent that the metaphorical content is understood as image schema. 
This sets the stage for two consecutive cognitive claims. On the more general level it will be 
proposed that the theme of a sequence can be condensed into a summary representation. 
This is a process that is especially important in the build-up of memory, but may also play a 
role in understanding an ongoing process. On this premise we can later examine the more 
specific claim that image schemas figure centrally in such a condensed representation and 
link it to related themes by virtue of abstract features that these several themes have in 
common. 
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2. Plot-genes and summary images 
There appears to be a capability of the human imagination to synthesize into a single 
awareness contents which cannot be perceived simultaneously in the world of experience. 
This, in turn, hinges on the human ability to build up ‘summary images’ from memory. I 
borrow the term from Langacker’s (1987a) imagistic theory of grammar, where its is 
proposed that certain word-types like past participles are cognitively defined through 
grammar as evoking summary representations. The idea is that in a summary scanning 
traces from past mental events are retained in the mind and new information inscribed in the 
same locus, much like a multiple-exposure photograph. Although the notion is not new, here 
Langacker’s notion will be applied on a supra-utterance level.  
    Cook’s (1990: 89) previously treated study of musical images lends substance to the idea 
that sequences can be imagined in a summary fashion. There seem to be images of music in 
which what is heard sequentially in the concert-hall is “distilled into a single, heightened 
experience that embodies everything that is characteristic of the music”. This experience is 
apparently available to anybody, regardless of his or her level of musical training. But not 
only music recipients draw on this ability. Several famous composers are reported to have, 
before writing the score, imagined their compositions not as successive parts, but as a single 
musical image (a Gestalt). This is also in keeping with a classic insight from reader-response 
theory by Wolfgang Iser (1978: 138). When reading novels there seems to be a sense in 
which an object appears with a kind of fullness and completeness that is not there in ordinary 
percepts into which no memories or expectations enter: 
 
‘When we imagine Tom Jones during our reading of the novel, we have to put together various facets 
that have been revealed to us at different times – in contrast to the film, where we always see him as a 
whole in a situation…In imagining the character, we do not try to seize upon one particular aspect, but 
we are made to view him as a synthesis of all aspects. The image produced is therefore always more 
than the facet given in the particular reading moment.” (quoted in Cook 1990: 89) 
 
While this statement is about the characters of a novel, perceived through a condensed 
blend of their attributes, I would argue that the same is true for the plot. In this context I 
would like to advance the general hypothesis that the operation of condensing a host of 
attributes, such as those of a main protagonist in a novel, into a single image is akin to a 
summary scanning of sequentially distributed events. What is more, it makes little sense to 
separate the attributes and plot, since they form part of a single process: The characters are, 
as we picture them, ‘suffused’ with the plot that has passed, and the action of the plot is, 
inversely, ‘carried’ or ’sustained’ by the protagonists and their attributes. Mark Turner (1996: 
134) also argues that a protagonist’s character can generate an entire story. He cites Jerome 
Bruner’s (1986: 37) general observation that the engine of action of a novel may either be 
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situated more in the plot or more in a character: In the folktale it is more plot that carries the 
narrative, whereas with the appearance of the psychological novel the engine of action 
shifted to the character. Turner (p. 134) also refers to the work of Kenneth Burke, who “made 
a life-long study of the ways in which any general aspect of a story space – character, action, 
goal, setting, and means – could sever as the basis for building up the rest of the space”. 
    Hence, we do not only blend attributes of somebody or something into a singular image, 
but are also able to imagine a complex plot as a summary whole. Of course, not all the 
various detailed memories of the narrative we could call up are present in such an image. 
Yet there is an important regard in which the general plot, in the sense of the logical structure 
or thematic cornerstones of the narrative, is condensed in a summary way. The resulting 
cognitive structure may be called a plot-gene, adopting a suggestion by Yuri Lotman (1990). 
The way I adapt the term to cognitive theory a plot-gene is a mnemonic device around which 
other less salient structures of the sequence can crystallize, if we choose to go deeper into it 
in order to unfold the theme further. At the same time it constitutes the image (or the small 
set of images) by which we remember a novel, a piece of music, etc., in a more fleeting way, 
without attending to the details. When prompted, aspects of the plot-gene will come to mind 
quickest and with the least cognitive effort. It is likely that plot-genes rely on deeply 
entrenched cultural scenarios, frames, and genres of artistic expression. These can provide 
expectational structures from where to set out. We can thus expect the actual plot-gene to be 
defined vis-à-vis this conventionalized expectational schema, either affirmatively, as a salient 
negation, as a split-off, or as a new revolutionary genre. 
    To the extent that plot-genes condense the action of the plot (and not the protagonists’ 
characters) they have the features of a simplified scenario. Sherry Ortner (1990) develops an 
anthropological perspective which fits well into the notion of plot gene. Ortner approaches 
narrative plot-structures with a view on underlying cultural schemas that are not only related 
through narrative devices, but are enacted. These she calls ‘core stories’. In her study of the 
Sherpa of Nepal, Ortner uncovers a foundational plot that relates to a main cultural theme of 
the Sherpa, namely rivalry among men for resources and power. She describes a 
prototypical, yet flexible basic scenario of how rivalry relations pass through certain stages, 
which is found in action sequences both as acted out socially and as described in the mythic 
blueprints of social action. The details of the models vary from one context to another, but 
their skeletal features are recognized as related and thus processed in a similar way. I 
assume that such skeletal scenarios play a key role in plot-genes and can be grasped as 
‘one-shot’ summary images. 
    Before we proceed to examine by which cognitive mediating structures plot-genes are 
aided, a cognitive definition of summary images needs to be recalled and the status of such 
images needs to be discussed. 
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WHAT ARE SUMMARY IMAGES? 
I have asserted that plot-genes are primarily stored as simultaneous Gestalts, meaning 
summary images. How – it may be asked – is a summary image grounded in the cognitive 
faculties special to humans? A persuasive explanation is given by Langacker (1987a,b) in his 
distinction between the cognitive mechanisms of summary and sequential scanning, which 
was explained in detail in chapter 9. When we construe a cognitive unit as a process, this 
can be best compared to a film with successive images that pass before our eyes. There is 
no cumulative image built up in such a process; the perceptions of preceding phases fade 
away as soon as new ones occur. By contrast, when imagining a process as summary image 
we do something that is similar to multiple exposures of a photograph. In the same way that 
these overlap in one single picture the subsequent phases of a process are built up, while 
previous phases are conserved in short-time memory.  
    For the case of music this would mean that in the imagination the parts are not heard 
successively, but as if they were present all at once. All else being equal, the same 
cumulative memory process is true for novels, oral narratives, and perhaps dance 
choreographies or other kinesthetic sequences. The central and all but pedestrian difference 
to Langacker’s theory, which focuses on the comprehension of words and clauses, is that for 
a piece of music such a scanning must occur over relatively long stretches of time. If such a 
summary image is to take effect, the corresponding memory traces must remain present in 
the long-term memory. 
    This raises an important general question: To what extent are the summary images 
retained in memory faithful to the actual percepts? In an attempt to give a cautious answer to 
this question Cook (1990: 90) paraphrases Sartre (1972), who speaks of the ‘illusion of 
immanence’. We may believe that our imagery of a scene is just as real as a percept of it. 
But when we test the images against reality, they turn out to be incompletely formed. Sartre 
furnishes the following very simple example. In imagining the Parthenon of Athens one may 
have a clear mental image of it including the portico with columns. Of course, one can 
choose to see either five, or six, or seven columns, but if not prompted further most people 
do not have a clear idea of their number. The mental image does not allow answering the 
question how many columns there are, because it does not contain a set number of columns 
at all. Rather, it would seem that the image embodies a generic property that may be called 
many-columnedness. Sartre’s observation is not only true for static images, but for 
sequences as well. Cook, for example, presents an example to show that this equally applies 
to music. When we try to imagine, say, the voice of Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau, we can imagine 
it as generic property. We cannot answer whether, in our generic image, he was singing 
piano or forte, what syllable or word he was singing, or whether he was singing the 
beginning, the middle, or the end of a note. Of course it is also possible to image him singing 
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a particular song, but it is equally possible to have only a generic image. In such a generic 
image one is capturing the mellowness of his voice, the particular emphasis in his 
articulation, etc., but no specific sounds or words. The image condenses overall attributes 
rather than the specific variations within a particular sequence. This and other general 
arguments for the human memory’s tendency to store complex sequences as integrated 
Gestalt-images can be found. At the same time, plot-genes do presumably not arise in the 
mind automatically. Therefore, we have to ask next how they are evoked and cued by 
symbolic mechanisms. 
 
FREEZE-FRAMES AND STORYBOARDS AS GUIDING DEVICES FOR CONSTRUCTING PLOT-GENES 
I suggest the hypothesis that cultural meaning is often orchestrated with special devices, so 
as to facilitate the creation of a condensed mental plot-gene. It is usually not the case that 
condensed summary images are built up in the mind completely autonomously, no matter 
what the input. Instead, I submit that facilitating cues are brought to bear through various 
stylistic features in at least two ways: One first kind of cues may strongly suggest the build up 
of a summary plot-gene image as such, and once that has been accomplished, there are yet 
other cues that give directives as to the thematic emphasis of the plot-gene. For example, in 
the acting arts central concepts may be frozen into high spot-frames, as Arnheim (1969: 182) 
observes: 
 
“In the Japanese kabuki theatre, an actor’s play suddenly petrifies into an immobile, monumental 
pose, the mi-e, which marks the climax of an important scene and epitomizes its character. Less 
obviously, dance and musical sequences quite in general are often organized around such simply 
shaped high-spots, which summarize the state of the action at certain moments and serve as markers 
to orient the beholder or listener on his way through the performed work.”  
 
Freeze-frames are a quite frequent way of expressing sequences in many other examples. 
Compare this to Alfred Hitchcock’s technique of freezing key scenes to imprint these scenes, 
and with them often particular images of terror, in the viewer’s memory. Likewise, imprinting 
a particular sequence in memory can be achieved through the special marking or the 
particular emotionality of a ritual episode. Harvey Whitehouse’s (1992) analysis of 
Melanesian rites of terror provides a telling example of this, when he refers to the so-called 
‘flashbulb effect’ on memory and the formation of social self-definitions in young men. 
Particularly emotionally loaded memories, created through intense pain or sexual overtone, 
last for life, even becoming more intense with time. Possibly, the same may be true for 
memories of particular beauty or symbolic intensity. 
    Returning to the Kabuki example, we can tentatively observe two cognitively relevant 
points. First, there is a double effect of the petrifying pose on the way the play is stored in 
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memory. While any single freeze-frame serves to condense the particular Kabuki act in 
which it occurs, there is arguably a larger-scale effect acting in parallel. An even more 
condensed sum-total of various freeze-frames may provide conceptual pegs facilitating the 
access to the play as an integrated whole. Second, note that an art form such a Kabuki 
always conveys a double message, one of memory structuration and another of memory 
content: On the one hand they instruct the audience to memorize stories by using plot-gene 
images more generally (i.e. in other aesthetic or everyday contexts). This tendency may be 
natural enough to the human mind, but is additionally encouraged by the imposition of 
deliberate summarizing high spots, such as the Kabuki mi-e. The esthetic style reinforced 
here is also a ‘memory style’. On the other hand, each specific deployment of a freeze-frame 
format guides the selection of what is chosen as a point of crystallization within the particular 
play in question. Other details are discarded or backgrounded within the given story.  
    The example suggests that a series of actions culminates in an image that embodies 
them. Hence, a freeze-frame must in some way be iconic of the whole process of which it is 
part. How is that possible? A freeze-frame or condensed epitome of any other kind must pick 
out crucial structures that have appeared distributed through time and integrate them into 
one simultaneously perceived Gestalt. Such a static image then becomes the crystallizing 
grain of a more complex event and thus a representative for its nature, by suppressing the 
variety. I would hypothesize that this condensed format is in fact exactly the way people often 
store meaningful sequences in memory. We might parenthetically note that such a cognitive 
view allows an interesting perspective upon naive and non-realistic art forms. The artist’s 
endeavor to replicate such a memory-Gestalt as an object of art explains why artistic objects 
before the advent of realism are not only equally full of meaning as highly realistic depictions 
are, but perhaps even more effective than these in capturing multiple structures of cultural 
meaning into a single compelling image. For example, multiple perspectives on a single 
event can be put into a single image, much like many of Picasso’s most famous pictures do. 
Departing from the natural dimensions, forms, or temporality of things may provide a direct 
access to memorizing more complex meanings. If, for example, a Christian religious icon 
depicts Jesus as much larger than other protagonists, this expresses his greater relative 
importance or holiness. I would say that these metaphors have a natural analogy in the way 
we think. In a sense, the main character figures ‘larger’ in memory by being more salient. 
    A technique related to freeze-frames is utilized whenever artists transpose narrative 
sequences into visual depictions in the fashion of a snapshot gallery or comic strip. Church 
friezes and religious icons provide a good example. Often we find comic-strip-like depictions 
of the Passion of Jesus. These Stations of the Cross were meant as didactic devices for 
condensing the Biblical story into a memorable and simplified storyboard, especially for the 
illiterate in the Middle Ages and early modern times. Here the sensory channel of vision is 
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used to condense the narrative medium or perhaps to associate the two for a more intense 
memory effect. Again condensation works by suppression of detail. Comic books and 
storyboards pick out the most salient parts of a more complex scenario and leave the 
remaining details to be filled in either from the memory of the narrative or from cultural 
scripts. Although the details are not tangibly present, the freeze-frames are crafted to evoke 
a maximum of suppressed detail. Caricatures of people do this by picking out, mimicking, 
and exaggerating gestures and expressions that embody the whole character. The intended 
associations are not explicitly stated, instead a talented comedian has the ability to create 
such a condensed image that evokes the most typical characteristics of a person. 
    The freeze-frame technique is also used to create trans-contextual archetypes. In chapter 
4 I extensively summarized Bradd Shore’s (1996) ethnographic treatment of Murngin 
initiation through a repetition of similarly structured sequences. Shore’s argument went that 
across a connected series of different versions of the same foundational myth of this 
Northern Australian people a sequence of memorable ‘snapshots’ is produced which freeze 
scenes into archetypes: A cultural archetype, in this case an archetypical process of gaining 
real and deep knowledge, is created by connecting several narrative and ritual sequences, 
from each of which a similar image can be picked out. As before, the effect is a condensed 
image. However, here it is not a condensation of a single event, but encompasses several 
related events, which are organized around archetypical freeze-frames sequences. In other 
words, different cognitive media evoke similarly structured storyboards and are integrated 
into an encompassing schema. Perhaps two processes rather than one happen here. On the 
one hand the freeze-frame picks out the shared generic structure from different but similar 
events, so that transcontextual commonalties are extracted as schematic images. I suggest 
that these become conceptual pegs for further processing. At the same time, a host of 
different details stemming from these differing contexts is integrated into a condensed 
memory image that is perhaps very rich in symbolic texture. I would argue that the 
interweaving of dense patterns of multivocal symbolism is facilitated by the conceptual pegs, 
i.e. the freeze-frames, that the various narratives and rituals share. Without them it would be 
considerably more difficult to project the differing formats into a single schematic image. 
Freeze-frames thus act as vehicles for associated pieces of memory. They may be thought 
of as converging conduits that create a confluence of symbols at a node. 
    Apart from prototypical scripts there are other important ways of how an image can evoke 
a host of details. As we have seen, the process of condensation is not only the case with 
attributes of the protagonists or moods, but also with movements. It is in particular painting or 
sculpture that often endeavor to abstract a movement or action into one arresting visual 
pattern or into a timeless image. An underlying issue is how a static image can evoke a 
dynamic movement in the mind. A major reason, so I would argue, lies in the mind’s 
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propensity to project image-schematic vectors into static images. As Arnheim analyzes in a 
later work (1982), a painting incorporates a distribution of visual forces (a distribution of 
attention-weights or attractors vying for the viewer’s gaze, so to speak). If it is abstract or 
two-dimensional, the distinctive Gestalts in a picture stand in a relation of weights determined 
by size, hue, and position, as well as in interrelations of alignment, direction, and interaction. 
If it is concrete, it evokes vectors that constitute vanishing lines and create a three-
dimensional effect of depth, i.e. a virtual distribution in the picture. The point that the 
perception of object arrangements is always intentional, one ‘way of seeing’ among several 
possible ones, has been extensively discussed in chapter 7. Recall Alverson’s (1994) 
demonstration of culturally specific ways of reading orientations into a simple arrangement 
where four objects of different size were aligned in the front-back dimension. My argument 
concerning his material went that culture and language teach us a specific way to choose 
either ourselves or one of the objects as point of reference for the remaining objects and, on 
that basis, read directional force vectors into the scene that correspond to this culturally 
determined figure-ground distribution. Also, a complementary demonstration was made 
earlier that explains how a static image can evoke dynamic movements. Recall Dewell’s 
(1994) argument that a focus on a prototypical segment of the trajector – in his case-study a 
focus on the arc of the OVER schema – can evoke the whole schema. An image can be a 
freeze-frame of an image-schema transformation and evoke the whole transformation that is 
conventionally associated with its ‘cut-out’ parts. A double action of static and dynamic 
features becomes evident: The Kabuki mi-e and similar freeze-frames evoke the movement 
that led to it, while impressing the image by its static retention in view for a couple of 
seconds.  
 
3. The Heart of Darkness, the Victorian self, and what it means to get lost in the 
distance 
Let us now draw all the just presented strands together. Paul Werth’s keen analysis of large-
scale metaphorical effects, which were left unconsidered by prior works on metaphor, can be 
combined with the concept of summary image and the concept of plot-gene. Going a step 
further than Werth, I propose to consider the possibility that the reader interprets the overall 
plot of a sequence as a unified metaphorical image. While Werth’s literary examples of 
megametaphors feature densely orchestrated lattices of moods and attributes,145 I have 
chosen a case here in which an overall plot can be quite straightforwardly explained through 
imagery. Here a novel evokes a central image schema upon which its deeper metaphorical 
                                                 
145The multiplicity of these many interwoven attributes suggests that the representations involved are 
propositional, irrespective of whether we see this as condensed imagery or as a mode of thought in its 
own right. 
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meaning as well as its cultural and psychological impact rests (or at least a crucial dimension 
of it). In other words, my objective is nothing less than the study of ‘plot-genes’ comprising an 
overarching theme that is constitutive of an entire story’s core-meaning. Note, however, that I 
do not claim that every story has a single constitutive plot-gene. 
    It should be borne in mind that the claims made here are cognitive in nature. In other 
words, what is proposed is not merely a plausible observer’s interpretation, as might be that 
of literary critic. My objective is the reconstruction of the cognitive reader response and its 
cultural preconditions, i.e. of the actual way a novel is interpreted by the predominant part of 
the audience in a given historical setting such as Victorian England. 
    I will demonstrate the operation of image-schematic plot-genes on the basis of Joseph 
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, published in 1899/1902, a novel which exploits the central 
theme of penetration (or, for that matter, transgression) into the dangerous unknown. The 
story is, in the words of Bill Harrell (1982: 231), about “a crossing of a boundary from the 
well-defined self, the soul, the domain of order and grace, into the unchartered abyss of the 
appetites, the crossing over from prudence to greed and lust.” In the novel, Marlow, a 
seaman and wanderer, recounts a steamboat expedition into deep African territory in search 
of the enigmatic Mr. Kurtz, who is the agent of a trading company at a jungle outpost. The 
story is situated around the turn of the century in the Congo, which was at that time a private 
property of the Belgian King Léopold and marked by rampant forced labor and vicious 
exploitation of the natives. The thrust of the narrative is (quite literally) towards Kurtz, who is 
the goal of the gradually progressing penetration into a strange, dangerous, and 
unfathomable territory. Kurtz has imposed a surreal order of terror and charisma among the 
natives. He is a man of captivating and demonic force who has signed a Faustian pact and is 
being worshipped as a god. When Marlow finds him, he is on the verge of madness and 
death, experiencing great inner turmoil. Marlow himself is changed in the struggle to 
comprehend his experience with this once exceptional and now tormented man who has 
looked into his own nature. Having succumbed to alien and yet strangely familiar forces in 
the zone of proximity between human nature and the ‘Other’, Kurtz dies with the words “The 
horror! The horror!” on his lips. 
    It is apparent that while the tale’s overall structure is that of a literal journey, metaphorically 
it is a journey to the limits of the human soul. This central double meaning becomes evident 
in the very title. Going even further, the novel can also be read as a statement on Victorian 
culture as a whole, to its constructed cultural ‘Other’ and the hidden anxieties expressed 
through it. The concept of ‘Other’, taking inspiration from Foucault and later so well applied to 
the Western perception of the colonial world in Edward Said’s seminal work Orientalism 
(1979), expresses a central cultural ambivalence. A harbinger of Said, Conrad ingeniously 
plays on the double-edged nature of Victorian imperialism. While explorative penetration into 
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the unknown of the ‘Dark Continent’ is the missionary imperative of the age, this always 
carries within itself the seed of alienation and self-loss through penetration into and 
dissolving within the unknown. The Dark Continent stands for the unknown within oneself, as 
it brings to the fore the baser aspects of human nature. In a revealing and ironic inversion, 
‘white man’s burden’ in this sense is not leading the ‘savages’ to a higher level of humanity, 
but the self-denying force exerted in maintaining a self that is always prone to give way to a 
baser nature, given the right circumstances (such as climate, malady, loneliness, and the 
like). The novel plays on the fear of getting lost and being engulfed by the enormity of the 
dark and unknown. More precisely, it plays on losing one’s self at the perimeter of culture. 
The fringes of culture, geographically and morally, interchangeably stand for the fringes of 
our perceived self. At the same time, they disclose the ‘other’ self beyond. Marlow’s words in 
reporting about the natives under Kurtz’ rule emphasize this uncanny mix of alienation and 
identification: “but what thrilled you was just the thought of their humanity – like yours – the 
thought of your remote kinship with this wild and passionate uproar (...) the mind of man is 
capable of anything” (Conrad 1995/1902: 63). 
    The basic metaphor of the novel likens a spatial journey into the unknown that is full of 
irrational horrors to an incursion into the terra incognita within, a journey into the dangerous 
reaches of the human soul itself. It is from this metaphorical understanding that we can infer 
an underlying image schema, which I will call the PENETRATION schema (or, from the inside 
viewing arrangement, TRANSGRESSION). It is a composite of several more basic image 
schemas. It should be easy enough to see that it arises when a FORCE moves on a PATH and 
breaks through a BARRIER of a realm that exerts COUNTERFORCE, but is eventually breached. 
Consequently, this particular version of penetration is superimposed on a basic conception 
that involves the CONTAINER image schema, since realms are containers. Even though plenty 
of non-imagistic understandings may be drawn from the conventional journey metaphor 
(journeys may be dangerous, it may not be clear where they lead, the motivation and goals 
of the traveler may change on the way, etc.), I prefer to describe this as a version of the 
penetration image schema. There are two related reasons for this:  
    First, neither the mentioned propositions nor the image-schematic PATH-GOAL structure of 
the journey metaphor are sufficient for comprehending the novel’s deep structure. More 
spatialized structure is needed in order to make sense of the barrier involved. After all, the 
story is about reaching and perhaps breaking the boundary of a realm. The boundary is also 
a barrier that contains and protects, and that does not yield easily. It exerts a counterforce on 
those attempting to transgress. The outer skin of the realm can be understood as the end-
point of our self, and at the same time as the beginning realm of the ‘Other’, the culturally 
(and subconsciously) unknown outside. The act of penetration carries in itself the danger of 
destroying the barriers of our known realm for good. Thus, the spatially conceived barrier of 
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the self-schema may also stand for moral barriers. This may be the case in a quite physical, 
embodied sense: In the Victorian age it was a prime imperative to contain oneself. The 
constraints of English upper class habitus dictated pulling-oneself-together, a control of the 
passions, and a strong avoidance of ‘getting carried away’. In Victorian metaphorology, being 
your socially accepted self was being in the proper place. Passions such as anger and lust 
were accepted, but only as channeled into socially accepted goals or romantically sublimated 
(cf. Stearns 1994: ch.3). 
    We can also see now why the more elaborate image-schema of PENETRATION is needed. 
In its most basic terms, the journey metaphor alone would suggest too little loss of center 
(i.e. security and certainty), since it tends to impose the ever-shifting perspective of the 
traveler. As roaming travelers on a journey we ipso facto always remain situated in the fixed 
center of perspective, while it is the landscape that passes by. Each place is like any other; 
none has a special relation to any point of origin. However, here we are confronted with an 
overall-view from the outward perspective that lets us feel that the center is losing itself in the 
distance. The distance from ‘home’ (and our ensuing forlornness) is crucial to the novel’s 
impact. In the more basic journey metaphor barriers may exist and be surmounted, but no 
imaginary realm is broken open, in a way that our movement would lead us away from our 
center of security. Yet, in Conrad’s novel there is penetration into the geographically remote 
and into the psychically remote, remote meaning away from a source or point of orientation. 
    The second reason for going beyond the path schema pure and simple can be partly 
inferred from what has been said: the PENETRATION schema, which adds the elements of 
BARRIER and FORCE, gears into another commonplace Western schema that conceives the 
self as a centered container. The self as centered container is, crucially, imagined as seen 
from the exterior and as set in a place. In other words, it is objectified and it has fixed 
coordinates. This corresponds to the Victorian tendency to frequently see the self as the 
others see it, which means in a place of social and moral propriety. In Langacker’s (1990b) 
way of speaking, the objective viewing-arrangement is socially and culturally encouraged and 
preferred to a predominantly subjective perspective, which would cast the viewing subject out 
of the mental scene perceived by it and let it perceive only other objects. Such an objective 
viewing arrangement holds the self in perspective as a trajector that is relationally defined 
relative to a landmark and so permits the subject to evaluate her relative distance from the 
socially appropriate coordinates of the container, to see how far she is ‘beside herself’ or ‘out 
of her mind’. Presumably the objective viewing arrangement of the self is a means to 
encourage a strongly normative style of social self-control. Note that the importance of 
internal self-monitoring as a newly emerging characteristic of Victorian culture is underlined 
by Stearns’ study of American emotion (1994: 51). Significantly, shame is added to guilt. My 
suggestion on how a self-monitoring version of the self works in the mind is also supported 
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by Kövecses’ (2000: 24) analysis of a metaphor he calls the DIVIDED SELF: “The canonical 
person consists of a self and a body, and they are related in such a way that the body 
contains the self.” However, I believe to speak of a DECENTERED SELF is more accurate, at 
least in the context of Conrad’s novel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) The self in its original place, (2) shifting to its boundary, and (3) transgressing it. The objective 
viewing arrangement is indicated by the external position of the subject, although the whole setting is 
of course reflexive: the subject sees herself as if it were another person. 
 
If we understand our self and the realm of our knowledge as structured by CENTER-
PERIPHERY, then penetration into the outer realm can entail a loss of anchoring in the center. 
This may manifest itself as a loss of self or a loss of control, and in either case a loss of 
existential certainties to hold on to as we proceed into the unknown. Conrad plays on the 
idea that, even if the core of the human self – much in the sense of the metaphor of 
epistemic proximity KNOWING IS GRASPING (Lakoff/Johnson 1999) – may be very familiar, the 
exact location of its outer limits ever eludes us. In other words, most of us find it difficult to 
imagine the extreme states of mind and behaviors of which humans are capable.  
    Yet another motif is refracted in Conrad’s novel, one that militates in favor of an underlying 
theme of penetration. In Marlow’s account of his experience a fair amount of evidence can be 
found for a coupling of the mysterious Dark Continent and the female element: seductive yet 
incomprehensible, dazzling yet abysmal, of powerful attraction yet alienating, dominated yet 
dominating. Needless to say, the theme of boundary is also a theme of gender relations. 
Penetration can also be seen in the light of the Victorian sexual anxieties, the fear of a 
female ‘Other’. It is women who “guard the door of Darkness” (p. 26). (Perhaps a Freudian 
perspective would best explain the juncture of women and the Dark Continent: they are alike 
in rousing male anxieties of being engulfed by the object of domination, which is at the same 
time their source of fascination, greed, and lust.) Marlow is split in his uneasiness about 
women in the position of knowledge and power and his veneration for women. Hampson, in 
his introduction to the novel (1995: xxxvi-vii), expresses this: 
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“Certainly, it is the African women and the Intended [of Kurtz] who are the focus of the final part of 
Marlow’s narrative. If Kurtz sets himself up as a god to be worshipped, Marlow here sets up the 
Intended for his own ambivalent act of worship: as he ‘bows down’ before what he conceives as the 
Intended’s faith, ‘that great and saving illusion’ (HD, p.121) he simultaneously reasserts and imposes 
on her a patriarchal ideology of separate spheres, a female world of illusion (‘too beautiful altogether’) 
and a male world of truth (‘too dark altogether’)” [italics mine] 
 
The last quotation also reflects a final aspect of the penetration complex, the mythical theme 
of initiation into dark, yet original knowledge. Penetration as a form of male initiation is a 
cultural template that appears in many guises. Parallels between a penetrative (‘male’) style 
of exploration and knowledge on the one hand and sexual penetration on the other have 
been variously pointed out.146 
    The question now seems to be how these themes become a unified complex within a 
cultural background. Bill Harrell (1982) ventures the interesting view that Conrad’s novel 
owed its great success to the reflection of an overarching preoccupation of his Victorian 
contemporaries with maintaining boundaries: those of race, nation, class, community, family, 
church, and gender. Conrad’s novel struck a cultural chord with virtuosity: the fear of the 
‘Other’, and the perceived necessity to remain distinct and superior. Late Victorianism was 
characterized by emerging class conflicts, by social boundaries coming under attack, and by 
the relation to the colonies being questioned. Hence, Victorians projected on Africa what they 
most feared in themselves and their conflicted social order. Harrell expresses this as follows: 
 
“The sense of being within a social and personal boundary of righteousness supports the pride 
(ethnocentrism) which permits the association of material wealth with personal grace and civilization. It 
permits the confusion of greed with progress. Marlow perceives this confusion and understands how it 
threatens to unhinge the bearers of progress, to bring down the boundary itself (to shatter the form). 
He understands also that Kurtz has confused truth with power; that his fragile control over the natives 
is maintained by fear grounded in force, a brittle and unreliable source of order.” (p. 232) 
 
The penetration metaphor with respect to the self also hints at the basic dilemma of the 
Victorian self-image. The political message is simultaneously a psychological one. It is the 
dilemma of maintaining self-conceit as ‘the pride of creation’ and at the same time exploiting 
                                                 
146 Despite his distancing irony, an only faintly concealed acknowledgment that the familiar illusion of 
self is not true knowledge is present in Marlow’s words. The journey, then, perhaps is one to true 
knowledge. Notions of a mythical original journey are reflected in passages like “Going up that river 
was like travelling back to the earliest beginnings of the world (...)” (p. 59) or “We could have fancied 
ourselves as the first men taking possession of an accursed inheritance, to be subdued at the cost of 
profound anguish and excessive toil.”(p. 62) 
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the colonies to the benefit of the motherland (again, the ‘center’). The need for contempt of 
and distance from the ‘animal Other’ reveals, both, the subconscious fear of its irruption into 
one’s self and the displaced truths of an imperialist economy in Christian disguise. The bad 
faith and the dilemmatic nature of an externalized social conflict create a source for cognitive 
dissonance that is hypocritically displaced. The twofold Victorian self-delusion that Conrad 
puts his finger on can be expressed in one quasi-spatial formula: Best that the center 
shouldn’t know what the outer reaches are really up to – in Victorian colonial politics as in the 
Victorian soul. 
    What is the upshot of all this for a cognitive analysis? A first observation is that the 
penetration theme surfaces in several ways that are understood as one, in this case a single 
underlying anxiety-cum-attraction. It seems appropriate to speak of a ianus-faced schema, in 
which what is penetration from the one point of view is transgression out of bounds from the 
other, with a pull on the subject both from the center and the periphery. I propose that 
diverse experiences of boundaries can give rise to one abstract schema or, put the other way 
around, that the same schema can be extracted from all of them. The unifying element, 
which may be called a plot-gene, thus appears to be image-schematic in nature. Within such 
a bracing structure various structurally similar sub-themes may be developed as transitory 
figures, while the plot-gene remains subliminally present in the cognitive background. The 
fact that Heart of Darkness can be read in many culturally significant, yet hardly arbitrarily 
chosen ways, substantially relates to a mixture of such a global structure and several sub-
themes. We saw that women repeatedly appear as doorkeepers at the thresholds which 
Marlow has to pass, literally and metaphorically. They are the guardians of liminality, the 
state of ‘betwixt and between’ described so well by Victor Turner (1967) for ritual process 
and initiation. On the one hand, such an iconic duplication of the novel’s global structure in its 
details – a process of transgression on both levels – gives extra impact to the boundary 
theme. On the other hand, it is significant to see that it may contribute to the unity of sub-
plots. For example, it may create an understanding that gender relations and race relations 
not only have a common concern with differences, but are actually aspects of one integral 
complex of difference. Metaphors such as Conrad’s women guarding spatial thresholds lend 
substance to the idea that all different varieties of difference are encoded through a common 
underlying spatial image schema. This bipolar schema I will call CENTER AND ALTERITY. Many 
of the sub-plots of Conrad’s novel are understood as meaningful in relation to the global 
structure, which they either hint at or replicate. The emergence of such an interactional effect 
in the reader’s mind between overall plot and sub-plots is presumably dialectic in nature. The 
sustained metaphors that Werth speaks of take effect on the basis of early elements in 
Marlow’s account that foreshadow the deeper existential and cultural significance of the 
journey into the uncharted realms of Africa. Conversely, the deeper metaphorical relevance 
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of the penetration theme is unfolded step by step by the consecutive sub-plots, which 
perhaps results in a cognitive effect in many readers paralleling the thick description unfolded 
in my analysis. 
    From a cognitive perspective, a second intriguing observation emerges: The narrative 
chooses a form that nicely gears into an already existing and significant cultural schema. An 
interpretation of it being but an extension of a conventionalized schema is congruent with the 
central thesis laid out by Lakoff and Turner (1989), who show that poetry is an artful 
elaboration of conventional everyday schemas. That this also holds for prose becomes 
evident when Harrell’s analysis is seen in the light of one of the principal Western models of 
the self (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1999: ch.13, who distinguish five models). Harrell’s diagnosis 
of a historically motivated preoccupation with boundaries in Victorian England is not only 
compatible with the self as container, but skillfully builds on it, in order to reveal previously 
undiscovered facets. In my view, one reason why the basic schema that is used and its 
extensions blend into one another is their simple image schematic structure. The background 
condition for the self model as container and the penetration model to go together so 
effortlessly is that, being image schematic in nature, they are spatialized, fairly abstract, and 
malleable. They fit because their conceptual core is relatively simple and poor in detail. 
Simple structural features allow the superimposition of models to be so productive. Recall 
that I identified a shared imagistic skeleton at a high level of schematicity as a precondition 
for families of models earlier. The ease with which human minds can perform this image-
schematic transformation accounts for the elaboration of complex meanings out of more 
basic cultural schemas to remain largely unconscious without the connection being lost on 
the individual. Only a certain subliminal awareness of the fact that the penetration theme has 
to do with an important cultural concept of the self accounts for the novel’s effects on its 
readers. The remote ‘Other’ is, as it were, recognized as a segment of the self. This may be 
due to the subliminal feeling that something unknown lurks within every soul. Given that the 
Western model of the self really invokes an imagistic container to be guarded and centered, 
it seems to be rather obvious that a purely propositional (i.e. non-imagistic) approach will 
have considerable difficulty in explaining the fit between the self-schema and Conrad’s plot-
gene of penetration into the unknown. In that the riverboat journey as overall plot is 
metaphorically understood as standing for a process of the self, it comes to be a 
‘megametaphor’ of the most extensive kind conceivable, and one which is constituted by a 
relatively simple, yet central image-schematic model. 
   To what degree is this model a mere historical contingency? In response to this question a 
third somewhat tentative observation seems possible. Recall that we assumed that image-
schematic plot-genes act as mnemonic vehicles for propositional details. The distinction 
between the imagistic plot-gene and the broader thematic cluster surrounding it may provide 
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a basis to answering the question of contingency. I showed that the broader Victorian 
psycho-political mindset in question encodes several resonating themes all linked through 
the spatial schema of CENTER AND ALTERITY. In a general way, they reflect social, gender, 
and racial anxieties with respect to shifting positions of distance, transgression, and 
incorporation. However, more specifically Conrad’s novel also develops a thematic cluster 
including the eternal mystery of the (female) ‘Other’, its terror and fascination, and the power 
ultimately located therein. Even though these ideas are framed in close connection to the 
loss of self and the notion of wandering the existential fringes, it goes without saying that 
there is much more cultural knowledge to these resonating ideas than a single image 
schema could convey. The exact cultural idea of what the female is like, what sex means, 
what death is, what a stable psyche requires, and the like are not specified by the idea that 
the self is a bounded space, nor could the manifold facets of such complex ideas ever be 
captured in a single schema. All these complex aspects are what I called (by default) 
propositional knowledge. As a further observation we may note that a crucially basic model 
of the self as centered space continues to be constitutive of all European cultures even 
today, whereas the distinctive Victorian anxieties framed in this model by Conrad no longer 
happen to be so virulent. The specific values, moods, and emotions associated with a loss of 
the self’s center have changed, a point that is also demonstrated by Harrell’s (1982) 
comparison of the public response to the Heart of Darkness, first published 1899, with the 
response to Francis Ford Coppola’s 1979 film Apocalypse Now. To name but a few changes, 
today the strongly normative definition of the sane self has lost in power, the fear of 
degeneration is less pervasive, the human passions are more socially accepted, and inner 
restraint is certainly no more the psychological precondition of neo-imperialist domination. 
The ‘Other’ of our times, while still firmly in place as a mechanism, is defined in other terms 
in spite of the continuing existence of racism. So, where does this leave us? It seems that the 
image-schematically defined self schema as a principal cultural schema can be expected to 
remain relatively stable, while the evaluative dimensions associated with it are more strongly 
subject to historical change. This suggests a generalized hypothesis to be tested: While each 
culturally important image-schematic model is ‘rigged out’ with a series of evoked 
associations, the former retains something like an organizing role. It is culturally more 
permanent and presumably more primarily selected from the cultural repertory, while other 
themes are organized around it. The underspecified nature of image schemas makes it 
natural for them to be enriched with various kinds of detail information. Thus, the penetration 
schema may remain stable at the same time that the exact cultural meaning and context of 
breaching the boundaries of one’s self has undergone transformation. 
    Now for some final considerations on the validity of the case study. If the fear of losing 
one’s self in ‘decentered’ states is indeed a prevailing Victorian schema, we should be able 
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to track down the theme in many other places. A case in point is given in Bruce Mazlish’s 
article “A Tryptych: Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams, Rider Haggard’s She, and Bulwer-
Lytton’s The Coming Race” (1993). A few short extracts from Mazlish’s analysis of these two 
other contemporary novels dealing with the cultural ‘Other’, although different in intention 
from Conrad, will serve to enhance the credibility of my account. Even though the spatial self 
schema can only be indirectly inferred and the plot of the gradual transgression of a 
boundary is less central, an identical cluster of themes is most evident. Haggard’s cultural 
metaphor of this Victorian thematic complex takes the form of a love story with the immortal 
‘She’ who, much like Kurtz, rules in Africa through irrational terror. Again the locus of the 
irrational is a far off place, uncanny but enticing. In Mazlish’s characterization, “a chaotic mix 
of love, sex, eroticism, necrophilia, death, and male curiosity about the supposed eternal 
feminine” (p. 734) runs through the novel. First, this fascination with the eternal feminine (as 
the ‘Other’ par excellence) has a counterpart in unspeakable terror, as expressed in the 
word’s of Leo, the novel’s hero: “no nightmare dreamed by man, (...) can equal the living 
horror of the place” (cited on p. 733). Like in the case of Marlow’s mission, breaching the 
sphere of sanity also gives access to deeper power: “For Haggard, women symbolically 
embody the ‘greatest mystery in the world’. Solving this mystery and finding the ‘spot where 
the vital forces of the world visibly exist’ give Leo and Holly, and thus mankind the power to 
rule over the world (...)”. And again the mystery takes the form of a spatial quest. Second, 
replicating the constitutive paradox and ambivalence in The Heart of Darkness, Mazlish 
identifies a spiritual task at the core of, both, Haggard’s and Bulwer-Lytton’s novels:  
 
“Both authors are also concerned with the need to defend and extend civilization, which they see as a 
spiritual, not material task. [Both men having served the causes of the Empire, they] see this task as a 
mission to be carried out by Englishmen. Yet, at the core of being an Englishman – who, for them, is a 
combination of gentleman, secular missionary, and empire builder – there lurks the sense of 
unrestrainable passions symbolized by the eternal feminine. Hence the sense of terror and foreboding 
of evil at the heart of their books.” (p. 741)  
 
This lurking danger is also the fear of being reduced to a baser state of humanity, an implicit 
heritage of the narcissist injury inflicted on Victorian culture by Darwin’s theory. In the case of 
‘She’ the fear is metaphorically expressed as being reduced to baboons. When She dies she 
shrivels up to the stature of a baboon (p. 735). Third, restraint and keeping the psyche in 
place is again identified as the basis of power, reverberating in the alter ego depicted in 
She’s rule. A rectified but subliminally revealing mirror image of She’s irrational rule of terror, 
Queen Victoria’s rule, “too, is based largely on imagination; for British regiments are always 
outnumbered by the savages among whom they exist but whom they dominate 
psychologically.” Bulwer-Lytton’s message fits perfectly into the present elaborations: 
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Britannia will rule as long as the valiant Britishers project their self and act in a way that 
keeps them at the secure center where self-control (and self-denial) reign supreme. The 
imagined self now turned social reality is their means of psychological domination. Colonial 
discourse endeavors to stay poised in the metaphorical place where a sense of certainty can 
be endowed with the self-mystifying attributes of power and where European cultural 
supremacy can be envisioned with ease. The imagined self that holds fast to its proper place 
is one that is not beset by doubts or weakness in the way the befuddled and horrified men on 
Marlow’s riverboat are. At the same time, somewhere deep down those who have come to 
the fringes of their ideal self sense that irrationality is the truer fountainhead of power.147 This 
enacted cultural contradiction of Victorianism appears to have been a compelling source of 
fascination for all of the mentioned authors and their audience alike. 
 
4. Summary: The study of sequential cognition 
The general intent of this chapter has been to demonstrate the scope and power inherent in 
imagistic formats of mental representations. More specifically, the culturally structuring power 
of highly schematic imagery acted as a background condition for the present reflections. The 
essential argument went that the recognition of structural interrelations between models that 
form a thematic cluster is situated to a significant extent in the schematic skeleton shared by 
several models. The elective affinity between the self model and Conrad’s core metaphor 
was explained on this basis. 
    Summing up, through the case study several general propositions about human sequential 
cognition have emerged.  
    (1) Overall metaphorical readings of sequences are possible and may constitute a 
significant level of understanding. Findings of the past show that the ongoing textual 
interpretation is enriched by conceptual information adduced from prior scenes into quasi-
imagistic blends of mood (Iser 1978) and that sustained undercurrents can evoke systematic 
metaphorical effects (Werth 1999). I submitted that these principles may apply to entire 
sequences, when people come to think about their main plot or their key-metaphors. The 
basic cognitive mechanism responsible for an overall reading is the gradual build-up of an 
integrated summary image in the mind of the addressee (Langacker 1987). A summary 
image is the simplified image people retain after reading, seeing, or listening to a sequence 
to organize its basic structure in their mind. A mnemonic memory trace of that sort acts as a 
scaffold for detail knowledge. It may be intentionally fashioned by authors through cues 
based on specific stylistic features.  
                                                 
147 A straightforward recognition of this topos can be traced in philosophical irrationalism at the end of 
the 19th century, also contributing to fascism shortly after the demise of Victorian culture. 
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    (2) Plot-genes can be image-schematic, and perhaps they tend to be. It was argued that 
the memory trace of plot-genes takes effect through image schema extractions from such 
summary images, to the extent that they are stored as analog Gestalts in the mind. 
    (3) It was surmised that the relatively simple Gestalt structure in the summary image 
functions as a bracing structure into which the more complex propositional details are 
inserted. (These details emerge as soon as one focuses on a specific scene in memory.) In 
our case the imagistic CENTER AND ALTERITY schema and its dynamized version, which I 
termed the ianus-faced PENETRATION-TRANSGRESSION schema, form a thematic hub that links 
a complex agglomeration of cultural anxieties. 
    (4) It was also argued that there may be sub-plots, such as the threshold image, that 
iconically replicate the overall plot-gene on the basis of their image-schematic structure. 
They initially serve to hint at and evoke the plot-gene in the beginning or to reinforce it once it 
has been built up.  
    (5) It was shown that artfully crafted sequential schemas, such as in novels, may gear into 
everyday models that are universally shared in a culture and creatively expand on them (cf. 
Lakoff/Turner 1989) in order to make historically virulent themes resonate. Again, they 
achieve this link on the basis of image-schematic similarities (such as the self as a centered 
sphere and the image of penetration into the unknown through a riverboat cruise). The 
general schema of the self forms the necessary background condition for a recognition of a 
specific overall metaphoric level in Conrad’s novel.  
    (6) It was proposed as a hypothesis that the basic image-schematic scaffold is historically 
more stable than the associated propositional details. Cognitive continuity in the basic 
images of culture is based on core images, such as the self as container, while the way they 
are framed and how inferences are drawn from them may deviate significantly. 
    (7) Finally, it should be noted as a disclaimer that it was neither proposed that the 
Victorian self schema is a cultural universal, nor that it captures nearly all aspects associated 
with the self in that culture and epoch. 
    I presented some ideas about how the levels of bracing themes and local imagery are 
interwoven into a textual fabric. A key task for further research is to get empirical support for 
the ideas and apply them to further examples. Another serious issue, which has perhaps 
been passed over too lightly here, concerns the individual variations in cognitive strategy and 
the idiosyncrasies in thematic emphasis in the way readers from the same cultural 
background acquire an understanding of deep metaphors. It is generally accepted now that 
there is no one true reading of a novel. While cultural cognitive analysis can in principle at 
least shed light on prevailing cultural dispositions and the scope of variation, this is more 
difficult in the case of deep structures that speak to the audience’s unconscious. This is the 
price to be paid for a perspective on metaphor on a complex supra-sentence level. The layer 
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of meaning in focus here is more implicit, and thus more elusive, than in the metaphors 
traditionally studied, precisely because it adds intricately to the primary level of episode 
comprehension. 
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Chapter 13:                                                                                               
An Image-Schematic Theory of Multimediality 
 
Explaining multimediality in complex discourse and social practice is one of the prime 
challenges to cognitive anthropology. Díaz de Rada and Cruces (1994: 115) express the 
problem in the following way: 
 
“Social practice brings into play a range of communicative and expressive channels. It is, by definition, 
a multimedia complex (Tambiah 1985: 145) whose global meaning does not lend itself to a reduction 
to what happens in each of the media separated from the rest. As the agents never cease to act, 
these media operate simultaneously.“  
 
As a consequence, one of the major difficulties of writing ethnography and claims to 
‘anthropological truth’ is conveying the simultaneous and multimedial nature of cultural 
knowledge through linear writing (cf. Bloch 1998). In the recent past, postmodernist authors 
have proposed impressionistic and similar innovative writing genres as an answer to this 
problem (cf. Clifford/Marcus 1986). However, in a cognitive approach a framework for 
multimedia settings is needed, which accounts for the experiential wealth encountered in 
ethnography, instead of reducing it.148 Here I will propose a theory of multimediality based on 
image schemas. 
    A precursor of my theory of multimediality can be found in Haskell’s (1989) theory of 
analogical transforms (see chapter 4). The model is broader and less specific than mine to 
the extent that it tries to model the transformation of invariances on numerous levels, in 
which the neuronal, sensory, perceptual, cognitive, linguistic, and logico-mathematic levels 
are viewed as a continuum. The part of Haskell’s approach which is of specific use here is 
analysis of multiple empirical correspondences among the sensory, affective, motor, 
phonetic, and syntactic levels of a discourse setting. Each of the experiential fragments, 
which occur in space and time and thus dispersed throughout an event, is cognitively 
collapsed into a dense schema. 
 
“By means of affective, sensorimotor, semantic, phonetic, syntactic, and cognitive processes, cognitive 
sensory schemata generate multiple meaning structures that are expressed in ostensibly single-
leveled symbolic vehicles (...).” (p. 271) 
                                                 
148 An alternative solution to the problem, though less interesting to the cognitivist project, has been 
proposed by postmodern ethnographers. They advocate capturing the multimediality of field 
experience by experimental ‘experience-near’ styles of writing that include impressionistic means. 
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The multiple levels of schematization by various analogic transforms can be conceptualized 
“as a series of matrices isomorphically stacked or mapped upon each other” (p. 268). He 
calls the fusing of multiple levels in one vehicle a ‘multicorrelative transformation’. On the 
basis of a laboratory discourse situation Haskell manages to isolate various levels of 
unconscious schematization in the participants’ statements. He distinguishes a subliteral 
semantic matrix, a subliteral phonetic or sound matrix, a subliteral syntactic matrix, and a 
subliteral motor or gestural matrix. Haskell analyzes a piece of discourse about a journalist, 
whose name is actually Sidney Harris, but who is mistakenly called Harry Harris. On the 
basis of this psychologically significant mistake discusses the subliteral references to the two 
researchers writing notes about the discussion group. The matrix transforms are notationally 
indicated by M0, M1, M2, M3, M4,..: 
 
“Subliteral Statement 13 illustrates matrix construction. M0 is the literal topic of a journalist by the 
name of Harry Harris; M1 is a semantic transform meaning hairy (bearded) and hairless (nonbearded) 
made possible M2, the sound matrix (i.e., hairy and hairless); in M3, the structure of the double Hs is 
reflected in the first letter of the two trainers’ last names and by the names of the two newspapers 
whose names both began with the letter H; in M4, the status order of the two trainers was reflected in 
the order of the double Hs (i.e., ‘hairy’ represents the bearded senior trainer, and ‘hairless’ represents 
the nonbearded junior trainer). The status order is also reflected in the order of the two newspapers 
mentioned, that is, ‘Harrisburg Independent Press,’ called ‘HIP’ represents the bearded, more liberal 
senior trainer, and the ‘Harrisburg Patriot News’ represents the second, more conservative trainer. 
Somehow cognitive structures were analogically and transformationally tracked, mapped, and stacked 
into an isomorphic matrix series (...).” (p. 269) 
 
While the model I will present here has multicorrelative transformations as its object as well, 
it adds to Haskell by specifying the transformations in terms of topological mappings using 
the medium of spatialized imagery. Image schemas allow an account of how – in the 
multimedial complexes characteristic of symbolic social action – a common mental format 
underlies divergent channels of presentation, such as action, image, word, or habitus. They 
explain how different media can reinforce thematic representations and still yield a unity or 
how complex blends between media work. The import of this for the social sciences is high. 
Image schemas afford the only deeper and at the same time parsimonious cognitive 
explanation for the continuity of symbolic modes in culture. The notion of image schemas 
frees us from the shortcomings of theories of transformation invoking a neutral-mode 
‘Mentalese’ for explaining how different channels of information interact. In embodied-cum-
conceptual image schemas the necessary ingredients are already there, all as analog 
structures that can be mapped on other analog structures. Recall that image schemas were 
characterized as transmodal skeletal mental structures that are either evoked by direct 
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external percepts, linguistically mediated meanings, bodily self-perception, or memories of 
any of these. They constitute what there is of common ground between preconceptual and 
conceptual knowledge of various sorts. 
    In the following argument major strands of all the previous chapters are drawn together. 
The foregoing chapters have presented a host of examples for the fact that image schemas 
underlie all of the following media acting on the human mind: 
(1) Perceptual structures of natural objects, artifacts, emblems, and pictures; 
(2) Perceived action structures of natural or social events; 
(3) States of bodily proprioception, including what I described in chapter 4 as imagery 
retrojected from conceptual knowledge into the body; 
(4) Mental scenes semantically evoked through language at the word and sentence 
level or as condensed ‘plot-genes’ of larger structures; 
(5) External and content-independent structural features of language form (iconicity); 
(6) Phonological structures that evoke imagery and co-occur with embodied states of 
the speech apparatus. 
 
Here I submit two propositions, both in keeping with the programmatic thrust of cognitive 
semantics: My first claim is that there are (potential) image-schematic relations obtaining 
between all these cognitive mediating devices and symbolic modes, simply because all of 
them share an analog format at the mental level. Second, it is by virtue of the common 
format that modes can operate in continuity with one another in cultural context. I assume 
that the continuity of symbolic mediating devices has several forms and functions. In many 
cases, a specific image schema heightens the impact of a new message by expressing it 
though several channels simultaneously. Often a symbolic medium also makes reference to 
a preexisting cultural theme. In other cases, the image-schematic continuity functions to 
blend information from various channels into a new unique kind of meaning that is more 
complex than any of its constituent parts. Finally, complex image-schematic interactions, 
such as opposition, irony, or Gestalt switch, may occur between several symbolic media and 
produce intricate tropic effects. It seems to me that all of these functions should be of 
immense interest to ‘blending theory’, since this perspective takes blending beyond its purely 
linguistic applications and gives us leverage for understanding cultural cognition of all sorts. 
Although this has not been studied so far, it seems obvious that diverging mental formats can 
go into blends, i.e. not only linguistic meaning can be blended with other linguistic meaning. 
    Ritual is an especially good point of entry for illustrating my hypothesis, since it is often 
crafted in a way that a maximum thematic interaction between symbolic channels occurs. 
The following ethnographic example will concentrate on how a common theme (albeit with 
connotative split-offs) is constituted through reinforcement. Unfortunately, I have not found 
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an example in which all of the above media co-occur, but four of the six will do. I will take a 
look at ethnographic data of a context in which a single image-schema underlies the shape 
of objects, the structure of actions, and the structure of images evoked by words as wells as 
by proprioceptive body imagery. 
 
AN IMAGE SCHEMA-BASED ANALYSIS OF A RITUAL MULTIMEDIAPLEX 
To shed light on some novel theoretical facets I chose an example involving a multi-level 
schema similar to the PENETRATION / TRANSGRESSION complex in the Heart of Darkness. Let 
us follow Maurice Bloch (1992) into a condensed account of the marriage ritual of Ladakh, 
originally described by the ethnographer Phylactou (1989). Bloch’s account analyzes the 
various aspects of a wife-taking raid into the bride’s household performed by a group of 
young men, a ritual in which an arrow plays an important role: 
 
“First of all, there is an element of sexual and reproductive symbolism. In the ritual the household of 
the groom is represented by young men arriving at the bride’s house. Similarly, the penetrated 
household of the bride is not surprisingly represented during the ritual most prominently by the bride 
herself. Again, the symbolism of the arrow planted in the grain is sexually evocative. 
    Secondly, there is the symbolism of conquest. The fetching of the bride acts out the entry into a 
bounded territory by a band of triumphant young men with god-like associations who (...) seem to 
represent a royal army who receive tribute from admiring villagers as they proceed on their way to 
bring back that which will ensure their reproduction. The conquering symbolism comes not only from 
the groom’s party’s dances but also from the arrow which the leader of the men carries prominently 
and with which in some cases he ‘catches’ the bride by hooking her by her clothing.“ (p. 71, my italics) 
 
In this passage Bloch elaborates the tie between reproduction and conquest, an association 
that is highly common in many cultures. It is quite plain that the two share a common 
underlying image schematic structure in a very relevant respect: the schema of PENETRATION, 
the forceful breaking of a boundary to enter another realm. This schema is grounded 
experientially in several salient ways. On the one hand, it is inherent in sexual penetration, 
which is the epitome and arch-image of penetrative acts for patriarchal cultures all over the 
world. Sexual penetration, in turn, is linked – via propositional knowledge – to fertility and 
reproduction, and thus partakes of the eminent cultural importance assigned to reproduction. 
In this way, the notion of penetration is linked with the continuity and well-being of the group. 
On the other hand, acts of penetration are also linked with the military expansion of the 
group. In warfare, territorial boundaries are being transgressed and the enemy’s territory is 
invaded. This perhaps helps explaining why rape is a universal practice of conquerors. It is 
the enactment of both penetrations as one, and is experienced in a more directly embodied 
and permanently subduing way than anything else, especially if it results in pregnancy. (In a 
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frequent second step after invasion the enemy’s territory is incorporated into one’s own 
territory, just as the enemy’s culture can be incorporated, and, in the most extreme case of 
cannibalism, the enemy itself.) Not infrequently, penetration into another group is also 
perceived as essential to maintaining the own group’s well-being, as in imperialism. 
    Both acts of penetration, military and sexual, evoke an underlying theme they have in 
common, namely vitality. Conventional (= propositional) knowledge as well as image-
schematic associations contribute to this. On the level of conventional knowledge the actors 
know that a loss of women entails a loss of vitality, because only they can reproduce the 
group biologically. This knowledge is additionally underwritten by the penetration image 
schema, which is brought into association by the ritual, and by its experiential ground: The 
most primary sense of penetration is experienced as a violation of one’s bodily integrity; this 
again typically entails a loss of psychic or physical vitality in some way. 
    Consider, next, how a ritual object is used to evoke an image schema. It is the role of the 
arrow that Bloch turns to next: 
 
“In fact the symbolism of the arrow reveals just how complex a totality is invoked in this marriage ritual 
and introduces yet further themes. Obviously the arrow is a weapon and perhaps a sign of the hunter 
[Phylactou 1989: 263] but it is also much more and has been very variously interpreted. The arrow is a 
central symbol, not only in the Tibetan culture area, but throughout the Mahayana Buddhist world, 
where it often stands for religion illuminating and fertilising the world. In the marriage ritual Phylactou 
stresses that one of its associations is that of a cosmic tree connecting the gods with the world of 
humans and so the entry of the young men can also be seen as the entry of the messenger of the 
gods into the house which is the centre of human production and reproduction.” (p. 71) 
 
Apart from the fact that the arrow, being a utensil for hunting and warfare, relates to 
propositional knowledge about conquest, it has the ideal shape to evoke strong image-
schematic associations. An arrow with a sharp point and fledged with feathers, and in 
particular the way it moves when shot, clearly evokes first the PATH schema – It is no 
accident that the customary pictogram used for a path or a directional movement is an 
idealized arrow – and then, if it hits a target, the PENETRATION schema. More than being 
concretely related to war or hunting, the arrow abstractly evokes associations with any kind 
of penetration into bounded spaces. 
    Therefore, the path schema can be changed into the related schema of penetration by 
adding specific details. However, the possibilities for elaborating this basic image schema 
are not exhausted by this. Both, the FORCE and the CONDUIT schemas may be regarded as 
enriched versions of the path schema, and both make sense of a further theme of the 
complex that Bloch analyzes. As he points out, the theme of vitality presents yet another 
aspect of the basic image. The arrow stands for the illuminating and fertilizing nature of 
 545 
religion. We may guess that a FORCE schema comes into play here, which would make 
sense if vitality were conceptualized as related to strength. If vitality is metaphorically 
understood in terms of kinesthetic movement (which it must be in part), receiving a force 
impulse implies a gain of vitality. The negative valence of penetration in invasion and rape for 
the receiving party is inverted to reveal the positive aspect of fertilization. 
    Even if the force schema were not operative here, Bloch’s account leads us to the 
conclusion that a CONDUIT schema is employed. It is clear that the arrow stands for some sort 
of benign substance sent on a vertical path and that religion is metaphorically conceived as 
such a substance. That is to say that the illumination and fertilizing is understood as 
transportation of a substance down a CONDUIT, specifying the substance as the fertilizing, 
enlightening, and blessing power of religion. This interpretation is additionally underwritten by 
the fact that the arrow can also be seen as a sign of the entry of the messengers of the gods. 
In both cases the contents of a container, in the one case the benign substances and in the 
other divine wisdom, are sent down a path-trajectory from the gods to the humans and effect 
changes in the recipients. It is hardly an over-interpretation to say that we have here a fine 
example of the CONDUIT metaphor for communication as analyzed by Reddy (1979), where a 
message is sent from one domain or space to another in just the same way one would send 
a material object from one person to another. 
    The theme of vitality is invoked in still another way by the arrow. There are two ways in 
which the arrow is like a tree, which metonymically stands for vitality. To begin with, the 
arrow bears an image-schematic resemblance to a tree. This resemblance is additionally 
reinforced by a second resemblance that can be gleaned from propositional knowledge, 
since both trees and arrows are made of the same material. Thus, the arrow does now only 
have a similar Gestalt-image as a tree, we also know that it originates from it and conserves 
its substance. If this correct, we have a fine example for the mutually reinforcing nature of 
imagistic and propositional cognition, as expressed in Paivio and Walsh’s (1993) ‘dual coding 
approach’. We can see how the arrow connects with the theme of the vitality of plants in a 
two-fold way, namely by the perception of its abstract form and by knowledge about its 
material and origin. 
    Bloch proceeds to show further facets of the multivocal symbolism that the arrow is 
capable of evoking: 
 
“Even this multitude of associations does not, however, exhaust the connotations of the symbolism of 
Ladakhi marriage and we find yet another element that could be repeated from a wide range of 
ethnographic areas: the symbolism of food and wealth of the house, both principally represented by 
grain. The bride is separated from a number of key parts of the house, including the central post and 
the main hearth. The central post can also be assimilated to the arrow, which connects the world of 
gods and the world of humans, and by being forcibly removed from it the bride is as though separated 
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from the fertilising principle of her own house. Similarly, by being ritually separated from the hearth, 
the bride is being separated from another area associated with the food-producing center of the 
house. It is as if in submitting to the entry of the wife-takers the household is abandoning that which 
sustains its vitality” (p.71-72, italics mine) 
 
That the arrow’s potential for multivocality depends on its image-schematic structure could 
not be made any clearer. What the arrow and the post have in common, and what merges 
them into one multivocal symbol, is precisely a particular abstract structure. To use Bloch’s 
words, what allows them to be ‘assimilated’ to each other is the PATH-structure they embody.  
    Bloch’s reanalysis of Phylactou uncovers yet further metaphoric aspects coming into play 
here. To begin with, the circumstance that the house is seen as a centered realm has a 
series of implications. Consider how the bride’s household, as she is taken from the center of 
her ‘realm’, loses its vitality that she is representing. This happens in a way, one may 
assume, that really gets under the bride’s skin, since being embedded in one’s familiar realm 
of control, of knowledge, and of social contact is crucial to the experience of vitality. So the 
notion of one’s own realm and its connection to vitality is a strongly experiential reality. 
(Incidentally, the same is true for the realm of the individual self, as I have tried to show 
earlier.) The general form of this experiential metaphor is expressed as WEAKENING IS A LOSS 
OF CENTER. We have already encountered this metaphor in the moral and physical corruption 
of Kurtz, who had been an upright and sane man before he entered the Heart of Darkness. 
    As Bloch points out (p. 70), houses are not only the prime social, but also the prime 
symbolic units for the Tibetans, which have religious significance as temples, in that they 
contain the shrines of the household gods. Consequently, the bride’s loss of vitality is not 
only experiential in the more practical sense, it is also symbolically mediated, insofar as she 
loses her spiritual vitality by being removed from the central post of her house. Specifically, 
the central post is conceived as a link with spiritual powers (presumably going UPWARDS) and 
the center of a CENTER-PERIPHERY system of moral belonging. Apart from being separated 
from the fertilizing principle of her own house, she is separated from her hearth, which, as 
the food-producing center, again is associated with vitality.  
    In sum, we find an impressive range of thematic evocations made into one in a single 
ritual. The unifying core-theme of vitality (the renunciation of the innate vitality of the bride-
givers and the recovery of outside vitality by the wife-takers) locks into other themes such as 
the kinship element, the theme of conquest, as well as the alimentary and the cosmogonic 
themes. There is a deeper theoretical aim in discussing this example at length. I want to 
show that a prerequisite for understand the multivocality displayed by the Ladakhi bride-
taking ritual is a thorough analysis of the present image-schematic mappings. While the 
example is perfect for demonstrating the tremendous importance of imagistic similarities, it 
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also shows that isolating these similarities from propositional knowledge makes little sense 
and would only impoverish our understanding. 
    More importantly, the present case study allows getting a handle on the general issue of 
multimedia cognition. In its amazing scope of symbolic media the ritual features a kind of 
multiple iconicity or, speaking in Haskell’s terminology, an entire matrix of analogical 
transforms of a central image schema (including some variation between subversions of the 
schema): First, remember that the theme of gaining vitality is represented as the ritual entry 
into a realm, i.e. the forceful crossing of a CONTAINER boundary, and the arrow as 
representation of a PATH, both the penetrative path of conquest and the path of divine 
energy. One intriguing discovery here is the isomorphism between the symbolic utensil and 
the structure of the event. In other words, what the young men themselves do is analogous 
to what the arrow they carry with them usually does, namely penetrating. This indicates that 
there can be image-schematic similarities even between things and events. Several 
ethnographic examples that may be taken as indicative of the same observation are brought 
together in Tilley’s work on material metaphors (1999: 68-76; see in particular page 74). 
    How such a mental similarity between a static object and a dynamic sequence is possible, 
may require some further explanation. A cognitively convincing answer is provided by 
Dewell’s (1994: 355) aforementioned observations on the possible uses of an image schema 
transformation that he calls the profiling of segments. Dewell argues that a part of a 
trajectory, a profiled segment, cognitively may come to stand for the whole of an imagined 
path. This simply means that it is sufficient to perceive or imagine a characteristic part of the 
trajectory to automatically reconstruct the whole of it. In this way a static object is capable of 
evoking a movement on a trajectory. By sticking an arrow in the ground, the path that it 
ideally would have taken is evoked. The central post of the Ladakhi house connecting the 
world of gods and the world of humans, similar to the Christian church spire, points upwards 
and beyond itself. Especially in the case of converging lines we perform a mental or visual 
scanning in which we move towards a certain point. Just as our experience with everyday 
objects in motion teaches us about the conservation of impetus, our scanning equally has an 
impetus that takes our mental motion beyond the limits of the scanned object. For a survey of 
the experimental evidence on this basic aspect of the human scanning faculty, I refer the 
reader to Gibbs and Colston (1995).  
   Returning to our example, we can venture the guess that the planted arrow is also 
interpreted as ESTABLISHED LINK. The arrow evokes the trajectory it would ordinarily have 
covered to reach its present location. By following the trajectory back to the people who 
launched the arrow, a link between the point of origin and the end point of the arc is 
constructed in the imagination. If this is the case here, the arrow might well function as a 
symbolism of an established social tie between wife-givers and wife-takers, a tie that is 
 548 
cognitively the result of an evoked image-schema transformation that lets us trace a path 
backwards. 
    Apart from imagistic isomorphisms between artifacts and event structures, there can also 
be isomorphism between word meanings and the former two. Although it should be clear by 
now, let me spell out again what it means that words can be homologous in structure to 
things and actions. It is obviously not the phonemic structure of words meant here, although 
iconic effects of this kind may also be frequent. When I speak about the image-schematic 
structure of words I mean the structure found in the mental images that words elicit mainly 
through their conventional definition. The idea that linguistic images and ritual actions can be 
isomorphic is implicitly present in much past anthropological literature. A brief, but apt 
example comes from Fernandez’ (1977: 111) analysis of the Gabonese revitalization cult 
Bwiti. A main metaphor motivating the ritual is that of ‘one-heartedness’ which is affirmed at 
several points of the religious ceremony. When the participants come back from the forest, 
where they have made appeals to the ancestors lingering there, they file back into the chapel 
and begin to spiral more and more tightly together until they form a compact mass with 
candles held above their heads so as to form a single flame. It is not difficult to see that the 
metaphor of ‘one-heartedness’ and the spiraling motion share an underlying image schema 
transformation: In both case there is a movement – in the one case mental in the other 
physical – from a multiplex to a mass in which the individual entities merge. This similarity 
presumably obtains because the metaphor of ‘one-heartedness’ elicits a mental image where 
separate entities are brought into a common focus or projected into a single container. This 
is also in line with the more detailed analysis of Bwiti in chapter 10, where I claimed that 
ontological unification is implied by a spatialized co-signature that is elicited by the non-linear 
rhetoric of preachers. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Highly consequential conclusions about the exploration of imagistic thought follow from the 
presented Ladakhi and the Gabonese examples. For the theory of ritual and for the 
understanding of modern media the fact can hardly be overrated in theoretical importance 
that in some contexts a single image schema underlies the shape of objects and emblems, 
the structure of human actions, the external formal structure of language, the phonetics of 
language, the structure of mental images evoked through language, and proprioceptive body 
imagery alike. The Ladakhi example demonstrates how a core image is manifested in 
different symbolic forms and how it can reinforce a cultural master schema.  
    Given the previous analysis, it is evident that image schemas play a central role in the 
explanation of a phenomenon called the ‘multivocality’ of symbols, a term coined by Victor 
Turner (1967, 1969). Due to their abstract and skeletal nature, image schemas can be given 
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multiple readings, depending on their context. Being an unspecified and malleable structure, 
the same core image can appear at different stages, on local or large-scale levels of a 
sequence, and in varying symbolic guises and perceptual modes. The image-schematic 
topologies shared between perceptual structures of artifacts, perceived action structures of 
events, bodily proprioception, words meanings, iconic features of a symbolic medium, and 
phonological image schemas indicate that these modes operate in continuity. We may 
assume that a major avenue towards explaining powerful cognitive models in culture lies in 
the analysis of what I would call ‘image-schematic multimediaplexes’. 
    What is more, multimedia image schemas also touch on the issue of diversity within unity 
in cultural thoughtscapes. They constitute ‘core themes with outriggers’: Any multimedia 
schema, in its various manifestations, allows for sub-varieties and conveys related, but non-
identical ideas. For example, the many imagistic ideas expressed in the bride-raid stand in a 
family relationship, in which all members share some features via the vitality nexus, but each 
member also contributes very idiosyncratic characteristics. The core imagery model 
highlights a degree of cognitive integration, because mappings between different media 
create symbolic unity, and at the same time diversity in the connotations, because the 
schemas would remain anemic without elaboration: While core imagery interrelates several 
thematic fields and facilitates associative inferences within and between domains, the 
connotative dimension of a mental structure depends heavily on the performance-bound 
context. 
    A number of methodological conclusions emerging from all this which point to a 
transdisciplinary agenda I will turn to forthwith in the final overview. 
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Conclusion:                                                                                           
Imagery and Metaphor in Culture Revisited 
 
This work ends with a final overview. Its objective is to survey the novel theoretical claims 
that I think most important and to tie loose ends together. It also aims at presenting my new 
terminological suggestions in a coherent fashion and at discussing basic issues of 
methodology. 
 
IMAGE SCHEMAS AND METAPHORS AS INTERPRETIVE CONSTRUCTS 
Let me start with some cautioning words about methodology and the role of theory. We have 
to bear in mind that image schemas and conceptual metaphors are hypothetical constructs 
that have to be indirectly inferred from a set of data. They are postulated as likely 
explanatory models for linguistic patterns, evidence from experimental and developmental 
psychology, or for ethnographic observations. As elsewhere, the interpretation of data is 
beset with several typical problems here: For example, often we speak of a conceptual 
metaphor’s entailments as if they logically follow from the metaphor, while, in truth, only the 
sum-total of so-called entailments made us postulate the metaphor to begin with. In the first 
chapter I also pointed out that linguistic findings on metaphor can be either interpreted as 
stored as prototypical exemplars, as abstract image schemas, or both together, and it is 
often difficult to decide between these alternatives without experimental data. Next, it is 
highly important to take care not to posit conceptual metaphors at a too general level. 
Clausner and Croft (1997) point out eligibility restrictions for mappings in the case of the too 
inclusive formulation THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, while Kövecses (2001) does the same thing 
for ANGER IS FIRE. All these problems point to the importance of abstaining from reifications of 
our theoretical constructs, into which we can ourselves get entangled very easily. 
    In the third chapter I have illustrated the problematic of theoretical reifications by reviewing 
a long-lasting squabble about the relative importance of ‘metaphors’ and ‘cultural schemas’. 
The long and the short of my argument was that any metaphoric reading has to vie with 
alternative (but often cognate) interpretations for principled reasons, e.g. with explanations 
on the basis of several ‘propositional’ themes and a cultural schema organizing or governing 
them. An example of multiple possible interpretations were Quinn’s (1991) reading of her 
data on American marriage concepts as circumscribed by eight themes (sharing, lastingness, 
mutual benefit, etc.) and one organizing background schema, while Kövecses (1999) claimed 
that all these themes are already encompassed by the metaphor MARRIAGE IS UNITY and its 
various entailments. Generally speaking the problem is this: Depending on one’s interpretive 
ingenuity, it is frequently possible to come up with a high-level metaphor that accounts for an 
amazing number of utterances within a discourse domain. However, the mere plausibility of 
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these interpretations does not automatically imply their cognitive reality in the minds of the 
people we study. The looming danger is that the more unified (and convenient for exposition) 
our theoretical constructs are, the poorer their predictive capacity for discursive details 
becomes, so that a single metaphor cannot easily bear the brunt of explanation alone with 
complex domains such as marriage. The other way around there is no sensible reason why 
‘themes’ or ‘propositional schemas’ should ‘govern’ individual metaphors to an extent that 
these are no more than expository devices. 
    This, however, does not mean that we stand devoid of useful criteria for the assessment of 
our explanatory models. I would advocate choosing a multi-level model that has predictive 
power both for the discursive details and for cognitive background characteristics. In 
particular, a good model should explain a maximum of pragmatic usage features of a 
metaphor or any other conceptual structure and, at the same time, its trans-domain 
conceptual constituents: 
(1) It should explain changes and shifts in metaphor use within short discourse 
passages, e.g. why one theme of discourse can be based on various alternative kinds 
of image schemas like ENTITY, LINK, PATH, and PROCESS at the same time. 
(2) It should explain how less obviously metaphoric (‘literal’) predications on the 
subject matter come about, i.e. if they are derivative of a conceptual metaphor, if they 
emerge from a dually-coded system, or if they constitute a system of which 
metaphors are themselves derivative. 
(3) It should take into account the effects of different discourse contexts on the choice 
of metaphors and images used for a theme, i.e. the impact of other available 
schemas cued by the immediate setting. 
(4) It should shed light on similarities with related items of cultural knowledge that 
either come in as background knowledge or partake of larger networks. This means 
that cross-domain relations provided by basic ontological metaphors and scenarios 
applicable across domains have to be considered. Ultimately, domains should never 
be analyzed in complete isolation. 
 
Summing all this up, which description of a folk-model among several plausible, but vying 
alternatives has the greater explanatory power can only be decided on the basis of a careful 
analysis of natural discourse or interviews. In my view, a solely corpus-based approach is 
inadequate with respect to complex domains for principled reasons: While it can come up 
with plausible interpretations (which may, no doubt, be correct), in cases of doubt it offers no 
useful criteria for checking which interpretation is more accurate. Such criteria have to be 
discourse-based and emerge from contextualized pragmatic usages. 
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    On top of all this, the plausibility of our theoretical intuitions also rests on other pieces of 
‘convergent evidence’ of multidisciplinary origin (cf. Lakoff/Johnson 1999). Convergent 
evidence includes evidence gained through the same method in other cognitive domains, 
evidence about the same domain gained through other research methods, and general 
domain-invariant findings (e.g. from cognitive psychology, neuroscience, or cognitive 
ethology). In addition to the requirement of having explanatory power for empirical data the 
metaphors or image schemas that we hypothesize should also be in accordance with our 
broader cognitive theory. The more interdisciplinary our theory is and the greater the number 
of research methods it draws on, the surer we can be of our intuitions. Regarding the novel 
kinds of imagery I proposed in Part II convergent evidence plays an even more significant 
role: It is near impossible to directly confirm hypotheses about metaphors and imagery at a 
large-scale level (such as plot-structure) or about generic image schema tools (such as the 
radial category image schema). These claims rest almost exclusively on indirect evidence 
and rely on their mutual fit with findings on memory cues and restrictions, inferential 
behavior, Gestalt perception, cultural schemas and interpretation defaults, discourse rules, 
reader response, etc. 
 
METAPHORS AS CREATORS OF THOUGHT SYSTEMS 
It has been established in the first chapter that metaphors can be classified in a number of 
relevant ways. One important criterion appears to be particularly interesting for social science 
and philosophy – a metaphor’s extension within, its relation to, and its defining power over 
the larger cultural thoughtscape. Metaphors can be relatively isolated, whereas others 
prefigure entire cultural thought models of lesser or greater scope. In the category of 
widespread cultural thought patterns we find various forms of cohesion: Some metaphors 
operate jointly and form clusters or scenarios. Simple metaphors (i.e. either thematic 
constituents or the very ontological primitives) extend over many domains. Other metaphors 
form networks. And, a few powerful metaphors assume an organizing role for large amounts 
of other conceptual material. Taken together, this vindicates the frequent practice of reading 
metaphor as shorthand for the interconnectedness of cultural cognition in general. Here are 
what I think the most important principles by which metaphors are organized: 
    (1) One kind of data points to metaphors that form complex mapping systems in a domain 
or that use recurring basic constituents across domains: 
a. Duals: Of late, so-called metaphor duals have been discovered, i.e. metaphor pairs 
for one target domain that are alternatively instantiated and share a part of their logic 
(Lakoff/Johnson 1999). Dual systems are often simply alternative viewing 
arrangements on the same matter, for example when time is understood in English as 
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either a moving object relative to a static self or vice versa. Of course, there can also 
be triple or quadruple metaphors (Yu 1995 documents a triple for Chinese time).  
b. Multi-metaphor scenarios: Clusters of sub-metaphors for one target domain can 
also be larger in number than in the previous category and they can include types 
more distinct than alternative viewing arrangements. Metaphors describing the 
different phases of a complex scenario constitute one important type of this. The 
classic example is Lakoff and Kövecses’ (1987) study of anger showing that the 
conceptualizing the phases ‘cause of anger’, ‘anger’, ‘attempted anger control’, 
‘venting’, ‘retributive act’, etc. takes different metaphors.  
c. Alternative metaphors for a domain: Many alternative source domains for the same 
target can exist in parallel, usually highlighting somewhat different aspects, e.g. LOVE 
IS UNITY, LOVE IS A COVENANT, LOVE IS A COLLABORATIVE WORK OF ART. In some cases 
these can be organized by an overall schema that specifies which metaphor covers 
which aspect. A sub-case in which a cluster brings together more fine-grained 
conceptual items can be seen in the different meaning aspects of any target domain, 
provided it is fairly complex: It is typical of all structural (i.e. multiple) mappings that 
the diverse aspects of the target are characterized through a combination of several 
primary metaphors (cf. Grady 1997b on theories and Kövecses 2001 on complex 
systems). Even though the primary metaphors are firmly joined together in the more 
complex metaphor, they may be also said to lead an existence of their own, since 
they individually occur in many other complex metaphors as well.  
 
(2) Other devices create metaphor networks, either for the purpose of merging conceptual 
material that usually stands apart in our experience or for mutually strengthening between 
the sub-models of a higher-scale model: 
d. Nodal key domains constitute a single source domain (e.g. house architecture, as 
exemplified by Blier 1987 or Bourdieu 1977) that metonymically unites a large number 
of metaphors in a single experiential locus. A stronger unity of the individual 
metaphors is thereby suggested, e.g. for unfolding a cosmology. Most significantly, 
ritual action almost invariably involves nodal key domains. 
e. Floating signifiers constitute a similar mechanism. The term refers to a single 
source domain or a whole piece of (usually attention-grabbing) discourse that is used 
across many different social contexts, while being given different readings in each. As 
the same source is ostensively projected onto different target domains, this 
connection makes a clear statement about their respective contexts belonging 
together at a higher plane of meaning.  
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f. Cross-buttressing or macro-metaphoric relations were the terms I suggested where 
a complex model underlying a great portion of cultural discourse (such as the entire 
epistemology of modern biomedicine described by Gordon 1988) includes several 
about equally important metaphors that mutually corroborate and stabilize each other. 
 
(3) There also was a discussion of several kinds of higher-level (i.e. generic) ordering 
mechanisms of the mind, which have the function of structuring reasoning either within or 
across cognitive domains: 
g. Master metaphors and hierarchization: In his analysis of political worldviews and 
morals in America Lakoff (1996) uncovers the master metaphor THE NATION IS A 
FAMILY, which is added to by a large number of other morality metaphors. Of course, it 
is debatable to whether one of these many metaphors plays a directing role for the 
rest or whether they form a cluster of equals. However, what the family metaphor 
minimally does is to fix the common discursive ground between conservatives and 
liberals, despite the fact that they develop deeply conflicting interpretations of how 
children in a family should be raised (and, by metaphorical implication, how citizens of 
a nation should behave). While the family metaphor is characteristic of both 
ideologies, their factual antagonism results from a different preference order – we 
might also say hierarchization – of the other connected morality metaphors.  
h. Embedding in a shared generic-level model: While not precisely uniting opposed 
ideologies, another kind of master metaphor brings together related concepts in a 
higher-order model. Kövecses’ (2000) analysis of metaphors for emotions and for 
rationality reveals such a model, in which the two are opposed as agonist and 
antagonist in a FORCE relation and thus become mutually defining in a higher-level 
model. This points to the conclusion that, at least in some cases, a very broadly 
defined domain can be under the sway of a single ontological metaphor (i.e. a simple 
image schema such as FORCE, PATH, LINK, PROCESS, or ENTITY).149 
i. Transdomain models: A foundational schema, thematic schema, or a thematic 
metaphor occurs when the same complex knowledge structure, imagery or other, 
informs so many domains that it either integrates the everyday discourse of a culture 
(such as Strauss and Quinn’s 1997 self-reliance theme in the U.S.A.) or that it creates 
a weave of cosmology (such as Shore’s 1996 Aboriginal walkabout schema). We can 
assume on the basis of Quinn’s work that complex cultural schemas of this sort 
                                                 
149 This can, by Kövecses’ data, be true for the model Americans use for summarily reasoning about 
emotions and reason, while the many individual emotions, of course, feature a range of ontologically 
different metaphors. 
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encode a number of individual metaphors simultaneously. On the basis of Shore’s 
work we can surmise that they most likely employ multiple codes for this. 
j. Imagery preferences: Cognitive templates, a notion I developed in chapter 5, refer 
not to metaphors or even any kind of specific conceptual model, but to wide cultural 
preferences in how imagery is used. This can, e.g., mean a general preference for 
constantly recombining basic Gestalts in different configurations, as Shore’s (1996) 
modularity schema suggests for the U.S.A., or it can mean a preference for using 
image schemas in heavy abstraction and without complements of rich imagery, as I 
suggested on the basis of a comparison between Judeo-Christian and Chinese 
thought styles. 
 
TYPOLOGICAL DISTINCTIONS OF IMAGERY 
If imagery has been used as a catchall term in this work, this has happened on purpose. The 
main rationale for this choice was that the designated cognitive phenomena operate in a 
functional continuum in real-life contexts. Also, a broad imagery framework allows studying 
cultural representations in an integrated fashion, while covering a relatively large number of 
interesting phenomena. Another reason for an inclusive approach is that the same 
experimental findings from psychology and neuroscience have a bearing on all of these 
phenomena. For example, we can assume that similar brain functions are responsible for all 
sorts of imagery phenomena. In sum, there is presently a growing cluster of ‘convergent 
evidence’ from several disciplines that can be grouped around imagery theory. 
    At the same time, since quite diverse aspects of the mind-body have been subsumed as 
imagery, analytical distinctions are necessary for the sake of theoretical clarity. Since much 
of past metaphor theory has been committed to a not overly theory-saturated style of 
exposition – a fact that no doubt accounts for its broad popularity –, I advocate giving a 
stronger emphasis to a series of typological distinctions. In a bird’s-eye view, I have 
proposed the following (partly overlapping) distinctions relating to usage types of imagery: 
    (1) The most basic distinction among types of imagery and, more particularly, of image 
schemas, already to be found in earlier work (e.g. Johnson 1987), refers to the sensory 
mode in which an image is perceived or imagined. Imagery comes in the following modes: 
 a. proprioceptive, possibly including aspects of emotion  
 b. tactile  
c. olfactory 
 d. gustatory 
 e. acoustic 
 f. visual 
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Of these modes of imagery the visual, tactile, and acoustic types afford the possibility of a 
dynamic change in time; in the other modes most people find it difficult to imagine or 
perceive complex sequences. Some imagery modes imply distance from the observing or 
imagining person, most notably vision, while others involve a high degree of experiential 
immediacy, most notably proprioception and tactile images. It is also noteworthy that several 
or all of these perceptual or imaginative modes can be fused in a multi-modal (‘iconic’) 
resemblance based on a central image schema. 
     (2) With regard to the possible loci of imagery either in conceptual knowledge of the mind 
or in preconceptual knowledge of the body I proposed a tripartite distinction for achieving a 
greater terminological precision in the embodiment debate: 
a. Non-objectified body imagery / proprioceptive body awareness refers to image-
schematic knowledge structures, simple or compound, that are stored primarily in the 
procedural memory system (but can emanate from or can be mapped onto 
conceptual image schemas). The proprioceptive and kinesthetic senses are very 
strongly involved here. We may call this type ‘primary embodiment’. 
b. Objectified body imagery is conceptual imagery closer to the threshold of 
consciousness or above it, in which image schemas, simple or compound, are used 
to imagine states of the own body as seen by an external observer. Ordinarily, the 
visual mode of imagination is involved here. (Note, however, that objectified body 
images frequently have a non-objectified counterpart). This type we may call 
‘conceptual embodiment’. 
c. Objectified external imagery is the term I chose for mental images of all other 
objects and people in the world that have nothing to do with our own body. A concept 
of this kind can be characterized as embodied only in a weaker sense, and only to the 
extent that it draws on image schema modules that have been originally acquired in 
childhood through kinesthetic experience, but have since started an autonomous 
conceptual existence in our mind. We may call this type ‘indirect embodiment’. 
 
(3) With regard to the necessary and frequent interaction between embodied and conceptual 
knowledge I have distinguished two complementary functional principles of metaphorical 
transpositions (I dubbed this nexus ‘metaphor in the vertical mode’ in chapters 1 and 4): 
a. Projection from proprioceptive body awareness into conceptual imagery is the case 
when a knowledge item is first acquired through body practices by an individual (e.g. 
in early childhood) and then used as a more abstract conceptual structure, either 
adding to the embodied sense or even entirely split-off from the original bodily 
motivation. A split-off is the case when a formerly embodied schema starts a 
conceptual existence in its own right, while the resonance of body awareness 
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subsides. More often, however, knowledge is double-coded both as embodied 
awareness and conceptual meaning. 
b. Retrojection from conceptual imagery into body awareness is the case when a 
knowledge item is first acquired by an individual through an abstract piece of body-
related discourse (e.g. through school learning or narratives) and only then gradually 
discovered in the own body as well. This happens by virtue of image-schematic 
structures that are increasingly imagined as existing in the own body. Discursive 
metaphor can thus trigger embodied states in people. Not only explicitly body-related 
discourse can produce this effect; other symbolic metaphors can also be 
subconsciously evocative of body structures (e.g. in depth psychology). Overall, the 
principle of retrojection accounts for the power, impact, and immediacy of many 
metaphors in discourse. 
 
(4) With regard to the complexity of imagery and its degree of situatedness in social context I 
have proposed a distinction between two broad kinds of image schemas: 
a. Basal image schemas, also called image schema modules, function as building-
blocks of more complex conceptual models. PATH, FORCE, BALANCE, UP-DOWN, 
ITERATION, etc. are already acquired in early childhood as kinesthetic modules. These 
and other basal image schemas must be called modular since they occur as 
elementary constituents of a plethora of different experiences – they are truly 
transcontextual mental entities. By consequence, they are too abstract to involve a 
significant amount of emotional or context-bound imagery. 
b. Domain-specific image schema compounds are images in which several basal 
building-blocks are superimposed and mentally stored as one integrative Gestalt. 
These compounds are usually closely linked to a particular social setting, most 
typically the one in which they were first acquired. What makes image schema 
compounds distinct from basal schemas is that they are capable of evoking situation-
specific emotions and other connotations. Although the meaning-carrying level, here 
too, lies in the image-schematic skeletons, these are likely to be bound up with some 
rich imagery. Many compound image schemas are the result of experimental 
metonymies, i.e. important social situations in which the involved features were co-
present. 
 
Regarding this terminological split I have emphasized that a cognitive approach to culture 
should cultivate a double-view on basal and compound schemas. At all costs, we must avoid 
according higher ontological status to basal schemas without necessity or reason, as has 
been implicitly done by scores of past authors. Implying that the compounds are in truth no 
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real schemas any more is just as wrongheaded, since compound imagery is still schematic  
(though perhaps less) and the function that of an expectational structure. 
    (5) With regard to the time scale and locus of imagery we can distinguish two broad 
groups of representational structures: 
a. Static, localized image schemas can be found in pictorial representations, artifacts, 
single semantic meanings, gestures, or short procedural schemas. They are not very 
noticeably extended in time and can be processed as a whole. 
b. Temporalized, dynamic, and translocal image schemas involve imagining events of 
noticeable duration either as a single process or as a condensed ‘one-shot’ image. A 
condensation into a core-image can result when imagining the structural features of 
temporal events. One such kind of schema was referred to as an image-schematic 
‘plot gene’. Furthermore, translocal imagery can be evoked through ‘megametaphors’, 
i.e. through surreptitious, cumulative cues that blend together into a richer image that 
is not present in any single section of a text or narrative. All in all, both the selection of 
core-features of a continuous event as well as the adding up and blending of 
individually occurring features from several sub-events can induce translocal imagery. 
 
(6) With regard to the kind of cognitive function performed by imagery I have drawn a graded 
and continuous distinction between content-related schemas and image-schematic tools. 
This distinction is based, both, on their degree of schematicity and their cognitive function: 
a. The semantic pole of imagery refers to imagery evoked by individual symbols, 
words, or language at the phrase level or slightly higher. Formal features of texts 
underlying so-called ‘iconic’ phenomena (e.g. the formal structure of a poem) are not 
semantic imagery in the strict sense, although they do not belong into the second 
category below either. They exist at an intermediary level between semantic content 
and purely transcontextual tool schemas. 
b. Co-functional imagery (i.e. image-schematic co-signatures) refers to extremely 
general and multi-functional tools of cognition, which involve image schemas at the 
utmost level of abstraction. In addition to semantic schemas, the generic schemas for 
radial category structures, Aristotelian categories, feature bundles, event schemas, or 
causality schemas are – according to Lakoff (1987) – based on our experience with 
spatialized image schemas. Co-functional imagery of this sort, as I propose to call it, 
assists the semantic pole of imagery in that it provides a background skeleton of 
expectational structures (about events, categories, causality relations, etc.) into which 
on-line cognition is inserted. This backdrop can either emerge from conventionalized 
cultural schemas or it can be newly cued in an ongoing event. It is worth noting that 
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many co-signatures are likely candidates for cultural universals, since they are 
relatively independent of the content of cultural beliefs. 
 
THEORETICAL GAINS ACHIEVED THROUGH THE SPATIALIZATION OF FORM HYPOTHESIS 
The perhaps most consequential new claim in my treatment of image schemas has been that 
they, among other things, shape broad cognitive tools that are operative across a high 
number of domains and tasks. This means nothing less than that the nature of generic multi-
purpose mechanisms (working either as universal or culturally acquired expectational 
patterns) is understood through – or, we might say, assembled out of – image-schematic 
elements. Thus, we do not only understand the structure of particular concepts imagistically, 
but also the prototypical structures of the mechanisms that organize, relate, and integrate 
groups of conceptual images. This is the claim sketched out by George Lakoff (1987) as the 
‘spatialization of form hypothesis’ and discussed in detail by Paul Deane (1991, 1996). 
    Accordingly, it is not unlikely that image schema tools are used on a routine basis to 
imagine the overall structure of events or of causal relations, the linkage of attributes of a 
concept into one, the complex structure of radial categories, the nature of metaphorical 
tension, the apartness of ontologically different belief spaces, or even the enablement of 
religious beliefs through transcendent principles. I gave the hypothesis a more precise 
theoretical form under the heading of image-schematic co-signatures or co-functional 
imagery: As stated above, co-functional imagery earns its name because it assists the 
semantic pole of imagery. Its function is to provide a background skeleton of expectational 
structures into which on-line cognition can be inserted and together with which it dialectically 
develops, as a theme unfolds. After this theoretical definition I surveyed four lines of 
argument in favor of the spatialization of form hypothesis that can be found at present: 
a. Spatialized forms are a plausible explanation for certain linguistic patterns in 
grammar. For example, they explain why so-called ‘head structures’ are needed as a 
conceptual ‘hub’ (CORE-PART SCHEMA and LINK) whenever we connect one 
subordinate phrase of a sentence with another in order for the combinations to make 
sense. 
b. Spatialized forms converge with data from selective impairment studies in the 
neurosciences that investigate the overlapping and integrative functions that our brain 
regions responsible for spatial cognition perform. They are also made plausible by 
recent model implementations from artificial intelligence, which suggest how an 
integration of dissimilar cognitive task, such as semantics and movement, may be 
‘wired’. 
c. Spatialized forms explain inclusion hierarchies and the continuity of schematic 
forms from the semantic word- or phrase-level via an intermediate level of generic 
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schemas up to a level of multiple-domain tools. Findings on metaphor indicate that 
some lower-level relations, such as Kövecses’ (2000) ANGER schema, can simply be 
inserted into higher-level schemas for EMOTION or even, at a level of even higher 
inclusion, for MENTAL STATES in general, which are all defined by force-relations. 
d. Spatialized forms are consistent with the hypothesis that our folk- or experts’ 
theories about thought and language, such as the model of metaphor as a CONDUIT 
transaction between separate SPACES, might in fact be simplified version of the co-
signatures that we subconsciously employ. 
 
If the spatialization of form hypothesis proves to be correct, the consequences for our 
understanding of the human mind are vast. The notion underwrites the general view 
submitted by cognitive linguists that semantics and the general operational structures of 
syntax operate in the same fluid cognitive medium and are therefore continuous. By 
consequence, a high-level structure can under certain circumstances turn into a more 
specific one by enrichment and a low-level one can become a high-level one by abstraction. 
This in turn also explains how general tools may emerge through the repetition of, or as the 
historical precipitate of, specific semantic meanings. This is discussed in Heine’s 
grammaticalization studies (1995, 1997a,b). (I would like to note in a brief aside that whether 
the continuity of individual semantic meanings and cognitive tools commits us to a 
completely a-modular view of the mind I dare not say; yet I would advise skepticism.)  
    I also discussed an interesting working hypothesis that is a logical corollary to the 
spatialization of form hypothesis. As Palmer (1996) foreshadows, complex propositions may 
be but high-level arrays of compressed imagery of which only the formal contours are in 
mental focus, as long as we do not return to a more specific viewing arrangement again. If 
my surmise holds true (and if the involved principles of condensation and contour perception 
can be worked out in detail) this supports a view of the mind operating in a unitary imagistic 
code. Transpositions between imagery and prepositions would then obey space logic and the 
rules of imagistic transformation described by Langacker. Even though my proposal begs the 
question of what accounts for phenomenal differences between analog and digital codes and 
surely leaves a number of other questions unanswered, it warrants further testing as a 
general framework for understanding representations (see Gärdenfors 2000 for an startlingly 
broad theory of space-logic). 
 
ONTOLOGICAL KINDS AND ONTOLOGICAL DYNAMICS BASED ON IMAGERY 
Another remarkable consequence of the spatialization of form hypothesis is that it paves the 
way for a cognitive definition of ontological kinds. Basically, ontology has to do with the 
differential phenomenal ‘feel’ of concepts, for example the intuition that processes are 
 561 
something fundamentally different from entities. Langacker’s (1987a) account of imagistic 
mechanisms in linguistic meaning, e.g. his explanations of word kinds, leads to the 
hypothesis that we classify ontological kinds simply on the basis of our noticing different 
generic Gestalt features in things. Building on this assumption I have sketched a theory of 
substance and processual, as well as mixed ontologies: 
    (1) Substance ontologies and especially essence beliefs can be explained through my 
notion of abstract quality spaces and their reified version, which I have named the ‘realm’ 
construal: 
a. Certain mental ‘regions’ in the imagistic thoughtscape are construed as a 
homogeneous mass in order to represent the deeper ‘sameness’ of superficially 
different things belonging to that region. Bestowing a mass construal on a region 
results in what I call a ‘realm’ (or, alternatively, a sort of general SAMENESS image 
schema). The rationale for this terminology is that the inner part of a realm is 
conceptualized as determined by one homogeneous quality feature, which we may 
dub its ‘rule’. The realm imagery functions as a totally abstract representation of a 
cluster of attributes and their essential sameness. As recent findings by Hirschfeld, 
Keil, Atran, Boyer, and others suggest, a representation of essence is often involved 
in cultural models without people actually understanding the underlying attributes. 
Refining Boyer’s (1994a) argument of ‘pseudo-natural kinds’ by recasting it in terms 
of imagery, I suggested that the absence of specific attributes in essentialist concepts 
is possible by virtue of imagining a container-like region with perfectly schematic (i.e. 
qualitatively unspecified) contents.  
b. Realm imagery can also assist the reification of all sorts of complex conceptual 
arrays or even entire epistemologies in cultural discourse, because it allows their 
condensation into a single term. Based on the complex signification of the Nuer 
concept of ‘spirit’ as AMBIGUITY schema I argued that any kind of higher-level cognitive 
relations, such as second-order similarity relations, can be reified if a realm image is 
projected on them. This allows using the realm image as a simplified token 
representation. 
 
(2) The central role of profiling and selective focusing was discussed in various (partly 
overlapping) respects, including a theory of trope relations: 
a. Learning culture means activating the right regions together, including the 
recognition that one can metaphorically stand for the other (Toren 1993a), but also 
that the tropical order of source and target can in some cases be inverted (Wagner 
1986).  
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b. Culturally thematic concepts correspond to regions frequently foregrounded in an 
unusual number of other representations. 
c. The focus on and the choice of sub-regions as parts of larger thematic wholes 
specifies either immediate discourse subjects (Cook 1993) or preferred explanatory 
concepts. In addition, the degree to which speakers tend to impose a clear-cut profile 
reflects their cultural style of keeping an issue vague or nailing it down. 
d. Links or overlaps between mental regions can express ontological separation or 
unity of notions, such as the Cartesian discourse on ‘thought’ and ‘emotions’, which 
performs an ascription to two ontological realms of fundamentally different nature. 
e. The insertion of a discourse into a specific background can express the ontological 
locus of a concept. An example is the Ifaluk folk-model of emotions in which emotions 
are set into the ontological background of interpersonal and public interactions 
instead of the background of inner experiences, as it is done in the West (Lutz 1988). 
f. The extension which the boundary of a region is given specifies the ‘width’ of 
concepts that are embedded in other relations, e.g. the space of the self as reaching 
into the larger family space or, alternatively, as being confined to the subjective space 
(Bloch 1992). 
g. The understanding of a relation as either a metaphor or a metonymy may result 
from alternative construals of a single mental scene as either two separated domains 
or two sub-domains embedded in a shared continuum. Hence, in discourse and ritual 
it is usually possible to let metaphor slip into metonymy and vice versa, depending on 
the intended emphasis. The polytropes involved in the Bororo and Kayapó bird rituals 
exemplified this wandering between metaphoric, metonymic, and synecdochic 
vantage points as the ritual proceeds (Turner 1991). 
 
(3) I gave a number of examples of processualist ontologies, which are all based on a 
widespread use of the PROCESS image schema as an interpretive template (i.e. expectational 
structure): 
a. To some extent processualist ideologies, although rare, can be found in everyday 
folk-models, as in Cannells’s (1992, 1999) example from the Philippines. The ideology 
of the people of Bicol fosters an awareness that lets them de-emphasize the 
permanence of seemingly fixed states and minimally lets them abstain from a 
frequent use of reified concepts in the domains of social and cosmological 
relationships. 
b. Full-blown and explicit process ontologies can be found in experts’ theories, 
especially in South and East Asian religions. The Buddhist core-tenet of the ever-
changing nature of reality involves a particularly strong ontological processuality 
 563 
schema. Here, the deeper nature of the mundane world is understood as totally 
conforming to a CONTINUOUS FLOW schema, whereas spiritual enlightenment means 
overcoming this very schema. Moreover, it was suggested that the CONTINUOUS FLOW 
schema is often combined with other schemas in complex theories, e.g. with the 
SYSTEM schema in the ‘co-dependent arising’ belief of Buddhism. 
 
(4) I argued that imagery theory does impressively well in explaining the dynamic nature of 
ontologies: I selected a number of respects, though this list could, no doubt, be continued: 
a. The dynamically shifting vantages in ritual polytropes mentioned above are one 
example, in which either the metaphoric or metonymic aspects of a setting are 
profiled.  
b. A mixed model of process and substance, as exemplified on basis of the Chinese 
qi concept, is possible by virtue of a stereoscopic view on two Gestalt arrays that are 
encoded within the same overall model, but as alternative foregrounded profiles (cf. 
MacLaury 1995, Hill/MacLaury 1995).  
c. A related, but different kind of model rests on discursive imperatives to repetitively 
perform radical Gestalt switches between totally incompatible images. This was 
exemplified by educational paradoxes in Buddhism in which INCLUSION and IDENTITY 
image schemas are postulated simultaneously and the mind has to skip back and 
forth between them. 
d. By looking at the rhetoric of the Bwiti ritual (Fernandez 1982) I discussed how 
religion can reshape ontology. I argued that the ritual involves the gradual 
deconstruction of the image-schematic default for serial causal sequence (the 
IMPETUS schema, a.k.a. ‘billiard-ball’ model) through a barrage of metaphors. A 
homogeneous image-schematic foil is built up in the default’s stead, with the purpose 
of evoking the unity of all things. The general hypothesis I have drawn from this was 
that predications through rhetoric or ritual can dynamically reshape default imagery of 
all sorts, thereby enabling the shifts in ontology from everyday knowledge to religious 
understandings or serving any number of other rhetoric purposes. 
 
(5) I hypothesized the existence of a learning default or representational default called the 
‘nodal schema’. Here a central (but very schematic and vague) concept acts as a linking hub 
for a series of surrounding ideas for any of the following purposes: 
a. The nodal schema is attached to not fully understood concepts whose centrality, 
however, is already being recognized by learners. By the same token, the schema 
structures concepts or words attached to so-called ‘floating signifiers’, i.e. mental 
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entities that are of recognized salience, but whose content changes depending on the 
context. 
b. A slightly similar schema might explain that many rituals radiate outwards into the 
larger ontological regions from which their symbolic material emanates. This usually 
happens with the purpose of producing a holistic cosmological statement. For 
example through a ritual that metonymically unites a specific animal and a specific 
human being the participants of the ritual may acquire an image of the two underlying 
domains themselves being ontologically blended. 
 
MULTIMEDIAPLEXES AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN A CONTINUOUS WORLD 
It is unfortunate that the imagery-based approach has long been unduly restricted to the 
study of linguistic phenomena. Image schemas can be found in a great many different 
symbolic media. I brought together ample evidence from anthropology showing that ritual 
action, habitus, dance, and music operate on the basis of the same kind of mental imagery 
as speech. Altogether, I discussed at least six cognitive media in which image schemas can 
be imagined or directly perceived as meaning-carrying devices: 
(1) Structures inherent in states of bodily proprioception;  
(2) Structures of natural objects, artifacts, and pictorial representations; 
(3) Structures of natural events and human actions; 
(4) Formal features of the symbolic medium in language or music; 
(5) Mental scenes evoked through words or gestural symbols; 
(6) Phonologically or musically evoked image schemas. 
 
Among these each kind of analog cognitive structure can be mapped onto any other by virtue 
of image-schematic similarities. The regular way in which the mind performs projections 
between modes suggests a strong continuity of cognition. While this hypothesis is most 
significant in itself, it entails an even more important conclusion: Frequently, especially in 
ritual or modern media events, various symbolic media interact with one another, either for 
the purpose of reinforcing a core-image or for producing other effects such as irony. The 
conglomerates of meaning arising from such a process I called image-schematic 
multimediaplexes.  
    My sketch of multimediaplexes bears not only on the subject matter itself, but in further 
consequence on how academia is carved up into disciplines. Most importantly, the continuity 
and interspersing of cognitive media in culture carries strong methodological implications for 
future linguistics, discourse studies, and cognitive ethnography. It quite plainly points to an 
interdisciplinary agenda. By consequence, the now often heard rallying cry for the integration 
of academic disciplines around cognitive theory and its multiple methodology invites 
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choosing imagery theory as a major point of assembly. The genius of the imagery approach 
lies in the fact that it explains language with reference to general mental operations not 
specific to language. For uniting disciplines in a common cognitive endeavor the approach is 
full of promise, though the existing potential has not yet been exploited to its fullest. To this 
effect, Hill and Mannheim (1992: 394) criticize the prevailing ‘linguacentrism’ in cognitive 
linguistics, a criticism also voiced by Palmer (1996: 140). I agree that a cognitive linguistics 
without cultural pragmatics or without a focus on non-verbal evidence for cultural schemas is 
of restricted value. At present, the most promising integrative steps come from the analysis 
of pictorial metaphor, sign language, and gestures. Deplorably, everyday artifacts, event 
structures, habitus, or proprioceptive knowledge have not been given nearly the same 
amount of attention. Cultural anthropology affords a counterbalance here. Its genius lies in 
the fact that it has – at its best – always pursued a multi-level approach spanning material 
objects, ritual and action, the body, and language, even though it is slower in embracing 
cognitive theory and carrying it into fieldwork. An integrative agenda between language, 
culture, and cognition has been given expression in Palmer’s praiseworthy programmatic call 
for a ‘cultural linguistics’, but also by more typical cultural anthropologists such as Díaz de 
Rada and Cruces (1994: 116), who point out that language and other sources of meaning 
are continuous in social practice, with the consequence that “practical experience cannot be 
easily labeled as ‘extra-’ or ‘prelinguistic’ (or, consequently as ‘merely linguistic’ either)“. 
    For all these reasons, the imagistic approach to multimedia cognition permits no other 
conclusion than the increased adoption of transdisciplinary research designs. One the one 
hand, more joint work by ethnographers and linguistic fieldworkers needs to be conducted in 
the future, while on the other hand each discipline should broaden its purview along the 
following lines:  
(1) Most generally, anthropologists can benefit from the fairly consistent terminology 
supplied by cognitive linguistics and from its method of systematic metaphor analysis. 
Ethnographers are called upon to make use of (and cross-check with) existing studies 
on cultural schemas and metaphors gained through interview-based cognitive 
methods, or, if their research design permits it, to conduct systematic interviews 
themselves. A particular challenge for cognitive anthropology is to focus on body 
knowledge more than in the past. It should systematize its interpretive skills through 
an applying metaphor and schema analysis as a method of tracing proprioceptive 
knowledge structures (perhaps the most hidden and elusive image-schematic 
medium). What we know about the acquisition of universal structures of bodily 
meaning (cf. Johnson 1987) comes in as a useful theoretical backdrop here. 
Ethnographers should also take to a more systematic examination of image-
schematic structures in human actions. This means that they should develop forms of 
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on-line notation for complex actional patterns or perhaps use film and computerized 
methods of analysis, as ethologists now already do in the study of gestures or 
habitus. Finally, with respect to the theoretical foundations in the study of culture, 
ethnographers of ritual, dance, music, or everyday behavior should increasingly use 
the powerful apparatus of imagery theory to express and specify their findings in a 
terminology compatible with cognitive theory. 
(2) Linguists, on the other hand, should extend their more typical research focus on 
semantics in at least three directions, mainly situated in pragmatics: First, it seems 
recommendable to go beyond corpus-based cognitive studies of language, because 
some domain-specific aspects and most pragmatic variations will not be captured 
otherwise. Next, linguists should extend their methodological scope to include 
‘megametaphors’ and other large-scale image schemas in narrative. This will in turn 
require developing methods for tracing how large- and small-scale cues intermesh in 
cognition in the act of reading or listening. Finally, going beyond the study of 
language proper, cognitive linguists and pragmaticists of all shades should express a 
systematic interest in research on gestures, habitus, artifacts, emblems, body 
feelings, and action structures. For example, they should adopt techniques of locating 
features in social action that iconically replicate either language form or semantic 
imagery. Especially the study of implicit social ideology, an agenda that many 
linguists pursue today, requires a broad recognition of various mediational structures 
in discourse and an analysis of how these interact (as exemplified in Scollon’s 2001 
‘mediated discourse analysis’).  
 
CODA 
At the end of our journey, what is the upshot for the general study of culture? My most 
fundamental conclusion is that, because image schemas occur as multimediaplexes in most 
real-life situations, we must adopt a diversified methodology. Although ethnographers have 
always been following an inclusive approach to meaning, what has by and large been absent 
from their work is the integration of the various studied symbolic levels within a 
comprehensive theory of bodily and mental meanings that is rooted in the cognitive sciences. 
In its totality, the approach to schemas and metaphors laid out in the present work, then, 
attempts to bridge the gap between ‘linguacentrism’ in cognitive linguistics and the relative 
scantiness of cognitive theory in anthropology. I hope that my study breaks some new 
ground in explaining where and how disciplines can work together. The notion of the dynamic 
and multi-modal image schema forms a common ground that explains in cognitive terms how 
the mind integrates the subject matter of various disciplines. Since a variety of symbolic 
modes operate in a single medium here, researchers from diverse fields trading in meaning 
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should take this as a serious clue where their approaches meet and through which 
theoretical instruments they can communicate. This includes the following fields or branches 
of the same: literary studies, theater studies, media studies, dance, history, sociology, 
political theory, theoretical linguistics, the diverse philological sub-disciplines, anthropology, 
ethology, archeology, psychology, philosophy, theology, or therapy. 
    All said and told, my plea is that we cannot afford to overlook the tremendous potential for 
a more unified cognitive theory of cultural representations and for a transdisciplinary 
rapprochement that the imagery approach to schemas and metaphors holds in store. Today 
the often voiced “I can respect what the others do, but it is simply not the business of my 
discipline” runs the risk of cementing divisions long obsolete under the cognitive paradigm. 
Only if image schema theory is taken seriously as a cultural, multi-modal, embodied, 
situated, and multimedial endeavor we can reap its full promise. If, however, a genuinely 
interdisciplinary imagery approach manages to establish itself as a point of crystallization 
(perhaps in tandem with the now spectacularly rising and theoretically complementary theory 
of blends), we can expect a lasting boost to the cognitive social sciences and, with it, a 
betterment of their recognition-factor alongside with the natural sciences working with the 
cognitive paradigm. 
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